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ABSTRACT
In short, the study proposes that farming in a 
marginal rain-fed environment such as that of the 
Northeast Region of Thailand presents special problems for 
the intensification of production, and that government 
policies should take account of these problems.
The thesis is based on fieldwork conducted in ctwo 
villages in the province of Mahasarakham, Northeastern 
Thailand, during the period September 1982 to June 1983. 
The villages were both farming communities in which 
households grew rain-fed wet-rice to meet their 
subsistence requirements, and upland cash crops 
(principally cassava) to supplement their income. A 
detailed questionnaire was conducted among approximately a 
fifth of the population.
The work involves an analysis of farmers1 practices 
vis a vis rice and upland cropping and contrasts them with 
the government recommendations. There were significant 
disparities between the two and these have been explained 
from the perspective of the farmer, rather than that of 
the extension office. The outcome is that many government 
initiatives are shown to be less than relevant to the 
position in which the farmer finds himself.
This fact - that the government recommendations are 
often irrelevant to the inhabitants - is then expanded 
upon to reveal some of the problems of intensifying 
agricultural production in a marginal environment where 
the risks are great. The strategy that the farmers 
adopted appeared to consist of two contrasting, although 
not contradictory,- elements: firstly, a great specificity
of response to varying edaphic and topographic conditions; 
and secondly, an emphasis on flexibility of response to 
the variable climate. Both elements combine to stabilise 
production or minimise risk.
The resulting limited opportunities for investment in 
agriculture forced farmers to look for a large proportion 
of their cash income outside rice and upland crop 
cultivation. This was accentuated by the ever-increasing 
pressure on farmers to have a greater disposable income, 
and emphasises the importance of diversifying the farm 
economy and presenting farmers with opportunities outside 
agriculture.
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Glossary of Thai Terms
Amphoe District
Baht Unit of Thai Currency
Bhikkhus Monks
Bor hok Sixth year of education
Bor kaew Kenaf
Bor krajaaw Jute
Bor Fibre crops
Bor sii Fourth year of education
Chaaw naa Farmers
Changwat Province
Din juut Exhausted soil
Parang Foreigner
Kamnan Village headman chosen to be head
of the commune
Kanom Sweets
Kaset Amphoe District Agricultural Extension Office
Khaaw bao 'Light' rice
Khaaw jaaw Non-Glutinous rice
Khaaw nak 'Heavy' rice
Khaaw niaw Glutinous rice
Khaay suan To sell a crop unharvested (green)
Khon Klaang Middleman
Khwaay Buffalo
Klum Group
Klum kasetakorn Farmers Association
Lam (Chi) River (Chi)
Long Khaek Reciprocal labour exchange
Mae Baan The female head of a household
Man Cassava
Man sampalang Cassava
Muubaan/Baan Village
Muu thii sii Village number four (in a tambon)
Ngaan Measurement of land (0.25 rai)
Phan phuan baan Local or village variety of a crop
Phor Baan Male head of a household
Phuan baan Ne ighbour
Phuu yay baan Village headman
Ra i Measurement of land (0.4 of an acre)
Sahakon Cooperative
Sahakon muu Pig Cooperative
Sangha Buddhist monkhood
Sanuk 'Fun'
Satanii Phukh Rai Upland Crop Station
Sataang Unit of Thai Currency (100=1 Baht)
Tambon Commune of villages
Tang Measurement of paddy weighing about
ten kilograms
Tham naa Rice farming
Thii lum Lower riceland
Thii naa Riceland
Thii raap Middle riceland
Thii dorn Upper riceland
Thii prang Irrigated riceland
Thii rai Upland
Thua faak yaaw Yard long beans
Wat Temple
Wua Cattle
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1 baht =
100 sataang =
1 rai =
1 ngaan =
1 tang =
Conversion Table
US$ 0.045 (average banknote dollar 
exchange rate between Oct 1982 & 
March 1983)
1 baht
1/600 square metres (0.4 acre)
400 square metres (0.25 rai)
20 litres (= 10 kilograms of paddy)
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Abbreviations
ALRO Agricultural Land Reform Office
ARD Accelerated Rural Development
BAAC Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives
CBIRD Community Based Integrated Rural
Development Project
CDD Community Development Department
ISO International Sugar Organisation
MOPH Ministry of Public Health
NESDB National Economic and Social Development 
Board
PDA Population and Community Development
Association
TDP Tambon Development Programme
"For nitrates are not the land , nor phosphates; and the 
length of fibre in the. cotton is not the land. Carbon is 
not a man/ nor salt nor water nor calcium. He is all of 
these, but he is much more, much more; and the land is so 
much more than its analysis. The man who is more than his 
chemistry, walking on the earth, turning his ploughpoint 
for a stone, dropping his handles to slide over an 
outcropping, kneeling in the earth to eat his lunch; that 
man who is more than his elements knows the land that is 
more than its analysis." [John Steinbeck, 'The Grapes of 
Wrath',1939, p 124]
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Chapter One 
Introduction, Theory and Aims
The Northeastern Region of Thailand; A Marginal 
Environment
The Northeastern Region of Thailand (Map 1.1) has,
for many years, been characterised as a harsh land lying
at the edge of the kingdom both in terms of communications
and in terms of the Thai conciousness [1]. This is clear
from early accounts:
"Communications [in the Northeast] are, on the 
whole, worse than in any other part of the 
country. Distances without water in the hot 
season almost impossible to man and beast, bogs 
and unbridged torrents in the rain, no salas, or 
rest houses, along the trails, dacoity not yet 
put down, and the least possible recognition of 
the importance of encouraging trade: such are
some of the causes of the lethargy of the people 
- attributable, first of all, as I think, to the 
nature of the country, and secondly to the 
incompetence and lack of interest of the 
official class" (Warrington-smyth,1896; quoted 
in Donner,1979,p 631).
"It is certainly no surprising fact that under 
such unfavourable circumstances the inhabitants 
[of the Northeast] are poor and backward 
compared with the Siamese of Lower Siam" 
(Carter, 1904, p 54).
"A population of some million and a quarter,
Lao, Siamese and Kambodian, about 20 people to 
the square mile inhabit this inhospitable land, 
wresting from the reluctant soil crops barely
sufficient to maintain an existence [this
region] is one of the most miserable imaginable" 
(Graham,1924).
"Communications except where the railroad is 
built and along the river leading through Roi Et 
to Ubol is [sic] almost totally lacking. (A part 
of the season this river is navigable almost to 
Khonkaen)." (Zimmerman,1931,p 294).
[1] In the thesis, the Northeastern region of Thailand 
will also be referred to as the 'Khorat plateau', the 
'Isan region' or, simply, just the 'Northeast'.
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Map 1.1 The Northeastern Region of Thailand
Until the post-war period the bulk of the inhabitants
of the Xsan plateau were subsistence glutinous wet-rice
cultivators with little knowledge or contact with the
world beyond their villages. This dramatically changed
with the rapid development of communications in the 1950's
and 60's and led directly to a spread in cash cropping.
Farmers who previously had no means or desire to earn a
cash income were presented with both and began to turn
their uncultivated upland over to such crops as maize,
kenaf and later cassava. However, this revolution in the
cropping pattern did nothing to change people's assessment
of the region as an area where physical factors impose
severe constraints on farming; and to find more detailed
references regarding the nature and influence of the
environment one need look no further than the multitude of
development reports. For example:
"Most of the soils are strongly weathered and 
leached alluvial or sandy soils, low in 
fertility and moderately to poorly suitable for 
cropping. Many areas are suitable only for 
forest, others are better suited for pasture 
than for arable farming. The soils are 
generally poor in plant nutrients, particularly 
in nitrogen and phosphate...The rainfall varies 
from place to place and from year to year. .. in 
areas where no irrigation is possible the crop 
growing period is restricted to the wet season.
Even in this period the irregularity of the 
rainfall constitutes a great risk to the farmer, 
resulting in little willingness on their part to 
spend money on agricultural inputs, particularly 
when profit margins are small" (IBRD,Nov 1974,pp 
11-12).
Until the last decade or so increases in population 
in Northeast Thailand have been accommodated through an 
expansion of the area under cultivation. This means that
although paddy production has increased, there has been no
25
necessity to increase production per unit area and indeed/ 
yields have decreased as more marginal land has been 
brought into use. Today however/ the limits of farmland 
expansion have been reached and the only means by which a 
greater agricultural population can be supported is 
through the intensification of land use [1]. This hiatus 
is in some respects a conceptual one as different 
changwats/ and different areas of changwats have obviously 
reached the point of saturation at varying times/ and 
there are certainly some areas where a modicum of 
expansion is still occurring. Even sof this idea of a 
move from an expansionist strategy to one of 
intensification is broadly accurate and is crucial/ as 
farmers have to change from an approach to cultivation in 
which the production methods are kept within the 
boundaries of the environment to one where the limits of 
the environment are being pressed upon or even exceeded 
[2], The consequence of this/ ecologically, is that the 
system moves from inherent stability where negative 
feedback flows tend to maintain an equilibrium, to 
instability.
The "limits of the environment" though need not be 
static and modern farming methods are founded on the basis 
of pushing the margins further and further outwards. For 
example; irrigation can negate the effects of a variable
[1] An alternative strategy would, of course, be to 
diversify the economic base of the region and to stimulate 
industrial growth.
[2] An example of the limits being exceeded is 
over-cropping where the soil nutrient content is gradually 
depleted until, eventually, it becomes sterile.
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or insufficient rainfall; fertilisers can improve the 
limits set on yields by the fertility of the soil; and 
green houses or under-soil heating can eliminate the 
problem of dangerously low temperatures. But/ it is 
important to realise two points connected with the 
manipulation of the limits set by the environment: 
firstly; not all locations are equally suited to such 
inputs and secondly, Liebig's 'Law of the Minimum' always 
applies [1]. In addition, as a result of the efforts made 
to overcome the influence of the environment (which tend 
to involve an investment) the economic and the physical 
risks increase. The economic risks increase because 
investment increases. The physical risks are amplified 
because, for example, high yielding varieties of rice are 
often more suceptible to pest attack and climatic 
variations,and yields tend to show greater instability. 
Invariably, this change in the level of risk is due to a 
move from a subsistence farming strategy where farmers 
"risk minimise" to a commercial one where the objective is 
the maximisation of profit (though, in fact there is a 
spectrum of points between the two extremes). How does 
all this apply to the Northeastern region?
The inability of farmers in the Northeast to control 
water supply is usually identified as the principal 
constraint restricting the intensification of wet rice 
production (Ng,1970,p 39). Unfortunately, irrigation
which would solve this problem has not, and cannot be,
[1] This states that the constraining factor is the 
resource in shortest supply.
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developed to any degree because the nature of the 
topography of the plateau (undulating and fragmented) 
prevents the construction, in most areas, of any 
large-scale schemes. At the present time only 6% of the 
cultivated land is irrigated (MOAG,1981,tables 84 & 90,pp 
153 & 168) while the maximum irrigable area is estimated 
to be only 11.5% (Sanan Chantkam,Oct 1981,table l,p 4) 
leaving the great majority of farmers still operating in 
rain-fed conditions. The use of high yielding varieties 
of rice, chemical fertilisers and pesticides is similarly 
low: it was estimated in 1973 that HYV's were planted
over less than 1% of the paddy area of the region 
(Framingham,1982,p 32) - and the figure certainly remains 
considerably below 10% (12% of nation's riceland is
currently planted to 'official release varieties' and the
figure for the Northeast would be far less - US 
Presidential Mission,April 1982,p 7); while the rate of 
application of chemical fertilisers recorded in the 1978 
agricultural census averaged a mere 4.7 kg per rai
(NS0[1],n.d.,pp 24 & 86) - one of the lowest rates in all
of Southeast Asia (see: Table 2.11).
The dilemma facing the farmers of the Isan region is 
therefore clear: they are now presented with the need,
which is becoming increasingly severe, to intensify their 
production and hence to intensify their production 
techniques. But, the two main avenues by which this is 
traditionally done - irrigation and the use of modern farm 
inputs - are unavailable to them in the first case, or 
remain underutilised by them in the second. It is this 
second question; why are farmers loath to use new farm 
inputs to increase their yields, which is one that will be
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investigated in this thesis.
But rice cultivation, although still the mainstay of 
farming in the region, is not the whole story, for many 
farmers have turned to growing upland crops in order to 
provide themselves with a cash income. Here the level of 
investment, in terms of inputs, is considerably lower even 
than that on rice and as a consequence of overcropping 
many areas are experiencing severe problems of erosion 
which have, in some cases, led to land being abandoned. It 
could be that the reasons for the low level of investment 
mirror those for rice - although it should be remembered 
that from the farmers standpoint the two 'crop types' are 
fundamentally different as one is a cash crop and the 
other a subsistence crop.
Another crisis, of a different nature, facing those 
farmers who cultivate upland crops concerns finding an 
alternative to cassava, which is at present easily the 
most important cash crop grown in the region [1]. For 92% 
of the cassava grown is exported to the European Economic 
Community (Business Review,March 1983,p 61) which in 1981 
imposed a quota of increasing severity on the level of 
imports from Thailand (Thailand Business,May 1982,pp 
30-31). This has led to a concerted effort by the Thai 
government (with aid totalling US$ 35 million from the EEC 
- Financial Times,August 7,1984) to encourage farmers to 
grow other cash crops such as mungbean, soybean, groundnut 
and sorghum, and to find alternative markets to Europe
[1] In 1980 cassava accounted for almost 49% of the area 
planted to "field crops" (MOAC,1981,tables 23 & 88,pp 26 & 
160).
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and alternative uses to animal feed [1]. To date these 
efforts have been singularly unsucessful and despite a 
fall in the price of the crop the production for 1984 is 
estimated to be approximately 20 million tons (Financial 
Times,7 August,1984), 21% higher than that of the 1980/81 
season (MOAC,1981,table 23,pp 26-31).
It may appear from the preceeding pages that the 
actions of the farmers of the Northeast are largely 
determined by the nature of the environment in that 
region. This would inevitably be an extremely one-sided 
argument for reports concerning the agriculture of the 
Isan plateau have identified a multitude of constraints 
influencing farmers in their decision making [2], Part of 
the problem is that the nature of western-orientated 
research reduces what is in fact a single system (the farm
[1] "The Thais are looking to countries like South Korea, 
Japan, Taiwan, the Soviet Union and even countries in 
Africa for fresh outlets. None yet offers an alternative 
remotely comparable to the EEC. Unlike the EEC some of
these countries also subject tapioca and other grains to 
similar tariffs. As tapioca is a carbohydrate which 
typically has to be mixed with other grains to create a 
suitable protein feed there is little incentive to import 
this commodity rather than others.
Alternative uses for tapioca offer few grounds for 
optimism. The market for tapioca flour is limited and the 
cost of conversion into alcohol too high. Mr Sukit (the 
president of the Thai Tapioca Trade Association) said 
recently in a local newspaper interview 'the problem is, 
tapioca really can't be used for anything but animal feed, 
so if we can't sell it there is little we can do with it' 
" (Financial Times,Aug 7,1984).
[2] For example: limited labour - Moerman (1968), Mizuno
(1978); limited income - Completion Report (1980);
cultural constraints - Pendleton (1962), Rubin (1974);
economic restrictions - Muscat (1966), Jacobs (1971);
historical factors - Keyes (1967).
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system) into a number of independent academic disciplines. 
This means that researchers often indentify what appear to 
be principal moving forces without looking beyond their 
particular field of study. The need for a 
multi-disciplinary approach to research in the 
Northeastern Region as the best means of arriving at a 
balanced appreciation of the various forces at work is 
noted in the most recent detailed assessment of Thai 
agriculture:
"Multidisciplinary approaches and feedback 
systems will hasten answers to farmers problems.
The team observed that the Thai agricultural 
extension and research systems are quite rigidly 
organised by disciplines. Farmers problems cut 
across discipline lines" (Executive Summary,US 
Presidential Mission,1982; quoted in The Nation 
Review,March 3,1983,p 5).
Determinist analysis is a problem that most 
disciplines have encountered, and will continue to 
encounter. It probably derives from a desire to find a 
single simple explanation for any phenomenon which will 
apply whatever the circumstances. As most phenomena are 
the product of complex interactions between forces (which 
may result in cases of equifinality) it is extremely 
dubious if this, at least in the social sciences, is ever 
possible.
In geography, it is probably when the discipline has 
attempted to explain occurrences which involve the 
interaction of man and his environment that the problem 
has become most tortuous; for it is here that the 
socio-cultural, economic and physical clash. The 
development of this area of geographic thought illustrates 
this.
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Theory: The Development of the Study of Man and 
his Environment
Although generalisations about the development of
Western thought are necessarily incomplete simplifications
of what really occurred they are occasionally useful in
determining the broad path that has been taken (see
Gellner, 1964). Thus Darwin's 'Origin of Species'
published in 1859/ coming as it does at the end of a
succession of works tending towards the same ends (eg:
Malthus,1798; Lyell, 1830 & 1832) can be seen to be the
culmination of a trend which changed the way man viewed
himself and the world about him. Using a stringent
scientific method of analysis (often termed the
hypothetic-deductive method) Darwin's treatise emphasised
nature's laws and the role of causality and placed man's
evolution within the limits of the environment ('survival
of the fittest') [1]. As Stoddart has observed:
"Darwin established a sphere of scientific 
enquiry free from a priori theological ideas/ 
and freed natural science from the arguments of 
natural theology... by empirical argument and 
inductive method, [he] thus dismissed teleology 
as a live issue in scientific
explanation...furthermore [he] sealed the 
acceptance of uniformitarianis m and law in 
science...and finally, and in this he was alone, 
Darwin established man's place in nature, both 
in Huxley's sense and in Haeckel's, and in so 
doing made man a fit object for scientific 
study" (Stoddart,Dec 1966,pp 697-698).
r
Geography, not suprismgly, adopted the
hypothetic-deductive method of analysis and embraced the 
Determinist Darwinian view of struggle and survival. 
Ratzel's "Anthropogeography" of 1882 was the first
[1] Although it was only later in "The Descent of Man" 
(1871) that Darwin really investigated the evolution of 
Homo sapiens (Burrows,1968,p 41).
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geographical product of this new era (Ratzel,1882). It 
stressed the extent to which man lives under nature's laws 
and regarded culture as being moulded and determined by 
natural conditions [1]. As a product of this general mood 
of intellectual thought at the turn of the twentieth 
century a number of geographers, especially in America, 
took Ratzel's lead and fostered the study of Environmental 
Determinism (eg; Ellen Semple, W.M. Davis, Ellsworth 
Huntington). Human geography became defined, "as the 
study of the nature and distribution of the relationships 
between the geographical environment and human activities 
and qualities (Huntington & Cushing,1934,p 1). H.H. 
Barrows, in 1923, refined this idea slightly and stated 
that geography was "human ecology". By this he meant that 
geography should play a role in which it makes clear the 
relationships existing between man and his natural 
environment (Schnore,1961,p 209).
However, environmental determinism quickly fell out 
of favour the trend arising in the discipline of 
anthropology in the early 1900's. Boas, Kroeber, Forde 
and others all objected to the deductive evolutionary 
approach and believed that socio-cultural phenomena could 
only be understood in the light of other socio-cultural 
phenomena with environmental factors, at best, playing
[1] In his later, and arguably greater work, the second 
volume of Anthropogeography (1891), Ratzel modified his 
ideas to look not only at the physical influences on man, 
but also at the historical and socio-cultural influences 
(Holt-Jensen,1980,p 25).
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only a secondary role [1] (Forde,1934;Kroeber,1952 & 
1969;Boas,1896 & 1932;Vayda,1969). Vidal de la Blanche
was the first geographer [2] to criticise environmental 
determinism recognising that man's social milieu cannot be 
set in opposition to the physical environment, with one 
dominating the other (Holt-Jensen,1980,p 27). As 
Hollingshead recognised, there is a difference between "an 
ecological order (which) is primarily rooted in 
competition" (ie; Darwinian) and, "social organisation 
(which) has evolved out of communication" 
(Hollingshead,1940; quoted in Steward,1972,p 122). The 
result of these objections was the birth of environmental 
possibilism in which there are no necessities regarding 
the way the environment moulds man, only possibilities 
(Febvre,1925,p 171),
The French historian Febvre coined the term 
'possibilism' in 1922 (Febvre,1925) and European
geographers were quick to adopt the approach (Vidal de la 
Blanche, Alfred Hettner, Jean Brunhes). However, possibly
[1] Eg; "...social practices of great consequence are 
relatively indifferent to the physical environment" 
(Forde,1934,p 6).
"The principle of cultural relativism has long been 
standard anthropological doctrine. It holds that any 
cultural phenomenon must be understood and evaluated in 
terms of the culture of which it forms a part" 
(Kroeber,1952,p 6).
[2] Anthropology and geography have had a history of 
opposition when it comes to the debate as to what extent 
the environment has an influence on man's development. 
However, much of the debate has been from afar; as 
Grossman observes, "geography and anthropology have many 
common problems and interests, but effective communication 
between the practioners of the two disciplines has been 
hindered by their insularity and traditional disciplinary 
concerns" (Grossman,March 1977,p 126).
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the best-known advocate of possibilism/ at least in the
English-speaking world was the American Carl Sauer. He/
along with others/ did not deny the importance of the
natural environment in influencing man's actions but
emphasised that man was not inexorably dragged along any
particular path. Thus, "the cultural landscape is
fashioned from a natural landscape by a culture group.
Culture is the agent/ the natural area is the medium/ the
cultural landscape the result" (Sauer,1963,p 343). Sauer
was particularly scornful of environmentalists who/ as he
saw it/ attempted to reduce geography to a mechanistic
discipline concerned with biophysics and human tropisms:
"Geography under the banner of environmentalism 
represents a dogma/ the assertion of a faith 
that brings rest to a spirit vexed by the riddle 
of the universe...what man does in a area
because of tabu or totemism or because of his 
own will involves use of environment rather than 
the active agency of the environment. It would/ 
therefore, appear that environmentalism has been 
shooting neither at cause nor at effect, but 
rather that it is bagging its own decoys"
(Sauer,1963,pp 348-349).
The development of geographic thought with regard to 
the man/environment debate may appear, from the preceeding 
pages, to have followed an evolutionary course in which a 
series of revolutions have rejected one paradigm for 
another. It would be wrong to see the situation as quite 
this simple (as Kuhn himself would recognise - see 
Kuhn,1962,chapter 12,pp 143-158) and it is probably more 
accurate to view geography upto 1970 as a dual (or even 
multi) paradigmatic discipline (Harvey & Holly,1981,pp 
30-33) in which the determinism of Ratzel and the 
possibilism of Vidal de la Blanche co-existed with both
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having its share of disciples [1].
However, during the 1960's and 1970's there was a 
remarkable change in geographic thought as it turned 
increasingly towards positivism. The essence of this 
change was that the ideographic approach to geography (eg; 
in Hartshorne's 'The Nature of Geography*, 1939) which 
’emphasised the uniqueness of phenomena was replaced by a 
nomological approach which aimed to stress their 
similarities through generalisations (eg; Ghorley & 
Haggett's 'Models in Gegraphy', 1967; and Harvey's 
'Explanation in Geography', 1969). This so-called 
logical-empiricist approach with its deductive-nomological 
model of scientific explanation and hypothetic-deductive 
view of scientific thought (Paterson,1984,p 20) gradually 
became pre-eminent and human geography, like economics, 
began to use normative models in which man was assumed to 
be rational. Thus; "To Harvey, the role of models in 
scientific investigation was to formalise a theory, using 
the tools of logic, set theory and mathematics, and to set 
out a theory's assumptions and hypotheses in a logical 
framework so as to eliminate any possible inconsistencies" 
(Paterson,1984,p 27).
The initial criticisms of the 'new geography' were, 
"directed against its philosophical, methodological and 
theoretical bases. By its very nature positivism is 
concerned with aggregate patterns, with the explanation
[1] The ideas presented in the first edition of Ratzel's 
'Anthropogeography' were elaborated by such scholars as 
Huntington, Semple and Davis. Vidal de la Blanche's work 
meanwhile was adopted by geographers such as Sauer.
36
and prediction of spatial patterns. In these ventures man
is portrayed as rational, and his spatial behaviour as
reflections of an organism that follows spatial strategies
which maximise some subjective utility function" (Harvey
and Holly,1981,p 33). The use of models, laws and methods
taken largely from the physical sciences were seen to be
inappropriate to the demands of human geography as they
were thought to be of "little value in the explanation of
real-world human geographical activity" (Bunting & Guelke,
Sept 1979,p 4 ). The reasons for this are made clear in
Guelke's paper of 1974 in which he argues for an 'idealist
alternative' to positivism.
"The idea that human geographers ought to 
attempt to emulate physical scientists in search 
of theory overlooks the fact that man himself is 
a theoretical animal whose actions are based on 
the theoretical understanding of his situation.
As man's theoretical ideas change, so will his 
behaviour. Any attempt to describe human 
behaviour in theoretical terms seems doomed" 
(Guelke,June 1974,p 202).
At around the same time that positivism was 
establishing itself as geography's new paradigm, 
geographers and anthropologists began to explore two new 
concepts: the ecosystem and general systems theory. Both
of these avenues of thought follow on from, and are a part 
product of, the determinist/possibilist/probabalist debate 
in which it was finally accepted that a more flexible and 
comprehensive method of examining man's role in nature was 
needed. But in addition to this there was a further 
stimulus to the rise of the 'system' as a framework for 
geographical analysis, and that concerned a general 
dissatisfaction with the manner in which the discipline
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had searched for a 'professional identity' (Ackerman/Dec
1963/p 431). Ackerman in his important paper of 1963,
'Where is a Research Frontier'/ felt that geography had
taken a course which had led it away from the mainstream
of scientific thought, leaving it in a wilderness of
intellectual independence and isolation:
"In our desire to make our declaration of 
independence viable, we neglected to maintain a 
view of the advancing front of science as a 
whole. We acted as though we did not believe 
more than the broadest generalities about the 
universality of scientific method. In effect we 
neglected to appraise continuously the most 
profound current of change in our time. We 
neglected an axiom: The course of science as a
whole determines the progress of its parts, in 
their greater or lesser degrees" (Ackerman,Dec 
1963,p 432).
Ackerman went on to argue that the discipline should
return to the objective of problem solving and the study
of human ecology (Ackerman,Dec 1963,pp 434-436). His
observations led a number of geographers (eg? Eyre &
Jones,1966,pp 1-29) to reaffirm the belief that the
discipline should concern itself with, "the mutual
relations between man and his natural environment"
(Barrows,1923,p 3) and many of these pointed to the system
as the best means by which the division between the human
and the physical aspects of geography could be overcome
and a wide range of interactions be examined:
"We could suggest that geographical thinking 
would profit considerably from the adoption of 
the ecologic rather than the physiographic point 
of view. The physiographic element in 
geography, slopes and microclimate, are truly 
environmental and are independent of, though 
influencing, biological phenomena in general, 
and man in particular. Thus they logically 
constitute a separate and distinct physical 
geography, for, if it be conceded that man is an 
essential element in geography, then interest
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logically should center on the biological 
relationship rather than on the physical one, 
for it is mainly through the biological 
relationship that any major link between man and 
land must be established" (Morgan & Moss,June 
1965,p 350).
The Development of the Systems Approach in Geography
Despite isolated calls from geographers such as Sauer
('The Morphology of Landscape') and Barrows ('The
Geography of Human Ecology') the development of the study
of the relationships between man and environment - both in
geography and in anthropology - was delayed. The
strictures of the environmental determinism of Semple and
Davis, and the possibilism of Boas and Kroeber; the
growing popularity of the spatial approach (positivism);
and the continued division of geography into its human and
physical halves [1] all tended to prevent any progression
(Grossman,1977,p 131). It was not until the mid 1950's
when, in anthropology, the first coherent product of the
growing dissatisfaction with the state of man/environment
studies led to the development of 'Cultural Ecology'. As
Netting explains:
"Chiefly it was the experience of fieldwork that 
convinced younger anthropologists that the 
processes of human adaptation to the environment 
had been undervalued and that sound empirical 
data, some of them quantifiable, were available 
to document wide-ranging and systematic 
ecological relationships. The excitement was not 
that of over-throwing old ideas, but of putting 
them in a more inclusive context. Functionalism
[1] "...human and physical geographers began to drift 
apart in the 1930 *s and were almost totally separated in 
the 1940's and 1950's. The conception of geography as a 
brodge between the natural and social sciences was still 
proclaimed in some text books, but was seldom evident in 
research" (Mikesell,1974,p 4).
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was extended beyond the social sphere, 
structural arrangements were seen to have
adaptive value in organisation for defence and 
production, cultural attitudes showed selective 
advantages in promoting subsistence success.
The ability of another set of facts to make
sense of what is already known by pointing out 
further order and meaning is, after all, at the 
heart of scientific endevor" (Netting,1977,p 6).
The terms of reference for cultural ecology were
provided by Steward (Steward,1955) and the approach
differs from social and human ecology [1] in that it does
not attempt to pre-determine a moving force in the
nature/nurture debate. Instead Steward maintained that an
attempt should be made to isolate those parts of culture
which are most closely linked to, and involved in, the
environment. These aspects of culture he termed the
"cultural core". Using this method the cleavage between
man and nature disappears, thereby dispensing with the
conceptual and often arbitrary division of the two. As
Geertz says; "One delineates, in short, an ecosystem
within which certain selected cultural, biological and
physical variables are determinally inter-related, and
which will yield to the same general mode of analysis as
ecosystems within which human organisms do not happen to
play a role" (Geertz, 1963,p 9). The result of the
[1] Hawley's 1950 work represents the clearest statement 
on social ecology ('Human ecology: A Theory of Community 
Structure'). Man is seen as reacting to the environment 
as a cultural rather than as a biological creature, and 
Hawley concludes that it is historical factors which are 
primarily responsible for man's behaviour (culture being 
seen as an historical facet), the environment never being 
causative. Steward criticises this view, just as the 
determinists had been criticised, for it promotes culture 
to the detriment of the environment (Steward,1972,pp 
123-124).
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approach is that one does not have to ask the question, 
"do habitat conditions (partly or completely) cause 
culture, or do they merely limit it", but instead ask, 
"given an ecosystem defined through the parallel 
discrimination of cultural core and relevent environment"; 
- how does it function? How is it organised? How stable 
is it? And how might it develop? (Geertz,1963,p 10).
By examining swidden cultivation in Indonesia in this 
way Geertz does not stress the negative aspects of the 
system (low intensity of cultivation, land inefficient) 
but instead looks at the way it is perfectly suited to the 
demands and constraints of the environment. It also 
manages to clarify and illuminate the functional 
differences (and the reasons for them) between wet-rice 
cultivation and shifting cultivation, which represent the 
two principal cultivation strategies in Indonesia 
(Geertz,1963).
However, Steward’s concept of the cultural core is 
flawed from a researcher's point of view in the sense that 
any analyst must pick those aspects of culture which he 
intuitively feels are most closely concerned with the 
environment. As the role of the environment, especially 
in the tropics, is only partially understood it would be 
likely that the delineation of the cultural core would be, 
to a degree, a false one. As well as producing this 
weighting the researcher is also making just the sort of 
division (albeit a less significant one) that the method 
of cultural ecology tries to avoid. Further, it is 
doubtful if any such thing as a "core" of culture actually
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exists for there must be a spectrum of cultural elements 
each of which is very slightly less (or more) integrated 
with the environment than the last. If all these features 
are included in the core "then the question arises as when 
a core becomes an entire cultural pattern, and the concept 
dissolves into mere tautology" (Ellen,1982,p 61).
However, the value of cultural ecology in clarifying 
the reasons for certain social phenomena is well 
illustrated in Harris' "The Cultural Ecology of India's 
Sacred Cattle" (Harris,1966). In this Harris investigates 
whether the Hindu doctrine of Ahimsa is really (as 
commonly presumed) a prime example, "of how men will 
diminish their material welfare to obtain spiritual 
satisfaction in obedience to non-rational or frankly 
irrational beliefs" (Harris,1966,p 51). Harris believes 
that not enough attention has been paid to the positive 
functioned features of the Hindu cattle complex such as 
traction, dung (fuel), milk and hide production, in 
relation to the costs of "ecologically viable 
alternatives" (p 59). Thus, he concludes: "The
probability that India's cattle complex is a positive 
functioned part of a naturally selected ecosystem is at 
least as good as that it is a negative functioned 
expression of an irrational ideology" (p 59) [1].
[1] Although it should be said that Bennet criticises 
Harris for, "applying a theoretical approach derived from 
studying highly integrated microecosystems to a complex 
human macrocosm with many subsystems and exceptions to the 
rules" (Bennet,1976,p 234).
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In geography, it was the physical side of the 
discipline that first looked to the concept of the 
ecosystem as a framework for analysis (eg? Chorley,1962,pp 
282-300). However, its broader relevance to geographical 
investigation [1] was quickly appreciated (Davies,1972,pp 
256-257), with a principal merit being that, "it (the 
ecosytem) focuses on the basic properties common to all 
systems: structure, function, equilibrium and change"
(Harris,1969, p 135). As Stoddart explained
(Stoddart,1972,pp 159-160), ecosystems are:
1/ Monistic. They bring man, plant, animal and 
environment into a single framework within which the 
components can be analysed thereby disposing of 
geographical dualism and with this the problems of
de terminism.
2/ Structured. "The essential fact here, for geography, 
is that once structures are recognised they may be
investigated and studied".
3/ They Function. They not only provide a framework for
study but also a dynamic one within which changes can be
measured (to an extent) and understood.
4/ They are General Systems [2] which tend towards a 
steady state and obey the laws of open-ended
thermo-dynamics. In addition they can be used at
different levels of complexity without affecting their 
integrity so that a researcher may adopt the scale which 
best fits his requirements.
Systems Analysis in Agricultural Geography
In agricultural geography as early as 1961 Blaut 
chose an ecological approach to try and define the role of
[1] Stoddart went so far as to state that, "ecPlogical 
concepts provide a research method which geography so 
sadly lacks" (Stoddart,1972,p 158).
[2] Note the link here to general systems theory. In many 
respects the division of "systems analysis" and 
"ecosystemstic analysis" is false because the ecosystem is 
a sub-set of the system.
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the environment in resource use in the tropics 
(Blaut,1961,pp 47-65), He felt that certain attitudes had 
led to a situation in which the analysis of the problem 
had become blurred (p 47):
1/ Framing man/environment relations into environmental 
"possibilities" and "restrictions".
2/ Hampering assumptions concerning the constraints of 
the environment as they operate in the tropics.
3/ Sloppy reasoning leading to problems concerning cause 
and effect. As he notes, "the environmental conditions 
can operate only in a cultural context which permits it to 
have an effect on the culture".
To overcome these Blaut proposed placing the three
distinguishable elements of resource use - environment (or
resources), motivation and behaviour - within an
ecological framework. In this way he hoped that the
geographers' tendency to overlook the influence of
behaviour and the anthropologists' of environment would be
overcome producing a view of the farm system which was
balanced in terms of culture, "behavioural environment"
(Kirk,1963,pp 357-371) and environment.
Since this early paper the use of the systems
approach in agricultural geography has developed into a
complex morass of methodologies and theories each
reflecting a different objective. This diversification
can be seen to be a product of the versatility of the
concept (the 'system' or 'ecosystem') which allows it to
be used to tackle a variety of problems. As Moss has
recently observed:
"On the broadest scale it serves as an 
organising principle for systematising diverse 
theoretical material. At another level it can 
be treated as an object of study in itself in 
order to develop specific theory of ecosystems.
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Then it can be used as a specific concept
defining a problem-solving approach. It can 
also be used as an empirical category denoting 
the visible expression of a specific set of 
ecological relationships. Then the term has 
been used in a much wider sense to denote almost 
any set of discernable relationships at the 
earth's surface" (Moss,1984,p 113).
Thus, within the agricultural literature it is 
possible to identify studies which take a fairly strict 
ecoigical line (eg: Bayliss-Smith, 'The Ecology of
Agricultural Systems', 1982, which highlights the flows of 
energy that link the farmer with his crops and animals), 
others which use the concept as an approach to problem 
solving (eg: Geertz, 'Agicultural Involution: The
Processes of Ecological Change in Indonesia*, 1963), and 
still others which use it to examine and to classify 
macro-level phenomena (eg: Duckham & Masefield,1970;
Grigg,1974; Ruthenberg,1980). It is arguable that the 
diversification of the approach is not only due to its
adaptability to a variety of uses but also because it is 
unacceptable to much of geography in its strict 
ecosystematic guise. Chorley recognised this in 1973 when 
he argued that unless the concept was stretched it had
little to offer contemporary geography (Chorley,1973,pp
162-167). Partly as a consequence, there has occurred the
development of what has been termed 'hard' and 'soft'
systems analysis. It is the latter which is often adopted 
when man is to be studied, for not only are social systems 
inherently different from natural ecosystems (the former 
are based on positive feedback mechanisms while the latter 
rely on homeostacy and negative feedback loops; Chorley in 
Taylor,1984,p 255) but inevitably when man is to be
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studied a degree of flexibility is always required [1]. 
Of the many forms that the systems approach in 
agricultural geography can take, it is Farming Systems 
Research which forms the broad framework for this study.
Farming Systems Research
The stimulus leading to the growth and development of 
farming systems research concerned the realisation that 
there was a need to have a framework of study which was 
structured so as to illuminate the nature of agriculture 
rather than to pursue any particular theoretical bent. 
The demands of, for example, the analysis of agricultural 
development requires that the total environment (both 
physical and socio-cultural) is reflected in the results 
and not just those aspects that are relevant to economics 
or to soil science or, for that matter to environmental 
determinism or possibilism. In this sense farming systems 
research is a product of an attempt to find solutions to a 
practical problem and its roots lie in the demands of 
fieldwork rather than in theory.
It should be clear that the methodology is not 
restricted to any one discipline but can range across 
agronomy, through geography, and on-to anthropology. In
[1] This applies to all disciplines, not just geography, 
which deal with social relations: "Much has been written
about systems and much overwritten. There is always that 
yearning for certainty in social science, a reaction to 
the vagueness of categories that depend, in the last 
analysis, on mental constructs of reality and not 
measureable reality itself - that search for hard 
categories filled with hard data, or for imposing rhetoric 
and terminology that seems so much better than "soft" 
language based on interpretation rather than consequence. 
Systems theory when applied to human affairs unfortunately 
often feeds these very human but also borderline 
authoritarian impulses..." (Bennett,1976,p 84).
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effect/ anything is relevant as long as it adds
information to the understanding of a farm system; and in
this sense it is multi- or inter-disciplinary. Although 
it is possible to assemble a group of experts
knowledgeable in each sphere (eg;KKU-Pord: 'An
Agroecosystem Analysis of Northeast Thailand', Aug 1982) 
this is usually impractical, and it is here that geography 
attains particular relevance to the approach. For, as a 
single discipline, it is geography which comes closest to 
being multi-disciplinary. Thus it is argued that not only 
should agricultural geography intimately concern itself 
with farming systems research (at least in its problem 
solving guise), but also that it is admirably suited to do 
so.
Norman and Gilbert see farming systems research as 
having a primary objective of, "improving the well-being 
of individual farm families by increasing the over-all
productivity of the farm system in the entire range of 
private and societal goals and given the constraints and 
potentials imposed by the technical and human elements 
which determine the existing farming systems" (Norman & 
Gilbert,1982,p 19). Two types of programme are 
identified: 'upstream' and 'downstream'. The former
involves using a systems approach on experimental stations 
to provide prototype solutions; while the latter aims at 
developing and introducing strategies that can be 
implemented as they stand, giving immediate results 
(Norman & Gilbert,1982,p 21).
'Downstream' farming systems research embodies four 
successive stages: description, design, testing and
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extension. It is the first of these - description - with
which the research is concerned. This diagnostic stage is
undertaken to "determine constraints/ needs and
flexibility in the current farming system" (Norman &
Gilbert,1982,p 23).
Although some very strict systems analyses adhere
closely to the rules that govern General Systems Theory it
is often thought that such an approach tells more about
the theory of systems rather than the systems themselves
(Langton,1972,p 127). This is felt to be particularly
pertinent when one is dealing with a complex open system
such as that of a farm in which the range and depth of
influences and constraints is such that a 'total'
examination is impossible (Bennett,1976,p 234). This
thesis does not attempt to follow the strictest of lines
regarding systems enquiry but does use the systems
perspective. Ellen explains the form that such an
approach takes:
"For some writers it has been sufficient that a 
systems approach supply a framework or 
perspective, and serve as a general set of 
organizing principles, or as an aide -memoire in 
data collection, a means to avoid the 
'existential dilemmas' between emphasizing
synthesis or analysis, theory or observation, 
generalization or specificity" (Ellen,1982,p 
202).
It is in these terms, using this rather flexible
notion of the farm sytem as the basis for examination, 
that the study is set. It is hoped that a comprehensive 
picture can be built-up, mirroring the kind of schematic 
representation illustrated in figure 1.1. as it is felt 
that this is the best means by which the aims of the 
research can be achieved.
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Aims
As was explained in the opening section of this 
chapter, the Northeastern region of Thailand has always 
been portrayed as an area where the physical environment 
plays a large role in limiting the intensification of 
agricultural production. This said, there are clearly 
many other influences impinging upon the farmer in his 
decision-making, especially now that the region has been 
firmly integrated into the cash economy of the country.
The accurate assessment of this clash between the 
influence of the environment and that of "culture" (in the 
broadest sense) is important if relevant development 
policies are to be formulated. Indeed, it is arguable 
that the agricultural policies so far initiated are either 
poorly implemented or are out of tune with farmers' 
requirements, for a minimal proportion are utilising the 
resources which the government has (apparently) made 
available [l]s high yielding varieties of rice are barely 
used; chemical fertilisers are grossly underused; the 
cooperative movement has a limited and an unenthusiastic 
membership; the government rice purchasing bodies have had 
no impact on the domination of the middleman; and farmers 
continue to cultivate cassava in spite of efforts directed 
at encouraging diversification. In the light of this 
there are two inter-related questions that should be 
investigated:
[1] It could be that it is the extension network rather 
than the policies themselves which is at fault. This 
would mean that the problem lies in the implementation 
rather than the formulation of the development intiatives.
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1/ In a marginal rainfed environment such as that of the 
Northeastern region of Thailand where the soils are 
characteristically infertile/ what is the balance between 
man and his environment?
2/ Do the special problems that face the farmers of the 
region require special solutions? The Thai government has 
been formulating policies to aid the farmers of the 
Northeast for very many years. The question is: Have
they been successful?
There is# in addition/ another question which arises 
as a result of the first two being posed; and that 
concerns the agricultural potential of the region. For it 
is apparent that farmers are increasingly turning towards 
agricultural activities outside cropping and to 
non-agricultural income earning opportunities to meet the 
shortfall between what farmers desire and what rice and 
upland crop cultivation are able to provide. Therefore:
3/ Given the environment/ the lack of free land/ the 
rising aspirations and the growing population of the 
region; what is the potential for increases in production/ 
and if this is limited/ what opportunities outside 
agriculture are farmers turning towards?
The Study Area
Two villages in Tambon Tha Song Korn/ Amphoe Muang 
Mahasarakham were chosen for the research. Both 
communities were located close to the Khon Kaen - 
Mahasarakham road lying approximately 9 kilometres west of 
Mahasarakham and nearly 60 kilometres/ by road/ 
east-south-east of Khon Kaen. The Lam Chi/ one of the 
Northeast's major rivers/ delineated the northern border 
of the tambon and a water tank had been built about six 
kilometres to the south-east (Map 1.2).
Prior to the selection of Baan Noon Tae and Baan Tha 
Song Korn as the two study sites/ a number of other
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Map 1.2 Mahasarakham Province
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villages in the vacinity of Mahasarakham town were visted 
and then rejected as being unsuitable. The three 
principal selection criteria were as follows:
(a) The villagers should cultivate rice as a subsistence 
crop/ and also have a certain amount of upland cash 
cropping.
(b) The villages should be located in an area of early 
settlement (or/ at least/ fairly dense settlement) where 
there is no longer any free land onto which agriculture 
can be extended.
(c) The villages should have relatively easy access to a 
town (iej a market).
Following the identification of Noon Tae and Tha Song 
Korn as suitable communities/ the phuu yay baan of each 
was asked for his permission for the research to be 
carried out. Both willingly gave their consent. It was 
emphasised at this early point [1] that the work was being 
done under the auspices of the University of London/ 
independently of the Royal Thai government. This was so 
that inhabitants would not associate the work with any of 
the official development agencies or projects.
After this/ all the appropriate government offices in 
Mahasarakham were visited in order to obtain as much 
information and as many statistics regarding the tambon
[1] In Baan Noon Tae/ soon after it was selected as one of 
the study villages/ there was a religious festival at 
which the purpose and background to the research was 
explained using the PA system set up by the abbot and his 
monks.
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and the villages, as possible [1]. At the same time, 
using aerial photographs of the area as a base, a detailed 
land use map of the 6 km2 surrounding the study site was 
made. The value of the completed map does not warrant the 
amount of time put into producing it; however, the task 
was felt to be useful, as the initial stage of the 
fieldwork, for a number of other reasons;
It is only by wandering around the fields (this was 
during the rice harvesting season; October to December) 
that an understanding of the nature of the environment can 
be reached (this understanding or appreciation will, even 
so, be limited and rudimentary). The process also enables 
the researcher to converse with the farmers quite
literally, "in the field", and to become known and 
recognised by the population. This second point is 
extremely important if farmers are to answer questions
fully and honestly.
Between February and April 1983 a detailed survey of
the inhabitants of Noon Tae and Tha Song Korn was
undertaken. A questionnaire was constructed with the help
[1] Department of Agricultural Extension (Amphoe and 
Ghangwat Offices); Community Development Department 
(Amphoe Office); Rural Development Department (Changwat 
Office); Land Department (Amphoe and Changwat Offices); 
Land Development Department (Changwat Office); Department 
of Forestry (Changwat Office); Cooperative Department 
(Amphoe and Changwat Offices); Pig Cooperative (Amphoe and 
Changwat Offices); Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural 
Cooperatives (Changwat Office).
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of a number of Isan speakers [1] and it was structured in 
order that there was room for a certain amount of 
flexibility (Appendix 1.1). This was so that a fertile 
line of enquiry could/ if necessary/ be pursued beyond the 
limits of each particular question.
The preliminary questionnaire was then tested on the 
two headmen so that they could offer their advice and 
criticisms [2], any problems be ironed out/ and also so 
that the etiquette of social relations in the villages 
could be fulfilled [3]. Following this limited pilot
[1] Terms and expressions for such things as categories of 
riceland vary across the Northeast. Thus/ in the research 
area upper paddy was called thii dorn; middle paddy, thii 
raap; and lower paddy, thii lum (these are terms which are 
used quite widely over the region). Grandstaff working in 
the changwats of Roiet and Chaiyaphum found villages with 
an assortment of other terms categorising paddyland types:
thii tarn (low place) and naa kao ("old paddys") 
identified lower paddys: while thii dong (forest
location), th i i ky n (places with less waterT, and thii 
sung (high place) all referred to upper paddys which 
suffered from water shortages (Grandstaff,1981,pp 15-16).
[2] eg; it was not certain if questions on income and 
birth control would be acceptable to the villagers. The 
phuu yay baan confirmed that they were acceptable and 
would not cause offence or an excessive amount of 
embarrassment.
[3] It was felt that it would not be good public relations 
if the headman discovered that a questionnaire was being 
conducted without him being told and involved in it. 
Indeed, the importance of the phuu yay baan and his power 
to limit the success of projects he did not give his full 
backing to or did not approve of was, at least in Noon 
Tae, clear (look to page 433; regarding the CBIRD fish pond 
project).
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study, it was slightly re-written and organised [1], and 
then duplicated. In addition, although the questionnaire 
remained essentially the same, there were a number of 
questions added as the survey progressed, eg; a question 
on income given to the temple fund, and one on herbicide 
use. The need to do this demonstrates the advantages of 
having the time, man power and the facilities to conduct 
preliminary surveys and representational pilot 
questionnaires. Following these amendments the
questionnaire was ready to be implemented.
Although I was present at every interview an Isan 
student from Srinakharinwirot University, Mahasarakham, 
was employed to actually conduct the interviews and to 
record the responses. This approach was followed because:
1/ If the interviews were given un-supervised, although 
it would have meant more could have been carried out, the 
only answers would be those relating directly to the 
questions. As the questionnaire was intended to be 
open-ended so that interesting lines of enquiry could be 
pursued further it was obviously important to have someone 
present who could identify those replies that warranted 
further investigation.
2/ It would not have been possible .to have conducted the 
interviews successfully alone due to language difficulties 
which would have meant too much time spent on asking the 
questions and understanding the answers, and too little on 
contemplating the implications of the answers (fertile 
areas of further questioning would have been ommitted).
3/ Answers often have a qualitative and a quantitative 
element which requires two people to appreciate. As the 
research draws heavily on farmers' views and perceptions 
of various subjects it was important to record the details 
of every response. This includes such things as emotion
[1] The ordering of the original questionnaire was found 
to be confusing. In addition the meaning of some of the 
terms was not exact enough (eg; the distinction between 
chemical and organic fertilisers).
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and hesitation, and the background or lead-up to what
might/ in the end, be a simple answer.
Each interview took between one half hour, and one
hour and a half to complete, and was conducted with, if he 
or she was present, the head of the household [1]. A
household was defined as an unit working and gaining their 
subsistence from a single "farm". As it turned out this 
definition (khroop khrua) was an accepted unit of analysis 
and almost always consisted of a nuclear family. There 
was no problem, common to many studies elsewhere in the 
world, with complex extended families. The families were 
selected using a stratified sample. Each village was 
divided into a number of similarly-sized segments and an 
equal proportion of households taken from each. By the
end of the survey 37 in Noon Tae and 44 in Tha Song Korn 
had been questioned amounting to 26.4% and 17.1% of the 
total number of households respectively. A higher 
percentage from Noon Tae was deliberately taken as the 
village had a greater diversity of activities. It is 
accepted that a larger sample would have been statistically 
more significant, but limitations of time and manpower 
prevented this.
The data obtained from the questionnaire was coded-up 
and analysed at the University of London Computing Centre
[1] This was due to the assumption that the head of the 
household would be the family member with the greatest 
knowledge of the farm and its operation; and also because 
it was thought that it would be politic to do so. 
Although the latter seemd to be true, the former was not. 
Indeed it was usually the wives who were able to provide 
the most detailed information regarding expenditure and 
income.
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using the statistical Package for Social Scientists' (Nie 
et al/1975) with the SPSS Update 7-9 (Hull & Nie/1981).
An important difference between the developmental 
input into the two communities was that one of the 
villages/ Baan Noon Tae# had been chosen as a target 
village for the "Community Based Integrated Rural 
Development Project" (CBIRD). This project/ operating in 
60 villages in the provinces of Khon Kaen and 
Mahasarakham/ was under the control of the Population and 
Community Development Association (PDA) and had been 
financed largely with foreign aid. Its principal aim was 
to/ "improve the livelihood/ employment opportunities/ 
living standards and the quality of life" (CBIRD document) 
of its target households. If, as suspected/ the potential 
for increasing agricultural production is limited then 
farmers anxious to meet the demands of a growing 
population with rising aspirations and expectations will 
have to turn to alternative income earning opportunities 
such as CBIRD was providing. An analysis of the success 
of the project (and other sources of income outside the 
cultivation of rice and upland crops) could illuminate 
whether there really is a demand for such a 
diversification of economic activity and what the 
possibilities for aiding it/ are.
The results of any research are to an extent dictated 
by the position from which it is conducted. Most commonly 
this can take the form of an ideological or a theoretical
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leaning which places an analysis within a particular 
mould. However, with reference to studies concerned with 
the problems of development at the village-level it is 
also possible to examine the situation either from inside 
the community looking outwards; or from outside looking 
in. In the first case one adopts the role and the views 
of the villager (the developed) and in the second those of 
the government (the developer) . The aims of the two may 
be similar but the nature of the viewpoint means the 
picture is very different. In the same way it is possible 
for a researcher to portray the success of government 
objectives, and development in general, from two 
positions. He can either examine the aims of the various 
government offices and departments and see how far those 
aims are being realised at the village-level; or he can 
scrutinise how the farmers perceive the problems they are 
facing and how far government objectives fit these 
perceptions. Although the two approaches may appear to be 
the same thing viewed from different ends, it is argued 
that the view point makes the outcome very different. 
With respect to this study the weighting is very much on 
the side of the villager; it is his views, perceptions and 
attitudes which are sought, and as a result of this it is 
inevitable that the problems are viewed largely through 
his eyes.
A final question that should be tackled is whether 
Baan Noon Tae and Baan Tha Song Korn can be viewed as
representative of the region as a whole [1], Physically 
(climate, soil,topography), the characteristics of the 
area do conform to those of the plateau, or at least to 
those of its central portion, and indeed, the region is 
one of the few where it is accurate to talk in terms of 
physical generalities. There are also similarities 
between the farm characteristics as revealed by the 
questionnaire and those for the region as calculated by 
the Thai government: thus, the average amount of riceland
owned per farming household in the region amounts to 20.1 
rai (MOAC,1981,tables 88 & 89,pp 160-161 & 162-163); while 
among those included in the sample survey it was 16.1 rai 
(80% of the regional figure). The quantity of upland is 
similarly balanced; 5.5 rai (MOAC,1981,tables 88 & 89,pp 
160-161 & 162-163) as against 3.6 rai (65%). Total farm 
income was calculated to be 26,336 baht per household per 
year in the Northeast in 1980 (MOAC,1982,table IIl2,p 66) 
and this compares with a figure from the questionnaire of 
20,990 baht per year. (80% of the regional figure). The 
regional strategy of cultivating glutinous wet rice for 
home consumption and growing upland crops, primarily 
cassava, to earn a cash income was also followed in the 
study villages; as was the level of fertiliser use on 
rice (the 1978 census recorded an average application on 
rice of 4.6 kilograms per rai; the farmers questioned used
[1] It is appreciated that no two villages can ever be 
truly representative. However, it is possible to say that 
two villages are close enough to a regional norm or 
standard (loosely defined) to be used to illustrate the 
broader problems of a larger area;- in this case the 
Khorat Basin.
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7.9 kilograms per rai) and on cassava (none).
Therefore, in broad terms the inhabitants of Noon Tae 
and Tha Song Korn can be seen to conform fairly closely to 
the standards of the region. However, there is one manner 
in which the study villages do not conform so closely to 
the 'mean', and that concerns the balance of agricultural 
to non-agricultural income. In the 1978/79 crop year the 
Department of Agricultural Economics (MOAC,1981,table 92 & 
95,pp 176 & 178-179) calculated that among farm households 
in the Northeastern Region 54% of their income was derived 
from agricultural sources;- a suprisingly high proportion 
in fact. In the study communities the figure was even 
lower at only 35%. The difference must be seen to relate 
to the proximity of the town of Mahasarakham which gave 
farmers income earning opportunities outside agriculture 
to which the majority of the population of the plateau 
would not have access. This said, it is arguable that in 
having a greater proportion of non-farm income the 
families are merely at the forefront of a trend which 
will, in time, affect all villages.
Thesis Structure
The thesis consists of ten chapters, including this 
one, arranged in the following manner:
Chapters two and three will deal with the Khorat 
Plateau as a region, looking at the physical and 
socio-economic characteristics which have led many 
officials within successive administrations to talk of the 
'Northeast Problem'. Chapter four will give an over-view
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of the villages of Noon Tae and Tha Song Korn before going 
into detail regarding the strategies that farmers adopted 
with respect to rice and upland crop cultivation in 
chpaters five and six. Chapter seven will examine the 
cooperative system in the area with reference to the study 
villages and will also look at the supply of credit. 
Following this examination of crop cultivation and the 
associated institutional framework in the two muubaan 
(seen as the first ’section' of the research) the thesis 
will then/ in chapters eight and nine/ turn to investigate 
the alternative sources of income to which farmers are 
turning in their efforts to raise their standards of 
living (the second 'section' of the thesis). Chapter nine 
will look particularly at the Community Based Integrated 
Rural Development Project as a means by which the 
government can become involved in alternative forms of 
income generation. Finally/ in chapter ten, an attempt at 
synthesis will be made.
Although it is stressed that the farmers of Baan Noon 
Tae and Baan Tha Song Korn did not divide up their lives 
into 'rice cultivation', 'upland cropping* and 
'alternative sources of income' it is felt that, for 
clarity's sake, this is the best format. Chapters five, 
six, seven, eight and nine can each be seen (chapter nine 
to a lesser extent) as illustrating sub-systems within the 
total farm system. Together, it is hoped, they constitute 
a realistic picture of the constraints and opportunities 
that the inhabitants face.
Chapter Two 
"The Northeast Problem"
Introduction
The Khorat Plateau is the second largest of the four 
regions that make up the kingdom of Thailand with 32,9% of 
the land area and over 34% (1981) of the population
(NSO,1982,table 7,p 13). However, in terms of wealth the 
region lags far behind with the per capita GRP (at current 
market prices) representing only 35% (1980) of the
national average (NSO,1982,tables 59 & 61,pp 82 & 84-85) 
(table 2.1). This relationship of the Northeast to the 
rest of the country is not a new one and surveys have 
continually emphasised that relative to the kingdom as a 
whole the region is impoverished (Carter,1904;Graham,1924; 
Zimmerman,1931). Zimmerman's economic survey of 1931 
calculated that the cash income of families in the region
Table 2.1
Population, Land Area and Gross Regional Product 
of Thailand, by Region
Population Area Per Capita
(millions) (sq km) GRP (1980)
Whole Kingdom 47.9 513,115 16,549
Central Region 15.8 103.902 26,307
Northeast 16.4 (34%) 168,894 (33%) 5,806 (35%)
North 9.7 169,644 9,541
South 5.9 70,715 14,190
- population is the 1981 estimate.
- gross regional product is at current market prices.
- in brackets are the Northeastern figures as percentages 
of the national figure.
Source: NSO,1982,tables 7 & 61,pp 13-15 & 84-85.
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was 29.7% of that for those residing in the Central Plains 
(Appendix 2.1). The economy of the Isan region is 
agriculturally based with 87.9% (1980) of the population
being employed within the agricultural sector. This 
compares with the mean for the country of 70.8% 
(NESDB/1980,table 6.2,pp 114-5). The average size of land 
holdings is 28 rai (1980) and of the total of 50,092,989 
rai over 92% is owner-occupied (MOAC,1981,table 90,p 168). 
The staple crop is glutinous rice and paddyland covers 
71.6% of the area classified as farm holdings. A further 
19.8% of farmland is devoted to what are termed "field 
crops" (table 2.2). Most of the rice grown is used to 
meet subsistence needs; farmers tending to earn their cash 
income through the cultivation and sale of upland crops, 
principally cassava and kenaf.
Table 2.2
Land Use in the Northeast (1980)
Area (rai) % of Total Farmland
Total Land 106,391,250
Farm Land Holdings 50,092,989
Paddy Land 35,886,374 71.6%
Field crops 9,901,022 19.8%
Trees/Fruit Trees 461,025 0.9%
Vegetables & Flowers 77,407 0.1%
Grassland 214,399 0.4%
Idle Land 1,968,805 3.9%
Other Land 683/, 944 1.4%
Unclassified 56,298,261
Source: MOAC,1981,table 88,pp 160-161.
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The Qpening-up of the Northeastern Region
The Khorat Plateau has had a history of division, and 
it was only in 1827 that the region became part of Siam 
[1]. Even then, control did not come directly from 
Bangkok but was dispersed among a number of 
semi-autonomous principalities. The process of
centralisation began when King Chulalongkorn, or Rama V 
(1853-1910), acceded to the throne in 1868 and continued 
until just after Thailand became a constitutional monarchy 
in 1932 (Keyes,March 1967,pp 14-17).
Coupled with the administrative isolation of the 
region there was also a great degree of physical 
remoteness as well as cultural distinctiveness. The first 
railway link was completed to Khorat in 1900 in response 
to the growing French presence on the Mekong, the line 
being extended to Khon Kaen in 1933 and to Ubon in 1938 
(Tate,1979,Vol II,pp 498 & 501). Automobile transport
meanwhile, did not really expand until after the Second 
World War and the majority of the region remained isolated 
until the 1950's and 60's. Zimmerman observed that, 
except where the railway was built and along some 
stretches of navigable river, communications were "almost 
totally lacking" (Zimmerman,1931,p 294).
Ethnically and culturally the bulk of the inhabitants 
are Lao and are more closely affiliated with the Laoatians
[1] Before that date the, "areas lying along the Maekhong 
were integral, but secondary parts of the Lao Kingdom for 
most of the period between the mid fourteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries, while most of the interior of the 
Khorat Plateau was politically autonomous" (Keyes,March 
1967,pp 12-13).
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to the east than the Thais of the Central Valley. They 
are distinct in dress, food and language. Although this 
is to an extent academic it has been stated, often with 
insinuations of revolution or secession [1], that the 
population regard themselves as more closely tied to their 
ethnic kin in neighbouring Laos than to the rest of the 
Kingdom (Turton,1978;Caldwell,1978). But, despite the 
fact that there are grounds to support the contention that 
the Northeasterners are neglected, underprivile ged and 
ignored there is a general feeling in the area that, "we 
are Lao but Thai citizens" (Keyes, 1973,p 360).
Even so, in the late 50's and 6 0 1 s the central 
government in response to the growing frustrations of the 
people as well as the increasing influence of the 
Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) [2] began to implement 
programmes and policies designed to develop the Northeast
[1] For example: "Thailand is in crisis. Momentum is
gathering towards full-scale civil war. A level of class 
struggle unimagineable until a few years ago when the 
effects of the integration of Thailand into the world 
capitalist economy since the 1950's began to take
form Armed opposition now pervades the greater part of
the country, operating from large base areas in all 
regions of the country, and led by the Communist Party of 
Thailand with the direct support of many hundreds of 
thousands of peasants" (Editorial, Journal of Contemporary 
Asia,Vol 8,1978,pp 3-4).
[2] The CPT's estimated strength reached a peak in 1977 at 
about 14,000 guerillas (The Nation,Feb 3,1983,p 5). The 
main force, by some estimates, now stands at less that 
2,500 and is still falling (Asiaweek,April 8,1983,pp 
16-24), although the recent arrest of Phirun Chartvanitkum 
(a former student leader who joined the CPT, and rose to 
become a full member of its central committee) and 
harrassment of former party members may rekindle 
dissatisfaction with the establishment (FEER,July 
19,1984,pp 26-28).
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region and to strengthen the government's presence there 
(London,1980,p 92). As Vandenbosch explained, the 
administration was "running scared in the wake of the 
known subversive threat in that part of the land" 
(Vandenbosch,1967,p 219).
The development strategy of this period was based on 
the philosophy that growth would be stimulated if the 
infrastructure of a modern economy were provided (Grit 
Permtanjit,1982,pp 124-125) and this led to a tremendous 
expansion in communications. Undoubtably, military 
factors were also involved, and the Friendship Highway 
linking Bangkok and Korat which was completed with US aid 
in 1958 together with many of the more minor roads were 
built, in part, for strategic reasons (London,1980,pp 
92-94). However, as far as the people of the Northeast 
were concerned the principal effect of these developments 
was to bring the mass of the inhabitants into contact with 
the market econmy of the Central Plains for the first 
time. Prior to this, farmers cultivated crops to meet 
their subsistence requirements and for local barter. It 
was, except in a few locations, impossible due to the 
absence of transport facilities to sell crops anywhere 
other than locally and it was only with the advent of 
widespread communications that farmers began to cultivate 
crops to give themselves a cash income. As Insor said, 
the road brought "civilisation, or at least its universal 
substitute, money" (Insor,1963,p 27).
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Migration and Settlement
The river valleys and basins of the Northeast were
settled first; this represents the most fertile, and more
importantly the most reliable land. Population was
historically concentrated in the changwats of
Mahasarakham, Roiet, Surin, Sisaket and Ubon
(Burcham,1979,p 144) and riverside towns such as Ubon
Ratchatani and Mahasarakham flourished. However/ 
population densities remained low and it was not until the 
mid-nineteenth century that there was any large-scale 
settlement when/ with official encouragement/ large 
numbers of Thais and Laos moved into the area 
{Dixon/1974,p 37). Even so, the Khorat region still had 
abundant land and surveys of land use by the Thai 
government (1937-1939) revealed that less that 7% of the 
area was cultivated (Burcham,1979,p 149). Traditionally, 
when local pressures of population grew too great a 
section of the inhabitants would leave to establish a new 
village (Keyes,1976,pp 53-54). In fact, the Lao marriage 
custom in which the bridegroom travels to the house of the 
bride is, "particularly suited to a pioneering 
atmosphere", and has played a large role in accelerating 
the opening-up of new land (Ng,1974,p 3). But, although 
the region has always been rich in land much of it is 
marginal or unsuited to rice cultivation and by the start 
of the twentieth century the most populated changwats were 
beginning to experience a shortage. Continued population 
growth meant that during the 1930's, even in the remoter 
provinces, only marginal riceland remained to be settled.
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During the post war period this general pattern of 
intra-regional migration continued with migrant flows 
running from the more densely populated central changwats 
(and to some extent from the southern tier of changwats) 
to the northern/ more peripheral ones (Burcham,1979/p 47). 
Old population centres such as the provinces of Roiet and 
Mahasarakham had/ "tremendous outflows"/ and with the 
spread of cash cropping from the mid to late 50*s it seems 
that comparatively/ "the paddy cultivating changwats all 
lost heavily to those experiencing agricultural 
commercialisation" [1] (Ng/Dec 1970/p 74). These trends 
have reduced the differences in density of most to least 
populated province from a ratio of 1:7 in 1947 
(Donner,1979,p 583) to 1:3.6 in 1981 (NSO,1982,table 7,p 
14).
At the inter-regional scale there was already a 
well-established seasonal migration of labour from the 
Northeast to the farms of the Central Plain by the end of 
the nineteenth century. This declined for a time between 
1905 and 1913 when the rice trade in Thailand suffered a 
recession and many landowners were unable to pay the wages 
of their migrant workers, but quickly appeared again when 
the international market for rice re-asserted itself 
(Puller et al,1983,p 26). Since the Second World War this 
outward movement has continued although measurement is 
difficult as censuses often fail to record temporary moves
[1] Changwat-level data fails to reveal the large amount 
of intra-provincial migration from the more to tyhe less 
populated areas, even in such long-settled chanwats as 
Surin. A
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and therefore do not give an accurate indication of total 
mobility (Fuller et al,1983,p 38). Ng, using data from 
the 1960 census concluded that "perhaps for want of a 
meaningful regional system, the emigration from the Khorat 
Plateau has been over-emphasised" (Ng,Dec 1970,p 75). 
Conversely Fuller et al, using farm-level anthropological 
studies and more detailed government surveys that would 
enumerate temporary moves stated that, "observations from 
several independent sources indicate that mobility levels 
are high" (Fuller et al,1983,p 41). Throughout the region 
temporary moves by individuals in search of jobs, 
especially to Bangkok, are common and efforts by the 
government to reduce such flows (stated in the Fourth and 
Fifth Five Year Plans) have, "failed miserably and will 
fail again miserably" (Suchart Prasithrathsint,1981,p 13).
Population Growth and Tenancy
In response to the growing population of the country 
as a whole (Table 2.3) the Thai government implemented a 
Family Planning Programme in 1970. In 1974 it was 
expanded and intensified in rural areas through the 
establishment of the Community Based Family Planning 
Service (Krannich & Krannich,Oct 1980,p 1026). The latter 
programme, managed by the charismatic figure Mechai, has 
been a success and, "despite large gaps between rural and 
urban residents with respect to income, education and 
access to public services, a remarkable decline in 
fertility has occurred throughout Thailand; it has been 
well characterised as a 'reproductive revolution'1'
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Sources: Statistical Yearbook : Thailand, No.32:1976-1980, 
National Statistical Office,n.d, and Statistical Summary of Thailand, 
National Statistical Office, 1982.
Table 2,3
Population and Contreceptive Use in Thailand and 
the Northeastern Region
1919
1937
1960
1965-68
1970
1975
1980
1981
Population 
Whole Kingdom
9,207,355
14,464,105
26,257,966
34,397,374 
42,391,454 
46,961,338 
47,875,002
Population
Northeast
3,092,117
4,952,288
8,991,543
12,025,140
16,393,356
New Family Planning 
Acceptors
186,893
228,578
535,023
1,120,966
Sources: Wilson, 1983 , pp 32.-35; NSO, 1974; NSO,1980,
NSO,1982,pp 13-15.
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(Rosenfield et al/June 1982,p 43). In the Northeast the 
birthrate has fallen from a figure of 37.0 per thousand in 
1970 to approximately 26.5 per thousand by 1979 (Graph
2.1); and a major factor contributing to this decline must 
be the spread of contreceptive use (table 2.3).
Upto the present the growing population of the 
Northeastern region of Thailand has been accommodated by 
expanding the area under cultivation and this is 
exemplified by the pattern of migration and settlement in 
the area. The density of population has now reached 97 
people per square kilometre, in comparison to the national 
figure of 93 (NSO,1982,table 7, pp 13-15). Although these 
two figures are similar, due to the nature of the physical 
environment on the plateau there is a limited supply of 
cultivable land and there now exists a situation in which 
it is a resource in short supply. Ramsson, by projecting 
the growth in farmland expansion concludes that, "it is 
certain that the frontier in farmland expansion for this 
region is on the verge of closing" (Ramsson,1977,p 78).
Land tenure systems, tenancy and landlessness are all 
connected to varying degrees with land availability and 
are frequently thought to be important in determining the 
degree of economic responsiveness among farmers 
(Suvaphorn,1975,p 118).
In Thailand the rate and problems connected with 
landlessness are in considerable dispute; it has 
frequently been stated that tenancy, especially in 
sections of the Central Plains and the North, has 
increased dramatically in recent years leading to
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considerable hardship which has, and will continue to 
manifest itself, in greater rural political instability 
(Turton,1978,pp 104-135). However, there is also a body 
of opinion which holds the view that the empirical 
evidence does not support the contention that tenancy is 
becoming a major problem, and even in the Central Plains 
the increase is in the partial tenant category, and has 
not necessarily resulted in a spread of poverty 
(Ramsay,Nov 1982,p 1083).
The Northeastern region has the lowest level of 
tenancy of all the regions of Thailand with under 4% of 
the area of holdings being tenanted in any way (Table 
2.4). Of this 2.3% is partially tenanted with the 
landholders owning more than half the land that they work 
(NSO,n.d.,table 1.2,p 10). These statistics are similar 
to those from past surveys which have recorded a tenancy
Table 2.4
Land Holdings by Tenure and by Region (1978)
owner- tenants Part-tenants Part-tenants
occupiers [1] [2]
Whole Kingdom 84.4% 5.4% 4.8% 4.2%
North 79.1% 7.4% 6.2% 5.5%
Northeast 95.3% 2.3% 0.8% 0.8%
Central Plain 65.3% 14.7% 8.1% 10.7%
South 92.2% 0.6% 4.6% 1.6%
[1] Partial tenants who own more that 50% of the land that 
they farm.
[2] Partial tenants who own less than 50% of the land that 
they farm.
Source: NS0[1],n.d.,table 1.2,p 10.
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ratio for the region of 2% in 1937 and 3% in 1947 
(Ramsson/1977,p 84) and it is generally accepted that at 
present it is a problem of little significance (IBRD,Sept 
1978/p 40). Nevertheless/ as land becomes an increasingly 
scarce commodity with the closing of the frontier in 
farmland expansion in the Khorat region/ it is likely that 
the fragmentation of holdings and the proportion of
tenants and partial tenants will grow causing tenancy to 
become a problem for the future (Ramsson/1977/p 
150;Krikkiat Phipatseritham/Nov 1979/p 12).
In January 1975 the Agricultural Land Reform Act was 
passed as a means to solve some of the developmental 
problems of tenancy through land consolidation (Appendix
2.2). It was initially implemented in the most 
problematic areas of the Central Plain and was only later 
extended to the other regions of Thailand. In the 
Northeast/ the Agricultural Land Reform Office is
basically concerned with land distribution and the 
development of communications/ water supply/ irrigation/ 
agricultural credit facilities and better agricultural 
production and marketing (US Presidential Mission,April 
1982,pp 45-47). This is mainly centred in the Tung Kula 
Rong Hai area of the lower Northeast where, although 
tenancy itself is not a problem, there is a need for land 
consolidation and the systematic authorisation of
ownership, as in the past acquisition of land has been 
arbitrary and uncontrolled (NESDB[1],n.d.,pp 125-126). As 
yet, the programme has not been successful in
accomplishing its aims neither in the Northeast nor in the
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Central Plain (Amara Pongsapich,June 1982,p
52;Kemp,1981,pp 19-20;US Presidential Mission,April 1982,p 
46).
Land Deterioration
The expansion of the area under cultivation has 
occurred not only through the need to feed more people,
but also due to the desire of the farmers to have a cash
income. The provision of an infrastructure as well as
giving the subsistence cultivator a means to market cash 
crops also brought him in contact with the consumer 
philosophy of Bangkok and the expectation of an 
ever-improving standard of living. However, "in the 
process of striving to satisfy these new-found needs, the 
villager has snatched every cash crop opportunity on a 
hit-and-run basis" (Ng,1970,p 36), and the result of this 
"reckless land clearance" (Ng,1970,p 28) is that now
numerous problems relating to erosion, loss of fertility 
and the destruction of forests have arisen.
The soils of the upland areas of the Khorat Plateau 
are usually sandy, low in organic content, low in
fertility and as an anthropogenic climax support dry 
dipterocarp savanna forest. The removal of the forest 
cover through clearence (table 2.5) has exposed the soils 
to weathering and has resulted in their erosion to sterile 
sands covered in lateritic nodules. In addition, the 
extensive stripping of watershed areas has increased 
run-off and therefore heightened the risk of flooding and 
further accelerated erosion (Pescod,1979,p 180). Since
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1940, the amount of forested land in the kingdom has 
declined from 62% of the total area to 25% (1977) and in 
the period 1973-1977 the forested area of the Northeast 
has shrunk from 36% to just over 16% [1] (Bangkok Post,26 
July,1980).
Table 2.5
Forested Area of Thailand as Percentage of Total Land Area
Whole Kingdom Northeastern Mahasarakham
Region Province
1940 62% - —
1952 58% - —
1960 51% - —
1973 39% 36% 5.6%
1977 25% 16% 0.0%
Source:Bangkok Post,26 July,1980.
A preliminary study by the Department of Land 
Development has revealed that in the region 85.74% of farm 
holdings (40.37% of total land) are affected by erosion, 
53.26% of these, "very severly" (US Presidential 
Mission,1982,table 4). In response to this, the 
Department of Land Development has recommended that the 
following action be taken as soon as possible 
(US Presidential Mission,1982,p 35):
[1] Most worrying is the fact that the rate of 
deforestation has been accelerating:
1940-1952 - 1 million rai/year
1952-1960 - 2.75 million rai/year
1960-1973 - 3 million rai/year
1973-1977 - 10.8 million rai/year
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1/ Prepare a land capability map indicating areas zoned 
for watershed/ residential/ industrial and agricultural 
use,
2/ Continue to study problems and preventive measures of 
soil erosion as it occurs.
3/ Take immediate preventive measures through soil and 
watershed conservation techniques on land such as forests/ 
watersheds and reservoirs with the cooperation of all 
government agencies concerned,the private sector and 
farmers.
4/ Enact legislative measures to support the above, 
particularly a national land use policy.
It appears that in the 60's farmers believed land to 
be an infinite resource and acted accordingly [1]. They 
were, "under no compunction to maintain the fertility of 
[their] temporary land holdings" and so have contributed " 
to the systematic deforestation of the region" 
(Muscat,1966,pp 89-90).
The land that has been planted to cash crops as well 
as being open to the forces of weathering has also
suffered from a loss of fertility through over-cropping - 
kenaf, maize and cassava, the three primary upland crops, 
all exhaust the soil rapidly unless steps are taken to 
prevent this occurring. There is even the possibility
that falling fertility accompanied by rising population
might lead to a situation in which the Northeast is no 
longer self-supporting in terms of food production
(Alton,1977,p 17).
Poverty and Economic Growth
Kuznets in his presidential address to the American 
Economic Association in 1954 stated that inequalities in 
developing countries tend to widen in the earlier stages
[1] NB - In their experience it was an infinite resource.
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of growth (Kuznets,1965,p 257). Since then, work by 
Myrdal, Williamson, Nurkse and Hirschman has supported 
this observation and the Northeastern region of Thailand 
represents another such instance where national growth has 
led to greater inequalities between the richer and the 
poorer regions. In 1960 the per capita GRP of the region 
was 53.8% of the national figure {Phisit Pakkasem,1973,p 
42); by 1980 (at current market prices) this had dropped 
to 40.1% (NSO,1982, tables 59 & 61,pp 82 & 85). The
differences in income relate not only to a regional bias, 
but also to a rural/urban bias, specifically with 
reference to Bangkok. In 1980 the Bangkok metropolis had 
a per capita GRP three times higher than the national 
average; 43,423 baht versus 14,475 baht (NSO,1982,tables 
59 & 61,pp 82 & 84). Efforts by the government to reduce 
these inequalities in income have so far failed and the 
emerging trends in land availability and productivity may 
lead to, "increasing disparities in the distribution of 
the benefits of growth ... a worsening of income 
distribution and even an increase in the extent of poverty 
in some areas" (IBRD,Sept 1978,p 77).
The World Bank calculated that the incidence of 
poverty in the country declined from 57% of the population 
in 1962/63 to 33% in 1975/76 (IBRD,Nov 1979,table 3.1,p
52). In terms of the total number of people living in 
poverty this represents a drop from 15.8 million to 13.6 
million [1]. The problem is primarily a rural one; 80% of
[1] A high population growth rate between 1962 and 1975 
means that even with a 24.6% reduction in the incidence of 
poverty there is nevertheless still a similar number of 
people classified as poor.
78
the poor live in rural areas and most of these in the
North and the Northeast (IBRD,Nov 1979,table 3.2,p 54)
(Table 2.6). As a document from the late 70's explains:
"Despite the substantial agricultural
development of the past 15 years, it is 
estimated that at least a third of agricultural 
households (about 9 million people) remain today 
in absolute poverty with many having had little 
or no improvement in their income since 1960.
In fact, three-quarters of all poverty 
households in Thailand, or nearly 8 million 
people, live in the rural areas of the north and 
Northeast and the vast majority of them grow 
rice under rain-fed conditions" (IBRD,Sept 
1978,p 64).
Table 2.6
Distribution of the Poor Population, by Region and Area 
1962/3 & 1975/6 (% of total poor population)
1962/3 1975/6
Northeast 
Rural 43% 44%
Urban 2% 6%
Total 45% 50%
North
Rural 22% 19%
Urban 3% 4%
Total 25% 23%
South
Rural 8% 10%
Urban 1% 3%
Total 9% 13%
Centre
Rural 15% 7%
Urban 3% 2%
Total 18% 9%
Whole Kingdom 
Rural 88% 80%
Urban 12% 20%
Total 100% 100%
The poverty line is enumerated in terms of household 
income and amounts to 1,981 baht/capita/year in rural 
areas, and 2,961 baht/capita/year in urban areas.
Source: World Bank,Nov 1979,table 3.2,p 54.
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General health standards are one indicator of 
standard of living. In Thailand, despite being a country 
which produces a food surplus, vitamin deficiency and 
malnutrition are widespread (Table 2.7). Especially 
important in the development of a healthy population is 
adequate nutrition during the pre-school years (0-60 
months) and it is in this age bracket that the problem is 
most severe. In the provinces of the Northeast almost 60% 
of pre-school children have some degree of Protein Calorie 
Malnutrition (table 2.7) (NESDB,1980,table 2.10.pp 70-71).
Table 2.7
Levels of Malnutrition in Thailand
Whole Kingdom[l] - Proportion of total population 
afflicted with:
Vitamin Deficiency - 37%
Malnutrition - 11%
Severe Malnutrition - 2%
Northeast[2] - Nutritional Condition of pre-school
children (0-60 months):
Pirst Degree PCM - 41.6%
Second Degree PCM - 15.2%
Third Degree PCM - 2.4%
[1] Source: Mahidol University,1982.
[2] Source: NESDB,1980,table 2.10,pp 70-71.
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The Genesis of Development Planning in Thailand
Up to 1932 Thailand's growth, primarily in the
agricultural sector, has been described as, "autonomous, 
expansionist, and satellitic" (Muscat,1966,p 26). By
this, Muscat, using Hoselitz's scheme of development, 
means that Thailand's growth was expansionist in that the 
increase in the gross product flowed primarily from an
expansion in the area of exploitation of resources; was
satellitic in that production was geared to export and
development was funded by foreign capital; and was
autonomous in that the government played little role in
the growth process (Muscat,1966, p 18-20). Even after 
1932, although there were certain fundamental structural 
changes so that growth became intrinsic [1] rather than 
expansionist, it remained largely autonomous
(Muscat,1966,pp 265-266), and the idea of planned 
development, which was common in many less developed 
countries in the early post-war period, was not part of 
the Thai approach to government (Phisit Pakkasem,1975,p 
223).
The first efforts at public development planning 
occurred with the recession in world trade following the
Korean War which badly affected Thai exports and as a 
result weakened the traditionally strong baht, as well as
[1] "Intrinsic" here means the intensification of resource 
use. Muscat identifies the following structural changes: 
"...absorption of all natural flood land in the Central 
Region, the acceleration in population growth, the rise of 
population pressure in the lower delta and of 
fragmentation of holdings, the absorption of natural rice 
lowlands in the Northeast, Southeast and elsewhere, the 
spread of shifting cultivation destroying forest cover 
over large watershed areas [and] the ageing of the rubber 
trees..." (Muscat,1966,p 266).
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turning a trade surplus into a substantial deficit 
(Silcock,1967,p 15). In response to the situation the 
Thai government tried to reform its finances and regulate 
exports but, partly because of a lack of skilled 
personnel/ these early efforts were/ "unbalanced, 
uncoordinated and indicative of a total lack of scientific 
planning" (Katchamat Suraphol,1978,p 68).
It was not until the late 50's when pressure from the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(IBRD) and certain individuals in the administration, who 
recognised the need to intensify and rationalise the 
country's economic development, led to the creation of the 
National Economic Development Board (NEDB) in July 1959 
(Phisit Pakkasem,1975,p 223). The process was spurred by 
the deteriorating political situation in Southeast Asia 
and the heightened communist threat to national security 
(Katchamat Suraphol,1978,p 70;Muscat,1966,p 3). It is
also possible that General Sarit Thanarat who gained 
control of the country after a coup d'etat in October 1958 
may have found it politically desireable to unfold a new 
economic programme, of which the NEDB was a part (Phisit 
Pakkasem,1973,p 16-17).
The First Four Five-Year Plans (1961-1981)
The First Five Year Plan (1961-1966) was formulated 
on the basis of recommendations from the World Bank (Grit 
Permtanjit,1982,p 124) and its importance lies in the fact 
that it was the first attempt to present national 
objectives. Public expenditures were concentrated on the
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development of infrastructural facilities such as 
irrigation, power, highways, railroads and
tele-communications (Shigeru Sugitani,May 1978,p 61), 
utilising the philosophy that increased output would be 
most easily secured through the spontaneous efforts of 
individual citizens, with the government acting as a 
catalyst by providing services and an infrastructure (Grit 
Permtanjit,1982,p 124-125). However, this plan was an 
extremely limited document and contained virtually no 
aggregate analysis: "Its over-all and sector targets are
vague and merely stated without supporting argument. 
Certain components are ignored entirely (eg; manpower) and 
very little attention is paid to the private sector" 
(Muscat,1966,p 281). In many ways though, it would have 
been suprising if anything more sophisticated had been 
produced, as the NEDB had few staff and very little 
experience (Muscat,1966,p 281). Inevitably, the result 
was a plan which, "in its final form consists of little 
more than a collection of ministerial projects" 
(Muscat,1966,p 281).
The Second Five Year Plan (1966-1971) was much more 
comprehensive and, like the first, continued to emphasise 
the development of communications and transportation 
(Shigeru Sugitani,May 1978.p 63). Significantly, it also 
stressed the social aspects of development and its 
objectives were specifically directed at the "promotion 
and maintenance of social justice; the preservation of 
social stability, national institutions, customs and 
culture; and the provision of relief to people in isolated
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areas..." (NEDB[1],n.d.,p 34). In terms of its 
macro-economic content the plan was a great improvement on 
the first but even so, "it does not seem unfair to 
characterise Thai planning in the later part of the 60's 
as being inconsistent and uncoordinated1 (Phisit 
Pakkasem,1973, p 22).
During the period of the first two Five Year Plans 
Thailand's growth rate was impressive, the GDP expanding 
by 7.9% each year (BBMR,Jan 1981,Vol 22,No l,p 15). 
However, the Northeastern region's already small share of 
the national GDP decreased further from 18% (1960) to
16.8% (1969) (Phisit Pakkasem,1973,table 2.4,p 36). This 
reflects the interplay of two trends; firstly the 
declining national importance of agriculture ,
the Northeast's dominant sector, from 37.4% of GDP in 1961 
to 29.8% by the end of the Second Plan in 1971 (Phisit 
Pakkasem,1975, p 231); and secondly the slow rate of 
growth of the agricultural sector in the region in 
comparison to the rest of the country, its share dropping 
from 27.1% of the national figure in 1960 to 24.7% in 1969 
[1] (table 2.8). In addition, the rapidly growing 
manufacturing sector of the nation failed to expand 
significantly in the Northeast and, in fact, the region's 
share of this part of the economy dropped 1.7% between 
1961 and 1969, to 8.3% (table 2.8).
[1] The Northeast did not draw many benfits from public
investment in irrigation in the first two plans, and the 
increased intensity of production through the greater use 
of fertilisers, high yielding seeds, pesticides and 
machinery, which was spreading in the Central Plain, 
failed to affect the farmers of the region.
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Because of the failure to stimulate the economy of 
the Northeastern region, and due to growing worries about 
the political loyalty of the area., the government created 
the Northeastern Economic Development Project (NEED) in 
1968, with the intention that it should produce a plan for 
the region, "in the light of the deficiencies of the First 
and Second Five Year Plans" (Phisit Pakkasem,1973,p 46). 
However, the Third Plan was not drawn up within a 
comprehensive regional planning context (Pakkasem,1973,p
53) and the recommendations of NEED were therefore reduced 
to the national level where spatial priorities are 
ignored.
Table 2.8
Change in the Northeastern Region's Share of the 
Gross Domestic Product; 1960-1969 
(at constant 1962 prices)
Sector 1960 1969 Change
Agriculture 27.1 24.7 -2.4
Manufacturing 10.0 8.3 -1.7
Construction 15.1 21.4 +6.3
Transport & 
Communications 7.5 11.0 + 3.5
Trade 14.6 15.7 +1.1
Services 14.2 16.1 +1.9
(All figures as percentages)
Source: Pakkasem,1973,table 2.6.p 39.
The Third Plan (1971-1976) coincided with the 
realisation by the World Bank that in Thailand, "the 
trickle-down development effect" was not being successful 
in distributing the benefits of growth (Grit
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Permtanjit,1982,p 126). The policies of the Third Plan
were therefore structured in an attempt to rectify, among
other things, the problems of uneven growth:
"1/ To reconstruct the economic system and to 
promote economic growth?
2/ To maintain economic stability
3/ To promote economic growth in the rural 
areas and to reduce income disparities?
4/ To promote social justice?
5/ To develop manpower resources and to create 
employment?
6/ To foster the role of the economic sector in 
economic development."
(NESDB[3],n.d.,p vi)
However, despite these efforts the Third Plan, and 
indeed the entire period of the first three plans 
(1961-1976), was one in which regional needs were 
subordinated to national objectives. The growth of 
production in the country averaged 7% per year but the 
"nature of growth led to further income disparities among 
various income groups and regions..." (NESDB[2],n.d.,p 5).
The Fourth Plan (1977-1981) was designed during the 
libertarian civilian administration of Prime Minister Seni 
Pramoj and although a dramatic right-wing coup d'etat in 
October 1976 led to Thanin Kraivichien being installed in 
power the plan remained unaltered and was implemented in 
its original form. Instead of "emphasising just economic 
growth, the Fourth Plan [stressed] rather heavily the 
importance of promoting social justice by reducing 
socio-economic disparities and improving mass welfare" 
(NESDB[2],n.d.,p 3). But, partly perhaps because it was
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designed by an administration very different from the one 
who had the job of implementing it, the impact of the plan 
failed to match up to its stated objectives with economic 
progress only benefitting certain parts of the country 
(NESDB[1],n.d.,p 1).
The Third and Fourth Plans were also affected by 
external factors outside the country's control which led
to their financial estimates and targets being upset. The 
quadrupling of the price of oil between 1973 and 1978 
meant that the ratio of the trade deficit to the gross
domestic product increased from 5.0% in 1973 to 6.4% in 
1978 (IBRD,June 1980,p 30) and the further doubling of oil 
prices between 1978 and 1980 increased this still more, to 
an average figure of 7.6% of GDP during the period of the 
Fourth Plan (1977-1981) (NESDB[1],n.d.,p 20). This led to 
a rise in the current account deficit from 4.6% of GDP in 
1971 (NESDB[2],n.d.,pp 44-46) to 5.8% in 1977 and 6.5% in 
1981, representing a growth of over 800% from 5.8 to 53 
billion baht (NESDB[1],n.d.,p 6). A further factor 
contributing to the continuously deteriorating terms of 
trade has been the loss of foreign exchange earnings
related to the American presence in Thailand during the 
Vietnam War (IBRD, June 1980, p 3). The present five 
year plan (1981—1986) aims to solve these problems
[1] The changes being identified in the Fifth Plan as, 
"changes in the price of oil and fluctuation of the 
international financial market [which] have led to high 
inflation, world economic recession and high unemployment 
all over the world" (NESDB[1],n.d.,p 17).
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recognising that the, "Thai economy has not adjusted
itself to these changes [1], resulting in over-spending at
the national, governmental and household levels"
(NESDB[1],n.d.,p 17).
It may not, however, be merely the content of the
plans that has been at fault; for there has always been
the recognition that the Northeast region is a problem
area in need of special assistance. Instead, it is
arguable that the very nature and form that planning takes
in Thailand is suspect;
"There is...little evidence that Thailand's 
development plans systematically guide or govern 
the actions of departments or, for that matter, 
the cabinet itself, in the day-to-day conduct of 
government affairs. ...the frequency and extent 
to which development plans appear to be 
disregarded in the allocation of financial and 
administrative resources and in the introduction 
of new policies, programs and projects is 
indicative of a lack of full commitment to the 
concept of development planning. In recent 
years it has become increasingly difficult to 
discern a sense of direction and purpose in 
public sector behaviour that is in any way 
comparable to its stated functions and 
objectives" (IBRD,September 1978,p 28).
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Three Development Programmes
During the period up to the end of the Fourth Plan 
there were a number of government initiatives designed 
specifically to help rural areas; three of the most 
important were the Community Development/ the Accelerated 
Rural Development and the Tambon Development Programmes:
1/ The Community Development Programme
The concept of community development in Thailand can 
be traced back to 1942 when/ during the administration of 
Prime Minister Phibun Songkhrarri/ 400 community development 
workers were trained and sent to work at the local-level 
in various tambons around the country. But/ it was only 
in 1960 that the Bureau of Community Development was 
established as part of the Ministry of the Interior/ being 
elevated to the status of a full department in 1962 (Dusit 
Dheppitoon/Dec 1973/p 186) and/ in the same year/ being 
adopted as an integral part of the National Development 
Plan (CDD/Feb 1983,preface).
The essence of community development is self-help 
with the government only providing material and technical 
support:
"The people will have active roles in analysing 
community problems and in planning appropriate 
actions. They will be aroused to feel 
responsible for their own village development.
The government will provide assistance on things 
that are beyond the capability of the people. 
Therefore the people will form an integral part 
of the programme..." (CDD/Feb 1983,p 10).
However, rural development during the First through
to the Third Five Year Plan lacked definite direction and
there existed no bias to help the poorer areas of the
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nation (US Presidential Mission/April 1982,p 42). In 
recognition of this problem the present Five Year Plan is 
area specific and calls for consideration of the varying 
intensities of poverty through the country. As a result/ 
216 districts and 30 sub-districts in 37 provinces of the 
Northeast/ North and South have been specified as target 
poverty areas (NESDB[1],n.d./p 281).
The new rural development strategy emphasises
low-cost self-help programmes with maximum participation
by the people (NESDB[1]/n.d.fp 278). The Community
Development Department is inextricably linked to this
effort and at the tambon level organises the following
projects as part of the Rural Poor Development Project:
1/ Child Development Plan 
2/ Youth Development Plan 
3/ Community Education Centre Plan 
4/ Women Development Plan 
5/ Voluntary Development Plan 
6/ Public Property Development Plan 
7/ Spiritual Development Plan
(CDD/Feb 1983,pp 33-36;NESDB[1],n.d.,p 287)
2/ The Accelerated Rural Development Programme
The Office of Accelerated Development (ARD) was 
established in the mid-60's and to begin with was 
essentially an office of engineering and construction with 
the role of giving access to previously isolated areas, 
particularly in the Northeast (Caldwell,1974,p 
56;MOAC,April 1980,p 133). USAID contributed large sums 
of money as the United States government was strongly 
supportive and vitally interested in reducing the 
insurgency threat in rural Thailand and felt that 
providing communications was crucial in controlling areas
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of potential instability (Mickelwait et al,June 1979/p 
A l ). Later on the programme diversified and began to 
involve itself in other aspects of rural development:
- Village Development Projects
- Medical and Health Projects
- Potable Water Supply Projects
- Business and Agricultural Assistance
The philosophy of the ARD programme, at least 
initially, was that the economic development of rural 
areas was the key to counter-insurgency; "If stomachs are 
full, people do not turn to communism" (Deputy Prime 
Minister,quoted in Caldwell,1974,p 137), and in material 
terms much was achieved. However, it is questionable 
whether increased loyalty on the part of the villagers, 
the essential aim of the programme, was accomplished 
(Caldwell,1974,pp 144-149), and Caldwell believes that the 
political and security bias reduced its overall 
effectiveness.
3/ The Tambon Development Programme
The initial Tambon Development Programme (TDP) only 
operated for two years from 1975-1976, but in terms of 
funds made available was extremely ambitious; 2,500 
million baht in the first year of operation and 3,500 
million baht [1] in the second (Poot,1979,pp 15-16). Its 
purpose was to "help farmers increase their incomes...in 
order to reduce their sufferings...The plan is to provide 
funds from the national budget to the tambon council for
[1] This represents 300 million baht more than the annual 
budget of the entire Royal Irrigation Department, one of 
the largest departments in the Thai adminstration.
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hiring local labour to dig canals, build small dams..." 
(PM's address to the House of Representatives,19 March 
1975;quoted in Snit Smuckarn,June 1979,p II-6). 
Undoubtably though, the TDP was also established as part 
of the nation-wide democratisation process and had a 
political goal of cultivating local support (Supachai 
Panitchpakdi,June 1979,p III-5).
It is generally agreed that the impact of the initial 
programme did not ref le ct the amount of money invested in 
it. The constrained time schedule for project design and 
implementation meant that coordination was poor, and there 
was no overall plan to give the programme guidance 
(Payungsak Sesavej,June 1979,p 11-23). It also lacked 
qualified personnel, and funds failed to reach the areas 
most in need with the Northeast, the most poverty 
afflicted region, receiving the lowest per capita 
investment (table 2.9) (Department of Labour,June 1979).
Table 2.9
Tambon Development Programme Funding Per Capita, by Region
Baht/Capita Baht/Capita Baht/Capita 
1975 1976 Average Income
Central 88 115 2,633
North 69 86 2,141
Northeast 65 75 949
South 95 105 1,670
Source: Supachi Panitchpakdi,June 1979,table 5,p III-8
In 1978 the TDP was "re-created" with the intention 
that it should once again present a bottom-up approach to 
rural development by giving funds to the lowest level of 
administration, the tambon council, and planning each
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tambon's projects in cooperation with its inhabitants.
initial
Unlike the programme scheme, villages were categorised 
according to wealth, the poorer ones receiving 
proportionally more (The Nation,August 18 1981,p 4).
The scheme was later integrated into the Fifth Five 
Year Plan (1982—1986) and now forms the basis on the 
'Poverty Alleviation Plan', targeted at 7.5 million rural 
poor in the Northeast, North and South. There are four 
main elements to the programme: The Rural Job Creation
Plan, Village Development Activities, Basic Services 
Provision and the Production Plan (NESDB[1],n.d.,pp 
283-294). The entire scheme has been budgeted over 7,000 
million baht for the five year period for which it is to 
run and through it, it is hoped the "people will be 
assisted in overcoming their poverty related problems such 
as hunger, sickness, ignorance and general deprivation" 
(NESDB[1], n.d. ,p 283). Whether or not its aims will be 
achieved is yet to be seen, but already a number of 
possible problems and drawbacks have been highlighted:
1/ The identification of the target areas through 
comparison of districts in the same region may not be a 
good method because it fails to account for differences 
between villages and population groups within the 
districts themselves.
2/ There are no clear measures to decentralise 
authority. The new strategies are to be implemented 
through the old government administration system and the 
local level committees and councils are unlikely to be in 
any way autonomous.
3/ The programme is fragmented and this could lead to 
inconsistencies between rural and national development 
odjectives.
4/ It is doubtful if the strategy will be effective at 
the implementation stage as the original government 
agencies involved with running the scheme remain 
unreformed and essentially unchanged.
Adapted from:BBMR,October 1982,Vol 23,No 10,p 422.
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Agricultural Devlopment in Thailand: The Emphasis on 
Irrigated Rice Cultivation
Until recently the Thai government has followed a 
strategy of improving rice cultivation and increasing 
output based around a policy of expansion of irrigation. 
In 1947 the area of the country under irrigation amounted 
to 608/000 ha/ by 1969 this had increased to 2/224/000 ha 
(Ingram/1971,p 276) and at the end of 1980 to 3/015/294 ha 
(MOAC,1981,table 84/p 153). However/ although the Central 
Plains are suited to such an approach to agricultural 
development/ it is uncertain how far water control can 
really be improved on the Northeastern Plateau. It has 
been observed that the topography and the drainage of the 
area is not conducive to large-scale irrigation works 
(Pendleton/1962/p 148) and even more limited projects face 
handicaps. At present the Northeast has the lowest 
proportion of irrigated land [1] and the maximum area that 
could/ potentially/ be irrigated is estimated to be only 
11.5% of cultivable land (Sanan Chantkam,Oct 1981,table 
1/P 4) (table 2.10). Even so, the development of
irrigation facilities in the area is a major objective of 
the Fifth Plan (1982-1986), with particular emphasis being 
placed on pump irrigation projects which are estimated to 
provide an additional 200,000 rai of irrigated land each 
year (NESDB[1],n.d.,p 49).
[1] Of the total irrigated land in the country only 12.1% 
is located in the Northeastern Region.
Prior to 1969 tanks were the principal source of 
irrigation in the region [1] but, "few of these appear to 
be functioning with any degree of success, generally 
because of their small live capacity" (Dixon,1977,p 219). 
Many "were built before the necessary hydrological studies 
had been completed; faulty design, ommission of spillways 
for instance, have made some of them useless, and in other 
instances the area flooded by the tanks is much larger 
than the area to be irrigated below the dam" 
(Platennus,1963,p 35).
Table 2.10
Estimates of Water Storage Potential and Irrigable Land in
the Northeast
Total Area of Region
Land Use (1980) [2]
Paddy
Other Crops
Total Cultivated Land
Potential Land Use[3] 
Land Suitable for Paddy 
Land Suitable for 
Upland crops 
Total Cultivable Land
Irrigable area [3]
From Exisitng Resources 
From Planned Resources
Potential Irrigable Area
All areas in rai
[2] Source: MOAC,1981,table 88,pp 160-161.
[3] Source: Sanan Chantkam,1982,table l,p 4.
[1] Royal Irrigation Department began to build the tanks 
in 1951. A target of 1,000 was set; by 1967, 144 had been 
completed (Yuavares Tupbun et al,May 1980,p 1).
106,391,000
35.886.000
10.439.000
46.325.000
22.640.000
39.920.000
62.560.000
4,205,495
2,973,195
7,178,690
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In addition to the tanks/ seven large reservoirs have 
been built irrigating almost 1,200,000 rai (Vivat
Shotelersuk,J une 1981,p 123). Like the tanks these
storage dams have not totally fulfilled the expectations 
of them (Donner,1979,p 629), and the land which is
effectively irrigated is far less than that which was 
planned. A number of reasons for this state of affairs 
can be identified: to begin with the nature of the
Northeast is not wholly appropriate to such projects; 
secondly, poor design and inferior construction has 
hampered their effectiveness; thirdly the day-to-day 
running and maintenance of the systems has usually been 
below standard; and finally the extension services have 
often failed, at least initially, to meet the demands of 
the farmers they serve.
The most successful and the most recent form of 
irrigation has been pump irrigation (Johnson,1979,p 35). 
Projects of this type do not have to rely on stored water, 
and are far more effective at providing controlled amounts 
of irrigation on demand. By 1980 a total of 167,376 rai 
of land was irrigated by pump for the second rice crop 
(MOAC,1981,table 85,p 154) and the method is being 
stressed in the present Five Year Plan. Even so, the 
potential area suited to the construction of such projects 
in the Northeast is small and the method will never 
benefit more than a fraction of the population.
It may be that irrigation in the region should be 
designed to stabilise water supply in the wet season 
rather than prolonging its' availability to the extent
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where double cropping is feasible. This would give 
farmers the opportunity to use HYV's and chemical 
fertilisers to their full potential/ while at the same 
time representing an approach that is/ perhaps/ more in 
tune with the nature of the physical environment. As Ng 
writes, "A transformation from the present rain-fed 
agriculture to supplementary irrigation for the main rice 
cultivating season, should remove one of the most serious 
constraints in what is now an unsatisfactory production 
function" (Ng,1973,p 185) [1].
Closely allied with the policy of expanding 
irrigation has been the government's rice breeding 
programme [2], Intensive rice breeding began in 1950 and 
a seperate Rice Department, now the Rice Division, was 
established in 1954 (Peeny,1982,p 110). The early
selection efforts were concentrated on producing varieties 
for irrigated areas, the first, RD-1 and RD-3 (both 
non-photosensitive and non-glutinous), being released in
[1] Even here though, the maximum area that could
conceivably receive such "supplementary" water supply 
would not exceed 10% of the cultivated area of the Region.
[2] The decision by the Thai government to set up its own 
breeding programme rather than use the already developed 
'IR' high yielding varieties of the International Rice
Research institute in the Philippines was because:
1/ Thailand was (and is) a rice exporter and cannot 
afford to grow 'inferior' rices which might affect their 
reputation.
2/ Only 10% of Thai farmers used chemical fertilisers, 
and even then not in sufficient quantities to grow the IR 
rices optimally.
3/ The majority of fields lacked the degree of water 
control necessary to grow IR rices.
4/ The government was following a policy of development 
on a broad front in terms of increasing rice yields, not
just by relying on new rice varieties (Adapted
from:Yamada,1978,p 10)
1969 (Chung et al,1978,p 4). However, these cultivars
were unsuited to the rainfed conditions of the Northeast
and the rate of adoption in that region was negligible.
As early as 1969 the World Bank questioned the notion
that irrigation should be the primary means of developing
agriculture in the region:
"...the Northeast is merely the most striking example 
of the widespread predisposition to disregard the 
potential for rainfed agriculture - at least at the 
official level" (quoted in:Donner,1979,p 629).
As a result of the change in thinking regarding irrigated
versus rainfed agriculture, development efforts on the
Khorat Plateau switched to place far more emphasis on
providing help to the great majority of farmers who
cultivate rice under rainfed conditions.
Agricultural Development in the Northeast:
Rice Cultivation in a Rainfed Environment
In the crop year 1980/1981 the Northeast had an 
average paddy yield of 224 kilograms per rai (for the 
major crop); this contrasts with 290 kilograms per rai for 
the country as a whole (US Presidential Mission,April 
1982,p 13). On average, 80% of riceland is planted and of
the sown area 80%-90% is harvested. Therefore only
64%-72% of riceland in the region actually produces a crop 
(MOAC,June 1980,p 1). There are three major reasons for 
these low and fluctuating yields:
1/ Erratic rainfall
2/ Low soil fertility
3/ Poor water holding capacity of the soil 
(MOAC,Junp 1980,p 1)
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In response to the problems of rice cultivation on 
the Plateau the Thai government/ in cooperation with the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/ set 
up the Rainfed Rice Improvement Pioneer Project (RRIPP) in 
1973 in an attempt to both stabilise and increase rice 
yields by breeding varieties that were more suited to the 
physical conditions of the area, and by improving 
cultivation techniques (MOAC,June 1980,pp 1-7). The 
priorities of the breeding programme were to produce rice 
cultivars with the following attributes:
"1/ Good plant type with high tillering ability.
2/ Sensitivity or insensitivity to photoperiod.
3/ Resistence to major economic pests and diseases.
4/ Acceptable grain appearance and cooking quality in 
both glutinous and non-glutinous types.
5/ Wide adaptability to environmental conditions."
(MOAC,June 1980,p 17)
In 1976 these objectives were reviewed and highest 
priority was given to wide adaptability (tolerance to 
flood and drought); even so, no appropriate useable 
alternative system of rainfed rice culture was presented 
to the farmers for evaluation and acceptance (MOAC,June 
1980,p 76). As an annual report of the programme 
expla ins:
"Traditional or intermediate type varieties usually 
exhibit a higher than average yield stability...and 
there is little doubt that in rather poor 
environmental conditions prevailing in the Northeast, 
they still usually fare better" (MOAC June 1979,p 
43).
Presently, over the country, only 12% of the rice 
growing area is planted to official release varieties (US 
Presidential Mission, April 1982, p 7), and in the
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Northeastern region the figure is considerably less [1].
The use of chemical fertilisers on rice in Thailand 
is low; in 1980 the average application for the main and 
second crops combined was only 6.65 kilograms per rai 
(MOAC,1981,tables 17,18 & 61,pp 14-15 & 91). This compares 
with the rate of application (on all arable crops) in such 
Asian countries as Burma, and is signifcantly less than 
that for Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam (table 2.11). In 
the Northeast useage is even more limited with the 1978 
agricultural census recording an average application of 
only 4.6 kilograms per rai (table 2.11).
Table 2.11
Average Rates of Fertiliser Application in Thailand and 
Other Selected Asian Countries
Thailand- (data from Application Application Yields
1978 census) kg/rai kg/ha[7] kg/ha[6]
Whole Kingdom [1] 7.4
Northeast [2] 4.6
Central Plain [3] 18.8
South [4] 7.0
North [5] 2.6
Laos 0.1 0.6 1,494
Burma 2.7 16.7 3,085
Indonesia 12.0 75.0 3,769
Malaysia 16.3 102.1 2,857
Philippines 4.6 28.8 2,470
Thailand 2.9 18.3 1,972
Vietnam 8.1 50.6
[1] Source: NSO,n.d.,tables 2.3 & 8.3 ,pp 24 & 108.
[2] Source: NSO,n.d./tables 2.3 & 8.3 ,pp 24 & 86.
[3] Source: NSO,n.d./tables 2.3 & 8.3 ,pp 28 Sc 102.
[4] Source: NSO,n.d./tables 2.3 & 8.3 ,pp 24 & 76.
[5] Source: NSO,n.d.,tables 2.3 & 8.3 ,pp 24 Sc 92.
[6] Source: FA0,June 1984,table 7,p 14.
[7] Source: FAO,1984, table 10, pp 44-55 (NB; refers to 
application on all 'arable land and permanent crops').
[1] In 1973 it was estimated that 0.09% of the area of 
rainfed paddy in the Northeast was planted to RD varieties 
of rice and 0.15% of the irrigated paddy (Framingham, 
1982,p 32).
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Agronomicslly, the traditional and intermediate 
varieties of rice, which are grown over almost all of the 
region, although they respond well to small applications 
of chemical fertilisers [1], tend to lodge and show 
smaller increases in yield when heavily dosed (Mekong 
Committee,Nov 1979,p 12). For this reason farmers, even 
when they have the disposeable income to purchase more, 
apply small quantities of fertiliser to their land and 
will continue to do so until a viable, fertiliser 
responsive, alternative rice variety is presented to them. 
The Mekong Committee, studying the characteristics of both 
the HYV's and the traditional varieties of rice in the 
Northeastern region concluded that, "in the wet season 
none of the new hybrid varieties can sucessfully compete 
(both agronomically and economically) with some of the 
traditional varieties" (Mekong Committee,Nov 1979,p 47).
Although agronomic factors have a great bearing on 
the low rate of fertiliser use in Thailand it is hard to 
clearly separate them from the equally important economic 
constraints:
For, despite the fact that at the present time 
fertiliser prices are fairly competitive in global terms 
and are only minimally controlled by the government [2],
[1] Sanpathong (an intermediate variety) has been shown in 
field trials to out-yield RD-5 upto the dose of 45 kg/rai, 
and shows a particularly high response with small 
applications of 10-12 kg/rai (Mekong Committee,Nov 1979,p 
12).
[2] The transport costs are partially subsidised, although 
the subsidised supply was estimated to satisfy only 20% of 
total demand in 1980 (US Presidential Mission,April 1982,p 
9). In the past fertilisers were actually taxed: during 
the period 1968-73, when the domestic nitrogenous 
fertiliser industry was in its infancy, the government 
placed a tariff on all imported nitrogen-based fertilisers 
(Bertrand,April 1980,p viii).
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the authorties do depress the farm-gate price of rice 
through a number of export tariffs. These, as well as 
directly taxing the farmer, have also had the effect of 
impeding technological change by altering the 
product/input price relationships (IBRD,Sept 1978,p 11), 
thereby making the use of fertilisers (and also 
pesticides and farm machinery) less profitable or, in many 
cases, unprofitable. It has often been stated that this 
"discrepency between fertiliser and farm-gate prices is a 
main impediment to increasing the intensity of production 
per rai" (USAID,May 1982,p 5).
The Rice Premium
The Rice Premium was instituted in 1955 following the 
dissolution of the government Rice Marketing Monopoly 
(Corden,l967,p 159). The premium imposed a levy on the 
export of the crop and was intended to provide both 
additional income for the government and to keep the price 
of rice in the cities down. Between 1955 and 1966 the 
premium was at a rate of about 40% of the FOB price, which 
implies a tax of slightly more than 80% at the farm-gate 
(Bertrand,1980,p viii). Since 1966 the premium has 
flucuated wildly, largely following the international 
market, but also with the intention of meeting the dual 
aim of placating the urban population while at the same 
time keeping farmers incomes at a reasonable level [1].
[1] The political weight of the urban population is such 
that successive governments have implicitly admitted that 
the policy of keeping urban prices depressed is vital to 
their own continued existence (Sungsidh Piriyarangsan, 
n.d.,p 1).
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However, these two objectives are largely irreconcilable 
(Kanok Wongtragan,April 1982,p 12), and it is generally 
believed that the burden of the tax has been borne by the 
Thai farmer (USAID,1982,p 1; Feeny,1982,p 115).
Since August 1975 the Royal Thai Government has 
experimented with targets and guarantees, intending to 
maintain a minimum farm-gate price for rice producers [1] 
(Holtsberg,1982,pp 177-178). This policy has been 
unsucessful except in those years (eg; 1980/81) when a 
buoyant international market has itself forced the 
farm-gate price above the government-set minimum level. 
The failure to control the price of paddy has been largely 
due to insufficient funding (USAID,May 1982,pp 2-4) 
coupled with poor planning and abuse of the system by 
officials, mill owners and merchants [2],
However, although the Premium has been a crucial 
factor in determining rice cultivation strategies in 
Thailand as a whole, it should be appreciated that the
[1] Funds are provided to the public purchasing bodies 
(the MOF, PWO and the Cooperatives) to buy paddy at the 
support price, thereby hoping to create enough demand to 
push the market price upto the government level. 
Unfortunately, the funding has always been insufficient to 
have such an effect on the market, and in any case the 
government’s policy of then selling the rice (often 
inter-governmentally) rather than storing it defeats the 
object of the exercise as this process would, if the 
quantities were large enough, bring the price back down 
once again.
[2] In fact, since the fieldwork was undertaken the 
support price has been abolished. In January 1984 the RTG 
decided to end its market intervention scheme noting that 
it had been unable to influence the rice price to any 
extent. This was largely blamed on the limited budget
which meant that the purchasing bodies could only buy a 
fraction of the total harvest (FEER,12 April 1984,p 52).
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Northeastern region itself has been far less influenced by 
the tax, for very little of the rice grown (most of it is 
glutinous for which there is an extremely limited market) 
is actually sold.
Agricultural Development in the Northeast; The Spread
of Upland Cropping
The remarkable expansion in the area of upland 
cropping that ran parallel and in conjunction with the 
growth in communications (IBRD,Nov 1974,Annex l,p 4) is an 
indication that the constraints to cash cropping, at least 
intially, were economic rather than cultural or physical. 
This development represents one of the most vivid examples 
of 'ignorant peasants' responding rationally to an 
economic incentive and it is particularly not able that 
the government, except through reducing the isolation of 
the farmer from the market by improving communications, 
played virtually no role in the process (Bertrand,1980,p 
viii; IBRD,Sept 1978,p 12). As Fedderson wrote of the 
cassava trade:- it is "a text book example of how the free 
enterprise system recognises a demand and fills it by 
creating an economic situation resulting in large-scale 
farmer interest in growing the product" (Fedderson,June 
1981). Undoubtably, the expansion in upland cash cropping 
has been the single most important occurrence in the 
agriculture of the Northeastern region this century.
The upland crops did not impinge upon the traditional 
glutinous rice lands of the lower and middle terraces, but 
were grown on the sandy and infertile soils of the higher
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ground. These uplands had previously only been used for 
shifting cultivation, grazing and the collection of forest 
products, and indeed, the bulk of that cleared was virgin 
land (Dixon,1974,p 41).
Important during the early years of cash cropping was 
maize cultivation when the Northeast produced over 57% 
(1952) of the total production for the nation 
(MOAC, 1970, table 17, p 55). However, from the mid 50's 
through to the early 60*s there was a remarkable change in 
the distribution of the crop, as cultivation shifted 
westwards to Nakhon Ratchasima and a block of adjacent 
changwats on the north-eastern edge of the Bangkok Plain 
and in the center and east of the Upper Plain 
(Behrman,1974,p 130). Why this occurred is not agreed 
upon although a number of hypotheses exist of which the 
most pertinent as far as the Northeast region is concerned 
is that farmers were turning from maize to the more 
profitable, kenaf (Behrman,1974,p 135). Today, maize 
remains concentrated in the central changwats of the Upper 
Plain, and only the Northeastern changwats of Nakorn 
Ratchasima and Loei produce significant amounts of the 
crop [1].
[1] However, because it is such an important crop in 
Thailand as a whole, the region's 24% share of total 
production (1980/81) has a farm value of 1,777 million 
baht, almost twice that of kenaf (MOAC,1981,tables 20 & 
21,pp 20-23).
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Table 2.12
Area Planted to Kenaf in the Northeast: 1950-1980
1950 30,100 rai
1955 49,800 rai
1960 849,300 rai
1965 2,366,300 rai
1967 2,139,500 rai
1973 2,641,872 rai
1975 2,486,351 rai
1980 1,055,100 rai
Sources: MOAC,1970;MOAC,1977;MOAC,1981.
Kenaf was first reported as a commercial crop in 
1947, although the real expansion in cultivated area began 
in the late 50* s and continued through to the 7 0 's 
(table 2.12). By 1959 it had spread right across the 
region with the highest production being recorded in the 
province of Ubon Ratchatani (Silcock,1970,p 78). The 
rapid growth was stimulated by a surge in world demand for 
fibre following the disastrous jute harvests in East 
Pakistan (Bangladesh) during the 1960-1961 season 
(Silcock,1967,p 247) and Thailand quickly attained the 
position of the world's third largest exporter (BBMR,July 
1981,p 255). But, since 1975 when production peaked the 
crop has become increasingly unpopular among the farmers 
of the Isan region and now Thailand is virtually a net 
importer of the commodity (table 2.13).
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Table 2.13
Exports and Imports of Jute & Kenaf: 1975-1980
Year Imports Exports
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
6,016.6
28,834.4
29.4
484*4
101.1
2.3 157,601
138,361
81,231
91,059
78,922
30,169
(tons, washed and dried fibre)
Source: BBMR,July 1981,p 256
The main factor contributing to the drastic decline 
in production during recent years is the switch by farmers 
from jute and kenaf to cassava, which gives relatively 
higher net returns (BBMR,July 1981,p 255), and is not 
subject to such dramatic price fluctuations (MOAC,April 
1980,p 38). Today, although 98.6% of kenaf is grown in 
the Northeastern region (1980/1981), it only covers 1.05 
million rai with a farm value of 906 million baht as 
against cassava's value at 7,507 million baht 
(MOAC,1981,pp 24-31 & 60-63).
Cassava was first planted in the Southern region 
about one hundred years ago from where it expanded to the 
provinces along the Eastern Seaboard (Tinnakorn 
Dararattanasilp, April 1982,p 1). By 1956 production had 
reached 396,000 tons of raw root (MOAC, 1970,p 58) and
107
was highly localised with 69% of the total between the 
years 1956 and 1963 coming from the East Coast province of 
Chonburi alone (Behrman,1974,p 120). Even as late as 1973 
the central Plain remained the primary cassava producing 
region and the Northeast1s output represented only 25% of 
the country's total (Somsak Chaewsamoot,1974,p 3) (table 
2.14). Since then however, although the production of the 
Central Plains has actually grown from 4.79 million tons 
(1973) to 5.95 million tons (1980), as a proportion of the 
Kingdom's total it has fallen to 36%, while the 
Northeast's output by comparison has expanded to over 10 
million tons of fresh tuber, 60% of all production (Somsak 
Chaewsamoot,1974,p 3;MOAC,1981,pp 26-31). Most of this is 
concentrated in the changwats of Nakhon Ratchasima, Nong 
Khai, Udon Thani, Kalasin, Khon Kaen and Buriram 
(MOAC,1981,pp 26-31).
Approximately 95% of Thailand's cassava is exported, 
and although second to Brazil in production, Thailand is
Table 2.14
Area Planted and Production of Cassava in the
Northeastern Region
Area Planted % of Production % of
in Northeast Total of Northeast Total
1957 4,300 1.8% 7,000 1.7%
1960 33,800 7.6% 60,100 4.9%
1971 189,000 12.4% 506,000 13.8%
1973 816,000 30.8% 1,574,000 25.0%
1975 1,585,000 - 2,195,000 _
1977 3,621,000 68.4% 6,738,000 56.9%
1978 4,584,000 62.9% 9,698,000 59.3%
1979 3,396,000 64.2% 6,952,000 62. 2%
1980 4,535,000 62.5% 10,009,000 60 .5%
(Area in rai, production in tons of raw root) 
Sources:MOAC,1981,pp 24-31:Somsak Chaewsamoot,1974,pp 2-4.
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is the worlds largest exporter of tapioca products having 
about 90% of the global market (Tinnakorn 
Dararattanasilp,April 1982,p 1). The great majority (92%) 
is shipped to the European Economic Community where it is 
used as a major ingredient in animal feed (Business 
Review,March 1983,p 61).
The switch from kenaf and maize to cassava in the 
Northeast, as stated earlier, was primarily motivated by 
economic factors relating to profitability? kenaf prices 
declined while the market for tapioca products boomed. 
However, profitability ' was not the only stimulus? 
agronomic factors were also involved:
Kenaf is fairly demanding of soil nutrients and
continuous cropping without fertiliser inputs had led, by 
the 1970's, to decilining fertility accompanied by 
declining yields (table 2.15) j Cassava however, can be 
grown on the poorest of land, and the sandy, slightly 
acidic soils of the upland areas of the Khorat Plateau 
were well suited to its cultivation (BBMR,April 1981). 
Other attributes of the crop which make it attractive to 
the farmers of the region are:
1/ It is easily propagated - seeds or roots are not
required? propagation is through planting the stalk 
cuttings.
2/ It is high yielding.
3/ It is relatively inexpensive to produce - it needs 
little weeding because of its leafy canopy? it can produce 
adequate yields without fertilisation? and it does not 
have a critical planting or harvesting date and is
therefore not season-bound.
4/ It is a good risk aversion crop - its hydrocyanic 
acid content makes it extremely resistant to insect and
animal attack? and it is drought resistant and can be 
grown with very little skill or attention.
(Partly adapted from: Somsak Chaewsamoot,1974,p 1)
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Table 2.15
Kenaf: Five-Year Moving Average 1962-1971 
(Northeastern Region)
Area (million rai) Yield (kg/rai)
1.7
2.1
2.1
2.2
2.2
2.1
218
218
206
198
187
176
Source:IBRD,Nov 1974/Annex l 7p 5.
The Marketing of Upland Crops
The marketing of upland crops in the region prior to 
the provision of an infrastructure must have been 
difficult, and where middlemen did make inroads the 
absence of choice on the part of the farmer would have led 
to a degree of monopsonistic exploitation. However, with 
the development of communications the relationship between 
farmer and middleman became more equitable, with greater 
competition among buyers and an increase in the amount of 
marketing information available to farmers causing prices 
to tend towards a competitive norm (Lui,1973,pp 57 & 59). 
But, despite the mass of empirical evidence showing that 
today marketing at the local-level is acceptably fair and 
competitive (Bertrand,1980,p 198; Usher,1967,p 223; 
Phaisal Lekutai,Jan 1982,p 164; Vasantha Narendran,1980,pp 
68-69), "the most commonly expressed sentiment in Thailand 
by practically everyone, particularly RTG officers, is 
that the existing system is very inefficient and that 
middlemen are taking excess profits form unsuspecting, 
uninformed farmers"(US Presidential Mission,May 1982,p 2).
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This rather peculiar situation relates partly to the 
fact that the small middleman is invariably of Chinese 
descent and represents an easy political target on which 
the problems of the farmer and the inadequacies of the 
government can be pinned. If the farmers are exploited, 
it is much more likely to be due to the large exporters 
and middlemen in Bangkok who, because of their small 
number, have far greater ability to manipulate prices and 
take excess profits (Phaisal Lekutai,Jan 1982,p 164); and 
regarding cassava, "there is little doubt that groups of 
commercial interests have made excessive fortunes from the 
export of tapioca products" (Actman,July 1981).
Upland Crops: Future Developments
Recently, the Royal Thai Government has been 
encouraging farmers in the region to both diversify out of 
cassava and into other upland crops such as mung bean, 
soybean and groundnut [1], and in addition, to improve 
their cultivation through the use of rotations, 
intercropping and greater chemical and organic fertiliser 
applications (KKU-IDRC,1977, Annual report;Sanan 
Chantkam,Oct 1981;Asian Business,June 1981,pp 49-52). 
This is because the present monocropping of cassava, and 
previously kenaf, has led to serious problems of land 
deterioration which, if left unchecked, will result in an 
increasing accumulation of sterile wasteland. The crops
[1] The government has an 'Action Plan' to encourage the 
diversification of cropping out of cassava. The plan is 
set to run over a six-year period from 1982 with a 
finacial investment of US 350 million
(Thailand;Business,May 1982,p 34).
Ill
being suggested are often leguminous [1] and the 
cultivation techniques are aimed at reducing rates of soil 
degredation and raising fertility [2],
The need to present viable alternatives to cassava 
has become even more urgent since 1980 when the EEC 
demanded that a quota be imposed on the import of the 
commodity into the Community [3]. This resulted in an 
agreement which will reduce exports over a six-year 
period, 1981-1986:
1981-2: 5 million tons per year with 10% allowance for 
over-runs in production.
1983-4: 4.5 million tons per year with 10% allowance for 
over-runs in production.
1985-6: to be decided.
(Source:Thailand:Business,May 1982,pp 30-31)
However, although the agreement has prompted some 
analysts to predict that the long-term prospects for 
cassava are poor (Actman,July 1981), at present the crops
[1] Legumes have the ability to 'fix' atmospheric nitrogen 
in symbiosis with the Rhizobium bacteria and are 
particularly useful in maintaining fertility (Webster & 
Wilson,1980,pp 204-209).
[2] The 1978 agricultural census shows that the average 
application of chemical fertilisers on ’field crops' in 
the Northeast to be a minimal 1.44 kilograms per rai 
(NSO,n.d.,tables 3.5 & 8.3,pp 42-43 & 86).
NB- 'Field crops' include: field corn, sesame, sorghum,
mung bean, black pea, rice bean, peanut, soybean, Job's 
tears, kenaf, jute, cotton, cassava, yam bean, tobacco, 
castor bean, mulberry, sugar cane and pineapple.
[3] The European market for cassava has been strong 
largely due to the crop's special position in the tariff 
system of the European Economic Community: because of the 
high price guaranteed for home-grown cereals there is a 
'barley levy1 on imported grains. This does not apply to 
cassava however, which enters the Community at a maximum 
tariff rate of 6%. Animal feed merchants and producers, 
anxious to keep their costs and prices down therefore 
naturally turn to cassava as the cheapest source of starch 
(Bennison,Jan/Feb 1984,pp 91-92).
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being promoted represent only a minimal proportion of the 
total farm value of field crops in the Northeastern 
region, and only when farmers can be persuaded that other, 
equally profitable crops exist, will they be willing to 
change (table 2.16).
Table 2.16
Importance of Various Upland Crops in the Northeast 
Region of Thailand (Crop year 1980/1981)
Production Farm Value
(tons) (million Baht)
Mung Bean 10,984 64.14
Soybean 5,302 30.63
Groundnut 24,824 198.87
Sorghum 5,105 11.68
Cassava 10,008,873 7,505.00
(the value of the 1980/81 crop of mung bean, soybean, 
groundnut and sorghum combined is 4.1% of that for 
cassava)
Source:MOAC,1981.
As part of this effort to change the pattern of cropping
in Thailand and to have a greater influence in affecting
the ways in which farmers utilise their land, in 1972 the
Office of Agricultural Economics divided the country into
19 'agro-economic zones':
"These zones were developed as aggregations of 
adjacent changwats with similar agricultural 
resource uses and potential. The objective in 
mind when these 19 zones were being delineated 
from the 71 changwats was to provide an 
accounting of agricultural potential and 
extension guidelines for identifiable areas of 
Thailand. Programs could then be developed in 
these zones to promote production of specific 
target commodities where they would have the 
highest potential for success" (Kinyon et 
al,1982,p 34).
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The criteria used to divide-up the country were: 
rainfall, temperature, soil type, type of farm and 
principal income of the farmer (MOAC,Sept 1972,p 5).
Suitable crops were recommended for each zone and it was 
hoped that cropping patterns could thus be guided along 
avenues that the government felt were beneficial to the 
nation as a whole. However, "the distribution pattern of 
the planted area of most crops has been relatively 
unaffected by the declaration of the agro-economic zones" 
and "a thorough review of the existing concept is
required" (US Presidential mission,April 1982,pp 26-27). 
A number of possible reasons have been suggested for the 
inability of the plan to influence farmer strategy:
1/ The Royal Thai Govern ment lacks the capability to 
monitor and regulate activity in the zones.
2/ The boundaries of the present zones may not be
appropriately specified.
3/ The concept of agro-economic zones may be an
inappropriate tool to affect changes in agriculture in 
Thailand.
(Source:US Presidential Mission,April 1982,p 27)
The Provision of Credit and the Establishment of a
Cooperative System
Although the Khorat Plateau of Thailand is commonly 
portrayed as an area where a harsh physical environment 
exerts severe limitations on agriculture it has become 
apparent in recent years through numerous studies that 
social and economic factors also have a crucial role to 
play. In 1973, Ng analysed the importance of social and 
economic variables in the determination of rice yields in
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the Northeast. Regarding the economic complex [1], he 
found that/ "they [the variables] alone determine over 60% 
of the variations in yield of the 15 sample villages. The 
physical or environmental constraints...can at best 
explain less than 40% of the local variations in yield" 
(Ng/1973,p 182). As a means to overcoming these economic 
constraints the government has, for some time, been 
attempting to stimulate the formation of cooperatives and 
improve and extend the availability of credit.
The first agricultural credit agency in Thailand was 
a credit cooperative established in 1916 in the changwat 
of Phitsanulok (Kirsch/1981 ,pp 7 & 12). Its role was to 
provide members with funds for agricultural production and 
to help refinance their old debts. However, as more 
credit cooperatives came into operation so a shortage of 
funds became a problem and in 1947 the government was 
forced to establish a central agricultural credit agency, 
the Bank for Cooperatives (APRACA,Dec 1982,p 8). This was 
replaced in 1966 by the Bank for Agriculture and 
Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC) which was given a brief 
to provide low interest agricultural loans, "emphasising 
supervised rather than collateralised credit" (Sunantar 
Setboonsarng et al,Jan 1982,p 49). At present it is 
estimated that approximately 64% of the total farmers' 
debt is borrowed from institutional creditors, and the
[1] The variables in the economic complex were: cost of
rice production; cash inputs as a percentage of total 
inputs; cost of nursery preparation; cost of land 
preparation; cost of fertilisers, pesticides etc; cost of 
harvesting rice.
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remaining 36% from private or non-institutional sources 
(APRACA,Dec 1982,p 9).
In the Northeast farmers have traditionally increased 
production by extensifying cropping. As this is 
essentially a strategy in which cash inputs do not form a 
part, the farmers have been able to expand their 
agricultural output without needing to borrow money to 
finance it (Tongroj Onchan & Meyer,April 1980,p 19).
Where crop failures have forced families to borrow they 
have tended to turn to such informal sources of credit as 
neighbours, relations, and if necessary, merchants and 
middlemen.
However, as land shortages have spread with the 
growing population, so farmers have been forced to 
increase production through intensification and this has 
necessitated that families borrow money to purchase 
inputs. At present, the evidence suggests that the BAAC 
has been unable to benefit the small farmer to any great 
degree and it was estimated in 1973 that over 80% of loans 
went to medium and large-scale establishments (Direk 
Patmasiriwat,1981,pp 40-42). Where the farmers have been 
incapable of meeting the credit requirements of the 
institutional lenders they have be forced to either go 
without funds or to turn to non-institutional sources 
and the high, often userous, interest rates that go with 
them (table 2.17). This has led to a situation in which 
the lack of credit facilities for the small holder has 
created a barrier to the adoption of new farming 
techniques (Mabry,1979,p 410).
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Table 2.17
Interest Rates on Agricultural Credit in the
Northeast: Formal and Informal Sources
Annual Interest
Formal Sources [1]: 
BAAC
Cooperatives 
Farmers Associations 
Commercial Banks
14%
14%
14%
Informal Sources [2]
Neighbours
Landowners
Relations
Merchants
60.5% 
57.3% 
50.4% 
35.2%
[1] Source: BAAC/1982 Annual Report.
[2] Source: Direk Patmasiriwat/1981,p 17.
The restricted availability and use of credit in the 
Khorat region is partly due to a lack of articulation 
between credit policy and the broader objectives of food 
and agricultural policy/ so that although the government 
has/ for many years/ stated one of its main concerns to 
be the development of the small farmer/ this is not 
reflected in the BAAC's loan requirements which tend to 
favour the wealthier clients (Tongroj Onchan & Meyer,April 
1980/p 3). It is arguable that/ at least to begin with/ 
credit should be extended to the smaller farmers as a 
social service which does not have profitability as one of 
its objectives (Trakarn Thakranonthachai/Dec 1982). But/ 
although small-farmers are often unable to borrow money 
they are, in many cases, also loath to even try; as 
Platenius wrote so lucidly in 1963:
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"It has been argued that the income of the 
farmer is so small that he cannot save; it would 
be more to the point to say that he cannot 
afford to be in debt" (Platenius,1963/p 55).
The first cooperative in Thailand was a village
credit cooperative established in 1916 based on the German
Raiffeisen model. The success of this institution led to
a growth in numbers, although it was not until 1932 that
other types began to appear (Kirsch,1981,p 7). By 1928
expansion had been such that the Cooperative Societies Act
was passed, designed to control and regulate the groups
and provide them with sufficient legal basis
(Demaine,1976,p 1). In 1968 a second Cooperative
Societies Act was promulgated, repealing the Act of 1928,
in order to facilitate further growth. The legislation
led to the amalgamation of all cooperatives and the
establishment of the Cooperative League of Thailand (CLT)
(Pradit Machima,March 1976,p 1). The CLT is o stensibly
an independent association for the promotion of the
cooperative movement (it is a member of the International
Cooperative Alliance). However as Kirsch points out
"although the League is officially a private and
independent association, it is in actuality little more
than an extension of the Cooperative Department", and,
"the influence of the government was firmly established by
law from the beginning" (Kirsch,1981,p 100).
In 1979 a NESDB Committee published a report
analysing the past and future development of agricultural
cooperatives: it stated: "After 61 years of effort and
expenditure of vast governmental resources, agricultural
cooperatives are universally regarded as a failure"
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(NESDB/Feb 1979/p 1). The report identified seven
problems which needed to be overcome:
1/ The pervasive government influence has stunted the 
growth of cooperatives/ and success or failure has been 
dependent on the largesse and controls of the Cooperative 
Promotion Department rather than the degree of 
participation by the members.
2/ Many farmers regard cooperatives as government 
charities/ and too much attention has been paid to the 
quantity rather than the quality of the groups.
3/ Dual and competing governmental organisations have 
led to confusion and inefficiency.
4/ The number of farmers served by the cooperative 
system is small.
5/ Cooperatives have been established due to policy 
decisions by the government rather than any analytical 
work.
6/ Profound disagreements exist between the Cooperatives 
Promotion Department and the BAAC.
7/ No effort has been made to provide agricultural 
extension advice equitably and systematically to all 
farmers.
(adapted from; NESDB/Feb 1979/pp 3-7)
Despite the identification of these problems 
cooperatives in Thailand are still ineffective in meeting 
their stated aims regarding the provision of agricultural 
credit/ inputs/ marketing facilities and advice and at 
present only 39% of the country's farming households have 
formed themselves into cooperatives (US Presidential 
Mission/April 1982/p 11). In fact/ they are "neither
fundamentally important in rural Thailand/ nor is the 
cooperative as a self-help organisation known in all 
areas" (Kirsch/1981,p 103).
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Summary
Within Thailand/ the Northeastern region has 
historically been viewed as the 'Far Province'/ peripheral 
to the nation both culturally and economically. It was 
not until the 1960's that the government felt it was 
necessary to develop policies that would narrow the 
inequalities between it and the rest of the kingdom and 
integrate it with the country as a whole. The principal 
means by which the government expressed its intentions was 
through a succession of Five Year Plans/ beginning in 
1961. The efforts arising out of these plans have had a 
mixed degree of success; for although an adequate 
communications system has been provided and irrigation has 
been expanded to cover just over 12% of the area currently 
used for rice cultivation/ it would not be unfair to see 
the region's development as being essentially autonomous 
and independent of government initiatives.
This is well“ illustrated in the evolution of rain-fed 
agriculture which has developed largely through the 
independent actions of individual farmers. As the 
majority of the population happen to be farmers 
cultivating rice and upland crops in rain-fed conditions/ 
the necessity to investigate the problems and constraints 
that this portion of the inhabitants are facing is clear; 
and it is particularly pertinent when one considers that a 
hiatus/ of sorts/ has appeared in which farmers are being 
forced/ due to the closure of the land frontier/ to move 
from extensive to intensive modes of production. What 
actions households are taking to intensify production; 
what the possibilities are for future increases; and what
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alternative strategies are open to them are the principal 
questions into which the following chapters will enquire.
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Chapter Three
The Khorat Region and the Province of Mahasarakham;
Their Physical Characteristics 
Introduction
The Khorat Region of Thailand is a large 
saucer-shaped plateau, bordered to the north and to the 
east by the Mekong river, and to the south and to the west 
by the Phnom Damrek and Phetchabun Mountains respectively. 
Most of the area (the 'Khorat Basin') is drained by the 
Mun and the Chi rivers which flow southeastwards and 
discharge into the Mekong. The smaller northern section 
is drained by the Nanwan, Luang and Songkhram rivers which 
run north and northeastwards and likewise into the Mekong 
(map 3.1).
Geology and Topography
The bedrock of the region consists of Cretaceous 
rocks such as sandstone, shale, limestone, metamorphosed 
limestone and conglomerate of the Triassic and Jurassic 
from which most of the soils are derived. These beds are 
overlain with Tertiary and Quaternary alluvial deposits 
which have been eroded to form a succession of terraces 
(fig 3.1) (Pendleton,1962,p 54;Donner,1978,p 554):
The flood plains which border all the rivers and streams 
of the area represent the youngest cycle of erosion and 
consist of recent and semi-recent riverine alluvium 
(Donner,1978,p 576;Dept of Land Development,1972). The 
plains are normally narrow, and in fact barely exist along
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much of the Mekong, but may widen to over 20 kilometres in 
parts of the Mun-Chi river system (Dixon,June 1978,p 3).
At a slightly higher elevation are found the flat to 
slightly undulating Lower Terraces which are composed, 
like the Middle and High Terraces, of older alluvium (Dept 
of Land Development,1972). This formation is less prone 
to flooding and despite having soils of lower fertility, 
is more suited to paddy farming due to its topographical 
position.
The Middle Terrace has an undulating to rolling 
topography (Donner,1978,p 557) and still poorer soils. It 
represents the margins of rice culture and is su^eptible 
to drought (Dixon,June 1978,p 3).
Above the Middle Terrace lies the oldest of the 
formations, the Upper or High Terrace. Here the soils are 
sandy and extremely low in fertility, the area only being 
suited to the cultivation of drought resistant upland 
crops. This terrace, which now only exists in small 
remnants, gradually gives way to upland proper 
(Donner,1978,p 577).
During the end of the Triassic period, crustal 
movements created the two major basins of the region, the 
Khorat and Sakon Nakhon basins. Water accumulated in 
these depressions and over time became increasingly salty, 
eventually evaporating to form massive salt and gypsum 
beds which were later covered by clay, sand and alluvial 
deposits (Lamoreaux et al,1959,p 13). The presence of 
these beds, coupled with wet rice cultivation which has 
tended to raise water tables and draw dissolved salts
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upwards, has led to the formation of saline soils over 8 
million rai of lowland in the Northeast (Vivat 
Shotelersuk,June 1981/p 118). The salt affected soils are 
primarily found along the central portion of the Mun-Chi 
river system with the situation being especially serious 
in the Tung Kula Rong Hai, an area of lowland straddling 
the borders of the provinces of Buriram, Mahasarakham, 
Surin/ Roiet/ Si Sa Ke t and Yasothon. The degree of 
salinity varies considerably and accordingly the effect on 
production varies: 700,000 rai has been classified by the
Mekong Committee as ’heavily affected', where few crops 
can survive; approximately 3 million rai as 'moderately 
affected', causing rice yields to be heavily reduced (the 
average production is about 15 kilograms per rai); and the 
rest 'slightly affected', leading to minor reductions in 
output (Vivat Shotelerusuk,June 1981,p 118).
To help rectify this situation the present Five-Year 
National Development Plan (1981-1986) has a target to 
improve 4.8 million rai of saline soil in the region 
(NESDB,n.d. ,p 48). in addition, the Tung Kula Rong Hai 
has been designated a special development zone by the Thai 
government, and its improvement is one of the major 
objectives of the Plan (NESDB,n.d.,pp 125-127).
Topography and Irrigation
The central portion of the plateau undulates gently 
between 100 and 200 metres, "dotted here and there by low 
hills and small shallow lakes" (Pendleton,1962,p 43). 
This fragmented topography makes water control difficult
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and has resulted in a scattered distribution of wet rice 
farming. It also means that the construction of large 
integrated irrigation works, except in a few areas which 
have already been exploited, is difficult. Even the 
smaller projects on which the government has recently been 
concentrating its resources are of doubtful value as they, 
"will at best only provide supplementary water" 
(Johnson,1979,p 36) and are often economically unviable 
(Johnson,1979,p 35). It is generally accepted that the 
potential for the expansion of irrigated land is limited 
[1] and of the 4.56% of farm holdings currently classified 
as such (MOAC,1981, table 84,p 153) only 2% are under 
controlled irrigation (USAID,1981,p 3). This has led to a 
greater emphasis being placed on the improvement of 
rainfed agriculture as the basis for increasing 
agricultural production.
Climate
The climate of the Khorat Plateau is monsoonal being 
in comparison to the Central Plains, "far more 
continental" (Pendleton,1962,p 127). It is characterised 
by having a seasonal rainfall regime that limits rain-fed 
rice production to only half of the year. Thus, the 
Amphoe of Muang Mahasarakham, the district in which the 
research was conducted, had an average annual 
precipitation for the 24
[1] Of the total land area suitable for cultivation in the 
Northeast (62,560,000 rai) the Ttotal potential irrigable 
area' is 7,178,690 rai or 11.5% of that figure (Sanan 
Chantkam,Oct 1981,table l,p 4). NB: not all of this would 
be 'controlled irrigation'.
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years from 1952 to 1975 of 1/228 mm (Dept of Land 
Development/Oct 1979/p 33); slightly less than the average 
for the whole region of 1,368.5 mm per year (Donner,1978,p 
567). However, 84% (1,036.2 mm) of this fell during the 
five months from May to September, and if April and 
October are also included the proportion rises to 95% 
(1,164.3 mm) (graph 3.1).
In addition to this seasonality there is also 
considerable variability in rainfall within each month, 
year to year (table 3.1). Such variability, combined with 
the seasonality, makes rainfed rice cultivation marginal 
and limits upland cropping to those cultivars that can 
withstand a degree of moisture stress. The Mekong 
Committee, using daily rainfall data for the years 
1952-1971, calculated the possible farming periods based 
on effective rainfall by changwat, for the period of the 
rainy season (April - October). In the case of 
Mahasarakham, all the months from May to August were found 
to be marginal to rainfed rice cultivation with only 
September having sufficient reliable rainfall for rainfed 
paddy production to be classified as 'possible' (table 
3.2) (UN-ESCAP,1974,table 8,p 19).
In the rainfed areas of the Northeast precipitation 
determines the timing of all farming operations and in 
response to the uncertainties connected with rainfall 
there has evolved a flexible cultivation strategy, 
socially and agronomically. The aim of such a strategy is 
to stabilise production from year to year at an 
appropriate subsistence level (Morss et al,1976,pp 49-52).
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It is often stated that the risks involved in farming with 
such irregularity of rainfall results in farmers being 
unwilling to innovate and spend money on agricultural 
inputs# especially when profit margins are small (IBRD,Nov 
1974,p 12).
Table 3.1
Standard Deviation/ Maximum, Minimum and Mean of 
Rainfall, Changwat Mahasarakham, by Month: 1971-1982.
Month Sample Standard Mean Maximum Minimum
Deviation (mm) (m m ) (mm)
J a nua ry 9.502 4.3 33.1 0
February 30.040 29.1 74.8 0
March 35.291 39.8 114.0 1.6
April 68.197 67.6 241.5 9.1
May 74.469 162.5 329.6 72.5
J une 94.089 175.8 415.3 63 .4
July 73.285 191.7 302.4 98.2
August 68.380 193.0 280.5 84.2
September 126.148 282.6 519.2 51.5
October 57.234 81.2 201.0 0
November 8.147 6.0 25.4 0
December 8.273 3.9 29.0 0
TOTAL 1,238. 2,565.8 380.5
Source: Unpublished Mekong Secretariat figures
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Table 3.2
Possible Rainfed Farming Periods based on Effective 
Rainfall; Changwat Mahasarakham
April May June July Aug Sept Oct
<-) (-) (-) (“) (-) (*) (-)
ER more than 75mm per month 
ER less than 75mm per month
ER-J more than 75mm per month 
ER-J less than 75mm per month
rainfed paddy cultivation marginal 
rainfed paddy cultivation possible
ER (Effective Rainfall) defined as; the "portion of Basic 
Effective Rainfall, excluding overflow and infiltration 
which increases soil moisture but which has not yet
appeared as free surface water. In other words, ER is the 
increment in the positive water depth in the paddy field 
after each rain" (p 14).
(*) ER- ; less than 16% risk that the Effective Rainfall,
as defined above, will not fall.
(-) ER- : greater than 16% risk that the Effective
Rainfall, as defined above, will not fall.
Possible Rainfed Paddy Cultivation defined as; "at least 
75mm of effective rainfall...during each month of the wet 
season to ensure continuous farming without damage" (p 
18).
(*)
(-)
Source:UN-ESCAP,1974,table 8,p 19
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Important, from the point of view of rice cultivation 
are the rains at the beginning of the season which must be 
prolonged and heavy enough to saturate the soil and allow 
the land to be prepared. Also critical is adequate water 
supply during reduction-division and early heading, at
q
which stages the plant is particularly suceptible to 
moisture stress and other environmental and nutritional 
variables (Matsushima,1976,p 312). In fact, 70% of the 
brown rice yield of traditional varieties and 90% of that 
of HYV's is determined during the late growth period which 
includes the stages of reduction-division and early 
heading (Matsushima,1976,pp 311-312). There have been a 
number of attempts to identify the optimum period for rice 
cultivation given the vagaries of rainfall. However, the 
results have been inconclusive (M0AC,June 1980,pp 31-32) 
and in any case it is doubtful if any "meaningful 
relationship among the many rainfall stations or between 
rainfall and various agricultural parameters" could 
actually be established (UN-ESCAP,1974,p 1).
In the crop year under study, 1982/83, the region 
suffered from delayed rains at the start of the season and 
flooding in the latter period (September/October) (graph 
3.1). Of the climatic factors it is rainfall which 
presents the greatest problems to the farmer and "under 
rain-fed subsistence agricultural production every aspect 
of rural life, work and well-being is determined by these 
uncertainties of natural water supply" (Ng,1970,pp 25-26).
Temperature meanwhile, "with an average annual figure 
of 22.9 degrees centigrade over the past twenty years,
132
imposes no constraint on double cropping or even multiple 
cropping of most tropical and sub-tropical crops" 
(Ng,1970,p 24). In fact, the extreme low temperatures
recorded at stations in Khon Kaen and Roiet, two 
neighbouring provinces to Mahasarakham, for the years 1976 
- 1980 were 8.5 and 9.4 degrees centigrade respectively 
(MOAC,1981,table 82,p 144).
Soils and Land Use
The soils of the region are, on the whole, strongly 
weathered and leached sandy or alluvial soils low in 
fertility and exhibiting an organic matter content that 
rarely rises above 1% (IBRD,Nov 1974,p 11). Land 
suitability studies have shown that of the Northeast's 
total land area of 106.3 million rai (17 million hectares) 
only 62.56 million (59%) consists of cultivable arable 
land of which 22.64 million rai is suitable for paddy and 
39.92 million rai for upland crops (table 3.3) (Sanan 
Chantkam,Oct 1981, table l,p 4). Even the land which is 
classified as 'cultivable' is rarely of high fertility and 
the Khorat fine sandy loams, "form one of the most 
extensive soil groups and at the same time one of the most 
infertile soil groups in the kingdom" (Pendleton,1962,p 
71).
The paucity of the soils (especially with reference 
to those of the uplands) and the seasonality of the 
rainfall of the plateau are to some extent reflected in 
its vegetation. Dry deciduous dipterocarp forest or 
savanna forest, the most important single formation in
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Thailand (46% of total forested area) dominates the region 
accounting for almost 80% of the forest vegetation 
(Stott/1978 ,p 168). The formation is characteristic of 
areas with hot bioclimates/ a dry season of five to six 
months and an average rainfall of between 1,000 and 1,500 
mm per year (Gaussen et al,1967; quoted in Stott,1984,p 
319). Further, the soils of the dry deciduous dipterocarp 
forest are, "typically 'dry1, being usually free-draining 
members of the Red-Yellow Podzolic or Grey Podzolic
groups, with a high sand fraction, and often relatively 
thin and stony" (Stott,1984,p 322). The humus content 
tends to be very low, the pH ranges from 5.0 to 6.2 while 
the C/N ratio, measured at 12.7, indicates a low rate of 
decomposition and nitrification (Stott,1984,p 322).
Rice, as the main subsistence crop, is grown on the 
entire area classified as suitable for paddy and, in
addition, on much of the marginal land which might be 
better suited to other crops (table 3.3). Most of this 
marginal riceland is upper terrace where there is an 
intermittent supply of water (MOAC,April 1980,p 23) and it 
is only during wet years that a rice crop can be planted, 
leaving the land idle for much of the rest of the time.
Farmers tend to reserve these paddys so that when rainfall
is excessive and the main crop on the lower land is 
damaged, the deficit can be made up by production from the 
upper fields (MOAC,1980,p 6). The strategy represents a 
classic case of risk aversion (risk minimisation) and it
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is often stated that only when yields can be stabilised on 
the true riceland will farmers be willing to plant other, 
agronomically more suitable, crops on these marginal upper 
terraces (MOAC,1980,p 1 & pp 25-26).
Table 3.3
Land Suitability and Land Use in the Northeast
[*] 'Field crops'.
Sources:Sanan Chantkam,1982,table l,p 4 ;M0AC,1981,table
88,p 160.
It should be noted that fertility is not a 
determinant in deciding where rice cultivation is 
feasible; the crucial factor being the interplay of 
topography and drainage: Drainage or permeability is
dependent on the clay/silt content of the soil which is 
highest in the depressions, decreasing as one travels up 
onto the higher ground. Topography meanwhile has the 
tendency to cause rainfall to gather through seepage from 
the surrounding countryside, on the lower land. These two 
factors combine so that it is only in those areas where
Land Suitability Land Use [2]
Total Area of Region 
Area Cultivable
106,391,250 106,391,250
62,560,000
Paddy
Upland Crops
22.640.000 35,886,374
39.920.000 9,901,022 [*]
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the nature of the soil and of the topography allows the 
accumulation, and thus the impoundment of water, which are 
physically suited to wet rice farming.
On the upland soils, erosion and the loss of
fertility is becoming an increasing problem as farmers
strive to boost their income through the cultivation of
cash crops without the application of fertilisers or the
use of measures to curb the processes of soil degradation.
The northern, southern and eastern parts of the region are
0
affected most sever^Ly, but even on the central portion of 
the plateau erosion is 'moderate1 (US Presidential 
Mission,April 1982,p 34) and soils are deteriorating 
(table 3.4). The three major upland crops, cassava, maize 
and kenaf are all demanding in terms of soil nutrients 
with cassava having an especially bad reputation:
Cassava has a high requirement for potassium 
(Chan,1980,p 82) and among the micro-nutrients, for 
magnesium (Howeler,1980,p 63) and zinc (Onwueme,1978,p 
131), and its intensive cultivation without proper 
management will lead to a rapid loss of fertility. As 
Shelton and Puket note: "Any crop which has a large
weight of plant material removed from the field at 
harvest, can be expected to remove a proportional amount 
of plant nutrients from the soil" (Shelton & Puket,1974,p 
8). In addition, inadequate ground cover due to the slow 
closure of the canopy and the high proportion of bare soil 
between the plants combined with the loosening of the soil 
during harvesting enhances and accelerates the processes
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of soil erosion (Weber et al,1980,p 10; Howeler,1980,p
60).
However/ cassava does seem to be an adaptable crop/ 
and nutrient requirements in different soils are highly 
variable with researchers being unable to provide general 
fertiliser recommendations (Weber et al/1980,p 11). This 
has led some people to state that even under continuous 
cropping without the use of fertilisers there is a certain 
point at which the nutrient levels stabilise and 
degradation halts (Sunthorn Rajvongsuek/Aug 1977/p 29). 
This disagreement over what effect cassava has on the soil 
nutrient status is largely because there does not exist a 
consistent body of useful information relating to the 
subject/ and up-to now studies have been uncoordinated/ 
ranging over varying soil types/ climates and cultivars 
(Coursey & Booth/1977/p 79; Weber et al/1980/pp 11-12). 
Also/ cassava's reputation as a vigorous nutrient depleter 
may be linked to the fact that it is one of the few crops 
that can be grown on eroded and exhausted soils/ and it is 
therefore presumed to have created the condition in the 
first place. It should be noted that any crop/ if no 
attempt is made to restore nutrients/ will impoverish the 
soil sooner or later (Chan/1980,p 82) and in Northeastern 
Thailand this applies to kenaf and maize, just as it does 
to cassava.
T
a
b
l
e
137
<T\ CD
CM 01
CD r-»
J •» -
<1) 00 in
u EH ^p ID
c O cr>
■H 0 EH *»
> o> CM i—i
o g
■H
a* T3 0
rH !ui i—1 CTi
s o 0 O CO dP
cd X > co in  m
X 0 «. dp — »
cm CO in 00 CM
cd O r -  • i n ■1
u co m
cd c*P 54 **
CO 0 CM
cd > CM
X
cd 0
E 0 i—1 i—i
54 in ID
G 0 0 O in  <sp
•H •<—• 5-1 *. dP -  o
12 0 1—1 'sp 'v? •
O > CO * pH r -
C M 0 r -  in rH 'sP
cd CO CO ** CM s ' ---
o CM rH
X ed i—1
CO co
cd
0 Pm r" m  ^
X O 0 r - 00 dP
X X CM o\° ID  CO
u Eh 0 ** [•" ** »
o S U CM * CM CM
s CO 0 -vP ^ 01 i—i
EH 13 CO rH CM
0 X 0
X co S r-
u
<o
0
N
■H
0
O
O
•
o
CM
0 G rH Ol
G G O
•H 0  —- 0 X 1 1 1
Cj i*H Ol o •H S~-
G C 0 CO CO X rH rH rH
O •H M CTi CM 0 0 o O O
•rH fO »» *» U 0 • • •
W rH CM rH ■H o in o O
O o o oi l> IJ CM o
54 33 00 O CO •H rH
CO Ol 0 rH
S rH O CM 0 •H
CM U m 0 O
o
F
a
in
rH
U
CO
X
G G
0 o O 0 0
X 0 in i—1 •H 54
X! 0 CM i—1 0 0
CO u - — O 0 >
I—1 CO 54 U X 0
0 ■H Ol ID CO o 0 0 CO
X rH 0 CO in tJl u U
EH 0 ^ ** *■ rH 0 0 0 > i
X 10 CO •H X fO > i-i
O o 0 0 0 0 0
Eh 1—1 CO o a CO >
CO
X
CO
0
0
x
X
u
o
s
&
0
x
0
i-i
0co
0
x
cd
s
So
ur
ce
: 
US
 
Pr
es
id
en
ti
al
 
M
i
s
s
i
o
n
,
A
p
r
i
l
 
19
82
,t
ab
le
 
3,
p 
3
6
,
p 
3
7
,
An
ne
x 
2,
p 
22
0.
138
The Soils of Mahasarakham
The nature of the soils of the Khorat Basin can be
exemplified through the case of one province,
Mahasarakham; and, in turn, the soils of that changwat are
revealed in the small area around the study villages.
Indeed, the soil series present in the research area cover
over 93% of the changwat (table 3.5).
dominate
Four soil series \the area surrounding the villages of 
Baan Noon Tae and Baan Tha Song Korn; namely, Roiet and 
Roiet Loamy Variant which are found on the lower riceland, 
and Korat and Warin occupying the higher ground (Map 3.2).
All four are either deep sandy loams or loamy sands, low
in fertility and organic content. The two lowland soils 
drain poorly and are physically suited to wet rice 
farming, while those found on the upland are more 
permeable making the impounding of water impossible
(tables 3.6a & 3.6b; Map 3.3) (Dept of Land
Development,1972)
The other soils of the area show a similar general 
pattern of either being suited to rice or. to upland crop 
cultivation (Map 3.3 & Map 3.4), although a clear
delineation between the two types of land does not occur 
and in reality there exists a zone of transition. This 
zone is the marginal paddy land which the farmer, in his 
strategy of risk minimisation, reserves for the years when 
the main crop on the lower land is damaged through 
flooding.
The suitability of the soils of the research area for 
rice and upland crop production is clearly reflected in
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Land Use 
Base Map (3 .2 , 3 .3 , 3 .4 , )
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Map 3 .2 . Soil Map of Area Surrounding Study Villages
M ahasarakham
Korat
Roiet Loamy variant 
Warin
Si Songkram 
Ubon
Chiang mai
Ratchab u r i 
Phimai 
Nam Phong 
Roiet
Water
S o u rce :L a n d  D eve lo p m en t D epartm ent 1972
Map 3 .3 . Land Capability C lassification for Rice
lahasarakham
to
Khon
Kaen •  BAAN NOON^:*s.tae»>ks
^UPARAAT
0 1 2  3 4 5 6 kms» ‘_______I_______I-------1-------1 I
Land capability classification Vt.
Land which is not suited to the cultivation of rice.
Land capability classification IVs . Land which is minimally 
suited to rice cultivation, because it is sandy and water rarely 
collects. Land also has low fertility.
Land capability classification III s .Land which is of average 
suitability for the cultivation of rice but the soil is low in fertility 
and must have fertilisers applied to increase production.
Land capability classification III f. Land which is well suited to 
rice cultivation , but might be affected by flooding.
Areas of permanent water
S ou rce : Land D eve lo p m e n t D epartm ent 1977
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Map 3 .4 . Land Capability C lassification for Upland Crops
9nmgmH«ngi
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Land classification IVd. Land minimally suited to the general 
cultivation of upland crops because the soil is poorly drained 
and water accumulates in the rainy season.
Land capability classification Ill’s. Land which is of average suitability 
for the general cultivation of upland crops, but should have fertilisers 
because the land has low fertility. Production maybe limited at times 
by low rainfall.
Land capability classification I l f . Land which is well suited to the general 
cultivation of upland crops , but might be affected by flooding in some years.
Areas of permanent water.
S ou rce : Land DevoIopm ent Departm ent 1977.
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Table 3.5
The Soils of Mahasarakham
Soil Series Area(rai) % of Total
Area
Alluvial Complex 17,860 0.50% RECENT &
*Chiangmai 42,015 1.17% FLOOD SEMI-RECENT
*Chainat & Ratchaburi 92,430 2.57% PLAIN RIVERINE
*Phima i 65,120 1.81% ALLUVIUM
*Si Songkhram 63,020 1.75%
*Roiet 1 ,304,040 36.26%
Roiet, High Phase 13,130 0.37%
*Roiet, Loamy Variant 203,250 5.65% LOW
Roiet & On 78,250 2.18% TERRACE
Kula Ronghai 12,600 0.35%
*Ubon 284,260 7.92%
Udon 1,050 0.03%
*Korat 744,720 20.71% MIDDLE OLD
Phon Phisai 7,615 0.21% TERRACE RIVERINE
*Nam Phong 529,650 14.73% ALLUVIUM
Satuk 60,130 1.67%
*Warin 19,170 0.53% HIGH
Yasothon 26,780 0.74% TERRACE
Yasothon,Gravelly Phase 2,630 0.07%
Ponds 22,580 0.63%
Swamps 5,250 0.15%
TOTAL 3/568,110 rai
* : Soils present in the study area.
Source:Dept of land Development,1972; Dept of Land 
Development,1975,p 24.
O a 3 Qj 3
§ ?■&
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Footnotes to Table 3.6a
[1] Classification:
a: United States Department of Agriculture/ 1970. 
b: National Classification (based on "Major Soils of 
Southeast Asia"/ Dudal & Moormann/Jour of Trop 
Geog; Vol 18/ 1964.
[2] Effective Soil Depth:
Refers to rooting zone. range of depth ratings as 
follows:
Rating Depth (cm)
Very shallow < 25
Shallow 25-50
Moderately deep 50-100
Deep 100-150
Very deep > 150
[3] Permeability
Slow: soils expected to have hydraulic conductivity 
< 0.5 cm/hour.
Moderate: soils expected to have hydraulic 
conductivity of 0.5-15 cm/hour.
Rapid: soils expected to have hydraulic conductivity 
> 15 cm/hour
Surface Runoff
Slow: surface water flows away very slowly.
Free water lies on surface for considerable 
periods or immediately enter the soil. Much 
water passes through soil or is lost to 
evaporation. Soils subject to little or 
no erosion
Medium: surface water flows away at such a rate 
that moderate amount enters profile and 
free water lies on surface for only short 
periods. Water lost through runoff does not 
seriously reduce supply available for 
plant growth. Erosion hazard: 
slight to moderate.
Rapid: a large or very large proportion of the 
rainfall flows over land surface.
Erosion hazard: moderate/ high or very high
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[4] Organic Matter (USDA)
Rating Range %
very low <0.5
low 0.5-1.0
moderately low 1.0-1.5
medium 1.5-2.5
moderately high 2.5-3.5
high 3.5-4.5
very high >4.5
[5] CEC (USDA)
Rating Range (me/lOOgm soil
very low <3.0
low 3.0-5.0
moderately low 5.0-10
medium 10-15
moderately high 15-20
high 20-30
very high >30
[6] Available Phosphorous (USDA)
Rating Range (ppm)
very low <3
low 3-6
moderately low 6-10
medium 10-15
moderately high 15-25
high 25-45
very high >45
[7] Available Potassium (USDA)
Rating Range (ppm)
very low <30
low 30-50
medium 60-90
high 90-120
very high >120
Source: Dept of Land Development,1972.
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various Thai government surveys [1]:
On the land closest to the Lam Chi/ four very deep 
alluvial soils are found: Chiangmai, Ratchaburi, Phimai
p
and Si Songkhram. Geomor|iologically, the area is a flood 
plain and consists of recent and semi-recent riverine 
alluvium (table 3.5). The Ratchaburi, Phimai and Si 
Songkhram series are all poorly drained and are defined as 
being well suited to wet rice cultivation although there 
exists a risk of flooding in some years. The tendency for 
water to collect during the rainy season makes them 
unsuited to the growth of upland crops. The fourth 
series, Chiangmai, however has the reverse classification 
of being unsuitable for rice but well-suited to upland 
crop cultivation. This reflects the fact that drainage is 
good and the permeability of the series rapid, preventing 
the accumulation of surface water.
In terms of chemical content the four soils of the 
floodplain show great variation (tables 3.6a & 3.6b): the 
available potassium in the top 30cm ranges along a 
spectrum from 'very low' on the Phimai series to 'low', Si 
Songkhram: 'medium', Chiangmai; and to 'very high' on the
Ratchaburi. In a similar fashion phosphorous in the top 
30cm reveals no pattern with Ratchaburi having a 'very 
low' content; Phimai, 'low'; Si Songkram, 'moderately 
low'; and Chiangmai, 'moderate'. Of more significance are 
the differences in CEC and organic matter content of the
[1] All the information in the next passage is taken from 
the following references: Dept of Land Development,1972;
Dept of Land Development,1975; Dept of Land 
Development,!977.
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four soils and those on the higher ground/ and in this a 
trend is discernable: the four soils have a much higher
CEC than those of the lower/ middle and high terraces/ and 
although organic matter content is described as flowf 
(1.0%) and 'moderately low' (1.2% and 1.3%) for three of 
the series and 'moderately high' (3.1%) for the fourth. Si 
Songkhram, in comparison to the other soils these 
percentages are high.
On the old alluvium of the lower terraces occur three 
soils: Ubon, Roiet and Roiet Loamy Variant (table 3.5;
tables 3.6a & 3.6b). Ubon is classified as a hydromorphic 
regosol and because of its extremely low fertility and
sandy nature, which results in rapid drainage and problems 
of water supply, is minimally suited to both rice and to 
the general cultivation of upland crops. The humic gley 
Roiet and Roiet Loamy Variant however, although they are 
likewise very low in fertility, with their high clay/loam 
content allow water to be impounded and are therefore
favourable to the cultivation of rice and unfavourably 
suited to upland crops. The loamy variant is rather less 
permeable and this leads to the risk of excessive
inundation (flooding) in some years.
With respect to their chemical and organic matter
content, the three soils are very similar exhibiting a 
dearth of nutrients (tables 3.6a & 3.6b): available
phosphorous and potassium in the top 30cm of the soils, as 
well as the organic matter, is in all cases classified as 
'very low'. CEC for the regosol, Ubon, is also 'very 
low', while for the Roiet and Roiet Loamy Variant it is 
'1ow'.
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Korat, a podzol and Nam Phong/ a regosol/ on the 
middle terrace as well as Warin, another podzol, on the 
high terrace all drain at least moderately well and are 
unsuitable for rice cultivation (table 3.5; tables 3.6a & 
3.6b). As far as upland crops are concerned the two 
podzols are of average suitability, although fertiliser 
applications are advised due to their low inherent
fertility. Production may also be affected during periods 
of drought as their topographical position and moderate 
permeability reduces water retention and often leads to 
problems of moisture stress. The regosol Nam Phong 
meanwhile, due to its characteristic of 'excessive 
drainage' coupled with poor fertility is, like the Ubon
series, only minimally suited to the general cultivation 
of upland crops.
Chemical analysis shows that the three soils are 
similar to those found on the lower terraces (tables 3.6a 
& 3.6b): they have a 'very low* organic matter content,
and 'low' or 'very low' CEC, while available phosphorous 
and potassium in the the top 30cm is also 'low' or 'very 
low'.
The soils of the Northeast characteristically have a 
low organic matter content and this is clearly portrayed 
in the study area where the four major series each contain 
less than half of one percent (tables 3.6a & 3.6b).
"Organic matter influences physical and chemical
properties of soils far out of proportion to the small
quantities present" (Brady,1974,p 137), and the lack of it
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throughout the region is a major constraint limiting the 
increase in yields (table 3.7). Especially important 
would be the improvement of the upland areas where a 
higher soil organic matter content would increase the 
water holding capacity of the soil (organic particles are 
hygroscopic) and so reduce the effects of drought, as well 
as improving its structural properties. Furthermore, 
organic colloids hold and exchange anions and nutrient 
cations in the soil thereby directly contributing towards 
a high cation exchange capacity. This would, in turn, 
make fertilisers more effective, with the added nutrients 
being held in the soil rather than leached through.
In addition to these improvements, the supply and 
availability of the plant nutrients nitrogen, phosphorous 
and sulphur is also closely related to the organic matter 
content and in consequence of this are also generally in 
short supply.
Table 3.7
Influence of Soil Organic Matter on Soil Properties
- Effect on soil colour; brown or black
- Influence on physical properties:
a) Granulation encouraged
b) Plasticity, cohesion etc; reduced
c) Water holding capacity increased.
- High cation absorption capacity:
a) Two to thirty times as much as mineral colloids
b) Accounts for 30-90% of the absorbing power of 
mineral soils
- Supply and availabilty of nutrients:
a) Easily replaceable cations present
b) Nitrogen, phosphorous and sulphur held in 
organic forms
c) Extraction of elements from minerals by acid humus
Source: Brady,1974,pp 150-151.
Nitrogen "is clearly the most important organic 
nutrient" (Faniran & Areola/1978,p 200), and 90-95% is 
stored within this medium (Faniran & Areola,1978,p 27). 
However, to be absorbed by plants nitrogen must be 
converted into the nitrate anion through the 
mineralisation (nitrification) process whereupon it 
becomes prone to leaching, immobilisation in the bodies of 
micro-organsisms and denitrification (Brady,1974,pp 
423-426). On cultivated land "there is a direct 
relationship between the amount of nitrogen in the soil 
and crop yields" (Faniran & Areola,1978,p 201), and 
therefore it is not suiprising to find both rice and upland 
crops exhibiting low productivity per rai.
"With the possible exception of nitrogen, no other 
element has been as critical in the growth of plants as 
has phosphorous" (Brady,1974,p 456). Like nitrogen it is 
rendered unavailable to plants through fixation and this 
is amplified in acid soils such as those prevalent in the 
study area, and over much of the region [1] (table 3.5; 
tables 3.6a & 3.6b) (maximium phosphate availability to
plants is obtained when soil pH is maintained in the range 
6.0-7.0; - Brady,1974,p 460-467). Crops largely depend on
[1] The application of lime to reduce the acidity of the 
soils of the plateau (most are 'medium acid'. Donahue et 
al,1977,p 118 classify soils as follows: pH 5,0-5.5,
'stongly acid'; pH 5.5-6.0, 'medium acid'; pH 6.0-6.5, 
'slightly acid') would be beneficial in a number of 
respects: it would give the soil a more granular
structure, increase the availability of certain nutrients 
(eg; phosphorous and potassium) while reducing the 
toxicity of others, and would also stimulate the formation 
of humus (Brady,1974,pp 413-414).
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phosphorous returned from the soil organic matter (Faniran 
& Areola/1978/p 201) and where it is low, problems of 
reduced availability arise. This is accentuated on land 
which is continuously cleared and cultivated, and will 
directly lead to lower yields (Faniran & Areola,1978,p 
201).
Sulphur is only of secondary importance in comparison 
to nitrogen and phosphorous, but nevertheless is an 
essential growth-promoting element (Faniran & 
Areola,1978,p 201). It is particularly important in the 
growth of jute (kenaf) and groundnuts (Cruikshank,1972,p 
207) two common upland crops of the Northeast, and as 
cultivation continues without fertilisation, so sulphur 
deficiency will spread.
Summary
The principal physical variable affecting the 
cultivation of wet rice is adequate water supply. In the 
Northeastern region of Thailand a seasonal climate coupled 
with a great degree of variation in precipitation within 
any rainy season means that the bulk of farmers who grow 
rain-fed paddy cannot ensure a reliable supply in their 
fields. In addition, the nature of the topography not 
only means that the opportunities for irrigation are 
limited, but also that the lower terraces and flood plain 
suffer from a proneness to flooding while the middle and 
upper terraces suffer from drought. This is further 
accentuated by the tendency for the soils of the lower 
lands to have a high clay/silt content and thus be
154
impermeable, and those of the upper fields to be sandy and 
so drain excessively rapidly.
The fertility of the soils is characteristically low 
with an extremely limited organic matter content being 
particularly debilitating, especially with regards to the 
true uplands. However, this said, in comparison to the 
ways in which rainfall, topography and soil inter act to 
affect water conditions in the paddys, simple fertility 
(that is with exception of the uplands) is of minor 
consequence.
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Chapter Four
The Villages of Baan Noon Tae & Baan Tha Song Korn 
Introduction
The two study villages of Baan Noon Tae and Baan Tha 
Song Korn are located in Amphoe Muang, Changwat 
Mahasarakham (map 4.1). They lie on either side of the 
main road to Khon Kaen approximately nine kilometres from 
the town of Mahasarakham, the capital of the province. 
Both villages are part of Tambon Tha Song Korn, a commune 
that comprises 14 villages with a total population of 
10,792 (1983) and covering an administrative area of
33,197 rai (5,311.5 Ha) (map 4.2).
The communities are situated close to the Lam Chi 
(map 4.2), a major river of the Northeast, which drains, 
along with the Lam Mun, a major potion of the plateau. 
The river valley represents one of the original zones of 
settlement in the region and population growth in 
conjunction with an expansion in the area of farm holdings 
means no free land remains [1]. The villages, like most 
on the plateau, are sited on one of the lower terraces to 
protect them from flooding during the rainy season and are 
linked to the main road by means of laterite tracks that 
can take vehicular traffic throughout the year. In 
configuration the villages are nuclear, although in the 
case of Baan Tha Song Korn there has been some growth
[1] Tambon Tha Song Korn has a land area of 9,405 rai. Of 
this, 7,370 rai or 78% is used agriculturally (1982). The 
manrland ratio for the tambon is 1:3.1 (rai). This 
compares with a figure for the whole kingdom (1981 data) 
of 1:6.7, and for the Northeastern region of 1:6.5 
(MOAC,1981,table 88,p 160; NSO,1982,table 7,pp 13-15).
Map 4.1 Mahasarakham Province
KHON
KAEN
C H IAN G  YUN
KATANA
W IC H A I
KOSUM
PHISAI
MAHASARAKHAl
Study area
BORABU
N A A  CHUAK W A P I PATHUM
PHAPHUM
50km s
J
RIVERS ■ . ......
RAILW AYS ■H III ll'H*
ROADS
CHANGW AT
BOUNDARIES
157
Map 4.2 Tambon Tha Song Korn, Amphoa Muang Mahasarakham
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along the Khon Kaen - Mahasarakham road giving it a mixed 
nuclear/linear form.
Baan Noon Tae/ the smaller of the two communities/ 
has 849 inhabitants in 140 households. It was not 
established until 1917 when a number of families headed by 
Mr Oon Khaay Naam moved there and formed a new village. 
The muubaan grew as other families migrated to the site 
and in 1941 the government officially recognised the 
hamlet as Muu Thii Sii (village number four) [1] / tambon 
Tha Song Korn. The method by which Baan Noon Tae was 
established follows a pattern that has been characteristic 
of the region: as population increases so farmers begin
to take up land on the periphery of the community [2]. 
Finally this is consumed and leads/ "eventually to [the] 
founding of satellite villages whose inhabitants moved 
from the mother village in order to be closer to their 
fields" (Keyes/1976/p 53). Baan Tha Song Korn meanwhile 
has a population of 1/574 in 257 households and has grown 
to physically fuse with another village/ Baan Tha Song 
Korn Nooy. The two sections have kept their identities 
though and are administratively separate/ with different 
headmen and village numbers.
Both villages are farming communities with 93% of the 
households being officially defined as 'agricultural1. 
Rice is grown to meet subsistence needs on 82% of the
[1] Every village is assigned a number; Baan Noon Tae is 
village number four in the tambon, and Baan Tha Song Korn 
is village number one.
I
[2] The 'periphery1 being defined as land near enough to 
be reached by foot, and cultivated.
farmland (crop year 1982/83)/ the remainder being planted 
to upland cash crops, fruit trees and vegetables. An 
important difference between the two which has already 
been mentioned, is that Baan Noon Tae had been chosen as a 
target community for the PDA's pilot project, 'Community 
Based Integrated Rural Development'.
In a general sense individuals within the villages 
can be grouped into two associations: the household, and
in spatial terms, the compound. It is usual to find a 
household comprising a nuclear family (large extended 
families are rare) living in a compound with other 
households who are often in some way related. In the case 
of the two study villages the average household size was 
6.1 members although they are fluid entities with 
husbands, sons and daughters leaving and returning with 
regularity.
Services and Amenities
Baan Noon Tae and Tha Song Korn are well-provided 
with services and amenities; a number of village shops 
exist selling a limited variety of general merchandise 
(fruit & vegetables, kanom, bottled drinks, washing 
powder, cigarettes etc;) and each has its own wat. Both 
villages have electricity and within one kilometre are 
located a Second Class Health Centre and the tambon 
primary school (map 4.2).
The town of Mahasarakham is easily accessible by 
means of a half-hourly bus service (fare: 2 baht) that
runs from Khon Kaen to Mahasarakham, and villagers
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commonly travel there to buy goods unavailable in their 
own communities or to sell agricultural produce and crafts 
at the market or to middlemen and merchants. In addition, 
being a provincial capital, Mahasarakham has all the 
changwat-level government offices, a sophisticated 
hospital, secondary schools, an agricultural college, a 
teacher training college and a university 
(Srinakharinwirot Mahasarakham).
Health and Sanitation
The second class health centre is staffed by a 
midwife and a sanitarian and is able to provide minor 
medical care and distribute contraceptives. More serious 
injuries and illnesses are referred to the provincial 
hospital in Mahasarakham which is staffed by doctors and 
equipped with an operating theatre. At the village-level, 
the Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) has implemented two 
programmes to improve the health of children, namely; a 
vaccination and anti-biotics programme and a nutrition 
programme for pre-school infants (aged 1-5 years old) [1]. 
The Community Development Department (CDD) has also become 
involved in this aspect of development and the nation-wide 
Women Development Plan which is aimed in part at improving 
the general health of pregnant mothers, as well as the 
Children Development Plan, are geared at eradicating
[1] This is possibly in response to the alarming national 
and regional statisics regarding malnutrition among 
pre-school children; in 1980 in the province of 
Mahasarakham 62.4% of children aged between one and five 
had some form of protein-calorie malnutrition, the figure 
for the region being 59.2% (NESDB,1980,p 70-71).
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infant mortality and malnutrition (CDD/Feb 1983,pp 33-36).
The provision of clean drinking water and adequate 
sanitation is also closely related to the general health 
of any community and the MOPH, CDD and the Population and 
Development Association (PDA) have been involved in 
providing, for a fee, rainwater tanks and jars, and 
lavatories. Now virtually all the households in Noon Tae 
and Tha Song Korn have some method of rainwater collection 
and storage, and 43 of the households in Baan Noon Tae 
have had lavatories built with the help of the PDA [1].
Education
In Thailand, primary education covering six years is
both free and officially, compulsory [2], In the
households interviewed all of the children apparently 
entered primary school [3] and in contrast to some
previous studies which have indicated a rapid drop out
rate (eg; Leonor Jr,1982,pp 105-125), they also all seemed 
to have attended throughout the six year period. The
[1] Lavatories are not built directly by the PDA but 
through the CBIRD project? as this project does not
operate in Baan Tha Song Korn, the number of latrines
there is far fewer than in Noon Tae.
[2] The Primary Education Act of 1921 obligated parents to 
send their children to primary school for four years. In 
1960 the length of primary education was extended to seven 
years (Kieatviboon Chomkhair,June 1981,p 206), The 
present National Scheme of Education was adopted in 1977 
and follows a 6:3:3 pattern: six years of compulsory
primary education followed by six years of optional
secondary education divided into two three-year portions;
Lower and Upper Secondary Education (Uma Sukonthaman & 
Sucharit Pienchop,Chulalongkorn University documents)
[3] Although one must assume a degree of over-reporting.
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notion that schooling is free however/ is only accurate in 
that no fees are levied and parents within the villages 
claimed there were significant outlays in terms of school 
uniforms/ books/ stationery and additional charges to pay 
for such things as ingredients during cooking lessons. In 
addition/ there is the important factor that a child as 
young as six years of age represents an economic resource 
who/ traditionally/ would have been a member of the 
household labour force employed/ most commonly/ looking 
after the buffalo and cattle.
If a child from Noon Tae or Tha Song Korn is to 
continue his or her education and go to secondary school 
or further he or she has to travel to Mahasarakham nine 
kilometres away# to attend. The percentage of children 
doing so is small with 14% of those interviewed going onto 
secondary education (many of these only to complete the 
Lower Secondary stage) and only a handful further than 
that [1]. The fact that secondary schooling is not free 
and has fees totalling 1/500 baht per year together with a 
greatly increased bill for clothes/ books/ stationery and 
travel must significantly reduce the number of families 
able to afford it. Indeed/ many parents when asked what 
they considered to be their largest cash outlays during 
the year identified schooling as one. Also/ by the time a 
child is ready to go to secondary school at twelve or more 
years old/ he or she is beginning to become a potentially
[1] It should be remembered that a larger proportion of 
those now in primary school will go onto secondary 
education and further.
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full member of the work-force, and is therefore that
much more of a lost asset. For how long a child attends 
school is not only dependent on a family’s financial 
status, but also relates to their perception of the
relevance of schooling to everyday life in a farming
community. A number of villagers saw little benefit 
deriving from schooling past bor hok (the sixth year) and 
some even thought it to be undesireable, turning students 
into people "with cold hearts, like those in the towns". 
The inhabitants of Noon Tae and Tha Song Korn may be 
correct in holding this view that education does not serve 
their needs; the syllabus is designed and imposed from
outside the villages and in many ways bears little
relation to the nature of problems at the farm-level. As 
Axinn notes utilising material from Nepal, India, 
Indonesia and Thailand: "The large-scale centrally
controlled literary and book orientated educational 
imports from abroad have failed to serve rural development 
in Asia" (Axinn,June 1977,p 487).
Authority and Administration: The Village Headman and
Village Development Committee
The lowest level of authority in Thailand lies with 
the phuuyaybaan or village headman who is voted into the 
position democratically and keeps it until the age of 60 
when he is obliged to retire (he may be removed if he 
loses the confidence of the other villagers). He receives 
a small government stipend of 419 baht per month and is 
empowered to settle minor village disputes and keep the
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vital statistics of the community. In the study villages 
the headmen were both respected and fairly influential 
men; this was especially true of the phuuyaybaan of Baan 
Noon Tae who was viewed by government officials and 
villagers alike as an especially able and committed man. 
He was 56 years old and had held the position for eight 
years. Unlike most of the rest of the inhabitants he was 
a relatively educated man with ten years of schooling, and 
as well as owning land he and his wife ran a small general 
store in the village. The headman of Baan Tha Song Korn 
meanwhile was 48 years old and had held the position for 
two years; as with the majority of the older inhabitants 
he had received schooling for four years to the level of 
bor sii.
The phuuyaybaan is critical as a link between the 
villagers and the government (Nehr,1974,p 46) and where 
his decisions are respected he may be an extremely 
important factor in the success or failure of development 
initiatives. In the case of Baan Noon Tae one of the 
officials involved in the CBIRD programme stated that any 
project which did not receive the support of the headman 
was unlikely to be adopted by the villagers; and indeed, 
the project managers were reluctant to choose a village as 
a target community unless they obtained the full 
cooperation and support of the village hierarchy (usually 
this meant the headman).
The study villages each have a Village Development 
Committee chaired by their respective headmen and, in both 
cases, consisting of nine members. The committees are
creations of the Community Development Department and are 
expected to provide the Community Development Officer, who 
visits the meetings, with information regarding the needs 
of the village. In Noon Tae the group met approximately 
once a month, and in Tha Song Korn four to five times a 
year. The committees receive no funds from the government 
and represent informal groupings with few responsibilities 
and little power. However, both headmen were of the 
opinion that the committees could have a more significant 
role to play if communications with government officials 
were improved, and certainly the government is making 
attempts, at least on paper, to disperse decision making 
downwards (eg: Fifth Five-Year plan).
Authority and Administration: The Kamnan and
Tambon Council
In each tambon the headmen of the villages elect one
of themselves to be Kamnan or tambon headman:
"The tambon headman can be considered a 
quasi-agent of the central government. He is 
responsible for transmitting to the people the 
directions of the government as handed through 
the chain of command. His specific functions 
include the supervision of law and order in the 
tambon, the supervision of agricultural 
projects, participation in ceremonial duties, 
the recording of vital statistics, tax 
collection and ex-officio membership of the 
tambon council" (Narong Sinsawasdi,1980,p 14).
In Tambon Tha Song Korn the headmen had chosen the
phuuyaybaan of Baan Nong Chuan Chang to be their kamnan.
The kamnan, as well as assuming a number of other
duties, is automatically the chairman of the Tambon
Council. In the commune of Tha Song Korn this council
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consisted of 29 members/ two from each of the 14 villages 
of whom one was the village headman; and the tambon 
doctor. The council received no direct funds from the 
government but was supposed to be involved in the 
decision-making process with respect to the design and 
implementation of projects in the tambon. In fact/ one of 
the objectives of the present Five-Year Plan is to 
strengthen/ improve and give greater responsibility to the 
Tambon Councils in the Poverty Areas of Thailand/ of which 
Mahasarakham is one (NESDB[1]/n.d.;pp 283-294). Even so, 
the headman of Noon Tae was not impressed by the degree of 
cooperation between the council and government officials 
and felt that decisions were made independently of it with 
little notice being taken of their views.
Authority and Administration; Religion
Thailand is a predominantly Buddhist society and / 
"apart from the family/ the wat is the next most important 
institution in Thai rural life... standing as a symbol of 
the committment of the people to Buddhism and as the core 
of village unity" (Somboon Suksamran/1977/p 19). The 
Sangha are highly respected and authority in a rural 
community lies not only with the phuuyaybaan but also with 
the abbot of the wat/ and to a lesser degree with the 
bhikkhus (monks) under him. Due to this/ as well as being 
the religious focus of the village, the wat and its monks 
also have an important secular role to play; councilling 
the villagers, arbitrating in the settlement of disputes 
and generally aiding in the process of modernisation
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(Klausner,1982,pp 144-153; Somboon suksamran,1977).
Each of the study villages had a wat containing, in
Baan Noon Tae, three monks and an abbot, and Baan Tha Song
Korn, seven monks and an abbot. Both institutions
represented important elements of village life with the
inhabitants respecting the bhikkhus and seeking guidance,
advice and information from them, and the bhikkhus
appreciating their potentially significant role in the
development of the communities. This was especially true
of the abbot of Baan Noon Tae, an innovative and able
30-year old, who was deeply involved in the modernisation
of his village and was, according to the Community
Development Officer, one of the primary reasons (along
with the phuuyaybaan) why the community had been so
successful in terms of development'. To illustrate this:
the abbot encouraged two of his bhikkhus to help dig and
build a road in the village, something that Klausner
states should never happen:
"One must always carefully distinguish between 
appropriate Sangha behaviour in disseminating 
information, playing the role of 'foreman1, and 
direct physical involvement in the program in 
question. Monks have encouraged the building of 
roads and wells and given such technical advice 
as necessary. In the case of wells, the rural
monks will often help place the well rings in 
proper position. However, the monks are 
forbidden to dig as they might inadvertently
kill a living creature" (Klausner,1982,p 152).
This seems to be an example of an instance where the
constraints of religion have clashed with the interests of
development, and, in this case, it is the latter which
has, so to speak, won the day.
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As well as supplying the Sangha with food, gifts and 
other necessities, the inhabitants of Noon Tae and Tha 
Song Korn also contributed a portion of their income to 
their respective 'Temple Funds'. Of those interviewed 
regarding this aspect of expenditure, the average outlay 
represented 3.9% of the stated annual income of the 
villagers of Baan Noon Tae and 5.1% of that for those of 
Baan Tha Song Korn (average: 4.4%). The resources of the 
funds seemed to be used in a variety of ways; for example: 
to repair and expand the wat, to subsidise festivals and 
to support both the religious and the secular activities 
of the Sangha.
Land, Topography and Soils
Reflecting the fact that the study site occupied the 
valley bottom of the Lam Chi the area surrounding the 
villages consisted primarily of lowland suitable for the 
cultivation of wet rice (map 4.3). Farmers classified 
their riceland into three categories: thii lum, lower
riceland; thii raap, middle riceland; and thii dorn, upper 
riceland. Xn addition, thii lum was further divided into 
the seasonal classification thii prang, irrigated riceland 
(fig 4.1), Except for thii prang which represents a 
special division of minor importance in the villages, the 
three categories reflect the varying degrees of water 
availability found in the area, and depend largely (as 
mentioned previously) on the inter-play of two variables: 
permeability/drainage and topography, the two invariably 
being closely connected.
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Figure 4.1
Land Categories and Characteristics
More permeable 
More sandy 
Less fertile
Lower organic matter content 
Less cation exchange capacity
Less permeable
Higher clay/silt content
More fertile
Higher organic matter content 
Higher cation exchange capacity
UPLAND
UPPER PADDY 
(DROUGHT PRONE)
M IDDLE PADDY
LOWER PADDY 
(FLOOD PRONE)
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Although there is clearly a continuum in which water 
becomes more, or less, available the three types of 
rainfed riceland which the farmers identified and 
labelled/ in effect neatly encapsulate the ways in which 
water supply, the primary factor on which the success of 
wet rice cultivation depends, can depress yields: thii
lum is prone to excessive inundation and thii dorn to 
drought, while thii raap, the land lying between the two, 
can normally be expected to have reasonable stability of 
water supply. However, even though the divisions have a 
very real resource related impact with relation to water 
conditions, the altitudinal difference between lower and 
middle, and middle and upper paddy may be very small - 
feet, or even inches.
The questionnaire revealed that farmers perceive 64% 
of their riceland to belong to the category thii lum, 19% 
thii raap, and 17% thii dorn, with irrigated lower paddy
land accounting for only 0.5% [1].
Above the upper riceland is found thii rai - upland 
proper. This land has conditions of drainage and 
permeability which prevents the impoundment of water and 
the area is suitable only for the cultivation of drought 
resistant upland crops. However, as on the riceland, the 
strict division of land into one type or another is
[1] Water is provided on this land during the dry season 
through pump irrigation. The project however, only 
affects a very small number of farmers in Noon Tae and Tha
Song Korn, and the season 1982/83 was the first it had
been in operation.
obviously a false one and in reality zones of potential 
rice cultivation fade into zones of potential upland 
cropping. The area of transition from one to the other 
(in the majority of cases) is presently reserved as 
pad iland even though a number of authorities (eg: 
Ng,1973) have observed that such marginal thii dorn might 
be better planted, both physically and economically, to 
upland crops [1] (farmers asked were of the opinion that, 
on average, this band of transitional riceland/upland 
could only be planted to paddy one year in three).
Figure 4.1 illustrates the distribution of land and 
land characteristics along the progression from thii lum 
to thii rai. It is important to realise that this
[1] In this thesis upland is defined as that land planted 
to upland crops (cassava, kenaf, sugar cane), lying above 
the upper padiland. The inhabitants of Noon Tae and Tha 
Song Korn called such land thii rai. It is important to 
realise that the definition is not a loose one but refers 
to a specific band of land above the upper paddy and below 
the forest line (in the case of the study villages there 
was virtually no forest remaining so it encompassed almost 
all the land above the upper paddy). The only occasion 
when the term did become a little flexible was during the 
few instances when farmers had planted thii dorn 
(identifiable by the presence of bunds) to upland crops. 
Where the land had permanently been turned over to such 
crops (often the bunds were left unmaintained and were 
being eroded away) farmers tended to have reclassified it 
as thii rai; where it was only a temporary measure the 
farmers would continue to call the land thii naa dorn, 
although they would qualify this by saying that it had 
been planted to an upland crop.
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progression and the associated topography is not peculiar 
to the study area but common to the entire central portion 
of the Northeastern region of Thailand.
The soils of the study site are characteristic of 
those of the changwat and their general properties have 
been described in the previous chapter. However, given 
the shortcomings of Thai government surveys and the 
variations that can occur when small areas are being 
examined in detail, it was felt that a limited analysis of 
the soils of the research area would be useful.
Soil samples were taken from three progessions from 
riceland to upland (table 4.1) in an attempt to illustrate 
the changes that occur in the nature of the soils from 
thii lum through thii raap and thii dorn and up onto thii 
rai. It was hoped that this approach would show that a 
relationship existed between soil type and land use. To 
be more explicit, it was expected (as government surveys 
and other reports indicate) that the progression from thii 
lum to thii rai would reveal the following trends: a fall
in the organic matter; a decline in fertility; an increase 
in the proportion of sand and finally, a drop in the 
clay/silt content.
Each of the fifteen samples consisted of 6-8 minor 
samples of equal quantity. There was a tendency to sample 
along the contour lines rather than across them as it was 
envisaged that the soils wouls change more dramatically up 
and down the slopes than along them. Tree stumps, 
boundaries to fields and padis, areas beneath trees,
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depressions and other factors which might have a caused a 
distortion in the results were avoided. The samples were 
tested for organic matter content, phosphorous, potassium, 
nitrogen and acidity at the Northeastern Regional Office 
of Agriculture at Tha Phra. In addition, four of the 
samples were also analysed for their particle distribution 
(texture}.
The results show that all the samples are infertile 
and low in organic matter, thus conforming to the 
'characteristic' Isan soil (table 4.1):
The organic matter content never rose above 1% with 
the highest reading of 0.910% coming from unused upper 
paddy and the lowest of 0.420% from harvested kenaf land. 
The average for the 15 samples was 0.691%. Using the USDA 
classification [1] these results range from 'very low' 
(less than 0.5%) to 'low' (0.5% - 1.0%), with the mean 
lying in the 'low' grouping. Reflecting the fact that 
nitrogen and organic matter are closely related, the 
nitrogen content of the samples was also low, varying from 
0.0210% on kenaf land to 0.0455% on unused upper paddy and 
with a mean of 0.0349%. As far as phosphorous is 
concerned both the highest (12.5 ppm) and the lowest (1.5 
ppm) readings came from samples taken from upland, the 
analysis recording an average of 4.9 ppm. This, using the 
USDA classification, is defined as 'low'. The potassium
[1] Source:Department of Land Development, 1972.
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Table 4.1
Soil Analysis of Three Progressions from Riceland to Upland
Progression
One
Progression Progression 
Two Three
Average
Thii Lum/Raap
(rice) (rice) (rice)
pH(H20)
Organic natter 
Nitrogen 
Phosphorous 
Potassium
5.8
0.840
0.042
4.0
12.3
5.8
0.490
0.0245
5.0
11.3
5.1 
0.735 
0.0367
6.1 
16.5
5.6
0.688
0.0344
5.0
13.4
Thii Dorn
(unused) (unused) (unused)
pH(H20)
Organic Matter 
Nitrogen 
Phosphorous 
Potassium
5.6
0.735
0.0367
2.5
15.5
5.7
0.735
0.0367
6.1
26.9
5.2
0.910
0.0455
4.0
23.8
5.5
0.793
0.0396
4.2
22.1
Thii Rai
(kenaf) (kenaf) (wasteland)
pH(H20)
Organic Matter 
Nitrogen 
Phosphorous 
Potassium
5.3
0.700
0.035
1.5
12.3
5.5
0.420
0.021
5.0
46.7
5.1
0.735
0.0367
4.0
14.4
5.3
0.618
0.0309
3.5
24.5
Thii rai
(kenaf) (cassava) (cassava)
pH(H20)
Organic Matter 
Nitrogen 
Phosphorous 
Potassium
5.7
0.500
0.028
1.5
12.3
5.9
0.700
0.038
7.6
21.7
5.5
0.665
0.0322
3.0
18.5
5.7
0.622
0.0331
4.0
17.5
Thii Rai
(cassava) (cassava) (cassava)
pH(H20)
Organic Matter 
Nitrogen 
Phosphorous 
Potassium
5.9
0.700
0.035
4.5
24.8
6.0
0.735
0.0367
12.5
21.7
5.6
0.770
0.0385
6.0
21.7
5.8
0.735
0.0367
7.7
22.7
In brackets: Land use at sampling point.
Acidity (pH): 
Organic Matter; 
Nitrogen: 
Phosphorous: 
Potassium:
H20, 1:1
percentage
percentage
parts per million (Bray P2) 
parts per million (NH4 Acl N.pH 7)
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content of the soils meanwhile ranged from 11.3 ppm on 
middle padiland to 46.7 ppm on harvested kenaf land. The 
average concentration of 20.0 ppm, again using USDA 
criteria, is "very low'. All the samples were moderately 
acidic (Brady,1974,p 34) with pH varying between 5.1 and 
6.0.
The four samples that were tested for texture 
represented one progression from upland Korat soil down 
onto the lower Roiet series. All showed a similar 
particle distribution placing them in the soil textural 
class 'loamy sand' (table 4.2).
Table 4.2
Soil Analysis: Particle Disrtibution
Sand % Silt % Clay % Soil Class
Thii Lum/Raap 87.31% 6.59% 6.10% Loamy Sand
Thii Dorn 88.03% 6.37% 5.60% Loamy Sand
Th ii Rai 88.60% 6.28% 5.11% Loamy Sand
Thii Rai 87.31% 7.11% 5.58% Loamy Sand
Although in general terms these results conform to 
what might be expected, the analysis reveals no trends in 
the nature of the soils from riceland to upland. There is 
no pattern regarding any of the tests conducted (including 
particle distribution), taking either the individual 
progression or an 'average' of the three (table 4.1). 
Because of this, it is impossible to identify any 
relationship between soil type and land use, or between 
soil type and topography. Instead the results reveal a 
group of samples homogenous in their infertility.
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AGRICULTURE
Baan Tha Song Korn and Baan Noon Tae are farming 
communities cultivating glutinous rice to meet their 
subsistence needs and growing upland cash crops to 
supplement their income. Despite the importance of 
non-agricultural sources of income among many of the 
households included in the questionnaire, the inhabitants 
of the villages viewed themselves first and foremost as, 
chaaw naa; rice farmers.
The average land holding of the two villages amounted 
to 19.7 rai? 82% or 16.1 rai of which was riceland and the 
remainder, 3.6 rai, upland (table 4.3). These figures are 
slightly lower than the government statistics for 
Mahasarakham as a whole , but given that the research area 
is located only nine kilometres from the capital of the 
province in an area of intense cultivation, this is not 
suprising (table 4.3). Individually, the villages show 
some variation: Baan Noon Tae, although it has a similar
average size of land holding, has a higher proportion of 
upland; 27% (5.5 rai) versus Baan Tha Song Korn’s 12% (2.3 
rai) (table 4.3).
Reflecting the fact that the area is one of long 
settlement, most of the land of the households questioned 
had been inherited, with only 6% of the riceland plots 
having been bought by the family-heads now cultivating 
them. Interestingly, the proportion of upland fields that 
had been bought was over twice as high at 15%; this
is probably because the upland was not absorbed into the 
farm system until relatively recently, meaning that it was
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available for purchase (or for acquisition by some other 
means) long after all the riceland had been claimed (table 
4.5).
Table 4.3
Baan Noon Tae & Tha Song Korn; Land Holdings
Baan Tha Baan Noon Average Provincial 
Song Korn Tae Average(1980)
Av. Size of 19.0 20.5 19.7 25.5
Landolding
Av. Area of 16.7 15.0 16.1 21.7
Riceland
Av. Area of 2.3 5.5 3.6 3.8
Upland
(Area in rai)
- Out of the 81 households interviewed three were 
non-agricultural. These have been om itted from the 
calculations.
Source:MOAC/1981/table 89/pp 162-163
Land Ownership
Tenancy is not a problem in the Northeastern region 
of Thailand, nor in the province of Mahasarakham. 
Government statistics show that in Mahasarakham 3.4% of 
the area of farm holdings are rented/ and a further 3.4% 
borrowed for no fee (MOAC/1981/pp 170-174). The 
questionnaire showed a similarly low rate of tenancy: 
96.7% of the land was owner-occupied (94% of households)/ 
0.3% rented and 3.0% borrowed for no charge. Out of the 
79 agricultural households interviewed three were full
tenants and two partial tenants [1], Significantly, all 
the land whether it was rented or borrowed was provided by 
relatives, and when each case is examined in detail it 
becomes clear that 'tenancy1 should not automatically be 
correlated with 'exploitation', and that the nature of 
ownership should be viewed with flexibility. For example; 
in Northeast Thailand it is commonly the youngest daughter 
who inherits a family's land and of the 50 rai borrowed 32 
rai, although still in the name of the parent, was under 
the control of the husband of the daughter who was due to 
inherit it.
In addition to there being five full or partial 
tenants among those households interviewed there was also 
one family who could be classified as 'landless'. This 
was a young couple with two children who lived in a house 
borrowed from a relative. The husband had no permanent 
job; he worked as a labourer when possible and was 
educated to bor sii (four years of primary school 
education). They wished to either buy or rent land but 
the scarcity of it meant that they had little hope of 
being able to do either. Despite this, at the time of the 
conversation neither husband nor wife wanted to leave the 
village in search of employment and, suprisingly, when 
asked what their occupation was replied, 'tham naa'; rice 
farming.
Also possibly symptomatic of a scarcity of land are 
the high rentals demanded: of the four households in the
[1] Tenancy here includes those households who borrow land 
and pay no rent.
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questionnaire sample who were involved with renting land 
either in or out/ one secured a rent of two-thirds of
production; one, one-half; and the third/ 200 baht per rai 
for five rai of upland [1]. Two of these rates are above 
those specified in the 1974 Farm Rent Control Law which 
stipulates that the maximum rental must not exceed one 
third of the total production (Krikkiat Phipatseritham/Nov 
1979,p 36).
In Northeastern Thailand it is often the case that 
although ownership of land is high, documentation of 
ownership is low. This tends to limit the number of
families who can use their land as collateral, as well as
causing administrative problems. There are four forms of 
ownership certificate; sor kor nung, bai chong, nor sor 
saam, and chanot thii din of which only nor sor saam and 
chanot thii din are valid as proof of ownership when the 
land is to be used as collateral when borrowing money 
(table 4.4).
Among those interviewed in Noon Tae and Tha Song 
Korn, 90.1% of their fields were registered as nor sor 
saam, 6.6% as chanot thii din and only 3.3% as sor kor 
nung [2] (table 4.5). Therefore, nearly 97% of the land 
can, if required, be used as collateral to secure a loan.
[1] The fourth farmer had borrowed money from an aunt. He 
gave her 10 rai of upper paddy to cultivate as payment for 
the interest on the loan.
[2] None of the land was registered as bai chong possibly 
because of the length of time the surrounding area had 
been settled and cultivated; the bai chong certificate
indicates that the land has only recently been cleared and 
is only common in areas of farmland expansion (look to 
table 4.4).
181
Table 4.4
Certificates of Land Ownership
1/ SK 1 / known as sor kor nung. This is the former 
certificate of ownership issued before the promulgation of 
the 1954 land code. This certifiate cannot be 
transferred/ but can be inherited. Holders are unable to 
use the document as collateral - a nor sor saam must be 
obtained
2/ NS 2 , known as bai chong (pre-emptive certificate), 
the document authorises temporary occupation of land. If 
the holder fails to cultivate that land within three years 
it becomes state land once again. The form cannot be used 
as collateral
3/ NS 3 / known as nor sor saam (certificate of utilisation
or exploitational testimonial). This can be issued after a
competent official has surveyed the land and found over 
75% to have been brought under cultivation. It replaces 
t*ie bai chong. The form can be used as collateral.
4/ NS 4 / known as chanot thii din (title deed). This 
includes a title deed map, certificate of ownership in 
lieu of title deed and the pre-occupation certificate
stamped 'already put to use'. The form can be used as
collateral.
5/ NS 5, known as bai tai suan (certificate of land 
examination). This states that a land survey has been 
undertaken for the issuance of a chanot thii din. It 
includes a plot identification slip, bainam.
Source: Land Department/1954,p 13; Van der Meer,1981,p 93.
In the light of this, the documentation of land ownership 
cannot, in itself, be identified as a constraint 
restricting the borrowing of money by farmers.
Table 4.5
Land Acquisition & Ownership in Noon Tae and Tha Song Korn
Riceland Upland Total
Plots Inherited 
Plots Purchased 
Total Plots
Plots with Chanot 
Plots with N.S.3 
Plots with S.K.l 
Total Plots
122 (94%) 44 (85%) 166 (91%)
8 (6%) 8 (15%) 16 (9%)
130 52 182
7 (5%) 
118 (91%) 
5 (4%) 
130
5 (10%) 
46 (88%) 
1 (2%) 
52
12 (7%) 
164 (90%) 
6 (3%) 
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Although land was scarce in the research area and all 
the inhabitants perceived that fragmentation of holdings 
was increasing as population grew, no family had managed 
to gain control of a dominantly large amount of land 
(graph 4.1). The largest land owner was a Mr Liang Arway 
of Baan Tha Song Korn who owned 81 rai, and of the sample 
only four of the 79 agricultural households, or 5%, owned 
more than 46 rai.
The importance of tenancy and the distribution of 
land in determining the degree of economic responsiveness 
among farmers is well known. It "controls or at least 
limits the power of choice and action of individuals and 
families; it is the chief means of rationing economic 
opportunity; and it determines the impersonal 
distribution of production and income and the extent to 
which general economic incentives become meaningful to the 
farmer" (Oweis; quoted in Chumphot Suvaphorn,1975,p 118).
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The fairly equal distribution of land [1] coupled with the 
low rate of tenancy and the high proportion of land with
certificates of ownership in Noon Tae and Tha Song Korn
at
means that vleast in this respect there are seemingly no 
problems restraining the farmer.
Rice
Padiland accounts for over 83% of the land under 
cultivation in the the villages and rice, as the
subsistence crop, is of paramount importance with every 
other aspect of agriculture being subordinated to its
demands. Taking the average consumption of paddy as 246.4 
kilograms per capita per year [2] (IBRD,Sept 1978,p 197), 
then of the 71 households in the sample (88% of total 
sample) with no substantial income outside agriculture,
76% (54 households) grew enough rice in the 1982/83 season 
to meet their needs. Of the remaining 17 households who 
did not, nine stated that they would normally expect to 
have to buy additional rice while seven remarked that
their production was abnormal and in most years they could 
expect to produce enough to feed themselves and their 
families (one household gave no reply) (table 4.6).
[1] Graph 4.1 shows that although overall land 
distribution is fairly equal, when the two villages are 
examined individually Baan Noon Tae exhibits a somewhat 
less equitable distribution than Baan Tha Song Korn. 
However, the difference is not felt to be dramatic enough 
to upset the contention that land in the villages is not 
unequally distributed .
[2] This figure is arrived at by taking the average per 
capita paddy consumption for the years 1967-1977.
Unlike the rest of Thailand, the staple crop of most 
of the Isan region is glutinous rice, khaaw niaw, and in 
the study area 84% of the rainfed paddy was planted to it 
(table 4.7). Those farmers who grew non-glutinous rice 
(khaaw jaaw) did so for two reasons: either they owned
enough riceland to turn a portion of it over to what is 
essentially a cash crop; or they had decided to take 
advantage of the higher price commanded by khaaw jaaw, 
through growing and selling it, and buying back 
proportionately more khaaw niaw for their own consumption.
Table 4.6
Rice Production and Rice Consumption [*]
Number of % 
Households
Grow enough rice to meet 51 63%
consumption requirements
Grow non-glutinous rice to
sell, buying back glutinous 3 4%
rice for home consumption
Do not grow enough to meet 16 20%
consumption requirements
Do not grow enough to meet
consumpt'n but have substantial 8 10%
income outside agriculture
Non-agricultural households 2 2%
Landless family 1 1%
[*] Consumption requirement taken as 246.4 kilograms of 
paddy per capita per year (IBRD,Sept 1978,p 197).
Table 4.7 shows the varieties of rice grown and the 
area planted. Taking only the rainfed paddy, except for 
one household in Baan Noon Tae who cultivated seven rai of
186
RD-6, no farmer in the questionnaire sample grew any of 
the RD rice types in the crop year 1982/83. Instead, 
almost 48% of the planted riceland was devoted to two 
'traditional' [1] varieties of glutinous rice: nang nuan
and khaaw dor. A further 510.5 rai or 43% was planted to 
three 'improved' rice types: khaaw dok mali 105,
sanpathong and kum phai. Sanpathong and kum phai are both 
glutinous and were released by the Thai government in 1962 
C2], while khaaw dok mali 105 is non-glutinous and was 
released in 1959. All three of the rices were bred to 
incorporate the best qualities of a number of traditional 
types; but even so they are not HYV's but products of an 
earlier period of breeding. The final 10% of rainfed 
paddy was planted to three non-glutinous rices: khaaw
jaaw khaaw, khaaw jaaw luang tong and khaaw laaw looy.
The 6 rai of irrigated riceland cultivated by those 
farmers questioned was planted to RD-7 (non-glutinous, 
released in 1975) and RD-8 (glutinous, released in 1978).
The beginning of the rice season in the Northeast 
begins any time from late May through to July or even 
August depending on the onset of the rains. However, it 
is important to realise that the various ricelands become 
available for cultivation at different times: the lower
land will become inundated first and the upper padis last. 
For this reason, farmers tend to locate their nursery beds
[1] Farmers refer to such rices as being phuan baan; 
literally, 'neighbour' or 'village' rice.
[2] The information on release dates is taken from 
Grandstaff's 1981 paper.
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in such a way that they will receive the first of the 
rains and so allow seeding at the earliest possible date. 
When the rice fields are saturated they are ploughed and 
harrowed with buffalo to puddle the soil and level the 
land. In only one instance did a farmer utilise machinery 
to do this job and/ in any case/ it may well be that 
mechanical deep ploughing would have a detrimental effect 
on the land by destroying the plough-pan that has built up 
in the padis over the years. If this occurred/ the 
sandier soils would become more permeable thereby 
shortening the period in which they could remain 
inundated.
Table 4.7
Rice Varieties Cultivated in Noon Tae and Tha Song Korn 
Rainfed Riceland Area (rai)
Nang Nuan [*] 448.5
Kum Phai [*] 173
Sanpathong [*] 251
Khaaw Dor [*] 120
Khaaw Jaaw Khaaw 3
Khaaw Jaaw Luang Tong 77
Khaaw Jaaw Looy 26
Khaaw Dok Mali 105 86.5
RD-6 [*] 7
SUB-TOTAL 1/192 rai
irrigated Riceland
RD-7 2
RD-8 [*] 4
TOTAL 1/198 rai
[*] - Glutinous rice types
The seedlings are transplanted from the nursery beds 
and into the rice fields when they are approximately one 
month old. Transplanting/ even though it is staggered due
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to the fact that the padis become saturated at different 
times/ is a labour intensive process and often requires 
more labour than any one family can muster. In the past 
this demand would have been met by reciprocal labour 
exchange or long khaek. Today however/ due to the
presence and prevalence of the cash economy/ labour in
Noon Tae and Tha Song Korn must usually be hired. The
wage for a days transplanting is from 25 to 30 baht with a 
meal (in some cases more than one meal) being provided 
[1].
Because of the varying levels of water availability 
found in the area/ more often than not a portion of the
higher riceland never becomes saturated enough to be 
transplanted. In fact/ in the crop year 1982/83 almost 
one quarter of the land classified as being thii dorn or 
upper paddy/ remained unused.
Although the use of chemical fertilisers was 
widespread with nearly 69% of farmers who cultivated rice 
using them/ the rate of application was low averaging only 
7.9 kilograms per rai. This compares with the district 
agricultural extension office's recommendation of 30 
kilograms per rai. Most of those questioned applied their 
fertilisers in one dose after transplanting. However, 
there were also some households who added them at
[1] Among the inhabitants of the villages it was felt to 
be important to provide a meal of some quality. Many 
households killed chickens to be used in the meal and some 
families kept fowl to be used solely for this purpose. It 
also appeared to be customary among some of those 
interviewed to add marijuana in order to 'make 
transplanting sanuk' (fun).
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'heading' and a small number prior to transplanting. As 
well as chemical fertilisers, 42% of the farmers also used 
manure on their riceland. This was collected from the 
buffalo stalls beneath each house and from paths, fields 
and wasteland, and placed in the padis to be later 
ploughed into the soil. The activity was very 
time-consuming however and invariably the amounts of 
manure collected were small.
After transplanting, the rice is left to grow and 
ripen with only a minimum of weeding being carried out.
5
At heading the crop becomes su^eptible to attack by birds 
and other animals, and to combat any loss of production 
the family, as a whole, will often move out into their
fields to sleep and eat, in order to protect their rice.
attack
Insect \ also becomes increasingly prevalent as the crop 
matures and 64% of the households used an insecticide of 
some variety. These seemed to be applied primarily as a 
cure rather than as a preventative: they were used after
the farmer had perceived that his crop was being attacked, 
and when a household had not bothered to apply any it was 
because, 'there were no insects'.
By early November some of the fields were ready to be 
harvested. As with all the other stages of the rice cycle 
in the Northeast, the activity is spread over a 
considerable period of time with the last padis, usually 
the lowest [1], not being ready until mid-December,
[1] These padis, as well as receiving the first of the
rains are also the last to dry out. . The farmers take
advantage of this by planting khaaw nak (heavy rice)
varieties which have the ability to yield more but are
late maturing. On the higher ground where water supply 
extends over a shorter time farmers cultivate khaaw bao 
(light rice) which is early flowering and hence quick 
maturing.
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Harvesting represents the second of the labour peaks in 
the season and usually requires that labour be hired or 
exchanged. However, the inhabitants of the two villages 
felt that the work of harvesting was not as hard as that 
of transplacing and the average wage was some five baht 
per day less because of this. After the rice had been 
harvested it was stacked and then threshed on a flattened 
piece of ground in the vicinity of the fields. Families 
often joined together to make the activity more enjoyable, 
or sanuk [1]. When this had been completed a pick-up 
truck was usually hired to transport the production into 
the villages to be stored in each household's rice barn. 
The remaining straw was then gathered together and placed 
on platforms set high in trees or fenced off on the ground 
(for protection) to be used as fodder during the dry 
season.
Among the 74 households in the sample who cultivated 
riceland only 10, at the time of questioning, had sold any 
of their production (a further six were intending to 
market some). In two of these cases the rice was sold 
informally to relatives or friends at a reduced price. Of 
the remaining households, seven sold their rice to 
middlemen in the town of Mahasarakham and one to the 
government. The total quantity of rice that was marketed
[1] People placed immense emphasis on sanuk; the nearest 
translation is, 'to have fun', although it really means 
much more than this and is a word with a great depth of 
expression. Activities would be completed due to the fact 
that they were sanuk and others avoided because they were 
not, and whenever possible tedious jobs would be done in 
groups, not necessarily because it was the best approach, 
but to make them sanuk.
191
(formal and informal) amounted to 31,150 kilograms of
paddy, some 14% of that produced by the farmers covered by 
the questionnaire.
Upland Crops
Upland, thii rai, covered 18% of the agricultural 
land in the villages. It was not evenly distributed 
between the communities however: Baan Tha Song Korn, the
muubaan lying right on the banks of the Lam Chi had less 
with only 11% of the land of those interviewed being
upland. In contrast, Baan Noon Tae with its location
slightly inland from the river had more, and nearly 26% of 
the land holdings were classified thus. The distribution 
of thii rai within each of the muubaan was fairly equal
and no farmer controlled an excessive amount. The
greatest area owned was only 20 rai and the average figure
among those cultivating upland was nearly 6 rai.
The upland was planted to five crops: cassava,
kenaf, jute [1], sugar and water melon. Among these 
cassava was predominant accounting for 85% of the area.
In the past the farmers of Baan Noon Tae and Baan Tha Song
Korn planted mostly kenaf and it was not until the 
relative prices of kenaf and cassava altered in the 
mid-lQVO's that they began to change. In fact, 74% of the 
farmers who grew cassava stated that they had previously 
cultivated either jute or kenaf.
[1] The 'jute' grown in the Northeast is known as bor 
krajaaw and unlike the jute of South Asia is an upland 
drought resistant variety which does not grow well in wet 
conditions.
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Cassava (Manihot utilisima Pohl or Manihot esculenta
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .      ■■■ ■ > ■  ■■■! ■■■■■■ ■ ■■■■■■ n    ■■ i , . . . . . .
Crantz) is a drought resistant tuber crop which/ in 
Thailand/ is grown almost exclusively for export. In 
terms of its growth cycle it is flexible and can be 
planted and harvested at any point during the year. For 
this reason, the timing that each individual farmer adopts 
is moulded around the demands set on him by his other 
crops and activities (although in the research area 
farmers tended to harvest their cassava between 
mid-December and the end of January).
When the previous season's crop has been harvested 
the vegetative remains are gathered together and burnt. 
None of the farmers encountered attempted to incorporate 
the ash into the land, and nor was there any indication 
that the raw residue was ploughed into the soil as an 
alternative to this. Following the clearance of the 
fields the land was ploughed and prepared for planting. 
There was considerable variation in the manner in which 
each field was prepared: some were merely ploughed while
others were built up into raised beds. Invariably the 
process was completed in the traditional manner using 
cattle or buffalo although occasionally farmers would hire 
tractors to do the job.
Cassava is a crop that can be propagated vegetatively 
and farmers retained some of the straightest and sturdiest 
stalks from the previous season to use as cuttings. These 
stalks are cut into 4-8 inch pieces and planted in rows. 
The density of planting varied although on average the 
rows would be three feet apart and the plants in the rows,
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two feet from each other. After planting, attention was 
meagre; only one of the farmers interviewed applied any 
chemical fertilisers and no pesticides or herbicides were 
used. In fact, the only input of any sort prior to 
harvesting was weeding which would be done, often 
superficially, on perhaps two or three occasions. Once 
again, it is important to stress that the quality of 
cultivation and the nature of the cultural practices 
varied greatly between farmers.
After anything from ten to eighteen months the crop 
is ready to be harvested, by which time it stands some 
five to twelve feet tall. The harvesting of the crop was 
done by hand. Hoes were used to loosen the soil around 
each plant and the tuber was pulled out of the ground with 
the upper vegetative parts. The roots were then cut from 
the rest of the plant and transported by truck to the 
point of marketing.
Of the 38 households that grew cassava 16 or 42% sold 
their crop in the raw state to middlemen in either 
Mahasarakham or the district town of Kosum Phisai some 26 
kilometres down the road towards Khon Kaen. The price for 
the root varied between 0.60 and 0.98 baht per kilogram, 
and the average yield was 1,190 kilograms per rai. 
Another 19 farmers (50% of those who grew cassava) sold 
their crop 'green'; khaay suan. It was sold to fellow 
villagers none of whom made large profits, and the 
practice seemed to be a response to a situation where the 
resources of land and labour were unequally distributed. 
The price paid per rai depended on the condition of the
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field and ranged from 625 to 2,000 baht per rai.
Following the harvesting of the crop farmers might 
allow their fields to be 'scavanged' for tubers and parts 
of tubers left behind. These would normally be chipped by 
hand, dried, and then sold to middlemen for a price 
approximately twice that of the raw root.
The only upland crop other than cassava grown in 
significant quantities in the study area was kenaf. This 
was planted by five of the farmers interviewed with 
another two cultivating its close relation, jute. Kenaf 
and jute are both fibre crops, and in comparison to 
cassava require greater attention: planting should be
more systematic and weeding more rigorous. In addition, 
the threat of pest attack is higher and the crop maintains 
its yield less well than cassava on soils of low
fertility.
Before the land is ploughed and prepared for seeding 
the stubble remains from the previous season are fired. 
As with cassava, firing does not seem to be an attempt to 
improve the fertility of the land but merely an efficient 
means of clearance. The crop is seeded in April to May 
and weeded on two or three occasions (although some
farmers, presumably due to labour constraints, allowed 
their fields to become overgrown). By September some of 
the fields are ready to be harvested but because this
clashes with the demands of rice the crop is often left, 
sometimes even until December, before it is cut by which 
time the fibre is over-mature and is beginning to lose
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quality.
Harvesting is done by hand/ the stalks being cut off 
about three inches above the ground. After this the kenaf 
is gathered into bundles and taken to be retted. 
Optimally, retting should occur in running oxygenated 
water but, due to the lack of surface water resources in 
the region, this is often very difficult. Even the 
farmers of Baan Noon Tae and Baan Tha Song Korn, living so 
close to the Lam Chi were usually unwilling or unable to 
transport their production to the river, and retting was 
carried out in ponds and other shallow depressions of 
surface water. This not only reduces the quality of the 
product but also deoxygenates the water so killing any 
fish. The retted kenaf is dried and is then ready to be 
marke ted.
Six of the seven households that cultivated kenaf or 
jute sold it to middlemen in either Mahasarakham or Kosum 
Phisai. All of them marketed the crop 'retted and dried', 
receiving a return of five baht per kilogram. The seventh 
farmer sold his crop to a paper company in Amphoe Borabu, 
a neighbouring district to Muang Mahasarakham, and due to 
the demands of paper-making the fibre was marketed in its 
raw state receiving a price of 0.70 baht per kilogram.
Fruit and Vegetables
Households in the two mubaan maintained an assortment 
of fruit trees within their compounds of which mango, 
papaya, banana and coconut were the most common. The 
fruit was eaten by the families and occasionally sold in
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small quantities to other villagers or at the market in 
Mahasarakham. Similarly/ fenced-off vegetable plots were 
to be found near most houses/ the production again being 
consumed primarily within the family/ with only three of 
the households interviewed marketing any of their produce 
in the 1982/83 season.
Livestock
In Noon Tae and Tha Song Korn machinery has not yet 
displaced the buffalo/ and to a lesser extent the cow, as 
the primary source of traction. All of the upland and 
virtually all of the riceland was prepared using cattle or 
buffalo and it was essential that every farmer own or at 
least have access to one (table 4.8). Their breeding and 
marketing/ an old and well-established activity in the 
Northeast/ was not widespread in the two villages and only 
nine households had sold any animals in the year prior to 
the questionnaire (1982). Despite this, the value of one 
buffalo at somewere between five and seven thousand baht 
and the crucial role that they play in rice cultivation 
means that they may be the most important asset/ apart 
from land/ ^  farmer possesses.
Pigs were raised by 18 of the households interviewed 
and in contrast to buffalo they were, without exception/ 
kept to be sold. There was some variation in the manner 
in which the animals were raised: in Noon Tae the CBIRD
project had formed a pig group of 29 members/ the details 
of which will be discussed later/ and due to close 
supervision care was usually good; the animals were
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inoculated against disease and de-wormed, high protein 
feed was provided and marketing was organised by the 
project staff. Farmers outside the CBIRD group tended to 
raise their pigs in a less uniform fashion and with far 
fewer inputs. Marketing was done through the Pig 
Cooperative (a governmental institution) or through 
private middlemen with prices ranging from 1/500 to 4,000 
baht per animal.
Table 4.8
Livestock Owned by Those Interviewed
Households Number per 
Owning Household
Buffalo 71 3.6
Cattle 13 4.2
Pigs 18 4.0
Horses 4 1.7
Chickens/Ducks 58 25.8
Geese 5 4.4
Rabbits 1 2.0
Number of agricultural households requiring the use of 
buffalo and/or cattle: 77
In addition to pigs, buffalo and cattle among those 
farmers interviewed five raised geese; one, rabbits; four, 
horses; and chickens and ducks were kept by 58 of the 
agricultural households questioned (table 4.8).
Non Agricultural Sources of Income
Sources of income outside agriculture played a 
significant role in the economies of Baan Noon Tae and 
Baan Tha Song Korn, and they can be divided into two broad 
categories: on-farm and off-farm.
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The primary source of on-farm non-agricultural income 
came from the manufacture and sale of crafts. The 
production and sale of mats was practised by 48 of the 
households in the sample (64% of agricultural families) 
and weaving by four [1] (three of whom also sold mats). 
Both activities were pursued by women and adolescents in 
their 'spare' time. Usually production was small-scale 
and on an individual basis although in Noon Tae there was 
a small informal silk-weaving cooperative and/ in 
addition/ a silk-weaving group of ten members set up by 
CBIRD. Apart from the silk group which marketed its 
production through CBIRD the products were sold either to 
merchants or to other villagers who had set themselves up 
as middlemen on a minor scale. The average income earned 
by the 49 households involved amounted to 3/250 baht per 
year.
There were eleven households who had a family member 
engaged in a full-time occupation off-farm: three worked
at the Upland Crop Station approximately one kilometre 
away; three as road construction labourers; one as a nanny 
in Mahasarakham; another as a cleaner/ also in 
Mahasarakham; and of the remaining three/ one was as a 
labourer connected to the Royal Irrigation Department/ 
another was a general labourer and the last was the 
manager of a small family-owned rice mill. The mean 
income from these occupations amounted to 21,110 baht per 
year.
[1] This only includes those families who marketed the 
mats or the cloth that they produced. It does not include 
the large number who wove cloth,and the smaller number who 
made mats, purely for their own use.
Perhaps more interestingly three men, all heads of 
their households, had travelled to the Middle East as 
migrant labourers. They remitted an average of 102,000 
baht per year. In addition, smaller amounts of money 
averaging 10,140 baht per year were sent by sons and 
daughters of twelve families who had left the village to 
work in other parts of Thailand.
Finally, the sample of 81 households included a 
teacher who earned 74,100 baht per year. The nature of 
his postion in the village means that he it is probably 
best to view him in isolation from the other families.
Summary
This chapter has attempted to provide a basis on 
which the rest of the thesis can stand by describing the 
economies of Baan Noon Tae and Baan Tha Song Korn; their 
institutions and framework of authority, the physical 
characteristics of the surrounding countryside and the 
services and amenities to which the villagers have access. 
It has dealt largely with the generalities of the village 
mielieu in order to build up a picture of the communities 
and the manner in which the inhabitants lead their lives. 
The next four chapters will look in greater detail at 
those aspects with which the study in concerned: rice and
upland crop cultivation; credit and cooperatives; and the 
alternative opportunities to agriculture to which the 
villagers have resorted.
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SECTION I
The Strategy of Cultivation in the Study Villages
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Chapter Five 
Rice Cultivation in Noon Tae & Tha Song Korn
Agricultural Extension
The previous chapter noted that the inhabitants of 
Noon Tae and Tha Song Korn/ despite a diversification of 
economic activity into areas outside agriculture/ still 
viewed themselves as farmers/ and more specifically as 
tham naa - rice farmers; and indeed/ this is true of the 
entire region. Reflecting the primacy of paddy 
cultivation as a livelihood the Thai government has always 
concentrated the bulk of it s resources on the improvement 
and development of its production [1]. As far as the 
farmers of the two research communities were concerned the 
principal manifestation of this input was the framework of 
extension through which successive administrations have 
attempted to aid the households of the plateau in their 
attempts to increase production. For this reason/ prior 
to any examination of farming in the villages it is felt 
that it would be useful to first give a brief review of 
the extension service in amphoe Muang Mahasarakham.
[1] This means . those resources directed towards 
agricultural development. For example; through the 
construction of irrigation schemes/ the breeding of high
yielding varieties of rice/ the 
fertilisers/ the establishment of 
stations/ the development of a 
network with 'guaranteed' prices 
year) and through the extension 
services.
provision of chemical 
a series of research 
government marketing 
(at least until this 
of advice and other
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In Thailand/ each amphoe or district is served by an 
agricultural extension office [1] which represents the 
lowest level of organisation within the department. It is 
the personnel from this office with which the inhabitants 
of any village come into contact and with whom they must 
participate. It is therefore the most important level in 
the hierarchy, for it is here that government policies and 
programmes are implemented.
Thailand, with advice and assistance from the World
Bank has adopted the 'Training and Visit' system of
extension as developed by D. Benor. The elements of this
system, which form the broad framework for the extension
service's efforts, are as follows [2]:
service
The extension^should operate as a coherant unit, with 
a single line of communications extending from the 
ministry responsible for agriculture to the field-level 
extension agent. These agents, who are given the task of 
diffusing the policies of the extension department to the 
farmers, should devote all their time to extension and 
should not have to be involved with administrative duties.
The extension process itself is based on systematic 
training and visits, with agents concentrating their 
efforts on a select number of practices, with reference to 
a few major crops, to be directed at a chosen number of 
contact farmers. In the initial stages of extension it is
[1] Samnakngaan kaset Amphoe Muang Mahasarakham krom 
songserm kaankaset
[2] This account has been adapted from Benor & Harrison's, 
'Agricultural Extension: The Training and Visit System',
May 1977, pp 10-18.
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essential to achieve an immediate impact so that the 
process becomes self-reinforcing/ and to ensure that the 
practices extended can diffuse through the community the 
contact farmers should be imitable; ie: they should be
'average’ farmers. To begin with/ practices that do not 
require additional outlays (eg; land preparation, weeding) 
in terms of purchased inputs should be concentrated upon 
and nothing should be recommended that does not increase 
farmers' incomes. New practices should be used on only a 
portion of any household's land so that risk is reduced 
and adoption made more likely. When farm practices have 
been improved, only then should extension agents turn to 
the additional use of purchased inputs. But, 'optimum' 
levels of application should be avoided; it is best to 
recommend 'minimum' levels. Finally, the links with 
credit and the supply of inputs should be carefully 
defined and developed, and the system should incorporate a 
built-in process of adaptation to changing conditions (the 
above elements are listed in more detail in Appendix 5.1).
In the introductory chapter it was emphasised that 
the thesis would principally examine the farmers and their 
views, perceptions and actions and compare these in the 
context of the broader government objectives. Because of 
this purposefully weighted approach, the information 
gathered regarding the extension service is far less 
detailed than that devoted to the villagers. Indeed, 
another study could quite easily be made taking the 
reverse weighting, and in many ways it would make a
fascinating exercise. Nevertheless, as far as this study 
is concerned the services provided to the farmers by the 
kaset amphoe are examined only in passing [1], to then be 
placed against the complexity of the position in which the 
inhabitants find themselves.
The extension officer responsible for Baan Noon Tae 
and Baan Tha Song Korn visited the villages 39 times per
year and 26 times per year respectively. As the Training
and Visit System advises, the officer had a specific
schedule of visits which could be easily remembered by the 
farmers* Tha Song Korn was visited every other Monday of 
the year while the agent went to Noon Tae every other 
Thursday and for half a visit on every other Friday (the 
Friday after the Thursday visit).
In addition, as the system stipulates, a group of
farmers had been chosen with whom the officer made 
specific contact. The kaset amphoe referred to these 
farmers as ’agricultural leaders’ [2] and as of the 
beginning of 1983 there were 25 such 'leaders’ in Tha Song 
Korn and 14 in Noon Tae. All of them had been educated to 
bor sii and their average age was 46 years old.
The Agricultural Extension Office sold chemical 
fertilisers on credit and also distributed 'RD' varieties 
of rice. It also, occasionally, supplied free pesticide
[1] This also applies, as will be seen later in the 
thesis, to the Cooperative and the Bank for Agriculture & 
Agricultural Cooperatives.
[2] 'Thabian Kasetakorn Phuunam*.
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and herbicide samples although by all accounts this was an 
irregular occurrence. Other government agencies involved 
in providing inputs/ and sometimes a modicum of advice/ 
were the cooperative, the Bank for Agriculture and 
Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC) and the Farmers Group. 
The cooperative provided, to its members, fertilisers on 
credit, one variety of pesticide, loans and also bought 
paddy at government support prices. The BAAC extended 
loans while the Farmers Group supplied chemical 
fertilisers on credit and also gave loans to its members. 
Finally, with reference to Baan Noon Tae, the CBIRD 
project provided fertilisers to members of its ’Fertiliser 
Group*.
This is the basic institutional framework to which 
farmers had access in their attempts to cultivate rice in 
the manner in which they saw to be best. Further details 
of the various agencies will be provided as the thesis 
progresses.
The kaset amphoe, the principal source of advice and 
assistance, recommended with respect to rice cultivation, 
that the farmers of Noon Tae and Tha Song Korn grow RD 
varieties of rice, or at least one of the 'improved' 
varieties, and apply 30 kilograms per rai of the chemical 
fertiliser 16-16-8. It was quite clear that the farmers 
who were interviewed did not follow this advice: just
over 1% of their land was planted to RD rices and the 
average fertiliser application amounted to 7.9 kilograms 
per rai. Why there should be this discrepancy between the 
recommended cultural practices and the actual cultural
practices is a theme that will run through this chapter. 
It will attempt to show, from the position of the farmer, 
why particular government policies (or their absence) are 
relevant or irrelevant. But in addition, as it is thought 
to be important to look at farming as an integrated system 
which preferably should not be broken-down or, for that 
matter disassociated from the rest of a farmer's 
existence, the account will regularly enter into elements 
both within (eg: labour use) and, in later chapters,
outside (eg: off-farm employment) agriculture with which
the government has no association.
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Rice Variety Selection Strategy
The Northeastern Region has been commonly portrayed 
as a zone of variability in terms of its physical 
environment. Rainfall fluctuates greatly and the nature 
of the soils and topography is uneven. However, although 
such environmental variations are often grouped together, 
it is important to appreciate that while climatic 
variations are largely temporal, edaphic and topographic 
variations are essentially spatial. This distinction is 
crucial and is reflected in the strategies that farmers 
follow in the selection of the varieties of rice they 
grow.
The variability of rainfall coupled with the limited 
control most of the farmers have over water supply means 
that the levels of water in the padis, whether they are 
lower, middle or upper, is changeable; and as a result the 
rice varieties that farmers choose to grow need to be 
resistant to fluctuations in water availability. 
Significantly, farmers felt that 35% of their planted 
rice plots were affected by flooding, 29% by drought and a 
further 20% produced low yields due to the influence of 
both flood and drought (table 5.1).. As far as the RD 
rices are concerned it was their inability to withstand 
these extremes of flood and drought which restricted their 
use on the rainfed riceland to a single inhabitant who 
cultivated 7 rai of RD-6. The farmers felt that they were 
not 'strong' enough to be grown successfully in their 
fields, and that this 'strength' related to a flexibility 
of response in conditions of varying water supply.
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In the past, ignorance on the part of the farmer in 
association with cultural inertia has often been presented 
as a major factor contributing to the slow uptake of new 
cultural practices. In the muubaan of Noon Tae and Tha 
Song Korn ignorance of the existence of the RD rices was 
not a problem. However, not all the inhabitants may have 
fully appreciated the details of the characteristics of 
the rices and this could have limited uptake. This said, 
it is worth noting that although the pump irrigation 
scheme had only been on-stream for a single year, in that 
first year of operation all of the three households 
interviewed with access to it planted RD varieties of 
rice, indicating that at least they knew of HYV's and 
their special qualities [1].
Table 5.1
Problems Encountered, by Rice Plot
Thii Lum Thii Raap Thii Dorn Total
Flood 35 6 5 46 (35%)
Drought 13 10 14 37 (28%)
Flood + Drought 18 6 3 27 (20%)
Drought + Salt 0 1 1 2 (1%)
Salt 1 1 0 2 (1%)
Insects 4 2 1 7 (5%)
Unaffected 4 4 4 12 (9%)
Total 75 30 28 133
[1] One of these three farmers had lent his thii prang to 
a relative. It was this relative, who was present at the 
interview, who gave the information regarding the rice 
variety that he cultivated (it was, in fact, RD-11 a 
non-glutinous high yielding type).
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Cultural inertia as a barrier to adoption is harder 
to identify (as well as being a rather nebulous concept). 
Some farmers certainly appeared to be unwilling to 
experiment and gave an impression of entrenchment. For 
example: one household of eight members that owned 23 rai
thii lum was headed by a grandfather of 65 who/ in
spite of his age, still held the power of decision-making.
In 1982/83 the family planted their riceland with a
mixture of kum phai and nang nuan; a strategy which 
apparently had been followed for 'over forty years1 [1]. 
The head of the household felt that there were no better 
rices than kum phai and nang nuan and refused to
experiment in any way even though his son-in-law (aged 27) 
thought it was sensible to try other varieties on their 
land. In this case it is clear that an elderly family 
head, due to his position as decision-maker/ was acting as 
a barrier to change. It could be argued that change is 
unnecessary and that the family's present strategy is 
already the optimum one given the conditions found on 
their land. But even sof the attitude is entrenched and 
it is perhaps not suprising that no chemical fertilisers 
were applied for the same reasons.
Other farmers/ although they were willing/ felt that 
they could not afford to experiment; they perceived the 
risks involved to be too great to warrant change. Many of 
these said that they would adopt another rice variety if
[1] This statement does not quite add up because kum phai 
is an improved variety of rice and was not actually 
released until the 1960's.
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it could be demonstrated (thus reducing the risks involved 
with an ’unseen* adoption) that it was better than those 
they already cultivated. Indeed/ the majority of the 
farmers showed a remarkable willingness to move from one 
rice variety to another in an attempt to find the type or 
combination of types best suited to their land. Mrs Kaw 
Jumbaaburii1s approach is indicative of this: she and her
husband/ who worked as a labourer in Mahasarakham/ owned 
six rai of land which she classified as thii lum. In 
1982/83 she planted two rai of khaaw dor and four rai of 
kum phai. However/ she was dissatisfied with their 
performance and was intending to plant sanpathong and nang 
nuan as well as kum phai and khaaw dor in the following 
season. She explained that her land exhibited 
considerable variation in conditions and she was hoping/ 
by planting all four varieties together/ to discover the 
rice or rices which would perform best on her land [1].
In Thailand/ in addition to ignorance and cultural 
inertia/ the availability of the new seeds has regularly 
been pin-pointed as a problem restricting the spread of
[1] With respect to the prevalence of cultural inertia as 
a restriction limiting the uptake_of new rice varieties it 
is worth pointing out that the three farmers who had 
access to irrigation for the first time in the 1982/83
season all planted RD rices/ indicating that when
presented with suitable conditions of water supply farmers 
are willing to switch to the cultivation of HYV * s with
little hesitation. Continuing on this linef it is also
worth remembering that a large number of farmers are 
currently cultivating the improved varieties (sanpathong/ 
khaaw jaaw luang tong/ kum phai and khaaw dok mali 105)
which were introduced to/ and then clearly accepted by/ 
the villagers (although admittedly/ improved varieties are 
very much more similar to the traditional types than the 
high yielding varieties/ thereby representing that much 
less of a * leap').
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their use (eg:MOAC,April 1980,pp 30 & 35). This was not a 
constraint in the research area however. The District 
Agricultural Extension Office, which was readily 
accessible and well-known to the villagers, had supplies 
of all the RD rices and it was apparently only the lack of 
demand that limited sales. In 1982, the office sold a 
total of 6,925 kilograms of RD rice seed in the amphoe; 
enough to plant approximately 0.86% of the planted area in 
that year (table 5.2). As far as the study villages are 
concerned the Kaset Amphoe distributed 375 kilograms of 
seed; enough to cultivate about 75 rai of land, or 4.3% of 
the riceland of the two communities.
Table 5.2
Distribution of Rice Seed by the Kaset Amphoe (1982)
Kilograms Sold Kilograms Sold
Amphoe Study Villages
Glutinous:
RD-6 4,560 270
RD-8 540 35
RD-10 180
Non-Glutinous:
RD-7 300
RD-9 480
RD-15 840 70
RD-19 15
RD-25 10
TOTAL 6,925 Kg 37 5 Kg
Enough seed to plant [1]; 1,385 rai 75 rai
% of total riceland [2]; 0.86% 4.3%
[1] It is assumed that five kilograms of seed will plant 
one rai of padi.
[2] These percentages are calculated from the following: 
the planted area of riceland in the amphoe in 1982, 
161,508 rai; and the area of riceland in the two study 
villages, 1,742 rai.
Instead of the RD rices the farmers cultivated an 
assortment of 'improved1 and 'traditional' rices (table
5.3). Of these the most popular were the four 'improved' 
varieties, sanpathong, kum phai, khaaw jaaw luang tong and 
khaaw dok mali 105 which accounted for 49% of the planted 
riceland; and two 'traditional* types, khaaw dor and nang 
nuan which covered another 47%. Although the 'improved' 
rices are commonly thought of as 'new' varieties by the 
villagers, they were released by the Rice Department (now 
the Rice Division) in the late 1950's and early 1960's,
and are in no way comparable to the RD rices in terms of
sophistication of breeding. In addition, the
characteristics of the original forms are likely to have 
been altered since their release through each farmers own 
selection process;
Farmers retain a proportion of each seasons' crop, 
consisting of the seeds from the most robust plants, to 
form the seed rice for the following year. In this way, 
the original rice variety is manipulated so that a
sub-variety more in tune with the conditions present on 
each farmers' particular rice plot(s) is formed [1]. How 
^ar sanPa thong, kum phai, khaaw jaaw luang tong and khaaw 
dok mali 105 have been altered through this process is
impossible to judge without an intensive investigation 
into their respective characteristics and those of the
[1] This would be accentuated by the fact that improved 
varieties of rice (and to an even greater extent, HYV' s ) 
are not as genetically stable as traditional forms and 
they begin to drift, even without any process of 
selection.
pure line. But, as many of those interviewed had been 
cultivating the rices for ten years or more, and given 
that if farmers do change varieties they tend to obtain 
the seed from fellow farmers [1] rather than from the 
kaset amphoe (who would, presumably, be distributing the 
pure line), it seems that the inhabitants of Baan Noon Tae
Table 5.3
Rice Varieties Cultivated By Riceland Type
Thii Thii Thii Thii Total
Lum Raap Dorn Prang[*]
Traditional Types 
Nang Nuan 277.5 109 64 - 448.5
Khaaw Dor 28 36 56 - 120
Khaaw Jaaw Khaaw 2 - 1 - 3
Khaaw Jaaw Looy 26 - - - 26
Intermediate Types 
Kum Phai 161 6 6 - 173
Sanpathong 177 74 - - 251
Khaaw Dok Mali 105 76.5 10 - - 86.5
Khaaw Jaaw Luang Tong 46 - 31 - 77
High Yielding Types 
RD-6 
RD-7 
RD-8
Area planted 794
Area unplanted 6
Area harvested 467
Total Riceland 800
7 - - 7
2 2
4 4
242 158 6 1,198
- 50 - 56
191 91 - 749
242 208 6 1,256
[*] Irrigated riceland is counted twice, once for the main 
season crop and once for the second, dry season, crop.
[1] This means that the seed base remains unchanged, and 
no new genetic material would be intruding on the 
development of the local sub-variety.
and Baan Tha Song Korn have now bred, through selection, 
sub-varieties of the original forms.
Thus, because of the nature of the climate in the 
Northeast and the fact that the fields are truly rainfed 
giving farmers only minimal control over water supply, the 
rice types that farmers chose to cultivate virtually all 
exhibited considerable resistance to fluctuations in the 
availability of water. They are, in these terms, 
'ecologically flexible'. This does not imply that the 
rices were all similarly flood and drought resistant, but 
rather that were able to show a breadth of response within 
the niche in which they were grown.
It is at this point that it becomes necessary to
discuss variations in the environment over space, and how 
this can affect each farmers' choice of which rice he 
cultivates. For, although rainfall is variable wherever a 
paddy happens to be located, the position of the paddy in 
terms of the topography of the surrounding countryside has 
an important affect in deciding to what extent the land is 
flood and drought prone. For example: upper padiland,
due to its topographical position is always likely to
suffer from a lack of water while, in contrast, lower
padiland will suffer from an excess. Variations in water 
supply will occur around these 'base' conditions with 
farmers selecting rice varieties which conform most 
closely to each 'base' (fig 5.1). Table 5.3 shows the
area of each rice grown among the farmers interviewed, by 
padiland type. Their varying resistence to flood and to 
drought is to some extent reflected in each type's
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Figure 5.1
"Base" Rice Conditions
UPPER PADDY
MIDDLE PADDY
LOWER PADDY
Extreme
Flood
Extreme
Drought
1 Base' for 'Base' for
Lower Paddy Middle Paddy Upper Paddy
[flood prone] [drought prone]
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distribution of cultivation, although it is only the five 
most popular rices that are grown over a sufficiently 
large area for the chance of a meaningful pattern to 
ernerge.
Among the five [1], nang nuan appears to be 
ecologically flexible enough to be grown on the lower, 
middle and upper paddy, its distribution representing 
34.9%, 45.0% and 40.5% of the three (planted) riceland
types respectively. In addition, farmers felt that 
sanpathong could be cultivated in a reasonably wide range 
of conditions although it was not thought to have the same 
level of resistance to periods of drought as nang nuan, 
and for this reason was not cultivated on the upper padis. 
This quality of flexibility, especially apparent in the 
traditional variety nang nuan, was highly valued among the 
villagers. They viewed it as a form of insurance 
necessary in a marginal environment such as that of the 
area. Possibly as a consequence of this, nang nuan and 
sanpathong were the two most popular rice and were planted 
on 58.4% of the cultivated land.
The other three rices show greater specificity of 
response. Kum phai and khaaw dok mali 105 were 
concentrated on the lower padis with over 90% of the area 
planted to them being classified as thii lum. Farmers 
felt that both the rices were flood resistant with kum 
phai being especially hardy in this respect. Even so, in 
the 1982/83 season only 44% of the lower riceland planted
[1] The characteristics of the rices cultivated in Noon 
Tae and Tha Song Korn are tabulated in table 5.4.
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to kum phai and khaaw dok mali 105 was actually harvested 
(table 5.3). This does not mean that the farmers should 
have been planting other, even more flood-resistant rices, 
but instead indicates how marginal much of the lower land 
is. This is supported by the Thai government's land 
capability map for rice (map 3.3) which classifies much of 
the riceland surrounding the two villages as being, 
"suited to the cultivation of rice, but might lose 
(production) through the affects of flooding" (Dept of 
Land Development,1977). The two rices are both 'heavy' 
varieties that take 150 days to reach maturity (table
5.4). This rather long growth period means that they are 
unsuited to the thii dorn where water availability may 
extend over only a short time [1],
In contrast to kum phai and khaaw dok mali 105, khaaw 
dor was planted primarily on the middle and upper 
ricelands (table 5.3). It is a 'light' rice which matures 
rapidly in 90-100 days (table 5.4) and, as its name 
suggests, is adapted to the conditions on the marginal 
upper paddy. Not only did it mature quickly but farmers 
also felt that it was the variety most resistant to 
periods of drought. Once again however it is worth noting
[1] Table 5.4 shows that sanpathong also matures in 150 
days. However, its resistence to some degree of drought 
means that it can be cultivated quite successfully on the 
middle paddy. It is important to realise that there is a 
play-off between the various characteristics of a rice 
plant and the farmers are often trying to cultivate those 
rices with the best combination of features (high yield, 
ecoLogical felxibility, resistance to flood/drought, 
fertiliser requirement etc;).
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that even with a rice specialised to deal with the 
problems of water shortages/ 24% of the upper padis
remained unplanted and only 63% of the planted area was 
ever harvested (table 5.3).
Edaphic variations as such are not nearly as 
constraining a factor on rice production as that of water 
supply. In Baan Tha Song Korn and Baan Noon Tae there 
were three ways that the nature of the soil influenced the 
cultivation of rice; two directly/- fertility and 
salinity/ and one indirectly/- permeability.
The fertility of all the soils of the area is low/ 
and the analysis of a number of samples failed to reveal 
any meaningful trends in nitrogen/ phosphorous/ potassium
and organic matter content (look to chapter 3). This
apparently uniform infertility means that without the
application of fairly large amounts of fertilisers (say 25 
kg/rai) the RD rices will not fare well (Fukui/1978/pp
265-269). Why farmers refused to apply anything even
approaching 25 kg/rai will emerge later/ but the fact that 
they did not is another reason why the adoption of the 
fertiliser-responsive HYV' s is not a sensible strategy.
Connected to soil fertility is salinity, and five
farmers said that production on their land had been
reduced because the soils were saline. Four of these
farmers grew nang nuan and the fifth, sanpa thong and they
all felt that the rice they grew gave a good response on 
land affected in this way. Whether this is so, and
whether the varieties they were cultivating had been
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'selected' to form a sub-variety more resistant to saline 
conditions is impossible to say without a detailed 
agronomic investigation.
The permeability of the soils# which largely depends 
on their clay/silt/sand content, in conjunction with
topography, are the two elements that determine the nature 
of water supply on any piece of land. Soils surveys
conducted in the Northeast have tended to show soils 
becoming more permeable from thii lum up to thii dorn. 
This means that the problems of flood and drought 
associated with the lower and upper padis respectively are 
further accentuated by the tendency for the soils of the 
thii lum to be impermeable and poorly drained, and those 
of the thii dorn to be sandy, permeable and to drain
rapidly. However, the limited analysis of particle 
distribution (look to chapter 4) conducted in the study 
area failed to reveal a trend such as this. It may well 
be that the analysis is at fault, as the upland soils
certainly appeared to have a sandy texture, and the 
lowland soils a clayey one [1]. Whatever the case, the 
farmers still perceived the different lands to have 
different properties of water supply and whether this was 
the result of soil and topography, or just topography, is 
not important.
[1] The clay/sand composition of a soil can be estimated 
by 'feeling' the moistened soil as it is rubbed between 
the fingers (Faniran & Areola,1978,pp 108-110; 
Hodgson,1978,pp 53-54).
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Summary
The selection of which rice variety(ies) to grow was 
principally controlled by the nature of the environment. 
The failure of the farmers to cultivate the RD types 
distributed by the Royal Thai government did not, in the 
main, lie in any socio-economic barrier relating to 
ignorance, cultural inertia, availability or cost but was 
instead connected to the inability of these rices to meet 
the environmental demands of cultivation in the area. On 
the whole farmers were willing t o • change to other 
varieties providing they could be shown to be capable of 
dealing with the physical problems they would encounter. 
In view of this, it is not suiprising that the rices that 
were grown all showed considerable flexibility. This was 
especially true of nang nuan and, to a lesser extent, of 
sanpathong. The other rices, while exhibiting a certain
degree of breadth of response to varying conditions, were 
specialised in respect either to drought or to flood.
It is also very important to appreciate the local 
conditions. Farmers would say that the rice they grew was 
suited to their padis, the implication being that the man 
farming 50 metres away might have very different 
conditions of soil and water requiring that another rice 
be planted. These micro-variations which occurred 
throughout the two villages, and which are so important 
when farming in a marginal environment where there is 
little room for manoeuvre and small differences assume 
great significance, are crucial in understanding why 
generalised government initiatives are unlikely to 
succeed.
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Fertiliser Use on Rice
The farmers of Baan Noon Tae and Baan Tha Song Korn 
purchased their fertilisers from a range of sources of 
which the most popular were the kaset amphoe, CBIRD and 
merchants in the town of Mahasarakham (table 5.5). Each 
of the outlets differed slightly in the manner in which 
they sold their fertilisers, and it is possible to break 
these differences down and to identify four important 
variations (table 5.6):
1/
from
Were the fertilisers purchased 
a governmental source?
from a commercial or
2/
have
Was the source accessible to all 
limited access?
the villagers or did
3/ What was the method of payment: cash or credit?
4/ Was there any delivery service?
Of the 51 farmers interviewed who bought chemical
fertilisers in 1982, sixteen or 31% purchased them from 
middlemen, with the remaining 35 obtaining their supplies 
from a governmental source of some kind (table 5.5). In 
the past studies have indicated the merchants are 
occasionally willing to sell fertilisers and other inputs 
on credit [1]. This was not the case in the study area
[1] 'Special' relationships evolve between middlemen and 
their clients (often termed patron/client relationships) 
so that, for example, a farmer can buy the inputs he 
requires on credit providing that he sells his produce 
back to the same merchant (see: Mabry,1979,pp 408-410).
In the town of Mahasarakham there were numerous 
commercial sources of fertilisers and other agricultural 
goods and the managers of these enterprises all said that 
they had no such 'special' relationships with any farmer.
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however/ and in every instance cash was demanded at the 
time of the sale.
In contrast/ the kaset amphoe7 BAAC/ CBIRD and the 
cooperative all distributed fertilisers on the 
understanding that payment would be made after the 
harvest. But/ access to each of these sources was limited 
to individuals who could gain 'membership1:- the kaset 
amphoe only sold fertilisers to farmers who were involved 
in one of the Office's projects. The BAAC stipulated that 
any household be a member of the BAAC organised Farmers 
Group (klum kasetakorn)/ while the cooperative would only 
sell to their own cooperative members. CBIRD is a slight 
anomaly in that it is not a national organisation and only 
operates in one of the two study villages; Baan Noon Tae. 
Membership was again limited though/ in this instance to 
those farmers who belonged to the 'Fertiliser Group'.
Table 5.5
Fertilisers Purchased/ by Source
Households who cultivated rice: 74
Households who used no fertilisers: 23 
Households who used fertilisers: 51
Fertilisers purchased from [*]:
Kaset Amphoe 14 (27%)
CBIRD 10 (20%)
BAAC Farmers Group 3 (6%)
Cooperative 7 (14%)
Merchants/Middlemen 16 (31%)
Unspecified 1 (2%)
[*] Units: household.
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In addition to allowing farmers credit facilities the 
CBIRD 'group1 was the only outlet to also deliver the 
fertilisers to the villages. This was highly valued by 
the farmers; not so much because of the costs of 
transportation but because of the effort and time it 
saved. It was in this respect a convenience rather than a 
necessity [1].
It is commonly believed that one of the 
pre-requisites for a successful development programme is 
an institutional source of agricultural inputs. In 
Thailand this is grounded in the belief that the private 
sector alone is unable to fulfil the requirements of the 
farmers; it is limited and selective and middlemen, so the 
thesis goes, are by nature exploitative.
Possibly as a product of this the inhabitants of the 
research villages had potential access to a plethora of 
governmental, as well as non-governmental, sources. These 
differed only in the respect that payment could be made 
after the harvest and, in fact, the price demanded by the 
merchants for 50 kilograms of the most popular fertiliser 
type, 16-20-0, was less than that asked by any of the
other outlets (some 8% less than the kaset amphoe). The 
unwillingness of the merchants to extend any credit 
facilities did not seem to be of great importance. None
[1] Many of the farmers transported their fertilisers by 
bus. The round trip to both villages cost 4 baht and
except for the big users who had to hire a pickup for the 
journey, was no great problem. However, it is worth 
remembering that both of the muubaan are close to a main
road and Mahasarakham is easily reached. This would not
be the case in the more remote areas of the Northeast 
where transportation might be a constraint.
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Table 5.6
Chemical Fertilisers: Details of Sources
Kaset Amphoe
Access: Sold only to farmers involved in one of the
Office's projects.
Payment: On credit/ after harvesting.
D e 1 i ve ry: No delivery service.
Types & Cost: 16-20-0 250 baht/50 kg.
15-15-15 300 baht/50 kg.
16-16-8 280 baht/50 kg.
21-0-0 225 baht/50 kg.
BAAC - Farmers Group 
Access: Limited to members of 'Farmers Group'
Payment: On credit, after harvesting.
Delivery: No delivery service.
Types & Cost: 16-20-0 235 baht/50 kg.
Cooperative
Access: Limited to cooperative members.
Payment: On credit, after harvesting.
Delivery: No delivery service.
Types & Cost: 16-20-0 250 baht/50 kg.
NB: The cooperative also sold 16-20-0 at a rate of 245
baht/50 kg. to any farmer willing to pay cash.
CBIRD - Fertiliser Group 
Access: Limited to members of the CBIRD 'Fertiliser
Group'.
Payment: On credit, after harvesting. But, if
quantity exceeds 150 kg. then half the cost 
met immediately.
Delivery: Delivery to village included in price.
Types & Cost: 16-16-8 265 baht/50 kg.
Merchants & Middlemen
Access: Open access.
Payment: Cash.
Delivery: No delivery service.
Types & Cost: 16-20-0 230 baht/50 kg.
15-15-15 280 baht/50 kg.
18-12-6 226 baht/50 kg.
NB: These rates were confirmed at four merchants whose
prices all corresponded with each another.
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of the farmers, even the poorest, complained that it 
was their inability to gain access to an institutional 
source which restricted them in their use of fertilisers. 
The reasons lie elsewhere.
The 51 farmers who applied fertilisers on their rice 
had been doing so for an average of 5.3 years, with 20 
years being the longest that anyone claimed to have used 
the input. Table 5.7 shows the breakdown of use by 
introductory source and although the numbers are too small 
to make any concrete assertions the table does reveal 
something of the nature of the spread of information 
regarding their use.
Table 5.7
Diffusion of Information: Fertiliser Use
Introduced by: Baan Noon 
Tae
Baan Tha 
Song Korn
Combi
Kaset Amphoe 11 10 21
Friend/Relative/neighbour 4 11 15
CBIRD 6 - 6
Cooperative 2 2 4
Farmers Group 1 2 3
Self - 1 1
No answer — 1 1
Total 24 27 51
Units: household.
Twenty-one farmers said it was the kaset amphoe that 
introduced them to fertilisers; a significantly greater 
number than for any of the institutional sourcs. This 
goes some way to indicate that the kaset amphoe was 
instrumental in the initial extension process. Table 5.7
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is also interesting in that it seems to show that the 
other villagers have played an important role in the 
dissemination of fertiliser use: fifteen of the farmers
thought that they had first used the input because of 
information derived from friends/ relatives or neighbours. 
This group seem to represent a second 'wave' of users who 
first needed to be convinced, through the example of other 
farmers, of the viability of the input.
Undoubtably, to begin with the two villages must have 
contained village leaders who adopted the innovation of 
fertiliser use first. Using Hagerstrands' model of the 
diffusion of an innovation (fig 5.2) these farmers would 
then have been joined by the 'early and late majority' 
leaving only the 'laggards' cultivating rice without their 
application (Rogers, 1958; Blaut, 1977; Morrill, 1970). 
During the 1982/83 season in the villages of Tha Song Korn 
and Noon Tae, 72% of the farmers who planted their 
riceland used fertilisers, leaving 28% who could be 
classified as 'laggards'. In many respects however, this 
sort of terminology and division is unsatisfactory [1] as 
it assumes that each farmer makes decisions with the same 
resources to hand. It fails to account for the varying 
social, economic and physical conditions in which each 
farmer finds himself and on account of which his strategy 
is decided [2]. The application of fertilisers is not
[1] This is not to imply that the model in itself is 
unsatisfactory; only unsatisfactory in terms of the 
research.
[2] Look to Blaikie, 1978.
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Figure 5.2
The Adoption of Innovations: The Normal 
Distribution
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necessarily of equal benefit to all farmers/and some 
individuals had clearly come to the conclusion that/ in 
the light of the constraints in which they were operating 
(eg: marginal upper padiland)/ their use was not worth
their while.
The rate of application of fertilisers on the rainfed 
riceland ranged from 1.3 to 37 kilograms per rai/ with an 
average figure of 7.9 kilograms per rai. This compares 
poorly with the District Agricultural Extension Office's 
recommended dose of 30 kilograms per rai.
It is often thought that the intensity of use is 
related to the ability of each farmer to buy the input 
(MOAC/April 1980/p 27). Poor farmers with a limited
amount of surplus cash are seen to be unable to make the 
outlay with which to purchase fertilisers/ or to purchase 
an adequate quantity. However/ with this broad notion of 
income as a constraining factor are two separate/ although 
admittedly often inter-related, influences: first, the
problem of a small total income, and second, that of cash 
flow.
The idea that the limited and variable cash flow of 
small farmers is a constraint was the major reason why the 
various government sources sold their fertilisers on 
credit. By doing so farmers could intensify cultivation, 
and pay for their inputs after receiving the returns from 
their production. But, as far as Tha Song Korn and Noon 
Tae are concerned this factor did not seem to play a major 
role; possibly because few of the farmers sold any of
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their rice, thereby making the delay in payment less of an 
advantage.
More significant than the problems of cash flow are 
those relating to a simple inadequacy of income, and it is 
easy to construct a hypothesis which maintains that income 
and the intensity of fertiliser use are related. Such a 
link is commonly alluded to in both the general 
agricultural development literature and in that devoted to 
Thailand (eg: US Presidential Mission,April 1982,p 11).
However, the data from the households interviewed fails to 
support this hypothesis, indicating that, at least 
superficially, the availability of cash did not influence 
the use of fertilisers: there is no correlation between
income and fertiliser use and no appreciable difference 
between the income of the 23 farmers who failed to apply 
them in 1982/83 and the mean for the sample (tables 5.8 
and 5.9).
Table 5.8
Comparison of those Farmers who Applied no Fertilisers in
1982/83 with the Sample Mean
Household Total Land Riceland Total Total
Size (rai) (rai) Income 1 Income 2
Farmers who
Applied no 6.3 22.5 18.5 23,890 24,690
Fertilisers
Sample Mean 6.1 20.8 16.1 23,890 22,200
Income in Baht.
Note:1 Income 1" is the total annual income as stated by 
each household head.
'Income 2' is the total annual income as calculated 
from the responses in each questionnaire.
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In fact/ the only socio-economic variable which 
appears to correlate with fertiliser use is the size of 
the riceland holding. The two show an inverse 
relationship and have a correlation coefficient of 
-0.2825, significant to 98.5% (table 5.9).
Table 5.9
Correlation of the Intensity of Fertiliser Use with 
Various Socio-economic Variables
Socio-Economic Complex
Age of Household Head
Size of Household
Size of Productive Household
Total Land Holding
Riceland Holding
Total Income 1
Total Income 2
Agricultural Income
Correlation
Coefficient
-0.1615 
-0.0064 
-0.1646 
-0.2623 
-0.2825 
0.0792 
0.0329 
-0.1707
Significance
(%)
97.6%
98.5%
Number of cases: 74 (except for Total Income 2, 73 cases)
Statistical techniques: Pearson Product Moment
Correlation and two-tailed test of statistical 
significance.
It is simplest to see this as a function of the 
man/land ratio: farmers with less land are forced to
intensify production to a greater degree to meet their 
subsistence requirements, and this necessitates that they 
apply larger quantities of chemical fertilisers. Thus the 
sub-group of families who farmed less than ten rai of 
riceland applied an average of 14.1 kilograms per rai, as 
against 7.9 kilograms per rai for the entire sample. On
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the surface this is reassuring as it seems to indicate 
that farmers will spontaneously intensify their production 
when faced with a deteriorating man/land ratio. 
Unfortunately the relationship is not as simple as this, 
and there are many additional, and often disguised, 
factors at work.
Perhaps the primary of these relates back to the 
influence of income and involves the cash outlay needed to 
cultivate varying areas of land: the average riceland
holding of the farmers interviewed was 16.1 rai. To add 
fertilisers at the intensity of 14.1 kilograms per rai, as 
the sub-group of farmers with less than ten rai of 
riceland did (who happen to be the lower quartile), would 
cost 1,180 baht; and for those in the upper quartile [1] 
who cultivated an average of 32.2 rai it would cost almost 
2,360 baht. As income did not differ greatly with size of 
land holding, the relative risks as a percentage of income 
would obviously be far higher for the larger than for the 
smaller landowners. This is borne out in table 5.10 which 
shows that if the farmers in the upper quartile had 
applied 14.1 kilograms of chemical fertilisers it would 
have represented an outlay amounting to almost 10% of 
their total annual income, as against only 2% for those 
farmers in the lower quartile. This fact certainly 
restrained many of the bigger operaters when it came to 
the use of fertilisers.
[1] Taken to be the 19 largest riceland owners in the 
sample.
Table 5.10
Costs of Fertiliser Use on Varying Areas of Riceland
Lower Sample Upper
Quartile Mean Quartile
Sample size 19 78 19
Riceland Holding 5.9 rai 16.1 rai 32.2 rai
Total Income (baht) 20,570 23,890 24,530
Fertiliser Use 14.1 if 14.1 if 14.1
Cost (baht) 433 1,180 2,360
Cost as % of Income 2.1% 4.9% 9.6%
Fertiliser use: kilograms per rai
Although income and the size of riceland holding can 
be seen to exert an influence on fertiliser use it still 
does not explain the consistently low rate of application. 
The 19 farmers in the lower quartile, who in theory could 
afford to apply the largest quantities, only used an 
average of 14.1 kilograms per rai, less than one half of 
that recommended by the kaset amphoe. To understand why 
this should be so it is necessary to examine the physical 
environment of the area and the inhabitants1 perception of 
this environment, as it is here that the core of the 
answer is to be found.
As was stressed earlier, the climate, soils and 
topography of the research area combine to present the 
farmer with an environment in which the potential rice 
yields are not only low, but also variable. In order to 
minimise the risks of cultivation they choose rice 
varieties which are suited to the specific conditions of
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each plot, while at the same time containing a large 
degree of ecological flexibility. But/ even with this 
highly developed strategy it is impossible for farmers to 
ensure stability of production/ and it is this that is the 
element of risk within which each farmer must apply his 
fertilisers.
The households of the two villages operated an 
average of 16.1 rai of riceland of which 64% (10.3 rai)
was thii lum, 19% (3.1 rai) thii raap and the remaining
17% (2.7 rai) thii dorn. In the past farmers would
probably, have owned an area of each so that they could 
meet their subsistence requirements whatever the climatic 
conditions (MOAC,April 1980,p 6j Ng,April 1974,p 29). 
Today though, with the fragmentation of land holdings and 
the worsening man/land ratio many families have only one 
land type on which to grow their rice. The erosion of the 
ability of the farmers to risk-minimise in this way has 
been met by the intrusion of income earning opportunities
in other crops, and outside agriculture. Even so, the
inhabitants of the two muubaan are still operating in an 
environment where decisions must be made in the face of 
uncertainty.
Using the data from the farmers interviewed, table 
5.11 is an attempt to illustrate the instability of rice 
production in the 1982/83 season: 1,250 rai of rainfed
riceland was available for cultivation, of which 1,192 rai 
or 95%, was planted. Of this planted area farmers 
estimated that only 63% was actually harvested, and almost 
10% of the plots produced nothing whatsoever. The average
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yield on the planted land amounted to 189 kilograms per 
rai/ some 65% of the national figure for the 1981/82 
season (MOAC,1981/table 17,p 14), and the standard 
deviation of yield was 20.398 (the variability in yields 
is visually demonstrated in graph 5.1). The farmers are 
therefore being encouraged by the government extension 
office to apply large quantities of fertilisers on land 
where less than two-thirds of the cultivated area was 
harvested, and where yields are consistently low.
Table 5.11
Planted and Harvested Area of Rice, by Padiland type
Land Type Area Planted Harvested Area[l] Area
Area Area Destroyed unplan
Thii Lum 800 794 467 92 6
Thii Raap 242 242 191 4 —
Thii Dorn 208 158 91 17 50
Total 1,250 1,194 749 113 56
Area in ra i
[1] This only includes those plots that were 
totally unproductive in 1982/83.
95% of riceland available was planted.
63% of the planted area was harvested.
9% of the planted area was destroyed.
4% of the riceland was not even planted.
The statistics present a strong case supporting the 
contention that the nature of the environment has an 
influence in restraining fertiliser use. Further evidence 
could come from the farmers themselves as it might be 
expected that their views would also reflect this state of 
affairs: when they were asked why they did not apply more
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Rice Yields by Plot
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fertilisers the immediate answer from most farmers was 
that they could not afford to (48 households alluded to 
limited cash as a constraint). However/ on deeper enquiry 
it invariably transpired that the reasoning was more 
complex than this/ and that they were reluctant to apply 
greater quantities because they were unable to guarantee 
that their land would produce enough rice to balance the 
costs involved. This returns to the point about the role 
of the cost of application as a proportion of total 
income/ and it appears that in Noon Tae and Tha Song Korn 
farmers are following a strategy which takes into account 
this cost/ and sets it against the problems presented by 
fluctuating yields and a marginal environment.
Earlier in the chapter it was emphasised that the 
envrionmental risks associated with each type of riceland 
varied/ and that this played a large role in determining 
which rice varieties were cultivated. Fertiliser use is 
influenced in a similar way.
If 'risk1/ defined as the size of the yield coupled 
with the variability of production and the percentage 
harvested area/ is thought to be one of the principal 
factors affecting farmers in their use of chemical 
fertilisers then this should be illustrated by the 
intensity of application on the various padiland types 
(table 5.12).
Table 5.12 shows that the farmers applied 7.2/ 9.6
and 6.5 kilograms per rai of fertilisers on their 
thii lum, thii raap and thii dorn respectively.
Supporting the notion that fertiliser application and
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production risks are linked/ the table also reveals that 
of the riceland types thii raap has the highest, and more 
importantly, the greatest stability of yield [1] (taken to 
be a function of the standard deviation and the harvested 
area). This corresponds with the idea that of the rainfed 
land it is the middle padis that are the most regular in 
terms of water supply. In constrast, the thii lum and
thii dorn, both of which exhibit lower and more
fluctuating yields, have problems of flood and drought
that cause farmers to apply smaller quantities of
fe rtilisers.
Table 5.12
Harvested Area, Yield, Standard Deviation of Yield 
and Fertiliser Use, by Riceland Type
Land Type Yield Fertiliser Harvested S. Deviation
(kg/rai) Use(kg/rai) Area [*] of Yield
Thii Lum 184 7.2 59% 21.092
Th ii Raap 237 9.6 79% 15.754
Th ii Dorn 140 6.5 58% 24.030
Thii Prang - 33.3 - -
[*] This is the harvested area as a percentage of planted 
area.
[1] The table is slightly misleading in that yield is 
obviously dependant, to a degree, on fertiliser use. More 
informative as a measure of risk must be the percentage 
harvested area and the standard deviation of yield.
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The irrigated riceland; thii naa prang; has an 
absolutely controlled supply of water and in these terms 
is a special category of land which presents the farmers 
with few risks. Indicative of this is the rate of 
fertiliser use which averaged over 33 kilograms per rai 
(table 5.12). It could be argued that the high
application also reflects the fact that RD rice types are 
being cultivated, and that these require that large 
quantities be used. It also important, though, not to 
view the two decisions separately; they are part of a 
single strategy which depends on the stability of water 
supply on the land.
In theory it should be possible to show that there 
exists a relationship between yield and fertiliser use; 
specifically that increased yields and increased
fertiliser use are positively correlated. Table 5.13
shows that this is indeed so, and overall there is a
strong correlation significant at the 99.9% level. If, 
however, the same correlation is computed for each of the 
riceland types a rather unexpected set of coefficients are 
exposed: the thii dorn, the least ’stable' riceland,
exhibits the highest correlation while the thii raap, the 
land with the greatest stability of yield, shows the 
weakest relationship (table 5.13). Explaining this is 
difficult, but it is worth remembering that the thii dorn 
produced the lowest yields and the greatest standard 
deviation of yield, while the thii raap produced the most 
paddy with the smallest deviation. In addition, farmers 
do not apply fertilisers 'unseen', so that if the upper
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padis do not receive enough rain and the farmers perceive 
that the crop will be a poor one/ then they will apply no 
fertilisers. In other words/ this is by no means a simple 
correlation in which fertilisers are applied equally. 
Farmers tend to respond to the type of land and to the 
condition of each plot/ and rather than seeing fertilisers 
as leading to greater yields/ it is best to see them as 
contributing to greater yields/ but only on the 'best' 
land. This means that there is a certain inevitability in 
the relationship between the two variables of yield and 
fertiliser use.
Table 5.13
Correlation of Yield and Fertiliser Use/ by Land Type
Correlation Number of Significance 
Coefficient cases (%)
Thii Lum 0.2350 77 96%
Thii Raap 0.3222 30 92%
Thii Dorn 0.7916 18 99.9%
All Plots 0.3623 125 99.9%
The kaset amphoe1s recommendation that farmers apply 
30 kilograms per rai of 16-16-8 on all types of riceland 
is a particularly unrealistic strategy when seen against 
the heterogenous nature of the environment. The 
inhabitants of the two villages would never contemplate 
cultivating their land in such an unsophisticated manner. 
This is not to imply that the officers of the kaset amphoe 
were ignorant of the conditions in the fields; they were 
not. Instead it seems to be a case where recommendations
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are passed-down to the district level administration from 
on-top. Thus, the results of agronomic studies conducted 
out of context are adopted as optimal, taking no notice of 
the local environment. Why this should occur lies outside 
the realms of the study, but the tendency for planning in 
Thailand to be top-down is well documented and often 
criticised (eg: Riggs,1966,pp 358-361).
From the previous account it might seem that the 
responses farmers gave for using little or no fertilisers 
related only to the play-off of cost versus risk. It is 
true that these two factors dominated, but there were also 
others involved; indeed, 22 of the households responded in 
other ways. It is valuable to look at these for two 
reasons: firstly, they show that (once again) the farmers
are not a homogenous group but a complex community where 
physical, socio-cultural and economic influences vary 
considerably. And secondly, they demonstrate that the 
inhabitants are astute and generally well-informed 
agronomically [1]. The replies of the 22 households can 
be divided into four groups, relating to:
1/ The prevalence of flood and drought.
2/ The influence of fertilisers on the growth of the 
rice plant.
3/ Edaphic factors.
4/ Ignorance and cultural inertia.
These responses are tabulated in table 5.14.
[1] I am indebted to Mr Philip Stott for advice regarding 
the biological and ecological significance of the farmers' 
comments.
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Table 5.14
Reasons Given, Other than Cost/ for Applying Little
or No Fertilisers
Reason Given Number of
responses
1/ The Soil is still fertile so there is no need 8
2/ Tendency for the land to flood means that the
fertilisers are not effective 2
3/ The land is too 'dry' making the use of 
fertilisers dangerous; their application will 
depress yields still further 1
4/ Fertilisers stimulate vegetative growth with 
little increment in grain production;
lodging occurs 3
5/ The land is salty; fertiliser use would make 
it more so 1
6/ Chemical fertilisers cause the soil to become 
'salty', 'hard' and less 'pliable' 2
7/ The farmer uses manure because it is better 2
8/ Fertilisers do increase yields but if the 
application is not continued from then onwards 
the production will decline to below its 
original level 3
9/ 'Cultural Inertia' 2
10/ If the rainfall is adequate fertilisers are 
not applied. But, if it is less than normal 
then they are; this brings production upto 
the level of a year when the rainfall is good 1
11/ Fertilisers cause the crop to grow so well 
that insects are attracted 1
Note: Some farmers gave more than one response. The total 
number of farmers represented in this table is 22.
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The prevalence of flood and drought
Connected to the prevalence of flood and drought are 
two points raised by a handful of farmers. Flood, as well 
as reducing the yields of unfertilised rice, was also felt 
to reduce the effectiveness of chemical fertilisers 
through 'dilution1. This would make their use an even 
less profitable proposition. Second, and more seriously, 
their use on land prone to drought was thought to be 
unwise because if it was a dry season they would actually 
harm the crop and depress yields further than if they had 
never been applied. Both of these points have a basis in 
the agronomic literature: De Datta, talks of the
"flushing action of dew or rain" adversely affecting the 
recovery of nitrogen from the soil (De Datta,1981,p 375): 
and it is well-known that drought and fertiliser use can 
combine to raise the nutrient concentration of the soil to 
a level where plant-water osmosis is impeded, and moisture 
stress occurs (personal communication; Mr Philip Stott).
2/ The Influence of Fertilisers on the growth of the 
rice plant
Traditional varieties of rice, although they respond 
well to small doses of fertilisers [1] tend to lodge when
[1] It is often said that traditional varieties of rice 
fail to respond satisfactorily to fertilisers and that if 
farmers would only grow HYV's then they would see the 
benefits of the input. Studies conducted in Thailand 
however have shown that upto a rate of approximately 25 
kilograms per rai, traditional rice varieties (represented 
by sanpathong - an improved variety) actually outperform 
the RD rices, and it is only with heavy applications of 
fertilisers that HYV's show their superiority (Mekong 
Secretariat,Nov 1979).
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greater quantities are applied [1] (Fukui/1978,p 266). In 
the fields of the villages there was at least one instance 
where lodging had occurred because the farmer had applied 
too much fertiliser on a traditional rice type; and among 
the households interviewed three specifically referred to 
large doses leading to excessive vegetative growth coupled 
with only a small increment in grain production [2]. For 
most of the farmers this situation would never arise 
though/ as other constraints hold fertiliser use way below 
the level at which lodging becomes a problem. There may 
also be another aspect to this: all the farmers used
ready mixed fertilisers containing a fairly high 
proportion of nitrogen [3]. As nitrogen principally 
encourages vegetative growth (phosphorous and potassium 
tend to aid flowering and fruiting)/ there will be a 
tendency for large applications to cause lodging/
[1] Lodging reduces the productivity of the rice plant as 
it/ "disrupt[s] the light receiving system and severly 
reduce[s] photosynthetic capacity" (Fukui/1978,p 266).
[2] Even though lodging may not occur/ the benefits of 
using large quantities on traditional varieties can be 
negligable. As Fukui notes/ leaves on indigenous rice 
varieties are usually long and drooping and lie 
horizontally. This means that/ "it is easy for the leaf 
area to pass the optimum level for maximum apparent 
photosynthesis" (Fukui/1978/p 266).
[3] The most popular fertilisers were N/P/K/ 16-20-0 and 
16-16-8.
especially when traditional rice types are being 
cultivated. The farmers recognised this but did not 
understand it in these terms/ and there is possibly a need 
to educate those villagers that apply large amounts so 
that they can use their fertilisers in a more 
sophisticated fashion.
Three other farmers had a rather different version of 
how fertiliser use affects the rice plant and why they 
applied little or none: they admitted that their use
would increase production; but, they also believed that if 
the application was not continued at the same rate in 
every subsequent season then yields would drop below the 
level at which they had been originally. As farmers were 
financially insecure and therefore unable to guarantee a 
greater application, they felt that it would be unwise to 
begin. This notion, that when one begins to use chemical 
fertilisers at a particular rate it is impossible to stop, 
is not without basis. A fertilised rice crop tends to be 
far more demanding of soil nutrients than an unfertilised 
one, and it is necessary to replace them in the following 
years through continued applications.
3/ Edaphic factors
Despite the fact that the soils of the research area 
are poor, seven farmers stated that they had used no 
fertilisers because their padis were still fertile.
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'Fertility* is a relative term/ and although the soils 
might have been better than most in the area (pockets of
more fertile soils do exist) they would have been poor by 
world standards. Of greater interest were the comments 
made regarding the effect that fertilisers have on the 
quality of the soils.
One farmer/ with salty land/ thought that using 
fertilisers would make the situation worse. This could be 
so: saline conditions mean that the water in the fields
has a high concentration of salts. The use of chemical 
fertilisers on such land raises the concentration further 
still/ making the uptake of water by the plant 
increasingly difficult (due to the unfavourable osmotic 
balance between the cell-water and the paddy-water). Thus 
fertiliser use would have a detrimental effect on 
production.
Two other farmers said that they used small 
quantities because too much made the "soil salty and hard 
to work". This astute statement can be understood when it 
is set against the properties of the soils of the area 
and/ indeed/ the two farmers appeared to see the problem 
in just these terms; for the low organic matter content of 
much of the land in the Northeastern region means that 
chemical fertilisers used alone compact the soil and 
slowly destroy what limited structure there is (reference 
to deleterious effects of inorganic fertilisers on soil 
productivity: De Datta/1981/pp 382-383).
247
4/ Ignorance and Cultural Inertia
In the section on rice varieties it was noted that 
one elderly farmer gave the impression of being entrenched 
in his choice of which rice varieties to cultivate. The 
same man used no fertilisers for similar reasons: he had
never used them before, was satisfied with his production, 
and was unwilling to experiment. There was, in addition, 
one other farmer who appeared to hold comparable views; 
although his wife was of the opinion that he was a 
good-for-nothing drunkard who did little of anything and 
this was why they were unable to use fertilisers. Even 
so, these two men were exceptions, for almost 70% of the 
households who cultivated riceland in 1982/83 applied 
chemical fertilisers.
Finally, there was a man who seemed to give a reason 
for which there is no basis: he explained that when the
rainfall was adequate he did not use fertilisers but, if 
it was inadequate, he did. By applying his fertilisers in 
this manner the farmer claimed that he was stabilising his 
yields by raising the production of a poor year to that of 
a good one.
Chemical fertilisers are not the only means by which 
yields can be increased; other possibilities include the 
use of manures, mulches and composts. These organic 
fertilisers are particularly well-suited to the middle and 
upper padis where the permeability of the soil restricts
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rice cultivation to those years when rainfall is 
plentiful. They would build up the colloidal content of 
the land, increasing its water retention capabilities as 
well as improving texture, plasticity and the ability of 
the soil to hold the anions of chemical fertilisers so 
that they can become available for uptake by the rice 
plant.
Although none of the sample used composts or mulches, 
42% of those who cultivated rice in the 1982/83 season 
used manure on their land [1]. The quantities applied 
were invariably small and most did not appreciate the 
advantages that manure has over chemical fertilisers. 
Instead they used manure for economic reasons; because it 
was cheaper. There were exceptions however, and two 
farmers realised that in addition to raising yields, 
manure also improved the structure of the soil, making it 
more pliable and easier to work.
The apparent gap in the knowledge of most of the 
farmers regarding manure, mulches and composts could be 
narrowed if the kaset amphoe did more extension work in 
this area. But, even with such a programme, encouraging 
farmers to use more would still be difficult; there are 
distinct problems of supply which would be hard to fill, 
and many of the farmers complained that a major
[1] Most farmers collected manure from the livestock 
stalls beneath their houses. This was then transported by 
pickup to the fields whereupon it was spread over the 
land. A number of households in the two villages owned 
trucks and were willing to hire them out; the fee for one 
journey varied between 100 and 150 baht per load.
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restriction was the time needed to collect and then 
distribute the manure on their land. This and other 
problems will be discussed in greater detail in the 
chapter covering upland crop cultivation in Noon Tae and 
Tha Song Korn, for the benefits of organic fertilisers are 
even clearer when it comes to cultivation on these lands, 
than on the ricelands.
Summary
In the muubaan of Tha Song Korn and Noon Tae 
fertiliser use was primarily controlled by the 
environment: the overall instability of rainfall tended
to restrict farmers to small doses; and on top of this the 
spatial variations in the environment, principally 
demonstrated by the three riceland divisions, caused 
further limitations to be imposed with respect to the 
specific conditions of each plot. Insufficient income 
also played a role in constraining farmers in their use of 
fertilisers. This was especially true of the larger land 
owners who had to purchase that much more to meet a 
particular doseage. And, finally, 30% of the households 
who cultivated riceland in the crop year under study gave 
other reasons for applying little or no fertilisers. 
These were extremely diverse, but even so they were 
invariably accurate in agronomic terms, revealing that on 
the whole the farmers were astute and well-informed.
De Datta notes that, "variability in the amount and 
distribution of rainfall is the most important factor 
limiting yields of rainfed rice..." (De Datta,1981,p 18).
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This was admittedly crucial in every farmers’ strategy vis 
a vis fertiliser use. But, it is also important to 
appreciate that over and above this, the heterogenous 
nature of the social and physical environment had a 
warping influence, preventing any attempt at a simplistic 
theory of cause and effect.
Pesticide and Herbicide Use
As well as using fertilisers, 62% (46 households) of 
the farmers interviewed who cultivated rice in 1982/83 
applied pesticides. These were obtained, in every case, 
from merchants in the villages or in Mahasarakham, who 
stocked a wide range of brands and types (table 5.15). 
The various governmental organisations were extremely 
limited in terms of their supply; only the cooperative
attempted to sell pesticides on a regular basis, and even 
here there were distinct limitations. Their stocks ran to 
only one variety [1] which was available solely to 
cooperative members on a cash basis. Possibly as a result 
of this, in the 1982/83 season the two groups covering 
Noon Tae and Tha Song Korn (and two other villages in the
tambon) managed to sell none whatsoever. The kaset
amphoe, although it did not supply pesticides regularly,
occasionally distributed free samples among the farmers. 
This was not a structured process and depended on when and 
if supplies were received from the central administrative 
structure.
[1] Identified as 'Phaaden1, which sold at a cost of 20 
baht per kilogram.
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Table 5.15
Pesticides Used by Farmers in Baan Noon Tae 
and Baan Tha Song Korn
Brand
Folidon (Bayer) 
605 50 cone
Ozo
(Thep Watana)
Furadaan 
(Baye r)
Azodrin (Shell) 
sytemic insect­
icide
Duratae 3%
(Bayer)
Dindrin 
(Lighthouse)
Endex 
(Shell)
Chemical Composition Cost/Unit
0-0 dimethyl-O.p nitrophenyl 15 baht
phosphorothroate (100 cm3)
(Active ingredient: 50%)
0-0 dimethyl 0-p-nitrophenyl 12 baht
phosphorothroate (100 cm3)
(Active ingredient: 50%)
25
(1
baht 
Kg. )
3-hydroxy-N-methyl-CIS- 28 baht
crotonamide dimethyl phosphate (100 cm3) 
(Active ingredient: 56%)
2,3,dihydro-2,2-dimethyl-7- 20 baht 
benzofuranyl methylcarbamate (1 kg.)
1.2.3.4.10.10-hexachloro-6,7- 10 baht
epoxy-1/4,4a,5,6/7,8,8a- (25 gr.)
octahydro-1,4-END0-EX05 ,8-
dime thanonaphthalene 
(Active ingredient: 50%)
1.2.3.4.10.10-hexachloro-6,7- 15 baht
epoxy-1,4,4a ,5,6,7,8,8a- (100 cm3)
octahydro-1,4-ENDO-ENDO-5 ,8-
dime thanonaphthalene(endrin)
(Active ingredient: 20%)
Recommended by the Kaset Amphoe
Ozo-Mala 1000E 
(Cheminova A/S 
Denmark)
diethyl mercaptosuccinate S- 15 baht 
ester with 0.0 dimethyl (100 cm3)
phosphorodi thioate 
(Active ingredient: 83%)
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Although herbicides were available through the same 
commercial outlets that supplied pesticides none were used 
by any of the farmers [1]- Virtually all of them 
explained that there was no need and if weeds did become a 
problem they could be dealt with by hand. It is well 
known that in comparison to broadcast rice, with 
transplanted wet rice competition from weeds is less of a 
problem (De Datta,1981,pp 476-477). In addition, the 
cultivation of tall local rices reduces the problem 
further as these types compete more rigorously with weeds 
than do the modern semi-dwarf (ie: RD types) varieties (De 
Datta,1981,pp 477-478).
The introduction of pesticide use to the villages 
seems to have taken a similar course to that of 
fertilisers: over half of the farmers identified the
kaset amphoe as having introduced them to the input, and 
another 30% felt that they had first used it because of 
information gleaned from relatives, friends or neighbours. 
Thus, it is possible, once again, to hypothesise that the 
kaset amphoe initiated the extension process and the 
villagers themselves played a major role in its consequent 
spread. However, despite the fact the two inputs are 
similar in this respect it does not follow that the 
similarities extend further. In fact, the tendency for 
fertilisers and pesticides to be appraised as if they are 
a single unit upon which the same influences bear is far 
from satisfactory. It not only simplifies the farmers'
[1] Herbicides were not distributed by any of the 
governmental organisations.
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strategy/ but also fails to account for an important 
difference between the two; for pesticides tend to be 
applied after insect attack has become a problem/ so that 
whereas fertilisers are a means to an end (higher yields)/ 
insecticides are invariably used as a solution to a 
problem (insect attack) [1]. Because of this and other 
differences it is essential to analyse their use 
independently of fertilisers. It is significant that 
there exists no relationship between the two inputs, with 
many of the farmers who applied fertilisers using no 
pesticides, and vice versa.
The average cash outlay devoted to insecticides among 
the farmers who used them amounted to 142 baht, only 18% 
of that allocated to fertiliser use. Possibly as a result 
of this small cost, pesticide use and income show no 
relationship [2] (table 5.16). Indeed, of the 26 
households who failed to use the input only five (19%) 
stated that financial factors restrained them. As far as 
the question, 'would you like to use more; if so, why 
don't you' (look to appendix 1.1) is concerned, a larger 
proportion of farmers pointed to cash as a constraint (46%
[1] In other words, within any community there will always 
be a group of farmers who, because their rice was not
affected by insect attack, will have no reason to apply 
pesticides.
[2] It is felt that it would be unwise to attempt to use
the 'intensity of pesticide use' as a variable in the
discussion. This is for two reasons:
1/ The farmers have different requirements depending on 
the presence and the extent of insect attack (which is
unsystematic).
2/ It would be hard to equate different pesticide brands 
and types; they have varying proportions of active 
ingredients, varying effects on different insects and can 
be purchased by volume or by weight.
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of those that used pesticides). However, the response, 'I 
have no money', should not be taken at face value. It is
a stock phrase employed on many occasions (eg; with
respect to fertilisers), and invariably deeper enquiry 
shows that other factors are also involved. The problem 
is, of course, a judgemental one in which the answer to an 
open-ended question must be deciphered. Multiple and
contradictory replies are common and in every case a 
certain amount of intuition is necessary. Given these 
limitations, the overall feeling was that cash did not 
play a major role in restraining the use of pesticides. 
Instead, as many farmers applied them as a 'curative'
after insect attack had been identified, the presence or 
absence of insects dominated with 53% of the farmers 
identifying this factor as being primary.
Table 5.16
Correlation of Pesticide Use with Various 
Socio-economic Variables
Socio-economic Correlation Number Significance
Complex Coefficient of cases
Total Land -0.1309 78 -
Riceland -0.1581 78 -
Fertiliser use/rai -0.099 74
Income 1 -0.1311 78 -
Income 2 -0.1420 78 -
Agricultural Income -0,0912 78 -
Statistical techniques: Pearson Product Moment Correlation 
with two-tailed test of statistical significance.
255
Having identified the principal influence on 
pesticide use/ it still leaves almost half of the farmers 
(47%) who gave alternative reasons/ unaccounted for. 
These are important as well as interesting/ because they 
illustrate, yet again, the complexity of factors operating 
within the community. The group can be divided into three 
loose categories of response:
1/ E conomic
2/ Perceptual/socio-cultural
3/ Environmental
By far the most important is the first; the problem 
of limited available income (table 5.17). Earlier it was 
discussed that the reply, 'I have no money' was far from 
straight-forward and was in many ways deceptive. It is 
interesting that there is a clear division between those 
farmers who applied ino pesticides and those who were 
reluctant to apply more. The first group had an average 
annual income of 7,800 baht and the second of 26,470 baht 
(table 5.17). It is possible that the questions, 'Why 
didn't you use any pesticides'; and, 'would you like to 
use more; if so why didn't you', are very different and 
that the former elicits a more direct and accurate reply. 
It certainly seemed that the farmers answering the latter 
question were more prone to resort to the stock response, 
'I have no money', without thinking and table 5.17 indeed 
shows that in basic financial terms they were not
constrained [1]. To sum-up this rather tortuous argument,
[1] They operated an average of 18.2 rai of riceland, only 
slightly ab ove the mean for the entire sample (16.1 rai). 
The amount of pesticide needed was therefore only 
marginally above the norm (assuming some degree of
comparability between farmers) and would not have
presented a problem in monetary terms.
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it appears both qualitatively and quantitively (in terms 
of income) that whereas cash could have exerted a 
prevailing influence on the five farmers who applied no 
pesticides and claimed financial problems limited them/ 
many of those who stated they were loath to apply more 
for the same reason were probably simplifying their 
circumstances.
Table 5.17
Reasons Given for Using No, or No More/ Pesticides
Why Farmers Applied No Pesticides Number of Average
cases Income
They had insufficient funds: 5 7/800
There were no insects: 18 )
Other reason: 3 ) 21,100
Why Farmers Applied No More Pesticides
21 26/470
20 )
4 ) 27,875
(Income in baht)
They had insufficient funds: 
There were no more insects: 
Other reason:
No response:
The second category, 'perceptual/socio-cultural', is 
especially loose accounting for five households with 
little to connect them. Two of them said that they were 
reluctant to use more pesticides because they were scared 
of the consequences of increasing the dos age. The first, 
a widow of 62, explained that she kept fish in her padis 
and felt that to use pesticides on the rice would kill 
them. Interestingly, because she wished to keep fish and 
to protect her rice from insect attack she applied 
pesticides on the nursery bed thus, as she saw it.
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fulfilling both of the goals. The conflicts that exist 
between pesticide use and fish farming were starkly- 
illustrated in early 1983 when a mysterious virus killed 
large numbers of fish (worth an estimated 104 million 
baht) in 29 of Thailand's southern and central changwats. 
The cause of the virus was widely attributed to an 
insecticide, although the manufacturers vigorously denied 
the charge (Bangkok Post Mid-year Review,1983,p 65). The 
second farmer was worried for a simpler reason: he
already used three pesticides in fairly large quantities 
and thought that applying even more might adversely affect 
the crop.
In fact, a number of farmers expressed apprehension 
about the use of insecticides, recognising them as 
extremely powerful and dangerous chemicals (many of those 
used in Thailand and other less developed countries would 
not be passed for use in the developed nations of the 
West). Indicative of this was an episode that occurred in 
Baan Noon Tae towards the end of the dry season: five
buffalo had somehow managed to consume some 
insecticide-treated seed rice and subsequently died in 
great pain. The loss in financial-terms for the families 
that owned the animals was enormous, as each would have 
been worth at least 5,000 baht. In addition, the 
emotional loss would have been great as buffalo are prized 
and loved.
Ignorance, as with fertiliser use, was not a major 
factor restricting the use of pesticides with only one 
farmer saying that he did not use the input becasue he did
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not know which type to buy or how to apply them. That the 
man should respond in this manner is, in some respects/ 
suiprising as not only was pesticide use widespread through 
the two villages but also the fa-rmer in question was 
fairly innovative in other aspects of cultivation (eg; 
fertiliser use). In a similar vein/ a fourth farmer 
stated that she used no pesticides because she 'didn't 
care'. This apathy is only understandable if it is seen 
against the broader background of her existence: she was
a widow aged 53 years old who gave the impression of never 
having really recovered from her husband’s death. in 
addition/ she had a brother who owned 'lots' of land and 
who gave her four rai of production in exchange for the 
household's labour. This meant that her subsistence was 
virtually guaranteed giving her no reason to intensify 
cultivation.
The fifth and final family in this category of 
'perceptual/socio-cultural', felt that they could not 
apply any more pesticide because they had insufficient 
labour to do so. Although there were six members in the 
household there was/ in effect/ only one agriculturally 
productive member; the Mae Baan. The household head was a 
teacher at the tambon primary school, the three children 
were still being educated and the last member, the 
grandmother, was too old to work at 64 years old. There 
was of course a further factor; that with an income of over 
70,000 baht from the husband's wage alone, there was 
little necessity to cultivate optimally.
Unlike the influences impinging on fertiliser use and
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the choice of which rice varieties to cultivate, the 
environment (excepting insect attack) did not play a 
significant role with respect to pesticides and only two 
farmers alluded to the environment as a constraining 
factor. The first felt that pesticides were ineffective 
in flooded conditions, to which his land was prone; and 
the second stated that because he farmed marginal land 
with low and variable yields the risks involved, even with 
a small outlay, were too great to justify their use. That 
only two farmers mentioned the risks of investing in a 
marginal environment is notable when set against the 
number who mentioned it regarding fertiliser use. This 
must pertain to the difference in the size of expenditure 
needed to apply fertilisers, and that needed to use
insecticides.
Summary
The farmers of the muubaan used pesticides principally 
as a cure after insect attack had been diagnosed. For
this reason, the presence or absence of insects exerted
the greatest influence in determining whether or not they 
were to be applied. Insecticides are, in fact, more 
effective when used as a preventative [1], but given the 
economic restrictions which continually occupy the 
background to any decision, it is not suiprising that
[1] Hidetsugu Ishikura notes that to apply pesticides at 
the right time, "pest species should be exactly identified 
and their occurance should be determined in advance to 
permit preperations for applying pesticides at the right 
time" (Hidetsugu Ishikura,1975,p 414).
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farmers should wish to wait and see if their fields are 
actually affected. A large number of farmers also 
mentioned cash as a problem. But, except for the poorest 
farmers who would find any expenditure a strain on their 
resources, this response seemed to be a stock one with 
little meaning. There was a further group representing 
10% of those who could have used pesticides in 1982/83 who 
gave a selection of other reasons why they were unable to 
use, or to use more, of them. These 10% illustrate that 
beneath the generalisations there lies a body of farmers 
with specific restrictions of their own.
Finally, it is worth mentioning the limited role that 
the kaset amphoe played in the use of pesticides. The 
office recommended that farmers use Ozo-Mala at a rate of 
30 grammes per rai (table 5.15). But, the office supplied 
no pesticides, and not one of the farmers in the sample 
used this type [1]. Instead it was the merchants who 
played the role of the extension officer; distributing and 
recommending various types and giving instructions on 
their use.
Labour Use
So far in this chapter, especially as regards rice 
types and fertilisers, the farmers' actions have been 
examined against a background of the kaset amphoe's 
recommendations. However, it is impossible to continue 
with this approach with respect to labour use as no 
'recommended practice' exists. But, it is still important
[1] Five farmers said that they used 'Ozo'. It is possible 
that 'Ozo' and 'Ozo-Mala' could have been confused.
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to look at the role of labour in the farm system as it has 
a potential bearing on fertiliser and pesticide use, and 
also accounts for a large proportion of the total capital 
invested in the production of rice. In this way it can 
exert an influence in limiting the uptake of new cultural 
practices, and restrict the amount of money available to 
purchase other agricultual inputs.
In Northeastern Thailand, wet rice cultivation is 
characteristically labour intensive with few of the 
processes involved having been mechanised to any extent. 
Families try to complete as many of the tasks as possible 
without resorting to help from outside the household. 
However, during the peak peiods of transplanting and 
harvesting the size of the demand means that many must 
either hire labour or enter into reciprocal labour 
exchange agreements. In addition to these two periods, 
labour is sometimes also required for weeding and for 
post-harvest processes such as threshing.
In Noon Tae and Tha Song Korn, nearly 70% of those 
interviewed who produced rice had to obtain labour from 
outside their own households to meet the demands of their 
crop (table 5.18). In the past this would have involved 
long khaek; the exchange of labour between households. 
Today however , with the intrusion of the cash economy into 
the area and the overwhelming desire of most people to be 
paid in cash for anything they do, over 80% of those 
families who used labour from outside their own 
households, had to hire it (table 5.18). The wage for a 
day's work ranged between 25 and 30 baht (generally, 25
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baht for harvesting and 30 baht for transplanting) with a 
meal(s) often being provided.
Table 5.18
Labour Use, by Household
Number of Households that: % [*]
Hire labour 37 54%
Use long khaek 8 12%
Use both 1 1%
Hire machinery 1 1%
Do none of the above 21 31%
Not applicable 13
Total Households 81
[*] Percentage of those households who 
cultivated rice in 1982/83.
The households hired the equivalent of 113 man days 
of labour/ an average of 7.0 man days per rai. This 
represents an outlay of between 2/825 and 3/390 baht per 
household depending on the wage, or approximately 13% of 
their total income. It is therefore the single largest 
investment in rice cultivation; nearly three times as much 
as that invested in fertilisers. But/ there is a problem 
with measurement: farmers exhibited a tendency to
over-estimate the quantity of labour they used/ and 
although it is impossible to say to what degree they 
exaggerated/ the figures should be viewed with a certain 
amount of scepticism [1]. This said/ it is still possible 
to view the data as accurate within itself; ie: to assume
[1] One household which claimed to hire an inordinately 
large amount of labour (it would have cost 44,550 baht - 
more than their entire annual income of 40,000 baht) has 
been omitted from the calculations.
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that the degree of over-estimation is comparable between 
households. Whatever the true figures are, it still seems 
likely that labour in the greatest monetary input. In 
view of this it is suiprising that so few farmers (only 
four) complained of financial constraints limiting them in 
their use of labour? especially when compared with the 
number who resorted to this excuse with respect to 
fertilisers and pesticides; inputs which consumed far 
smaller sums of money. Part of the reason for this might 
be that whereas fertilisers, and to a lesser extent 
pesticides, are optional inputs, labour is a necessary 
input. Farmers have to transplant and harvest their rice 
(this does not apply to weeding) and there is therefore 
never the possibility of cutting-back on labour use [2],
There was a very uneven use of labour: one farmer
alone hired 17% (in terms of man days), and the five 
largest employers, 41%. In many ways these households 
with extremely large requirements are special cases. For 
example; the family in Baan Noon Tae which hired 17% of 
the total figure (the equivalent of 1,260 man days) had a 
clear need for such a labour input: the Mae Baan was
acting as the head of the household because her husband 
had gone to Iraq as a migrant worker. This meant that she 
was the only productive member in the family (she had 
three daughters but they were all at school, so that at 
best they can only be viewed as semi-productive), and
[1] Although it is arguable that labour is flexible, to a 
degree, and that the members of a household could work 
harder thereby reducing their additional labour 
requirement. It would, though, probably be only a minimal 
reduction.
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somehow managed to cultivate 35 rai of thii lum. Given 
that her husband was remitting 120,000 baht per year, the 
obvious answer to her labour shortage was to hire 
villagers to work the land, which she did.
In the two villages labour use exhibits a 
relationship with three socio-economic variables; the area 
of riceland [1], income, and the number of agriculturally 
productive members in a household (table 5.19). The area 
of riceland is, not suprisingly, strongly correlated with 
the total amount of labour utilised. However, this is not 
tremendously illuminating and of greater consequence are 
the correlations between labour use and income, and labour 
use and the number of productive members in a household. 
Income shows a strong positive correlation with total 
labour use and a weak relationship with the intensity of 
labour use (ie; per rai). The first is significant at the 
99.8% level, and the second at 90%. The size of the 
productive household meanwhile exhibits a negative 
relationship with both total labour and the rate per rai; 
the former is significant to 96% and the latter to 98%. 
These relationships are 'classic' and almost beguilingly 
neat. From them it is possible to begin to describe the 
type of farmer who would hire large amounts of labour; he 
would cultivate more than the average amount of riceland, 
would have fewer productive members in his household, and 
would earn a higher than average income.
[1] The fact that this relationship exists is strong 
evidence that although farmers may have over-estimated the 
quantity of labour they hired, they all did so to a 
similar degree.
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Table 5.19
Correlation of Labour Use with Various
Socio-economic Variables
Total Labour Use
Socio-economic
Complex
Correlation Number Significance 
Coefficient of cases
Productive Household 
Riceland 
Total Income 1 
Total Income 2
-0.2480
0.3379
0.3909
0.3526
58
58
58
57
96%
99%
99%
99%
Labour Use per Rai
Productive Household 
Riceland 
Total Income 1 
Total Income 2
-0.2953
0.0053
0.2172
0.1896
58
58
58
57
98%
Statistical techniques: Pearson Product Moment Correlation 
with two-tailed test of statistical significance.
Only nine farmers used long khaek to meet their 
labour requirements/ one of whom also hired some labour
(table 5.18). This group of farmers do not appear to be 
distinctive in any way; the area of riceland they operated 
and the number of productive members in their households 
conform closely to the mean/ and although income is
slightly lower than the average for the sample/ it is not 
significantly so (table 5.20). in these terms, why they 
were able to fulfil (or decided to fulfil ) the labour
demands of their rice crop through long khaek is therefore
unclear. It is possible that it could correspond to the 
structure of social relations within the two villages:
Long khaek involves the exchange of labour between
two or more families/ the implication being that ties 
between households must exist. These ties are usually 
between related households who pool their labour at 
particular times of the year. Because of this, families 
are not all equally able to enter into reciprocal labour 
exchange agreements, and the nine farmers in Noon Tae and 
Tha Song Korn who used long khaek may have done so because 
they were able to call upon long-standing links with 
other, related families. One elderly farmer commented 
that, "in the past everyone was able to use long khaek 
[and, he implied, the villagers were better for it]; now 
very few can." The point of this is that it seems to 
indicate that it has been the breakdown of the linkages 
between households, rather than diminishing demand which 
has caused the exchange of labour to become so much less 
prevelent. Whether or not this is so, it is clear that 
long khaek as a means of overcoming the uneven labour 
requirements of wet rice cultivation, at least in this 
part of the Northeast, is dying out.
Table 5.20
Comparison of those Farmers who Used Long Khaek to Meet 
their Labour Demands with the Mean for the Sample
Sub-group who Mean
Used Long Khaek
Age of Family Head (years) 
Productive Household 
Area of Riceland (rai) 
Total Land Area (rai) 
Income 1 (baht)
3.4
14.1
17.4
17,720
47
3.3
16.1
19.7
23,890
47
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The increased use of man-power is not the only way by 
which a labour shortage can be overcome. The
mechanisation of agriculture can eliminate the demand by 
drastically reducing the number of man days required to 
cultivate a unit of land. In Noon Tae and Tha Song Korn/ 
only one farmer said that she had utilised machinery in 
the production of her rice. She had hired a rotavator
(hand-held tractor) from another villager to plough 19 rai 
of her riceland. This cost 100 baht per rai and to pay 
for it she obtained a loan of 3,000 baht from the Bank for 
Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives. In this case, 
the hiring of a tractor seemed to be a simple alternative 
for a household with limited manpower, to hiring labour: 
her husband was dead and at 53 years old she was only 
semi-productive. Thus the work fell to her son and
daughter aged 19 and 21 years old respectively.
. Because only one household used machinery it is
impossible to draw any conclusions about the influences 
impinging on its use. All that can be said is that the 
farmers did not perceive there to be a problem regarding 
access to tractors etc; they simply expressed no desire to 
hire them.
Of course, in the absence of any degree of 
mechanisation of the means of production, farmers 
continued to rely on buffalo, and to a lesser extent 
cattle, to assist them in the cultivation of rice (and 
upland crops). Out of the 77 agricultural households who 
were interviewed, 71 owned buffalo and 13 also kept cattle 
(no farmer just had cattle. See table 4.8). The average
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number of head per household amounted to 3.3 and 0.7 
respectively. Given that it is clearly essential that 
farmers have access to some means by which their land can 
be prepared/ it is interesting to see how the six who 
owned no buffalo at the time of the questionnaire had 
managed to cultivate their crops:
- Mrs Nooy Narinyaa and Mr Thook Siimaa both hired them 
from relatives; the former at a rate of 100 baht per day 
for two days to cultivate two rai of riceland; and the 
latter as part of a deal which included the renting of 
five rai of thii lumf costing him two-thirds of the 
production from that land.
- Two other families were lent buffalo. Mr Samay Nandii 
borrowed them from his mother-in-law who lived in Baan 
Doon Do about two kilometres to the east of Baan Noon Tae 
(look to map 4.2). When he required the animals he would 
walk over to Doon Do in the morning/ and take them to his 
fields to use for as long as he needed. Mrs Kaw 
Jammaamurii borrowed buffalo from a relative who lived in 
the same compound as herself. She explained that the two 
families commonly helped each other and she gave the 
impression that they were involved in an extensive system 
of reciprocal labour and resource exchange.
- The final two farmers has sold their animals at the 
end of the previous season and were tending to buy 
replacements before the onset of the 1983/84 season.
Buffalo and cattle were used for a variety of 
agricultural purposes: they were indispensible in the
crucial processes associated with land preperation where
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they were used to harrow, puddle and plough the padis and 
upland; and they were also used, to a limited extent, to 
transport inputs and produce to and from the fields.
At the present time in the two villages there appears 
to be little chance of a replacement of draught animals by 
mechanical means of land preparation. Not one farmer
expressed a desire for change and the animals were fully 
and perfectly integrated into the farm system. There has, 
however, been considerable development as far as using 
draught animals as a mode of transportation is concerned: 
farmers tended to hire pickups to take their produce from 
their fields and onwards, if necessary, to the point of 
marketing. In fact, the familiar carts of the Isan region 
were a rare.sight in the vicinity of the communities. The 
rates charged to those hiring pickups varied according to 
distance; for trips to the fields they ranged between 100 
and 200 baht; to Mahasarakham the rate was approximately 
200 baht and to Kosum Phisai, 250 baht (although commonly 
the charge to transport produce was based on the weight of
the load - varying between 10 and 15 sataang per
kilogram). Buffalo and cattle were also no longer used as 
a common means of personal transportation, for the
inhabitants, being fortunate in having a convenient bus 
service close at hand, usually chose to travel by road. 
In addition to these uses, the animals are a source of 
manure. A number of farmers took advantage of this fact 
(look to chapter 6) and spread the fertiliser on their 
land.
Not only were cattle and buffalo the most valuable
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resource that most farmers owned after their house and 
land, but there was also a considerable emotional 
attachment between the farmers and their animals. It 
could be argued that this would tend to prevent their 
phasing-out in favour of machinery; although the evidence 
suggested that they were amply fulfilling their principal 
job of land preperation.
Not suprisingly, if the number of buffalo owned is 
correlated with the area of land holdings and riceland 
holdings, a strong positive correlation significant to 
99.7% and 99.9% respectively, emerges. There is no 
relationship however between the number of cattle owned 
and the size of landholdings. This is because cattle are 
not an essential agricultural resource: they are not
strong enough to plough padiland successfully and are 
always owned in addition to buffalo, for it is only 
buffalo which can meet all the demands of the rice 
cultivation cycle. One farmer noted that a problem of 
owning both cattle and buffalo is that a households labour 
requirement rises considerably: he explained that cattle
walk faster than buffalo so that it is impossible to herd 
the animals together. Because of this, he said, any 
family with insufficient labour to spare two youths is 
unable to raise both animals.
Having discussed the various elements of the rice 
cultivation cycle; varieties planted, fertilisers applied, 
pesticides used, labour hired and exchanged,and machinery 
and animals employed; and then set them against the
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government recommendations; it is now necessary to move
onto the final element of the production process, the 
marketing of the paddy, and to examine it in the same 
manner.
The Marketing of Paddy
The two muubaan are essentially subsistence rice 
growing communities and only occasionally do the farmers 
market any of their production. With respect to the 
1982/83 season, seven households sold 100 tang [1] or 
more, three less than 100 tang and five were intending to 
sell rice later in the year (table 2.21). Table 2.21 
shows that the farmers who sold more than 100 tang owned 
significantly more land than the average household; 32.7 
rai versus 16.1 rai. This enabled them to grow enough 
rice to market a portion as well as meeting their 
subsistence requirements. The three farmers who sold less 
than 100 tang owned an average of 14.3 rai of padiland;
slightly less than the mean for the sample. However,
their production from that land was considerably greater 
(table 2.21). It is interesting to look at the planting 
strategies followed by the two groups (those that sold 
more than, and less than, 100 tang) as they demonstrate 
how the difference in the margin of risk can exert an
impact on decision making.
The inhabitants of the villages have a staple diet of 
glutinous or 'sticky' rice. As there is little demand
A tang= 10 kilograms of paddy.
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for this type of rice on the international (and to some 
extent the national) market the prices are considerably 
lower than those paid for khaaw jaaw - non-glutinous rice. 
Therefore/ if a farmer is intending to sell some of his 
production it is naturally more sensible to plant the 
latter type, as it will give him a greater return. But, 
there is a problem; the farmer still has to meet his 
glutinous rice needs before he sells any of his crop. He 
must therefore perform a juggling act; he has to first 
estimate the amount of land that needs to be planted to 
khaaw niaw to meet his subsistence requirements (given the 
variability in yields), and from this calculate the area 
that can be safely planted to khaaw jaaw. The data from 
the villages rather neatly exemplifies this dilemma (table 
2.22); it illustrates that it is only the larger land 
owners that have the margins of 'safety' to plant 
non-glu tinous rice (they own an average of 46.5 rai of 
riceland and produce 1,050 tang of paddy). The smaller 
landowners, unable to guarantee their own demands for rice 
will be met, are 'forced' to plant khaaw niaw, a portion 
of which they might sell if the season happens to be a 
good one.
The position is, however, not quite as 
straight-forward as outlined above. Table 2.22 shows that 
two farmers actually sold all the rice they grew. To 
understand this it is necessary to look at the two 
households individually.
The farmer who sold 300 tang of the glutinous rices 
khaaw dor and sanpathong was the phuuyaybaan of Tha Song
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Table 5.21
The Marketing of Rice in Noon Tae & Tha Song Korn
Farmers that sold more than 100 tang Riceland Holding
1/ 150 tang of Sanpathong [G] 7 rai
150 tang of khaaw dor [G]
2/ 800 tang of khaaw dok mali 105 [NG] 80 rai
3/ 350 tang of RD-6 [G] 17 rai
4/ 300 tang of khaaw jaaw luang tong [NG] 51 rai
5/ 300 tang of khaaw jaaw looy [NG] 34 rai
6/ 800 tang of khaaw jaaw luang tong [NG] 21 rai
7/ 200 tang of nang nuan [G] 19 rai
AVERAGE: 32.7 rai
Farmers that sold less than 100 tang:
1/ 18 tang of nang nuan [G] 12 rai
2/ 15 tang of sanpathong [G] 16 rai
3/ 32 tang of sanpathong/nang nuan [G] 15 rai
AVERAGE: 14.3 rai
Farmers intending to sell rice;
1/ khaaw dok mali 105 [NG] 15 rai
2/ RD-8 [G] [*] 23 rai
3/ kum phai or nang nuan [G] 16 rai
4/ RD-7 [NG] [*] 11 ra i
5/ khaaw jaaw luang tong/nang nuan [NG/G] 50 ra i
AVERAGE: 23 ra i
Total average rice production of those:
that sold > 100 tang: 778 tang
that sold < 100 tang: 417 tang
that will sell rice: 717 tang
Av. for entire sample: 299 tang
[G] = Glutnous rice
[NG] = Non-glutinous rice
[*] = Grown on irrigated riceland
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Korn; he owned seven rai of padiland and three rai of
upland and was relatively affluent. He explained that the
reason why he sold all his production was because he 
needed to pay off a 'debt'. He was unwilling to state its 
exact nature but it seemed to be a gambling debt of some 
sort, and he emphasised that the money was needed
immediately. The second farmer owned 21 rai of thii lum 
which he planted to the non-glutinous khaaw jaaw luang 
tong. He also operated six rai of upland and like the
headman of Tha Song Korn was relatively wealthy. He had 
decided (as explained in the previous chapter) to take 
advantage of the higher price commanded by khaaw jaaw, by 
growing and selling it, buying back proportionately more 
khaaw niaw. The 1982/83 season was the first year he had 
followed this strategy, and because khaaw jaaw luang tong 
had performed rather poorly on his land he was intending 
to revert back to cultivating the glutinous sanpathong in 
the following year.
Farmers sold their rice in one of three ways; to the 
government, to middlemen or informally within the village 
(table 5.23). Of the ten households who had already 
marketed their production or were in the process of doing 
so, seven sold it to middlemen, one to the government and 
two informally. Unfortunately, because of the small 
numbers of farmers involved it is not possible to draw any 
firm conclusions about the prices paid. It does seem as 
though the village rates are lower than those paid by the 
middlemen, but this can only be a tentative observation, 
and it should be noted that there may well be a charitable
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element involved when farmers sell rice to relatives or 
friends. However, it is possible to draw some important 
qualitative points out of the information that farmers 
gave.
Table 5.22
Comparison of the Farmers who Sold Glutinous Rice 
with those who Sold Non-Glutinous Rice
Total Amount Sold Area of
Production Riceland
Glutinous Rice 300 300 7 ra i
470 350 17 rai
800 200 19 rai
300 18 12 rai
560 15 16 rai
400 32 15 ra i
AVERAGE 472 tang 152 tang 14.3 rai
Non-Glutinous 1,550 800 80 rai
900 300 51 ra i
950 300 34 ra i
800 800 21 rai
AVERAGE 1,050 tang 550 tang 46.5 rai
SAMPLE AVERAGE 299 tang - 16.0 rai
Most striking is that the majority of farmers went to 
commercial enterprises to market their rice. Indeed, only 
one sold to the government. Why was this?
The farmers of Noon Tae and Tha Song Korn could sell 
rice to the government in one of two ways; they could 
either sell it to the agricultural cooperative or to the 
government purchasing centre. The cooperative bought 
paddy (nb; unmilled only) at rates above those in the free 
market place but only from their members. No transport
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facilities were provided and farmers were expected to take 
their produce to the district office located just outside 
the town of Mahasarakham. The purchasing centre bought 
rice at the government support price [1] and although it 
was accessible to any household, farmers were again 
expected to deliver the rice to the depot in Mahasarakham, 
themselves. The existence of these two bodies was 
well-known by the villagers, and three of the seven 
families who sold rice in 1982/83 were also members of 
the cooperative. Ignorance cannot, therefore, be regarded 
as a problem.
Table 5.23
Rice: Marketing Channels and Prices Paid
1/ Rice Sold to Middlemen
Baht/kg
150 kg (sanpathong) 2.0
3,000 kg (khaaw dor/sanpathong) 2.8
8,000 kg (khaaw dok mali 105) 3.5
3,000 kg (khaaw jaaw looy) 2.7
3,000 kg (khaaw jaaw luang tong) 3.0
3,000 kg (khaaw jaaw luang tong) 2.7
180 kg (nang nuan) 3.1
2/ Rice Sold Informally
2,000 kg (nang nuan) 2.0-2.
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- to relatives 
kg (sanpathong/nang nuan) 2.6
- to fellow villagers 
3/ Rice Sold to Government 
3,500 kg (RD-6)
[1] A decision was taken in January 1984 to end the 
government market intervention scheme and the support 
price has now been abolished (Far Eastern Economic 
Review,12 April 1984,p 52).
277
It is commonly thought that because■ the government 
buys rice at only a limited number of points through the 
country and communications are sometimes difficult, 
farmers sell to middlemen who will often provide transport 
as part of their service. This might be true of the more 
remote areas of the country, but it does not apply to the 
research area; both villages were relatively close to the 
buying points, communications were excellent and trucks 
could be easily hired (one of the farmers actually owned a 
pickup). In a similar way marketing information at the 
farm-level is often thought to be less than adequate 
giving middlemen the upper hand in any negotiations. This 
did not apply to the inhabitants of the study villages who 
gave the impression of being fairly well-informed. In 
fact, Noon Tae had a 'library1 where newspapers and 
agricultural pamphlets were kept [1]. These were 
regularly delivered and gave the community access to 
up-to-date marketing information. The farmers of both
villages knew that they could obtain a better price if they 
sold to the government and they all believed middlemen to 
be exploitative. Yet they still sold to the private 
sector.
The primary reason for this seemingly anomalous state 
of affairs was the belief that if one sold to either the 
cooperative or to the government purchasing body, payment 
took a long time in coming through. Farmers would explain 
that they needed the money straight away, and that if they
[1] This was built as part of the development programme of 
the Patanaa Chumchon (Community Development Department).
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had gone to the government there would have been a 
considerable delay between the time of the transaction and 
the time of the payment. It was for this reason that they 
went to middlfien who at least gave 'cash on delivery'. 
Whether or not this was actually so was unclear. The 
district agricultural cooperative insisted that farmers 
were given the full amount/ in cash/ with no delay. 
However, the important point is that there still existed 
the widespread perception that the government, in all its 
guises, was slow in terms of payment and this in itself is 
a problem that should be overcome. It is revealing that 
in 1982/83 the district cooperative of amphoe Muang 
purchased 116,364 kilograms of paddy (for 349,404 baht =
3.0 baht/kg.), an extremely small amount when one 
considers that Noon Tae and Tha Song Korn alone marketed 
31,150 kilograms.
One other farmer complained that he was forced to 
sell to a middleman because the government was not buying 
rice at the time when he wished to sell, and that he could 
not wait for them to begin. The accuracy of this 
observation, once again, is rather difficult to gauge. No 
other farmer mentioned the point as a constraint and there 
seemed to be no supporting evidence that this was so. 
Nevertheless, we return to the fact that the man believed 
it to be so and that is all that is needed to prevent a 
family marketing it s produce through a particular 
institution.
From the prece ding account of rice marketing in the 
two communities (albeit extremely limited in scope) it is
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arguable that it was the shortcomings, or the perceived 
shortcomings, of the government purchasing bodies rather 
than the advantages of the middlemen that caused farmers 
to go to the latter, rather than to the former.
Conclusion
This chapter has attempted to show that the manner in 
which the farmers of Noon Tae and Tha Song Korn cultivate 
their rice is influenced, above all else, by the nature of 
the environment of the area. The failure of high yielding 
rice varieties to make any sort of impact has been shown 
to be due to their inability to cope with the variability 
of water conditions in the padis, coupled with their 
generalised response to varying soil and land conditions. 
Similarly, the low intensity of cultivation, exemplified 
by the level of chemical fertiliser use, was largely a 
response to the fluctuating yields and the risks of 
investing scarce financial resources on a crop which had a 
large chance of failing to justify such an investment. 
But in addition, above these generalisations are a wealth 
of further physical, economic and socio-cultural 
influences which integrate to form the complexity that is 
the farm system.
Figures 5.3a to 5.3e [ 1 ]  are an attempt to graphically 
illustrate some of the influences impinging on the farmers 
in their choice of which rice varieties to cultivate, what 
quantity of pesticide and fertiliser to use, how much 
labour to hire and whether to market any of their 
production.
[1] These figures are contained in a pocket at the back of 
the thesis, and appendix 5.2 briefly explains their 
format.
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Chapter Six 
Upland Crop Cultivation in Noon Tae and 
Tha Song Korn
The pattern of upland cropping
Of the 1,534 rax of farmland operated by the 
households who were interviewed, 278 rai or 18% of the 
total area was upland, or thii rai [1], and of this 95% 
was planted to what might be termed 'upland' or 'dry-foot' 
crops. The land was distributed fairly equally through 
the villages (although Noon Tae had a higher proportion of 
upland to riceland; 26% versus 11%) with nearly two-thirds 
(49) of the agricultural households owning a plot(s), and 
the average holding amounting to 5.7 rai. In this way 
upland cropping should be seen as an integral rather than 
as a subsidiary part of the farm system, and should be 
placed alongside any analysis of rice cultivation.
Cassava was the principal crop grown in the two 
villages and in 1982/83 it was planted on 85% of the 
upland operated by the families who were interviewed. The 
remaining 15% was used for a variety of purposes: almost 
10% was planted to other crops (kenaf, 7%; jute, 2%: sugar 
cane, 0.4%; and water melon, 0.4%), 2% was left as
woodland, 1% was grazed, 1.5% remained unused and a 
further 1.5% was having a house built upon it (table 6.1).
The dominance of cassava in the villages corresponds 
with its position in the changwat and indeed, in the
[1] Look to chapter four for a definition of upland or 
thii rai.
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Northeast as a whole (table 6.2). However/ just as the 
crop has not always held this position in the region/ nor 
has it done so in the two villages where a distinct shift 
in the pattern of upland cropping occurred approximately 
seven years ago.
Table 6.1
Upland Cropping in Noon Tae and Tha Song Korn
Total Upland 278 rai
Cassava 237 rai 85.2%
Kenaf 19 ra i 6.8%
Jute 5 ra i 1.8%
Sugar Cane 1 ra i 0.4%
Water Melon 1 ra i 0.4%
Woodland 5 ra i 1.8%
Graz ing 2 ra i 0.7%
Unused 4 rai 1.5%
Building Plot 4 rai 1.5%
In 1975 Thailand was the largest exporter of kenaf in 
the world and the great majority of this was grown in the 
Northeastern Region (table 6.2). The figures for that 
year show that 2,486,000 rai of land was planted to kenaf 
(98% of the area for the whole kingdom) and 1,585,000 rai 
to cassava. By 1980 the area planted to kenaf had shrunk 
by 58% to 1,055,000 rai while the area cultivated to 
cassava had expanded by 286% to 4,535,000 rai. An even 
more dramatic change occurred in Mahasarakham where the 
area planted to kenaf contracted by 61% and that devoted 
to cassava grew by 1,580% (table 6.2). Thus, between 1975 
and 1980 there has occurred a remarkable switch from kenaf
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Table 6.2
The Area Planted to Kenaf and Cassava: 1975 & 1980
Kenaf Cassava
1975
Whole Kingdom
Northeast
Mahasarakham
2.524.000 3,050,000
2.486.000 1,585,000
166,000 15,970
1980
Whole Kingdom
Northeast
Mahasarakham
1.068.000 7,250,000
1.055.000 4,535,000
65,055 252,170
Area in rai
Sources: MOAC,1981,pp 24-31 & 60-65; MOAC,1976,p 52
and into cassava [1] (graph 6.1).
The farmers who operated upland in Noon Tae and Tha 
Song Korn described a similar transformation in the 
pattern of cropping, with 74% stating that they had 
switched from kenaf or jute to cassava. This occurred six 
to eight years ago (1975-1977), and the reasons that were 
given show a suiprising conformity. Almost all the farmers 
(93%) said that the initial stimulus which encouraged them 
to change was the fact that the prices of the crops 
altered to make kenaf and jute less profitable, 
relatively, than cassava. This is also the usual reason
[1] All through the post-war period the farmers of the 
Northeast have been extending the area they plant to 
upland crops. Thus, some of the increase in the area 
planted to cassava would have been accounted for by land 
previously uncultivated.Even so,it is still correct to see 
cassava replacing kenaf over large tracts of the region.
f
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given in the literature [1] to account for the phenomenon 
(eg: Bangkok Bank Monthly Review,July 1981,Vol 22,No. 7,p
255; The Business Review,April 1983,p 60). But when the 
actual prices changes are examined (albeit for grade 'A' 
kenaf and 'high grade' tapioca flour [2]), although there 
is a small increase in the relative price of tapioca in 
the period 1973-1976, it is far from dramatic and one is
i
left with the impression that there must be other factors 
at work to account for such a significant alteration in 
the pattern of upland cropping [3] (table 6.3; Graph 6.1).
It may be that return per rai is a better and more 
realistic way of comparing the changes that have affected 
the two crops at the farm-level. When this is done 
h o w e v e r ,  there appears to be even less reason to support 
the contention that the farmers were responding to a 
change in the returns [4] from cassava vis a vis kenaf
[1] The "main factor contributing to the drastic decline 
in jute and kenaf production here during recent years is 
the switching of farmers from jute and kenaf production to 
cassava which gives relatively higher net returns due to a 
booming export market" (Bangkok Bank Monthly Review,July 
1981,Vol 22,No. 7,p 255).
[2] It would not be illogical to assume that the price 
changes of grade 'A' kenaf and 'high grade' tapioca flour 
would approximate those for the commodities as a whole.
[3] Usually change is assumed to be linear, ie; a small 
change in one variable will lead to a small alteration in 
an associated variable. But it is becoming clear (viz:
chaos theory) that small changes on one side of an
equation may cause suprisingly large responses on the
other. This could, conceivably, be what has occurred in
the Northeast.
[4] This is gross return. It does not take account of any 
variation in the costs of cultivating kenaf and cassava. 
It is presumed that the two crops' cultivation costs are 
comparable.
PERCENT
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Graph 6.1
Relative Prices/ Gross Returns and Area Planted
to Cassava and Kenaf/ 1968-1982
750-
500-
4,535,000 rai
'  2,641,872 rai
250-
1,055,149 rai
100- 816,000 rat
50-
8280787670 721968
YEAR
Relative wholesale price of Cassava and kenaf/ 
1968-82 (the tapioca price as a percentage of 
the kenaf price!.
Gross returns per rai 1968-82 (cassava return 
as a percentage of the kenaf return).
Area planted to kenaf 1973-1980.
Area planted to cassava 1973-1980.
Sources: MOAC/1977; MOAC/1981/ Bangkok Bank Monthly 
Review.
285
Table 6.3
The Relative Wholesale Prices of Kenaf and Tapioca
1968-1982 [*]
Tapioca Price as a
Year % of the Kena
1968 71%
1969 58%
1970 61%
1971 59%
1972 46%
1973 72%
1974 103%
1975 88%
1976 76%
1977 63%
1978 62%
1979 102%
1980 91%
“1981 73%
1982 78%
1983 (first quarter) 82%
[*] Prices are for Grade 'A' kenaf and for 'High Grade1 
tapioca flour at the Bangkok wholesale rate (baht per 
metric ton).
Source: Bangkok Bank Monthly Review
(table 6.4; Graph 6.1). There are many problems with 
analysing data in so simple a fashion, but granted this 
there still remains the feeling that other influences, 
which cannot be clearly identified, affected the farmers: 
There must have been an initial introduction of man 
sampalang to the region and the subsequent spread of its 
cultivation. Connected to this, there must have also been 
a development of a marketing structure capable of handling 
large quantities of the commodity (middlemen, brokers, 
exporters, mills and chipping and drying facilities). Not 
until these facilties had been created would the region
have been able to absorb a large expansion of cultivation. 
Whatever the accuracy of these musings, it does appear 
that despite past reports cassava did not suddenly become 
a more profitable crop than kenaf; table 6.4 shows that 
it has always been so. Rather, the farmers suddenly 
realised it was the more profitable crop. This would 
account for the widespread perception that the prices did 
change.
Despite what could be seen to be a slightly distorted 
vision of the price changes of the two crops through the 
1970's the farmers of the study villages were sensitive to 
price fluctuations, and their 'businesslike' approach to 
cash cropping supports the often noted contention that the 
small-holders of the plateau are responsive to economic 
stimuli (Bangkok Bank Monthly Review,April 1981,Vol 22,No. 
4, p 146; - "These farmers [of the Northeast] are quick to 
adapt themselves in response to world market demand").
For some time the Thai government has been trying to 
encourage farmers to diversify into other crops, seeing 
the dominance of cassava within the region as unhealthy. 
These efforts have recently been redoubled as a result of 
the 1983 agreement reached with the EEC, the main importer 
of Thai tapioca [1], which will limit the export of the 
commodity to the community. The government has been 
attempting to find alternative markets but the possibility
[1] 92% of Thailand's total production is shipped to the
EEC (Business Review, March 1983,p 61).
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Table 6.4
Average Gross Returns per rai on Cassava and Kenaf
1967/68-1980/81
Cassava Kenaf %
1967/68 918 378 243%
1968/69 813 377 216%
1969/70 1,409 207 681%
1970/71 1,152 243 474%
1971/72 1,177 325 362%
1972/73 912 410 222%
1973/74 714 453 158%
1974/75 633 357 177%
1975/76 895 400 224%
1976/77 1,087 704 154%
1977/78 1,051 603 174%
1978/79 831 590 141%
1979/80 1,617 572 283%
1980/81 1,711 861 199%
Gross Return: Baht per rai. Calculated by multiplying the 
average yield and the average farm price.
Sources: MOAC,1977,tables 15 & 30,pp 49 & 64; MOAC, 1981, 
table 22,p 24.
of identifying any large ones is slim. As a USAID 
document records: "Cassava has very little intrinsic
value as an animal feed. It is a cheap source of 
carbohydrate in animal feed in the EEC because the EEC has 
priced domestic feed grains out of the market" (Tinnakorn 
Dararattanasilp,May 1982,p 11), and even within Thailand 
animal feeds would be cheaper to use than cassava (p 12). 
Because of the gradual fall in demand associated with the
288
staggered imposition of the quota it is likely that the 
farmers of the Northeast will be affected by a fall in the 
price of tapioca. At the present time however, in spite 
of the efforts directed towards diversification, the 
amount of land cultivated to man sampalang remains the 
same (indeed, it continues to rise) and the inhabitants
have shown no inclination to follow the government's
advice.
These national objectives are followed in the study 
area where the extension services virtually ignore the 
existence of cassava, providing no advice, cuttings, 
fertilisers, pesticides or marketing facilities; and this 
despite the fact that the crop accounted for over 67% 
(1981/82 season) of the area planted to field crops in the 
amphoe (table 6.5). A major question that needs to be 
investigated is why should the bulk of farmers apparently 
fly in the face of the Thai government and continue to
cultivate cassava? As will become clear, the reason, in 
short, is that the crop is pre-eminently appropriate given 
the physical and socio-economic position in which the 
farmer finds himself. Whether the new initiatives will 
have a greater im pact is yet to be seen, but it is
certain that unlike the move into cassava, the movement 
out will not be quite as smooth, quick or as simple.
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Table 6.5
Field Crops Cultivated in Amphoe Muang Mahasarakham
1981/82 Season
Groundnut 630 rai
Sesame 708 rai
Kenaf 8,730 rai
Water Melon 548 rai
Cassava 25,000 rai
Sugar Cane 103 rai
Others 1,377 rai
Total 37,096 rai
Source: District Agricultural Extension Office, Amphoe
Muang Mahasarakham.
Cassava Versus the Fibre Crops: Their Popularity
It is obvious from the pattern of land use - over 90% 
of the planted upland was cultivated to cassava - that man 
sampalang was the most popular upland crop among the 
villagers of Baan Noon Tae and Baan Tha Song Korn. It was 
also clear from their comments that farmers perceived 
cassava to be a 'better' crop than kenaf or jute, or 
indeed better than any other crop which they had 
experience in growing. In other words, there was more to 
tapioca's popularity than just its profitability.
The most important of these additional reasons 
concerned the relative ease of growing cassava versus 
other crops. It was thought to be so simple to grow that
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the farmers almost seemed disdainful of it. Commonly they 
would comment: "You don't even have to be a farmer to grow
man sampalang; you can just shove it in the ground and 
leave it". In contrast to this was the belief that bor 
was hard to grow; the crop needed weeding and careful 
attention/ and unljke cassava was su^eptible to insect 
attack. Tapioca's ease of cultivation is important in the 
light of the demands set upon the farmer by his rice crop/ 
because even though the inhabitants saw upland cropping as 
important it was certainly perceived to be of secondary 
importance to paddy cultivation and due to this its needs 
were treated as being subservient to those of rice. 
Connected to cassava's ease of cultivation were what the 
farmers saw to be its flexibility and 'strength'.
With the declining fertility of the upland around the 
villages the necessity of applying chemical fertilisers on 
the various crops is becoming an important factor which 
the farmers were increasingly taking into account. They 
noted that cassava could be grown on extremely poor soils 
and still give an acceptable yield/ while this was not the 
case for kenaf/ jute/ sugar cane or groundnut. Cassava's 
flexibility with respect to its growth cycle was also 
mentioned on a number of occasions. One farmer who used 
to grow groundnuts said that he had changed to man 
sampalang because he could plant and harvest it at any 
time of the year. This was not so with groundnuts which 
he could only grow in the dry season thereby restricting
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the number of choices he had regarding other income
earning opportunities.
More striking are the problems of cultivating jute or 
kenaf. Both of these fibre crops should be harvested by 
the beginning of November/ approximately a month before
the peak period for rice. However/ although there was no
clear conflict (in a strict agronomic sense) between the 
labour demands of the two crops there was ample evidence 
of bor standing over-mature (flowering) in the fields 
around the two villages as late as early December. 
Evidently/ in the run-up to rice harvesting farmers are 
short of man power for one reason or another [1] and they 
are faced with the decision of either hiring additional 
labour or of delaying the harvesting of their jute or 
kenaf until a suitable gap in the demands of the rice crop 
appears. As they are reluctant to invest much money in 
cash cropping farmers invariably follow the latter path 
and as a result of this the fibre is often low in quality 
(Sunthorn Rajvongsuek/August 1977/pp 18-19).
Fibre crops also need to be retted. This is best 
done in running water and the shortage of such resources 
in the Northeastern region commonly results in a further
deterioration in the quality of the final product (bor
[1] Some rice varieties are early maturing and would push 
into the end of the kenaf season, eg; khaaw dor which is 
ready for harvesting at the beginning of November. There 
is also the question of labour availability: a number of
families had sons and daughters working outside the 
villages who returned for the rice harvesting period. 
Prior to their return there might be a labour shortage 
within the household preventing bor from being harvested.
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that is over-mature is also more difficult to ret; 
Sunthorn Rajvongsuek;August 1977,pp 18-19). One of the 
farmers interviewed said that because his land was too far 
from a suitable supply the time involved in the retting 
process led him to change and cultivate the ’easier1
cassava. Given that labour is the largest financial 
outlay that farmers have to make, the additional 
requirement that is needed to ret kenaf and jute is 
another factor causing them to turn to other, less 
demanding, crops.
The contrast of the demands of bor and the 
flexibility of man is best illustrated by cassava's
ability to be sold ’green’, which 19 households or 50% of 
those who grew the crop, did. It involved the farmers 
selling their fields unharvested to other villagers who
have to take it upon themselves to harvest and to market
the product; and it meant that families in labour surplus 
and those in deficit could interact to produce a more 
equitable distribution of labour. This was only possible 
because man is not constrained by a specific harvesting 
date and can be left in the ground for a considerable 
time, waiting until a farmer is ready to harvest it.
Of the 49 families who operated upland, 38 cultivated 
cassava, and seven, one of the two fibre crops. The 
reasons why the farmers of the two villages chose to grow 
man sampalang have already been briefly discussed, but it 
does not shed any light on why seven households had 
decided, in spite of all the apparent disadvantages, to 
continue to cultivate bor. Table 6.6 shows that the two
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sets of families are similar in most respects, with the 
only real differencs being the number of productive 
members in the households of each group and the size of 
their landholdings. The farmers who cultivated bor farmed 
nearly a third (29%) less land and it might be argued that 
due to this their agricultural labour requirements were 
less, enabling them to grow the relatively labour 
intensive fibre crops. But, if the size of the workforce 
is also taken into account the difference becomes less 
dramatic with the ratio of labour and land showing a 
difference of only 11.5%. Because of the lack of any 
statistical evidence illuminating why certain farmers 
chose to grow kenaf or jute, it is necessary to look at 
the qualitative responses of those in question.
Four of the seven farmers cultivated kenaf or jute as 
they felt the price was better. This is hard to reconcile 
with those farmers who were growing cassava because they 
thought it to be the more profitable crop, but it possibly 
concerns the problems of deciding the optimum cropping 
strategy in the face of fluctuating market prices. 
Interestingly, two of these four households and one other 
were intending to revert to the cultivation of cassava 
despite believing fibre crops to be more profitable. This 
was because they were all dissatisfied with the yields 
they had obtained. Two blamed this on insect attack and 
the third on drought and 'poor soil', and crucially, they 
all thought that these problems would not have arisen with 
cassava.
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Table 6.6
Comparison of those Farmers who Grew Kenaf or 
Jute and those who Cultivated Cassava
Cassava Kenaf/Jute Sample
Ave rage
Age of Household Head 47.5 yrs 47.7 46.8
Household Size 6.3 members 6.2 6.1
Productive H'seh'd Size 3.5 members 2.8 3.3
Total Landholding 24.0 rai 17.0 19.7
Riceland Holding 17.3 rai 13.3 16.1
Upland Holding 6.7 ra i 3.7 3.6
Total Income 24/600 baht 23,500 23,900
Agricultural Income 10,700 baht 11,300 7,200
Two further responses related to environmental 
factors. One farmers said that his land was too 'low' and 
too 'wet' to cultivate cassava and he was forced to grow 
kenaf which is more resistant to excess moisture (here 
again is the implication that the farmers would have grown 
man if it had been possible). The second rotated bor and 
man in an attempt to improve the fertility of her land 
which had been decreasing over a number of years. She 
thought that cultivating the two crops alternately would 
stabilise the soil's fertility and because she had no 
money to purchase chemical fertilisers felt that it was 
the only option open to her.
These two replies shows that cassava does have some 
drawbacks/ and they will be expanded upon later in the 
chapter. It needs to be grown on extremely well-drained 
land and/ apparently/ is demanding of soil nutrients 
threby exacerbating the problems of growing crops on land 
which is already poor. However/ the drawbacks are far
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out-weighed by the benefits, and as far as the farmers of 
Noon Tae and Tha Song Korn were concerned there was very 
little doubt as to which upland crop to cultivate. In 
view of this, the efforts on the part of the government to 
encourage farmers to diversify their cropping are likely 
to meet with stiff resistance, and only if there is a 
dramatic reduction in the relative price of cassava will 
they move into other crops. Indeed, there was the 
distinct impression that even if the kenaf prices (or any 
other) rose to the levels of the late 60's in relation to 
tapioca the farmers, who now hold the flexibility and 
strength of cassava in such high regard, would not be 
encouraged to switch. It should not be forgotten that 
upland cropping is a part of the farm system, and that the 
families of the area make their decisions with many other 
factors in mind. Due to this, the profitability of a crop 
is only part of the equation, and it is important that it 
also slots easily between the other demands and 
constraints which farmers face. It is this which cassava 
does so well.
To understand the details of cassava's popularity and 
the problems inherent in its cultivation (as well as those 
of the fibre crops), it is necessary to examine the manner 
in which it is grown, and whether this conflicts with the 
few recommended practices that exist (if they can be 
termed such).
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Advice and Extension
The amount of advice and assistance offered to 
farmers with respect to upland cropping was extremely 
limited. The office of the kaset amphoe/ the principal 
source of extension/ did not involve itself in the 
cultivation of cassava/ kenaf or jute; it supplied no 
seeds or cuttings and made almost no recommendations on 
how to grow the crops. An officer observed that it was 
unecessary to apply chemical fertilisers, and as far as 
cassava was concerned, also unecessary to use pesticides. 
The only piece of advice that the Office proferred was 
that farmers should apply the insecticide Sevin 85% on 
kenaf and jute if the crops happened to suffer from insect 
attack [1]. The Office did provide seeds for such 'minor' 
crops as water melon and thua faak yaaw (yard-long beans), 
but these were of little importance and in effect the 
kaset amphoe was uninvolved in the expansion of upland 
cropping.
In fact, the only government department which 
concerned itself with the cultivation of such drought 
resistant crops was the satanii phukrai; the upland crop 
station. This was located approximately two kilometres 
from Noon Tae and Tha Song Korn, just north of the Khon 
Kaen-Mahasarakham road, and was well-known among the 
villagers. But, a caveat should be inserted here and that 
is that the station is not part of the true extension
[1] Sevin 85% (Union Carbide). Active Ingredient: 85%. 1 
naphthyl methylcarbamate (WP). Sold by merchants at the 
cost of 15 baht per 80 gram packet.
structure; there are only a handful of such stations in 
Thailand [1], they are essentially concerned with research 
rather than extension (IBRD,July 1979,p 9) and very few 
villages are close enough to have access to one.
Reports have commonly criticised the lack of 
articulation between research and extension (eg: IBRD,Sept 
1978,p 96), and even the present Five Year Devlopment Plan 
notes that the, "extension of technology [to] rural area 
[sic] is still limited; and what technology is used is not 
adaptable to local conditions" (NESDB[1],n.d.,p 99). The 
failure of the findings from the Upland Crop Station in 
Mahasarakham to be passed down to the local extension 
office must represent another instance where the 
coordination between the two bodies is less than adequate.
The satanii phukrai sold a wide variety of seeds to 
farmers who wished to purchase them, with the only 
noteable exception being cassava (table 6.7). The head of 
the establishment explained that the government was 
attempting to encourage farmers to cultivate other crops 
and the station was instructed not to supply cassava 
cuttings. This is hardly surprising when seen in the light 
of the EEC quota and corresponds with the many national 
directives emphasising the importance of diversifying out 
of tapioca and into other cash crops (An 'Action Plan' to
[1] A 1980 Thai government report recorded that there were 
ten Upland Crop Experiment Station in the Northeast 
located principally in the northern and central parts of 
the region (MOAC,April 1980,p 47).
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encourage diversification was implemeneted in 1982; 
Thailand Business/May 1982,p 34). Fertilisers and 
pesticides were not distributed; the manager noted that 
the station was primarily concerned with research, and the 
supply of agricultural inputs such as these was not part 
of his brief. However, although it was not actively
involved in the dissemination of information and advice, 
the station was located close enough to the fields of Noon 
Tae and Tha Song Korn to assume that the base soil 
conditions are similar to those of the two villages [1], 
For this reason, the research findings and consequent 
recommendations issued from the establishment are 
particularly applicable to the communities; and they can
Table 6.7
Seeds Available to Farmers from the Upland Crop Station
Crop Variety Cost
Kenaf bor kaew thai 10 baht/kg
bor kaew cuba 10 baht/kg
Jute bor krajaaw fakyaaw 20 baht/kg
bor krajaaw faklom 20 baht/kg
Cotton - 8 baht/kg
Upland Rice - 5.50 baht/kg
Maize khaaw phort khaaw niaw 20 baht/kg
khaaw phort rai 6.50 baht/kg
Sesame ngaa Nakhon Sawan 20 baht/kg
ngaa W53 20 baht per/kg
[1] Although through the years the soils of the Upland 
Crop Station would probably have been 'upgraded' through 
the continuous application of chemical fertilisers.
be used to compare what the farmers did with what, in 
agronomic terms, has been found to be the optimal method 
of cultivation.
Cassava
Cassava, due to its acid content, is very resistant 
to insect attack and the satanii phukrai found no need to 
use pesticides of any sort [1]. Unlike the kaset amphoe 
however, the station did advise that chemical fertilisers 
be applied; specifically that 15-15-15 be used at the rate 
of 50 kilograms per rai. In addition to this it was felt 
that because of the edaphically demanding nature of 
cassava [2], monocropping was inadvisable, leading to a
rapid deterioration in the quality of the soil. To combat 
this it was recommended that the crop be either 
inter-planted or rotated with a nitrogen-fixing legume
such as groundnut. By applying fertilisers at the rate of 
50 kilograms per rai on the variety Rayong 1 (and also, no 
doubt, with close supervision and good cultural 
practices), the station found it could obtain yields of 6 
tons per rai of raw root (9 tons if 100 kilograms per rai 
of chemical fertiliser were used).
Kenaf
g
Kenaf is more suceptible to insect attack than 
cassava and the Upland Crop Station recommended that
farmers use the pesticide 'Azodrin' at the rate of
[1] The only problems are scale insects and bacterial 
blight; and even these are, apparently, rare.
[2] This is a contentious point, and many agronomists 
disagree with the assertion that cassava is particularly 
demanding of soil nutrients (look to chapter two).
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120-160 cm3 per rai [1]. It was also advised that 
chemical fertilisers be applied; either 15-15-15 at 25-50 
kilograms per rai, or 8-8-8 at 50-100 kilograms per rai. 
If these practices are followed then the station sees no 
need to rotate or to inter-crop kenaf, believing that it 
can be planted every year without any fear of depleting 
the fertility of the soil.
Upland Crop Cultivation in Noon Tae and Tha Song Korn
1/ Crop Varieties
In the previous chapter the rice varieties that 
farmers chose to grow were discussed in some detail and it 
was stressed that they had an intimate knowledge of the 
various strains and their characteristics. This was not 
the case vis a vis upland crops: 65% of the farmers who
were interviewed had no idea what variety of kenaf, 
cassava or jute they were cultivating, and a further 21% 
merely stated that they planted phan thamadaa (ordinary
type) or phan phuan baan (local/village type). In fact,
only six households could give a varietal name to the 
upland crop they grew; four said that they had planted the 
cassava varieties Rayong (3) or hua yaaw (1) and two the 
kenaf khiaw yay (table 6.8).
In many ways the situation is not very surprising.
Upland is not divided into separate environmental zones by 
the farmers as riceland is, and there does not exist
[1] Azodrin (Shell); systemic insecticide sold by
merchants in the town of Mahasarakham for 28 baht per 100 
cm3.
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a large number of varieties designed to fill the various 
ecological niches. Farmers are therefore presented with a 
simpler array of choices to plant on land which they
unsophisticated) fashion. The point about this is that 
they attach no importance to the type of upland crop they 
cultivated because they believed it to be of little 
consequence: and when pressed they would only say,
"oh...its an ordinary variety". In addition, concerning 
cassava, there were no sources of new varieties and 
farmers had to resort to either re-using cuttings from 
their own crop or to exchange them with other farmers. In 
this way the origins of the plant, and its name, are 
likely to have been forgotten.
Table 6.8
The Identification of Upland Crop Varieties by the Farmers
perceive in a less sophisticated (though not
Cassava Kenaf Jute
Did not know the 
variety
24 2 2
Termed it phan 
thamadaa
6
Termed it phan 
phuanbaan
3
No response 1
Named variety 
(as specified)
3 (Rayong) 2 (khiaw yay) 
1 (hua yaaw)
Units: Households
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2/ Fertiliser Use
The use of chemical fertilisers on upland crops was 
very limited and only two farmers applied them on their 
land. One grew ten rai of cassava and used 16-16-8 at the 
rate of 20 kilograms per rai, and the second one rai of
sugar cane, applying the same fertiliser at 50 kilograms
per rai. It was clear why the farmer who grew sugar cane 
(he was the only one to cultivate the crop) used the 
input; the crop cannot perform well without it (Williams 
& Chew,1979,p 238; Webster & Wilson,1980,pp 297-298). 
But, it is not clear why Mr Nit Khammanii applied 
fertilisers; and indeed, applied it at the fairly high 
rate of 20 kilograms per rai over ten rai [1], His income 
was below average for the sample at 15,000 baht per year, 
as was his area of riceland (12 rai). It is true that he 
gave the impression of being a fairly progressive man, but 
even so there was no apparent reason why he should be the
only villager to use fertiliser on cassva, jute or kenaf.
Possibly he is at the vanguard of a trend towards the 
increasing use of chemical fertilisers on upland crops.
The soils of the uplands of the Northeastern region 
are characteristically infertile; they are sandy, low in 
cation exchange capacity and most nutrients, and contain a 
very low organic matter content. The continuous 
cultivation of cash crops on this land since the 1950's, 
without the use of rotations or fertilisers has led to the 
widespread degradation of the soil, in some places to
[1] In comparison to the mean application on rice of 7.9 
kilograms per rai.
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the extent where the land has had to be abandoned. The 
need to improve cultivation techniques so that further 
deterioration does not occur has been stressed for some 
time and it is now one of the Thai government's objectives 
(US Presidential Mission,April 1982,pp 34-35). The 
research area is particulalrly suitable as a case study in 
assessing how (and whether) farmers are responding to the 
situation and how they are likely to respond in the 
future, as it is a zone of long settlement where the 
uplands have been cultivated for a considerable time.
The inhabitants of the villages clearly stated that 
the fertility of their upland plots have declined over the 
years, and table 6.9 shows that over 70% of those who 
grew crops on this land identified poor soil or din juut 
as a reason for their low and falling yields. Most of the 
farmers thought that the cause was the fact that they had 
been continually cultivating cash crops on the land 
without attempting to replenish the soil. Cassava has an 
especially bad reputation as a soil nutrient depleter and 
degrader, although this reputation is not always founded 
on hard agronomic evidence. Undoubtably, the continuous 
monocopping of cassava leads to soil deterioration 
(Hughes,Jan 1980,p 2) but as was stressed in chapter two, 
this is true of virtually all crops, and at the present 
time the discussion over the crop's effect on soil 
fertility remains largely unresolved. Six of the farmers 
of the research communities said that man was ruining 
their land but this probably says more about the 
inadequa .cies of their fertilisation methods than about
the demands of cassava. The paradox of this is why, when
there is the broad appreciation that soil fertility is
declining due to over-cropping, did only two farmers apply
chemical fertilisers and six, manure (one used both).
Once again, the question is far from a simple one, and to
gain a detailed understanding of the influences at work it
is necessary to look at both its qualitative as well as 
tiits quan^tative aspects.
Table 6.9
Land Use Problems Facing Farmers Cultivating Upland Crops
Frequency %
Dryness 1 2%
Poor Soil 28 60%
Floods/excess moisture 6 13%
Poor soil & drought 3 6%
Poor soil and flood 2 4%
Weed growth 1 2%
No problems 6 13%
Total 47
Because so few farmers applied chemical fertilisers 
it is impossible to set up a comparison of those who did 
with those who did not. However, a somewhat inadequate 
substitute is to include those who used manure, and then 
discover if there are any significant differences between 
the two groups.
Table 6.10 shows that the farmers who used manure 
and/or chemical fertilisers on their upland crops differed 
in only one respect: they operated 36% more land than the
average. Unfortunately, due to the small numbers involved
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(7 & 45) the difference lacks any stat . istical
significance, and it is impossible to go further than to 
merely point it out. However, it is worth noting that the 
group did not complain of din juut any more regularly than 
the total sample and the yields they obtained were not 
dissimilar. The qualitative reJ>onses that farmers gave
were equally un-illuminating. Those who used organic 
fertilisers all recognised that their yields were
declining as a consequence of falling fertility associated 
with over-cropping, but then 70% of the families who grew 
upland crops recognised this. They all applied small 
quantities of manure and none appeared to appreciate the 
particular appropriateness of using organic fertilisers on 
sandy soils such as those of the area; instead they
applied them as a ’cheap1 alternative to chemical inputs. 
Due to the inadequacy of the above in revealing any of the 
underlying influences affecting fertiliser use on upland 
crops, it is necessary to examine why 84% of farmers who 
used neither organic nor inorganic fertilisers chose not 
to do so.
Firstly, given that 68% of farmers who cultivated 
rice complained that a shortage of cash restricted them in 
their use of fertilisers to under 8 kilograms per rai, it 
is perhaps unsuiprising that economic limitations should 
likewise be alluded to with respect to the use of the 
input on upland crops. It should also be noted that in 
addition to this, the uplands are planted to cash rather 
than subsistence crops and therefore their demands are not 
given such a high priority by the inhabitants. Farmers
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were unwilling to risk much of their restricted financial 
resources on crops which were not directly related to 
survival/ and families felt it was important to cultivate 
those which demanded the least from them. This 
fundamental difference between rice and upland crops is 
hard to over-state/ and lies at the basis of the lack of 
fertiliser use. Needless to say however / it i s  by no means 
the whole story and many other factors are superimposed 
over and above it.
Table 6.10
Comparison of those Farmers who Cultivated Upland Crops 
and Used Manure and/or Fertilisers with those who did not
Age
Size of Productive Household 
Total Landholding 
Riceland Holding 
Fertiliser Use on Rice 
Size of Upland Holding 
Number of Buffalo & Cattle
Total Income 1 
Agricultural Income
Sample Size
Group 1 Group 2
48 44 yrs
3.4 3.4 members
24.3 33.1 rai
18.2 27.9 rai
8.3 8.0 kg/rai
5.8 5.2 rai
4.5 4.3 head
24/440 27,760 baht
11/110 12/960 baht
45 7 households
Group 1 = Those farmers who cultivated upland crops.
Group 2 = Those farmers that cultivated upland crops and 
used manure and/or fertlisers.
The low organic matter content of the soils of the 
uplands causes distinct problems when it comes to the 
application of inorganic fertilisers. The scarcity of
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colloids means that nutrient anions (nitrogen,potassium 
and phosphorous) are not held in top soil but are ’free’ 
to be washed through and the situation is exacerbated by 
the climate of the region as rain tends to fall in heavy 
erosive storms. Two farmers appeared to allude to the 
problems of leaching: one said that he had used chemical
fertilisers two years previously but a heavy storm soon
after application meant that they had no effect on his 
crop; and the second farmer, although he had never used 
fertilisers, stated that man grows better without them, 
mentioning that the irregularity of precipitation meant 
that they were not always effective. The nature of the 
soil and climate can also influence fertiliser use in 
another way, as two of the men who were interviewed 
appeared to realise: one thought that the absence of rain
was problematic; even detrimental to cultivation. The 
second, Mr Samay Nandii, went into more detail on this 
point. He believed that his upland was too 'dry' to use 
inorganic fertilisers and that they would actually damage 
his crop. The two men were probably referring to the 
risks of burning when undissolved and undiluted chemical 
fertilisers lie on the surface of the soil. It should be
appreciated that the families of Baan Noon Tae and Baan
Tha Song Korn 'broadcast' fertilisers, and did not have 
access to more sophisticated and less hazardous ways of 
incorporating the chemicals into their land.
A number of families also thought, as they did with 
rice, that unless fertilisers were applied every year then 
yields would drop to a level even lower than the original
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one. The limited and variable income of most of the 
population and their consequent inability to guarantee 
that they would be able to use fertilisers every year, 
therefore meant that they were loath to begin doing so. 
The reasoning of this is exactly the same as that which 
some households gave with respect to the cultivation of 
rice; but it is different in that the pressures to use 
fertilisers and to increase production on their 
subsistence crop are that much greater. Most farmers did 
not even contemplate applying chemical fertilisers on 
their cassava or kenaf, and so were never faced with the 
question of whether or not they were in a position to 
guarantee their continual use.
Ignorance also played a role and three farmers said 
that they did not know how to apply fertilisers on their 
upland crops. However, even if they did not know it is 
unlikely that they would have begun to use them as their 
ignorance was a reflection of the fact that they had no 
wish to apply them, and therefore had no need to find out 
how it was done. In spite of this, not all the farmers 
were unwilling to investigate the possibilities of 
improving the quality of their land, and two had 
particular initiative.
Mrs Chaysarii Sariimuang, whose strategy was 
mentioned earlier, rotated bor and man in an attempt to 
improve the fertility of her land. She realised that the 
continual cropping of cassava had been degrading her land, 
but was unable to use chemical fertilisers because she 
could not afford to purchase them; therefore, as an
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alternative/ she was combatting the situation by rotating 
cassava with kenaf. Mr Muythin Motkaew exhibited even 
greater enterprise: two seasons prior to the year of the
study he had used chemical fertilisers on his cassava and
had obtained an exceptional yield. In the following 
season/ due to a shortage of money/ he found that he was
unable to apply them and as a result (as he saw it) his
harvest was appalling. Because of the fact that he could 
not ensure their contijial use/ and in addition because his 
son had migrated to Bangkok leaving him short of labour 
with which to apply fertilisers/ Mr Muythin was forced to 
search for an alternative means of arresting the 
deterioration of his land. He had decided to do this by 
cultivating cassava only every other season, leaving it 
fallow so that it could recover in the intervening year.
Earlier in this chapter the use of manure and the low 
organic matter content of the soils was mentioned and at 
this point it seems se nsible to enter into a wider 
discussion of the merits of applying organic fertilisers.
Previously it was noted that a greater use of 
manures, composts and mulches would improve the soils of 
the upper and middle padis by building-up their colloidal 
content, thereby increasing their water retention 
capabilities, improving texture and plasticity as well as 
preventing leaching by raising the ability of the soils to 
hold onto nutrient anions. These benefits apply to the 
uplands even more so than to the ricelands, as the soils 
are sandier and even more impoversihed in terms of their
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organic matter content [1].
Until fairly recently the Thai agricultural extension 
and research services have only paid lip-service to the 
possibilities of organic means of fertilisation. As a 
report prepared for the NESDB in October 1981 says: 
"Extension work on composting is not well achieved" [2] 
and "information from past reasearches on the utilization 
of organic fertilizer is not enough to provide sound 
recommendations for the farmer" (Chairek Suwannarat,Oct 
1981,pp 14 St 17-18). The present Five Year Plan, in an 
attempt to ammend this state of affairs, ‘states as part of 
its Agricultural Restructuring Progarmme that it will, 
"encourage farmers to produce organic fertilizers" 
(NESDB[1],n.d. ,p 53). However, at the time of the study 
there was no indication that the office of the kaset 
amphoe at Muang Mahasarakha.m was concerning itself with 
the directive, or any evidence that the farmers of Noon 
Tae and Tha Song Korn were adopting the practice. The 
major question is, of course, would the farmers be likely 
to follow any advice which advocates the increased use of 
organic fertilisers; that is assuming the objectives of 
the National Plan do actually filter down to the 
district-level.
[1] Hughes (1980,pp 2-3) goes into some detail describing 
the possibilities of applying organic fertilisers on 
cassava. He says, significantly, that yields from green 
manured plots were equal to, or greater than, those from 
plots fertilised with NPK at a rate of 50-50-25 kilograms 
per rai.
[2] Composting has been the primary avenue of research and 
extension into organic fertilisation (Chairek 
Suwannarat,0ct 1981,pp 8-18).
Of the six farmers who used manure not one applied it 
because he or she appreciated its particular 
appropriateness to the edaphic conditions of the uplands, 
and there were no indications of what stimulated or 
inhibited its use. However, certain impressions were 
received and derived from these there appear to be a 
number of hurdles to be overcome before organic fertiliser 
use is likely to become widespread.
Firstly, there was a lack of knowledge surrounding 
the use of manures, mulches and composts (which the kaset 
amphoe was not rectifying). Secondly, the labour and time 
needed to collect, produce and spread them when there 
exists no labour-saving equipment is likely to be a 
constraint. Thirdly the supply of manure might well 
become a problem if its use were to gain popularity (the 
average number of buffalo/cattle owned by the families was 
only four head). And lastly, there is the important point 
that upland crops are always in a position of playing 
second fiddle to rice and the inhabitants would be 
unlikely to divert much of their time into a crop which 
does not concern their survival, is subject to a 
fluctuating market and therefore not necessarily 
profitable, and which they have chosen for the specific 
reason that it is so undemanding and easy to grow. 
However, there must be a point at which declining 
fertility and yields forces farmers to look at the 
possibilites of improving their land. Indeed, there were 
six families [1] who said they would start fertilisation
[1] 16% of those who grew upland crops but did not
fertilise them.
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’soon’ because of just this reason. It is yet to be seen 
though whether they do mean 'soon1, or whether the word is 
something conjured up for the benefit of a farang 
researcher.
Although mulches, green manures and composting were 
used by none of the farmers in the sample, CBIRD had begun 
to introduce these alternative methods of fertilisation on 
a small-scale to the in^bitants of Baan Noon Tae. This 
was being done in three ways: firstly through the Village
Biogas Project, secondly by encouraging the cultivation of 
such crops as lucaena, hamata, spiratro, paragrass and lab 
lab bean, and lastly by promoting the use of compost 
piles.
The Village Biogas Project was primarily designed to 
help alleviate the problem of an energy shortage, but 
CBIRD also appreciated that the effluent from the process 
of gas production would be of great benefit to the soils 
of the area. They calculated that the faeces produced by 
four pigs in a year would have a value, in NPK terms, of 
579 baht (CBIRD document,1982,p 3). In addition to using 
the by-product from biogas production, CBIRD was also 
trying to get farmers to make compost piles using straw 
and buffalo manure. The organisation realised that at 
present, "manure is not regarded as a recyclable energy 
source by farmers" and summed-up the current situation 
as "an almost total non-use of manure as a fertilizer and 
as a soil conditioner" (CBIRD document,1982,p 1). 
Finally, CBIRD was hoping to encourage farmers to plant 
high protein leguminous crops to use primarily as fodder
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but also/ possibly, as green manure.
In 1982/83 when the fieldwork was being conducted 
these three methods of organic fertilisation were only 
just beginning to be implemented and had not made much of 
an impact. However, the realisation that there were 
possibilities for improving the soils of the area by such 
methods is in stark contrast to the approach of the Office 
for Agricultural Extension which appeared to concentrate 
wholly on the provision and encouragement of chemical 
fertiliser use. Whether the farmers will be receptive to 
these laudable efforts is another matter and is yet to be 
seen. Even so, certain problems were already obvious:
Firstly, the biogas generators are expensive costing 
between 3,600 and 3,800 baht (15-16% of an average 
family's income). The money is loaned by CBIRD, interest 
free, and is repaid in monthly instal ments of 100-150 
baht. The cost, naturally enough, tended to restrict the 
generators to the richer households (there were only 4-5 
in Baan Noon Tae in March 1983) and it is arguable that 
being such an obvious visual statement of wealth their 
presence might increase social tensions within a village 
where disparities in income are growing. In contrast, 
compost pile construction is a possibility for almost all 
of the villagers. There is still a problem, though, of a 
limited supply of manure and this means that widespread 
application would be impossible. Lastly, the cultivation 
of green manure/fodder crops: as far as this is concerned, 
there was already appearing a problem connected with 
available land: farmers did not seem to wish to turn any
of their upland over to crops from which they could 
envisage there to be little return. But admittedly, the 
project had only just begun and those families interviewed 
who said that they realised that something needed to be 
done to stem the decreasing fertility of their upland may 
well adopt the practice of cultivating a green manure 
crop. If they, as innovators, are seen to be successful 
by the other villagers, then the practice could spread.
Pesticide and Herbicide Use
Only one of the farmers who were interviewed used 
pesticides or herbicides on his upland crops, and there 
appeared to be no history of their use. The single 
exception applied the insecticide 'Folidon' on his water 
melon at the rate of 600 cm3 per rai. Judging from the 
problems that farmers said they had to deal with, this 
state of affairs is not particularly suprising: not one
complained of insect attack, and only a single man of 
excessive weed growth.
The need to use insecticides on cassava is minimal. 
The crop is renowned for its resistance to insect attack 
and neither the kaset amphoe nor the satanii phukrai 
recommended its use [1]. Bor is not so immune, and the 
kaset amphoe recommended the use of 'Sevin 85%' to combat 
insect attack, while the upland crop station recommended
[1] The root contains an average concentration of 
something less than 0.03% Hydrocyanic acid (the 
concentration varies with the maturity of the plant), and 
this makes it unpalatable to most pests (data from: 
Hughes,jan 1980,p 4).
the use of the systemic insect attack 'Azodrin'. However, 
the seven households who grew kenaf or jute failed to 
follow this advice. This was because, as with rice, 
farmers used the input as a curative rather than as a 
preventative. (So, presumably, they might have applied a 
pesticide if their crop had been attacked; although this 
was not entirely clear from their responses).
The benefits of applying herbicides would probably be 
greater, especially upon kenaf. There were numerous
examples in the fields of the two villages of man and bor 
plots overgrown with weeds, and at least one case where a 
kenaf plot had been abandoned. However, the use of
herbicides was unfamiliar to the farmers, and none of the 
extension agencies supplied, recommended or gave advice on 
how to use the input. Instead, the communities dealt with 
the problem of weed growth by hand; either through hiring 
or through using a family's own labour resources. On 
average the crops were weeded three times a season, each 
family employing the equivalent of 4.7 man days of labour.
Labour Use
Of the farmers who grew upland crops, 51% hired 
labour, 2% used long khaek and 2% did both (table 6.11). 
The small number of families who were involved in 
reciprocal labour exchange (2) [1] reflects the fact that
[1] Strictly speaking only one farmer used reciprocal 
labour exchange. The second employed children, who were 
provided with one meal, to ret his kenaf and although he 
termed it long khaek there did not seem to be any 
reciprocal element involved.
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upland cropping is a relatively new activity which has no 
tradition of long khaek. The nature of the crops possibly 
prevents the development of such a tradition; they are 
grown for cash and are unlikely to be incorporated into a 
system of social relations which has evolved to ensure the 
successful cultivation of a subsistence crop. It is also 
worth remembering that such practices are dying out on 
rice, and only 13% of farmers utilised reciprocal labour 
agreements to cultivate their padiland.
Table 6.11
Type of Labour Used on Upland Crops
Households that Own Upland 49
Households that Cultivate Upland 45
Valid Responses 43
Households that Hire Labour 22
Households that Use Long Khaek 1
Households that do both 1
Households that do neither 19
As would be expected, the amount of labour hired was 
significantly less than that employed to cultivate rice 
(table 6.12). Households used an average of 22.5 man days 
or 4.3 man days per rai. This represents 20% of the total 
amount hired to grow rice and, in terms of quantity per 
rai, 63%. Assuming a cost of 25 baht per day per labourer 
[1] then the mean outlay was approximately 560 baht per 
household, or 110 baht per rai of upland crops. From
[1] All but two of the households interviewed paid a daily 
wage of 25 baht.
these figures it is immediately clear that the money 
injected into cash crops was a fraction of that allocated 
by farmers to their subsistence crop (remembering that 
labour is easily the largest cost involved). Including 
fertilisers, pesticides and labour, upland crops received 
a monetary input of 590 baht, some 17% of the 3,545 baht 
allocated to rice. The relative costs and returns, and 
the associated risks will be returned to and discussed in 
greater detail later in this chapter.
Table 6.12
Labour Use on Upland Crops
Total Labour Amount Hired 
Hired/Family /rai
Rice 158.5 md 4.3 md
Kenaf/Jute 21.0 md 6.7 md
Cassava (harvested) 26.9 md 5.8 md
Cassava (sold green) 16.8 md 1.8 md
All Cassava 22.8 md 3.9 md
Kenaf+Jute+Cassava 22.5 md 4.3 md
Units: man days (md)
If labour use is correlated with a complex of
socio-economic variables there appears a pattern of
relationships in which the total man days hired correlates 
with the area of upland and also, both in total and per 
rai, with income (table 6.13). However, sutprisingly,
there is no relationship between the size of household - 
either total or total productive - and labour use.
Table 6.12 also shows the labour input by type of
upland crop (cassava is split into 'harvested' and 'sold 
green'). The two fibre crops had the highest input per 
rai at 6.7 man days, but it was not a great deal more than 
the figure for harvested cassava of 5.8 man days.
Superficially,this seems to indicate that kenaf and jute 
were not much more demanding in labour terms than cassava 
and, to some extent, contradicts the commonly stated 
opinion of the farmers that bor needs alot more attention. 
But, labour hired is not the only relevent variable and if 
one looks back to table 6.6 it shows that those farmers 
who grew bor operated a quarter less riceland than those 
who grew man, and almost a half less upland; and despite 
the households who cultivated cassava having a larger 
number of productive family members the man/land ratio for 
those growing kenaf or jute was some 11.5% greater with 
respect to total land holding and 30.1% with regards to
the upland holding. Assuming that families use their own 
labour resources to capacity before hiring additional 
hands, then the combined labour input (ie: hired and
family) of bor in comparison to man sampalang would have 
been considerably greater than that indicated by the 
figures in table 6.12 [1].
When the two major upland crops are correlated
individually with the complex of socio-economic variables
[1] The amount of labour represented by an 11.5% 
difference in the man/land ratio is much greater than it 
might appear. As a proportion of the average productive 
household of those families cultivating cassava it amounts 
to just over 0.4 of a man or, assuming full year-round 
employment (admittedly, an unlikely proposition) 147 man 
days of labour.
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in table 6.13, the pattern of relationships changes 
slightly from that described previously. Cassava 
continues to show a strong correlation between labour and 
income, and also a moderate one with the area of upland. 
But, labour use on kenaf and jute does not exhibit any 
such links and instead shows an inverse correlation with 
the size of the productive household. The relationship is 
only 95% significant but considering the fact that there 
were only six cases in the calculation this is not 
terribly sutprising {the coefficient is -0.8145). How can 
the difference between bor and man be explained?
Table 6.13
Correlation of Labour Use with Various 
Socio-economic Variables
Household Productive Income Area of Number 
size H.H'd size Upland of cases
Kenaf/Jute
Total man days - 95.2% - - 6
(-0.8145)
Man days/rai - 94.8% - - 6
(-0.8077)
Cassava
Total man days - - 99.6% 97.3% 37
(0.4642) (0.4244)
Man days/rai - - 99.4% - 37
(0.4424)
Kenaf+Jute-t-Cassava
Total man days - - 99.9% 95.7% 43
(0.4832) (0.3132)
Man days per rai - - 99.7% - 43
(0.4476)
In brackets: correlation coefficients.
Statistical techniques: Pearson Product Moment correlation with
two-tailed test of statistical significance.
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It may be that the difference is a product of 
cassava's flexibility and/ to a lesser extent/ it s 
'strength1.: if households are short of labour/ rather
than hire additional hands they can simply grow the crop 
less intensely. This is olny possible because man is able 
to withstand considerable variation in the manner in which 
it is cultivated. In addition/ and more importantly/ they 
can sell the crop 'green* thereby foregoing the necessity 
to hire labour for harvesting. Farmers who grow bor 
however are unable to match this strategy: there appeared
to be no opportunities to sell fibre crops unharvested 
[1]/ and because kenaf and jute are less hardy there is 
only limited flexibility with respect to cultivation 
practices. For example; they cannot be left un- or 
under-weeded without seriously depressing yields. The 
correlation coefficients/ arguably/ reflect this state of 
affairs. Farmers who grow cassava can balance the way in 
which they cultivate the crop (eg; labour input) against 
their household size/ and hence there is no relationship 
between labour hired and the number of productive members 
in a family. Those who grow bor though/ are forced by its 
inflexibility to employ more hands if they are demanded/ 
and thus a negative relationship between labour and the
[1] Unlike cassava/ fibre crops need to be harvested at a 
certain date if the commodity is not to lose quality and 
therefore/ value. This means that any household 
purchasing the crop 'green1 would have far less latitiude 
with which to organise its labour/ and would not being 
able to leave it unharvested until suitable labour was 
available. For this reason/ buying kenaf and jute 'green' 
was not a attractive propostion to the farmers of Noon Tae 
and Tha Song Korn.
size of the productive household appears. This hypothesis 
is rendered some support by the lack of any link on bor 
between labour use and income demonstrating that there 
may be a certain minimum labour input that must be 
maintained whatever a family's income.
Farmers hired labour for three activities; planting/ 
weeding and harvesting, in the proportions 30%, 23% and
47% respectively. That harvesting accounted for nearly 
half of all the labour hired when 19 families (out of 45 
who grew upland crops) actually sold their crops 
unharvested demonstrates that this is easily the most 
labour-demanding stage of cultivation. It also shows how 
significant selling a crop 'green' can be in reducing a 
household's labour requirements.
If the farmers who sold their cassava unharvested are 
examined as a sub-group of the sample, an interesting 
array of characteristics appear and they reveal something 
about the influences that encourage farmers to khaay suan 
(table 6.14). Most striking is the reduced labour input 
per rai; 1.8 mandays, as against 5.8 mandays for those 
farmers who harvested their cassava. The reason why 19 of 
the 37 families who cultivated man chose to sell 'green' 
should relate, if the hypothesis outlined previously is 
correct, to size of landholding and/or size of household. 
Table 6.14 shows that although they had similar size o 
household, they owned 45% more land (34% more riceland) 
than those who marketed the crop in the normal way, and 
therefore it is possible that it was because of their 
stretched labour resources they decided to khaay suan.
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Table 6.14
Comparison of those Farmers who Sold their Cassava
'Green' with those who Harvested the Crop
Household Productive Total
Size H.H. Size Landholding
Sold Green 
Harvested
6.1
6.4
3.2
3.6
28.9 rai
19.9 ra i
Riceland Mandays
Holding (total)
Mandays 
( / ra i )
Sold Green 20.3 rai 16.8
Harvested 15.1 rai 26.9
1.8
5.8
The need to hire labour can also be reduced if the 
various processes of cultivation are mechanised. Only one 
farmer used machinery to help with the cultivation of his 
cash crops: he hired a tractor (a 'big' one, not a hand
held rotavator) to plough his three rai of upland prior to 
planting cassava, at the cost of 120 baht per rai. The 
man who operated the tractor had come from either Khon 
Kaen or Udon Thani (the farmer could not remember which) 
and apparently he travelled around the region stopping at 
each village to see if anyone wished to use his services 
in order to have their land prepared. That only one 
farmers should have decided to have his land prepared in 
this way demonstiates that demand was minimal (no one 
complained of supply being a problem). However, in Mr Jen 
Yotsunat's case there was a clear reason why it was a 
sensible course for him to follow. There were only two
productive members in the household (possibly 
semi-productive: he and his wife were aged 53 and 64
respectively) and they had to cultivate 15 rai of land. 
He was therefore short of labour. He also felt that 
ploughing upland mechanically was necessary if cassava was 
to grow well, explaining that buffalo (of which he owned 
three) could not plough the land deep enough. There seems 
to be little basis to this reasoning [1], and if anything, 
preparing the land in such a manner would, in the long 
term, lead to a decline in yields as a result of 
accelerated soil erosion.
Yields, Returns, Costs and Profits
With these methods of cultivation and levels of 
input, how do the yields that farmers obtained compare 
with those for the tambon, amphoe, changwat and nation as 
a whole? On the surface they seem to correspond fairly
closely, especially those for kenaf and jute, indicating
that the muubaan of Noon Tae and Tha Song Korn are not
abnormal communities (table 6.15). There is, though, some 
doubt as to the validity of the cassava yields recorded 
for the tambon by the district agricultural extension 
office. Each village in the tambon was assigned the 
identical yield of 1,000 kilograms per rai. Given the
methods of measurement they are unlikely to be accurate
[1] Deep ploughing tends to aid rooting, although the 
benefits to the uplands of the Northeast would probably be 
minimal as the bulk of the soils are already sandy and 
disaggregated. However, there is every likelihood that 
erosion, already a manifest problem (gullying) in the 
surrounding area, would be accentuated.
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and are best ignored [1]. If this is done then those for 
the study villages begin to appear to be rather lower than 
the others in table 6.15. It would be tempting to explain 
it by noting the absence of chemical fertiliser use and 
the general low level of inputs; and by mentioning the 
widely perceived decline in yields coupled to a fall in 
soil fertility. The trouble with this is that the sample 
was a small one and the comparison figures are from a 
variety of (dubious) sources recording data pertaining to 
a variety of crop years.
Finally, it can be seen that there is a gross 
disparity between the optimal yields recorded by the 
satanii pukhrai and those of the sample. This corresponds 
to an equally vast difference between the way in which the 
upland crop station cultivated its man sampalang and the 
way the farmer did so. It has been explained why those 
who were interviewed failed to follow the station's advice 
and it is debat able whether its recommendations are
[1] One day, while talking to the phuuyaybaan of Baan Tha 
Song Korn he was in the process of filling in, with the 
help of two friends, the kaset amphoe's annual report of 
agricultural statistics. The manner in which this was 
completed does not give one a great deal of confidence in 
the accuracy of some of the data: for example, the areas
of each crop cultivated in 1982 were clearly guesses, as 
can be seen from the figures -
- Rice
- Cassava
- Ke na f
- Peanut
- Sesame
- Mulberry
2.000 rai
2.000 rai
1.000 rai 
50 ra i
None
3 ra i
Some of the questions asked of them struck the men as 
being especially amusing; eg: how many chickens and ducks
are there? They did not have the first idea and filled in 
1,000 and 500 respectively.
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really in accord with the position in which the 
sma11-holder finds himself. In fact/ the farmers were 
presented with no sensible alternatives to their own 
strategy of cultivation and it seemed likely that the 
development of upland cropping; at least in Noon Tae and 
Tha Song Korn; would follow the intuitions of the 
inhabitants rather than any advice extended through the 
offices of the Thai government.
Table 6.15
Comparison Data for Upland Crop Yields
Cassava Kenaf/Jute 
(kg/rai) (kg/rai)
Sample Data 1/190 153
Noon Tae & Tha Song Korn 1,000 [*] 142
(1982) [1]
Tambon Tha Song Korn 1,000 [*] 130
(1982) [1]
Amphoe Muang 1,904 186
(1982 [2]
Mahasarakham 1,845 152
(1981) [3]
Whole Kingdom 2,281 198
(1981) [4]
Yields obtained at the 6,000- -
Upland Crop Station 9,000
[1] - data from office of the kaset amphoe
[2] - data from office of the kaset changwat
[3] - data from MOAC,1981,pp 26-27 & 62-63
[4] - data from the Upland Crop Station,fMahasarakham
[*] - These figures are of dubious accuracy
Yields: Cassava in kilograms of raw root per rai.
Kenaf/jute in kilograms of dried and retted fibre 
per rai
When the returns per rai are calculated for bor and 
man, the figures show that it was man sampalang which gave 
the highest return in the 1982/83 season of 1,158 baht per 
rai (table 6.16). In comparison, kenaf and jute yielded 
737 baht per rai. If the costs involved are then included 
in the calculation the difference widens further with 
cassava, on average, giving a net profit margin 76% larger 
than that of the two fibre crops. In spite of this 
already significant disparity there are reasons to believe 
that a strict comparison of their costs, returns and
profitabilities is impossible and that, if anything, the
difference is even greater.
For it has already been demonstrated that the 
households who grew fibre crops operated smaller 
landholdings than those who grew cassava, especially if it 
happened to be sold green. In view of this, and in view 
of the comments farmers made, the labour input per rai is 
probably much larger than than indicated by the data for 
’labour hired* (table 6.12), and it was only because those 
families had the surplus with which to cultivate bor that 
they we^re able to do so. In addition, and perhaps more
importantly, is the fact that the farmers of Noon Tae and
Tha Song Korn tended to cultivate cassava on the worst 
land. Many believed that man sampalang, because it could 
be grown on virtually sterile soils, was the only crop 
that they could cultivate, and this naturally meant that 
the yields they obtained were lower, relatively, than 
those from kenaf or jute.
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Table 6.16
Costs, Returns and Profits from Upland Gash Crops
(per rai)
Cassava 
Harvested 
'Green'
Chipped/dried 
All Cassava
Labour Transport Other Yield Return Profit 
costs costs costs kg/rai baht/rai
145
45
40
92
149
150 
74
r 1 90
r 200
r 0 50 
r 240 
r520
1,158
756
-188
-330
988
Kenaf/Jute 
Re tted/dried 
Raw fibre
All kenaf/jute
160
50
144
19
101
31
153*
807
766
565
737
587
414
562
All costs in baht
* This is the yield of retted and dried fibre. All other 
yields are raw root or raw fibre.
This is not quite the whole story as nearly one half 
of the households who cultivated man sampalang chose to 
sell their crop unharvested. Table 6.16 shows that, 
suprisingly, those who decided to do this earned a greater 
return per rai than those who harvested their crop. The 
difference becomes even larger when the costs of 
harvesting and transporting the produce to the point of 
marketing are included and, given the information to hand, 
is difficult to explain.
Finally, and more expLicably, the table shows that the 
largest profit and return was obtained by the single 
farmer who not only harvested his cassava but also
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chipped and dried it. He received 1,520 baht for each rai 
that he cultivated, and when his costs had been 
subtracted, earned a net profit of 1,330 baht per rai.
The Marketing Process
In the communities of Noon Tae and Tha Song Korn 
'upland cropping' is synonomous with 'cash cropping' and 
the entire production of those who were interviewed was 
marketed. However, in contrast to rice the Thai 
government plays no direct role in the process, so that 
farmers are forced to sell their produce to private 
middlemen. In all, 42 farmers grew and marketed upland 
crops? 19 of these sold to 'middlemen' living in Noon Tae 
or Tha Song Korn; 21 to middlemen in Mahasarakham, Kosum 
Phisai or Borabu (the district town of the amphoe 
adjoining Muang Mahasarakham); and one farmer to a paper 
company in Amphoe Borabu (table 6.17).
The nineteen who marketed their cassava crop through 
fellow villagers represent the nineteen who sold 'green'. 
These men (as well as the buyers) appeared to be able to 
judge, fairly accurately, the potent ial yield of an 
unharvested field, and the prices paid were negotiated on 
site and depended on the state of the crop. The highest 
return per rai amounted to 2,300 baht and the lowest, to 
625 baht with the mean being 1,240 baht per rai. It is 
probably wrong to call the villagers who bought green 
cassava, 'middlemen', in the true sense of the word. The 
activity was always small-scale, and was essentially a
Table 6.17
The Marketing of Upland Crops in Baan Noon Tae
and Baan Tha Song Korn
Households
Households who grew 
Upland crops
Households who marketed 
upland crops [1]
45
42 (two marketed two 
types of crop)
Those Who Grew Cassava
Sold Green: 19
Harvested: raw root - 16
chipped & dried - 1
Those Who Grew Kenaf or Jute 
Harvested: retted and dried - 6
retted and dried - 1
All sold to 'middlemen' 
in Tha Song Korn or 
Noon Tae.
All sold to middlemen 
in Mahasarakham, Kosum 
PhisaiPhisai or Borabu.
Sold to middlemen in 
Mahasarakham or 
Kosum Phisai.
Sold to a paper company 
in Amphoe Borabu.
Household that Sold Water Melon
Harvested: 1 Sold to a middleman
in Mahasarakham.
[1] Three households failed to market any produce: One
grew sugar cane and gave her production away because the 
price was too low to make harvesting worth her while; and 
two grew cassava but obtained no yield.
process by which households with a labour shortage could 
interact with those in surplus so that a balance could be 
achieved. Four of the families interviewed bought fields 
of cassava to harvest and market and they reflect this 
situation: they estimated that their profits would be
8,000, 15,000, 16,000 and 20,000 baht (table 6.18), and in 
three of the four cases the activity was thought of as an 
income earning opportunity subsidiary to the farming of 
their own land (the fourth case is difficult to assess as 
in the 1982/83 season all his riceland - 22 rai - was
destroyed by flood or drought). Although the sample is
obviously an extremely small one, it is not able that the
families had a high man/land ratio giving them a surplus 
of labour with which to indulge in the practice and to 
harvest the purchased crop (table 6.18). And, indeed, if 
harvested riceland and cultivated upland are taken to be a 
more accurate measure of labour requirements then the 
difference in the man land ratio between those households 
who bought 'green' cassava and the sample average grows to 
76%; the ratios being 0.44 and 0.25 respectively (table 
6.18).
The remaining farmers who grew and sold man sampalang 
took their produce to middlemen located in one of the 
three towns within a reasonable distance of the study 
villages (Mahasarakham, Borabu and Kosum Phisai). In
every instance bar one the crop was marketed as raw root, 
the exception being the man who sold the tuber chipped and 
dried. The number of middlemen in the vicinity of the 
communities coupled with the ease of transportation and
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spread in communications meant that competition between 
merchants was strenuous/ and as a result prices tended 
towards a competitive norm. The difference in the returns 
that farmers obtained were a result of price fluctuations
through the season rather than exploitation The highest
for raw root was 0 .98 baht per kilogram/ the lowest 0.60
baht per kilogram and the mean 0.77 baht per kilogram.
The individual who sold his crop chipped and dried
received 1.90 baht per kilogram.
Table 6.18
Buying of Green Cassava
Household Productive Income from Total
Household Buying Cassava Income
1/ 5 15/000 70,000
2/ 5 16/000 20,000
3/ 4 8/000 15,000
4/ 2 20/000 24,600
Average 4 14,750 3 2,400
Sample Mean 3.3 - 23,900
Household Riceland Harvested Man/land Cultivated Man/lai
(con't) (Total) Riceland ratio [1] Upland ratio [:
1/ 12 12 0.42 5 0.29
2/ 17 17 0.29 2 0.26
3/ 12 0 - — -
4/ 22 0 - - -
Average 15.7 7.2 0.55 1.7 0.44
Sample Mean 16.1 9.7 0.34 3.4 0.25
Man/Land Ratio [1]: ratio of productive households to harvested 
riceland.
Man/Land Ratio [2]: ratio of productive households to harvested 
riceland + cultivated upland.
All income in baht; all land in rai.
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Six of the seven farmers who grew kenaf or jute sold 
their crop retted and dried, and they all marketed it 
through middlemen in Mahasarakham or Kosum Phisai (table 
6.17). Except that the fibre was quality-graded the 
marketing procedure was, as far as the farmers were 
concerned, the same as that for cassava. Each of them had 
their crop graded as 'B' and all received a rate of 5 baht 
per kilogram of fibre. The seventh man sold his 
production in the raw state to a paper company in Amphoe 
Borabue, and obtained a return of 70 sataang per kilogram.
In addition to bor and man one farmer grew a rai of 
water melons and another a rai of sugar cane. The woman 
who cultivated water melons sold her crop of 500 melons to 
a middleman in Mahasarakham for 3 baht each. Of greater 
interest was the family who cultivated the sugar cane, as 
the problems that they encountered demonstrate the risks 
that small farmers face when cultivating cash crops.
In 1982 Mrs Liang Away decided to switch from 
cassava, which she had cultivated in the previous year, 
and plant sugar cane on her one rai of upland. She had 
decided to do this because she said that the price for 
cane at the beginning of the season had been very good. 
By the end of the season however, the price had dropped to 
a level at which she felt it was not worth her while to 
hire the labour to harvest the crop. So she gave the cane 
away to her friends and neighbours telling them they could 
have as much as they liked. These villagers, rather than 
take the cane to a middleman, cut and stripped it and sold 
it as a snack in Mahasarakham market for approximately 50
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sataang a packet. Interestingly/ Mrs Liang recognised 
that she could have followed the same labour intensive
process but because she was fairly wealthy [1]/ as she put 
it, "could not be bothered".
The point of this is that it reveals the risks that
must be taken into account when cultivating crops for
sale; and it shows one of the reasons why farmers are 
usually reluctant to invest much money (Mrs Liang applied 
50 kilograms of the chemical fertiliser 16-16-8 at the 
cost of 300 baht) when they were growing crops which might 
not justify the investment by failing to yield an adequate 
cash return.
It has been noted in the past that middlemen are 
sometimes willing to travel to the farmer to purchase
upland crops (as they do with rice; Preecha
Kuwinpant, 1980, p 159). This has been seen to be a 
response to the problems that the inhabitants of the more 
remote villages have in transporting their produce to the 
point of marketing. In the muubaan of Noon Tae and Tha 
Song Korn there was no instance of this occurring and the 
farmers went to the middleman rather than the other way 
around. There were a number of villagers who owned trucks 
of one kind and another and they were easy to hire. The
rates they charged for transporting produce to
Mahasarakham or Kosum Phisai varied between 100 and 150
baht per ton carried, and usually the crops were taken 
directly from the fields to the middlemen. The ease with
[1] The household owned 81 rai, the largest landholding of 
all the families who were interviewed.
which farmers could deliver their crops to the middleman 
was demonstrated by the fact that no one identified 
transport or communications as a hindrance to the sale of 
their produce.
In one of the opening chapters to this thesis (Ch 2) 
it was mentioned that the Thai administration has always 
stated that a principal reason why farmers remain
impoverished is that they are exploited by unscrupulous 
middlemen. Numerous independent studies have shown that, 
to the contrary,the agricultural marketing system, 
especially at the local level is, on the whole, very 
efficient and is unlikely to be improved upon by 
government intervention [1]. However, despite these 
revelations, the present Five Year Plan (1982-86)
continues to insinuate that the private marketing system 
is unfair to farmers; "Middlemen have a monopoly over 
marketing and agricultural pricing information resulting 
in lower bargaining power for farmers" (NESDB[1],n.d.,p
46). To investigate, very superficially [2], whether or
not they did take 'excessive1 profits when marketing 
agricultural produce a Chinese middleman in Khon Kaen was 
interviewed.
[1] "So far direct government iitervention and agricultural 
cooperatives are inefficient, private middlemen are more 
efficient. From field marketing audit the preliminary 
findings show that middlemen upto provincial level are 
efficient and they receive comparatively lower rate of 
profit due to local competition..." (Phaisal Lekutai,Jan 
1982,p 164).
[2] It is appreciated that the responses from a single man 
with no corroborating evidence is a weak basis for any 
argument. However, it is felt, and there were reasons to 
believe, that the replies were truthful and accurate.
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Middlemen or khon klaang are generally involved in 
the marketing of a number of crops. This account though, 
will deal exclusively with the case of cassava both for 
simplicity's sake and because it is the principal cash 
crop of the region and of Noon Tae and Tha Song Korn.
Usually, raw root is sold by the farmer to the 
middleman. The middleman will then chip and dry the tuber 
and either sell it to a broker in Bangkok or send it to a 
mill to be processed further into pellets or flour (figure 
6.1). Farmers who chip and dry the root themselves can 
sell it either directly to a mill or, alternatively, to a 
middleman.
According to Mr Nit, middlemen do not tend to work on 
a percentage profit basis but will take a standard cut (eg 
5 sataang) from the rate paid for each kilogram. This 
will normally remain stable whatever the Bangkok wholesale 
price, although severe fluctuations can result in the 
amount being re-evaluated. Table 6.19 shows the profits 
and costs of marketing dried and chipped cassava as it 
moves from the farm-gate to the broker in Bangkok. The 
prices are those of December 1982 and although they would 
vary through the year the percentage profits and costs 
would remain roughly stable and would be similar from crop 
to crop. It is clear that the profits, after all the 
costs have been taken into account, are not excessive at 
1.5% of the price paid at the farm-gate (table 6.19). Mr 
Nit believed that with the large number of khon klaang 
operating through the country and the greatly reduced 
frictions of distance, there was very little chance of
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Figure 6.1
Marketing Structure; Cassava
FARMERS
BANGKOKLOCAL
MIDDLEMAN
chips
raw root
BROKER
chips
flour or. pallets
MILL
chips
EXPORTER
Source: Middleman/ Khon Kaen.
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monopsonism developing. Today there are few areas of
Thailand isolated from marketing information and from
modes of transport/ and as a result there are very few
farmers who must rely on the services of only one
middleman.
Table 6.19
Breakdown of Costs and Profits Incurred by a Middleman 
in the Marketing of Chipped & Dried Cassava
Price offered over the telephone 
by a broker in Bangkok
Transportation costs per kilogram 
- Khon Kaen to Bangkok
Interest on Loan to buy cassava
Middleman's cut and costs;
Labour costs - 
Machinery costs - 
Profit -
Total -
Price at the farm-gate
Costs/ %
kilogram
2.30 baht 100%
.20 baht 91.3%
.04-.05 89.1%
.01 baht 
.01 baht 
.03 baht
.05 baht 87.0%
2.00-2.01 baht
Earlier it was noted that accounts in the past have 
sometimes recorded that khon klaang provide other services 
than marketing (provision of inputs/ credit/ transport 
facilities etc;)/ and that these are extended on the 
condition that the farmer sells his produce to the 
middleman in question. The implication of this is that a 
hold is gained over the farmer/ allowing him to be 
exploited. Mr Nit appreciated that this practice had been
prevalent in the past but claimed that today middlemen, 
because of the increased competition, are forced to 
separate their sevices into wholly independent entities, 
treating each transaction individually. This is supported 
by the absence of any such arrangements in Noon Tae or Tha 
Song Korn, and also their absence among the merchants of 
Mahasarakham town.
It would also seem that the number of brokers in 
Bangkok would tend to eliminate their ability to form a 
cartel to manipulate the market. This does not 
necessarily follow with respect to the cassava exporters 
however. There are only 66 exporting firms and because 
92% is shipped out of the country there is the possibility 
that they could influence the price to their own benefit 
(US Presidential Mission,USAID,May 1982,pp 1-3). But it is 
not they who are vilified; it is the small-scale ethnic 
Chinese middleman who receives accusations of exploitation 
and who is viewed by nearly all Thais, officials and 
farmers alike, as unscrupulous. It is worth noting, in 
conclusion, the observations made regarding over-all 
marketing margins in a recent article on the cassava 
industry in Thailand; "An analysis of the marketing 
margins shows that the farmers receive about 50% of the 
CIF Rotterdam price [80% of cassava going to Europe is 
handled by the port of Rotterdam], In the generality of 
export crops based on small-scale farmers production, this 
is a very high proportion of the market price" 
(Bennison,Jan/Feb 1984, p 92).
The Expansion of Upland Cropping onto the
Marginal Upper Padis
It has commonly been noted that the farmers of the
Northeastern region of Thailand would obtain a greater
return if they turned their marginal upper padis, which
they are only able to cultivate in the wetter years, over
to upland cash crops. As Ng notes: "The North-eastern
farmer must come to terms with the reality of the local
terrain and soil in order to branch out into growing a
larger acreage of non-paddy field crops. Insistence on
producing as much rice as possible is the worst strategy
that could be chosen" (Ng,1970,p 42). However, almost
fifteen years after Ng wrote this there has been little
change in the pattern of land use, and the land cultivated
to upland crops still does not impinge, in the main, upon
the traditional ricelands. The reasons why the farmers of.
the region have failed to follow this advice are often
seen to relate to their strategy of risk minimisation in
which they own and operate a variety of padis each
representing a different ecological niche; in this way
farmers can maintain a stable output of rice whatever the
climatic conditions:
"Although upland terrace land accounts for upto
a third of the area in rice production, this
land is generally unsuitable for the growing of 
paddy rice. But farmers reserve these areas for 
planting to rice if their main crop is damaged 
by erratic or excessive rainfall" (MOAC,April
1980,p 6).
But, in Baan Noon Tae and Tha Song Korn it has 
already been noted that most of the farmers (66%), due to 
the growth in population and the associated breakup of
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land holdings/ own only one type of riceland. They are 
therefore/ in any case/ unable to follow this strategy in 
which they plant/ "as much rice and as early in the year 
as they possibly can" (Ng/May 1974/p 6). What then are 
the inhabitants doing with their land and why?
Two of the households in the sample had/ in the past/ 
turned their upper paddy over to upland crops. There was 
also evidence that some of the land surrounding the 
villages currently planted to upland crops had at one time 
been padiland (remnants of bunds existed). However/ bar 
these cases - which can be seen as exceptions to the rule 
” thii dorn continued to be cultivated as riceland. The 
two farmers who had turned their land over to another crop 
demonstrate rather well some of the reasons why Ng's 
suggestion has gone unheeded.
Mr Chin Nahaat owned five rai of marginal upper 
paddy. In 1982 he had to leave it uncultivated because of 
insufficient rainfall. But/ two seasons prior to this he 
had planted kenaf on the land. He explained that the 
price of bor was very good in that year and this 
encouraged him to cultivate the crop. He reverted back to 
reserving the land for rice when the price of bor declined 
again. What is interesting about this is that it 
demonstrates economic awareness as well as flexibility. 
The question is/ however; why did Mr Chin act in this 
manner when the rest of the village did not; in other 
words/ what made him special?
The answer is largely economic: the family was a
small one consisting of Mr Chin and his wife. They owned
fifteen rai of riceland (giving them a land/man ratio of 
7.5:1/ as against the sample average of 3.2:1) and had an 
income outside agriculture/ coming from trading. Their 
rice production/ despite not being able to plant the five 
rai of thii dorn/ was enough to enable them the feed 
themselves and to sell a portion of their crop. They were 
therefore under no compunction to meet subsistence 
requirements by planting their upper paddy to rice and 
could look to economic rather than purely subsistence 
considerations. This is not the case for most of the 
inhabitants; only one of those that actually sold rice 
(ie: had a surplus of production [regular?] so that they
could escape from the demands of subsistence) owned any 
upper padiland. Indeed/ Ng's statement that reserving all 
potential padiland for rice cultivation/ "is the worst 
strategy that could be chosen" seems to ignore the 
economics of subsistence.
The second farmer/ Mr Muu Phonlaa/ had turned his 
upper riceland over to cassava in the season previous to 
the one of the study/ but in the following year had 
reverted back to reserving it for the cultivation of rice. 
Unfortunately/ due to the late and insufficient rainfall, 
he was unable to plant the land to paddy and it was left 
unused. From this it is clear that the land is exactly 
the type Ng states is more suited, both physically and 
economically, to crops other than rice. Mr Muu’s 
experiences are therefore pertinent to understanding the 
influences at work.
Mr Muu Phonlaa owned 23 rai of riceland of which he
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classified 10 rai as thii dorn. The household contained 
only three members so that like Mr Chin's it was land rich 
with a land/man ratio of 7.7:1. In addition to this, four 
rai was thii naa prang - irrigated riceland. This meant 
that a portion of his land was not influenced by the 
vagaries of the climate and could be virtually guaranteed 
to produce a good yield. The family was therefore able to 
escape from the constraints of subsistence. The principal 
reason why, despite all these factors which would allow Mr 
Muu to cultivate upland cash crops, he had decided to stop 
planting man sampalang and switch back to the possibility 
of growing khaaw dor, was that the land was too wet to 
grow cassava sucessfully. His was not an isolated case: 
another six housjiolds said that their cassava crop had 
suffered because the land that they were cultivating it 
upon was excessively wet. Their average yield amounted to 
115 kilograms per rai, less than 10% of the sample mean. 
The point of this is that the upper padis are not only 
marginal to rice cultivation but also to the cultivation 
of cassava. It could be argued that another cash crop 
would be more suited to the conditions of this 
intermediate land (eg; sugar cane). But, at the present 
time cassava is a virtual monocrop; the inhabitants have 
knowledge of few others and there are no alternatives 
within their experience which can compete with man 
sampalang in terms of profitability, and ease and 
flexibility of cultivation. Until there is, and until 
farmers can be guaranteed either a subsistence income or a 
subsistence rice crop, the thii dorn is unlikely to be 
cultivated to crops other than rice.
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Conclusion
Upland cropping in Noon Tae and Tha Song Korn is now 
firmly entrenched within the farm system and represents an 
important element in the economy of the villages. But/ in 
spite of this, it is the demands of rice cultivation which 
are paramount when farmers are deciding on any strategy of 
cultivation/ and the needs of an upland crop are always 
subservient to those of rice. This was evident in the 
widespread opinion that the cultivation of such crops was 
not 'proper1 farming; farming/ for the inhabitants of the 
villages/ implied rice cultivation.
In view of this/ it was important that any cash crop 
be flexible/ and it was the particular appropriateness of 
man sampalang to the constraints imposed on the farmer by 
the various elements of the farm system which made the 
great majority of those interviewed plant this crop rather 
than any other. Indeed, it is possible that even if 
kenaf, for example, did become more profitable than 
cassava farmers would be reluctant to change due to the 
stricter demands under which they would then have to make 
decisions.
Some of the influences impinging on the villagers in 
their choice of which upland crop to grow, whether to use 
chemical fertilisers and pesticides and how much labour to 
hire are illustrated in figures 6.1a to 6.1c [1].
[1] These figures are contained in a pocket at the back of 
the thesis, and a brief explanation of their construction 
is given in appendix 5.2.
Chapter Seven 
Cooperative Membership and the Extension of 
Credit in Noon Tae and Tha Song Korn
Introduction
The previous two chapters have examined some of the 
ways in which the government of Thailand is attempting to 
aid the farmers of Noon Tae and Tha Song Korn in their 
efforts at intensifying the cultivaton of rice and upland 
crops. However, there are two important avenues which 
have not, as yet, been discussed in any detail - those of 
credit and cooperatives. For, in addition to supplying 
farmers with inputs and advice through the Office of the 
Kaset Amphoe, the government also involves itself in their 
affairs through two other national organisations - the 
Cooperative Promotion Department (CPD) and the Bank for 
Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC). The 
history and background to these two organisations was 
discussed on a national scale in chapter 2. This next 
section will take a much more specific line by continuing 
on the theme of chapters five and six and examining the 
role that they are playing in the research communities, 
and the manner in which they are perceived by the 
inhabitants of the two villages. In this way it is hoped, 
once again, to reveal the relevance of the efforts to the 
varying positions in which the farmers find themselves.
Cooperatives
In Thailand, the cooperative structure takes the form 
illustrated in figure 7.1. The lowest level of 
administration are the cooperative "groups" or klum which 
are administered at the district level and which usually 
represent the farmers of between one and three villages. 
In Amphoe Muang Mahasarakham there are 70 such klum with a 
combined membership of 3,007. The farmers of Baan Noon 
Tae were organised within a single group, number 18, which 
in April 1983 had 25 members. The inhabitants of Baan Tha 
Song Korn meanwhile belonged to klum 17, which also 
included the villages of Baan Uparaat and Baan Tha Song 
Korn Nooy, and which had the slightly larger membership of 
47 (Table 7.1). Both groups were established in 1974.
From these figures it is immediately clear that 
cooperative affiliation, both in the Amphoe and in the two 
groups to which the study villages belonged, was far from 
universal. Only just over 14% of the 20,877 agricultural 
households in Muang Mahasarakham belonged to a 
cooperative, while in klum1s 17 & 18 membership
represented 9% and 19% of the farming households 
respectively (Table 7.1). The questionnaire revealed a 
similar pattern and level of affiliation with 22% of the 
sample from Noon Tae holding cooperative membership and 
14% from Tha Song Korn.
The official at the Amphoe Office said that to become 
a member of the cooperative or sahakon a farmer must own a 
house and land. She said that there was no lower limit to 
the size of the landholding, and both nor sor saam and
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Figure 7.1
Cooperative Structure; Baan Noon Tae & Baan Tha Song Korn
COOPERATIVE LEAGUE 
OF THAILAND
PROVINCIAL COOP­
ERATIVE FEDERATION
DISTRICT COOPERATIVE 
OFFICE 
(70 KLUM; 3007 MEMBERS I
KLUM 17KLUM 1B
47 MEMBERS25 MEMBERS
532  agric 'l households132agric ’l households
membership
BAAN THA SONG K O R N /N O O Y  A  BAAN UPARAATBAAN MOON TAE
Source: District Cooperative Office, Amphoe Muang
Mahasarakham.
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chanot thii din were acceptable as titles of ownership. 
This means that virtually all of the farming households 
who were interviewed would have been eligible for 
membership.
Table 7.1
Cooperative Membership
Coop Membership Agric'l households %
Amphoe Muang 3,007 20,877 14.4
klum 17 47 532 8.8
klum 18 25 132 18.9
from questionnaire:
Tha Song Korn 6 41 14.0
Noon Tae 8 36 22.0
Combined 14 77 18.0
The cooperative provided a number of services, some 
of which have already been mentioned: members could buy
the chemical fertiliser 16-20-0 at the rate of 245 (cash) 
to 250 baht (deferred payment) for 50 kilograms; and they 
could also purchase the pesticide "Phaaden" for 20 baht 
per kilogram (cash only). However, seeds were not sold 
and farmers could not hire machinery of any sort. In 
addition to supplying inputs the cooperative also 
marketed rice and provided loans. Paddy was bought at 
government support prices and members could obtain short 
(one year) and medium-term (three years) loans at a rate 
of interest of 14% per annum. The size of the loan to 
which each was eligible was calculated on the basis of the
size of their landholding: each rai of land, either
riceland or upland, could be used as collateral to 
guarantee up to 2,000 baht. Table 7.2 shows the extent to 
which each of these services was utilised by the members 
of the cooperative groups 17 and 18: each member bought
an average of 35 kilograms of 16-20-0 in the crop year 
1982/3, marketed a minimal quantity of paddy and purchased 
no pesticides. Upto April 1983, 44 individuals had loans 
issued through the coop, 32 of these being medium-term (3 
years) and the remainder short-term (1 year). The average 
loan amounted to 8,700 baht or, if all the members are 
included in the calculation, 5,300 baht.
Table 7.2
Services Extended to Cooperative Groups 17 & 18: 
1982/83 season (per memberT
Group 17 Group 18 Combined
Fertilisers Sold 29 kg 46 kg 35 kg
Pesticides Sold - - -
Marketing of Rice[*] 39 kg 39 kg 39 kg
Loans extended(Baht) 4,900 6,100 5,300
[*] This figure is calculated from the district data as 
figures for each group were unavailable. It is rather 
misleading as the great majority of farmers sold no rice 
and this is only an average derived from the small section 
of the membership who did.
Although the cooperative office had data pertaining 
to the extension of credit, the amount of fertiliser and 
pesticide it sold and to the marketing of rice this data, 
in itself, reveals nothing of the underlying reasons
behind the figures. To discover what they are it is
necessary to examine the results/ both quantitative and 
qualitative, derived from the questionnaire.
Of the households interviewed 14/ or 18% of the 
sample, were members of the cooperative (Table 7.1).
Table 7.3 shows how they differed from those farmers who 
were not members: they owned 31% more land, 28% more
riceland [1], had a total income 44% larger and an 
agricultural income over twice as large; borrowed nearly 
three times as much money and applied 32% more fertilisers 
on their rice. In other words, at least in Noon Tae and 
Tha Song Korn, the farmers who belonged to the sahakon 
were wealthier and owned larger land holdings. The 
question is; why are they apparently a distinct group 
within the sample? Is it because, despite what the 
distict cooperative office professed, eligibility is
limited for one reason or another; or is it simply that a 
particular sort of farmer is attracted to the advantages 
that membership holds? It is arguable of course that 
what appears in the table to be a significant set of
differences does not, in fact, hold any significance; and 
indeed, when they are correlated, although there is a
[1] It could be argued that the larger land holdings of
the cooperative members are a result of their membership;
that in some way it has aided the accumulation of land. 
The information from the questionnaire however, indicates 
that in Noon Tae and Tha Song Korn this has not been the 
case, almost 94% of the plots (122 out of 130) were
inherited by the present head of household.
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fairly strong positive relationship between membership and 
the total amount of fertiliser used, credit extended and 
agricultural income, it is weak for total land, riceland 
and total income (table 7.3). Debating the merits of this 
distinctly unilluminating set of coefficients is, perhaps, 
the wrong approach to the problem and to discover the 
benefits and nature of cooperative membership it might be 
better to look more deeply at the responses that farmers 
gave and to the details of the differences t^tween the two 
groups [1].
Table 7.3
Comparison of Cooperative Members and Non-members
Coop Members Non-members % Signif'ce
Age of Head(years) 46
Years of Residence 33
Size of Household(head) 7
Size of Productive 
Household(head) 3
Total Land (rai) 26
Riceland (rai) 20
Fertiliser Use(kg/rai) 9
Fertilisers Bought(kg) 178 
Money Borrowed(baht) 9,000
Total Income(baht) 31,600 
Agricult’l Income 
(baht) 13,200
47 -
47 -
1 5.9 -
8 3.1 —
0 19.9 85%
7 16.2 -
9 7.5 -
93 96%
3,200 99.8%
22,000 85%
5,900 98.6%
Statistical techniques: Pearson product moment correlation 
with two-tailed test of statistical significance.
[1] The overall pattern of the correlation coefficients 
says little. This does not mean that individual
coefficients are uninteresting, and this will be expanded 
upon later.
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Given that the cooperative provides certain services 
to its members and that their provision is the principal 
benefit which farmers can derive from affiliation it might 
be expected for these services to be used by the farmers 
in question. Their use, and the inability of non-members 
to gain access to similar services at comparable prices, 
would indicate that there are distinct advantages attached 
to membership.
Earlier it was pointed out that fertiliser use both 
in total and per rai was greater among members than 
non-members (Table 7.3). However, when these figures are 
examined more closely one finds that of the 11 who used 
chemical fertilisers only 5 purchased them from the 
sahakon, the remainder going to middlemen (2), CBIRD (2), 
the BAAC(l) or the kaset amphoe (1). It has already been 
demonstrated in chapter five that farmers have access to a 
number of similar sources of fertilisers so that, in this 
respect, there is no particular advantage of belonging to 
the cooperative. As far as pesticides are concerned, not 
only did no farmer in the sample buy them from the sahakon 
but, according to their own statistics, neither did anyone 
in the four villages associated with klum1 s 17 and 18. 
Once again, the farmers need for the input was met by 
commercial sources which provided pesticides at a 
competitive price and, incidentally, in a far greater 
selection. Only two households belonging to the coop 
marketed any paddy in the 1982/3 season and both sold 
their produce to middlemen in Mahasarakham. The comments 
that farmers made (look to chapter 5) illustrate that they
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do not think highly of government purchasing bodies, and 
even when they are members of the cooperative are not 
encouraged to sell to it.
Finally, there is the question of credit. The 
households covered by the questionnaire had taken out 
loans from all sources averaging 4,300 baht. If they are 
then broken down into cooperative members and non-members, 
the former had loans averaging 9,000 baht and the latter 
3,200 baht, and it has already been demonstrated that 
there is a strong positive correlation, significant to 
99.8%, between cooperative membership and the extension of 
credit. On immediate appraisal this seems to indicate 
that the farmers who belonged to the sahakon were able, 
for one reason or another, to borrow larger quantities of 
money. However, not all these loans were negotiated 
through the coop. Indeed, of the 14 members, five had 
loans issued directly through the BAAC and if they are 
subtracted from the figure of 9,000 baht the amount of 
credit extended per household declines to 4,100 baht, only 
a little greater than the average for the entire sample 
(Table 7.4). It is possible, of course, that belonging to 
the cooperative is a sign that a farmer is a good risk, 
thus making it easier for him to borrow money from the 
BAAC (this would explain the correlation between credit 
and membership); although the bank itself claimed that 
this did not necessarily follow; and it is not-able that 
whereas 93% of cooperative members borrowed money from 
instit utional creditors, only 42% of the sample as a 
whole did so (the question of the provision and use of
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Table 7.4
Credit Extension to Cooperative Members
Amount Households Baht per 
(baht) Involved Household
Source:
Coop 57,000 8 4,100
BAAC 69,000 5 4,900
combined 126,000 13[*] 9,000
[*] One household borrowed no money.
credit will be entered into in greater detail in the 
second half of this chapter).
With only 18% of the sample belonging to the sahakon 
it is possible that the most fertile line of enquiry is 
that which is directed at those farmers who have not 
become members. Table 7.5 gives the reasons that the 
inhabitants gave for remaining unaffiliated (NB; the table 
does not include those who belonged to the alternative 
Farmers Association).
Table 7.5
Reasons Given for Failing to Join the Cooperative
Number of 
Households %
No need 17 47%
No need & ignorance 4 11%
Ignorance of coop 3 8%
Not enough land to
be eligible[*] 3 8%
Not enough money to
be eligible 1 3%
Other reason did not
fit requirements 4 11%
In process of becoming
a member 4 11%
(No reply:17 households)
Total 36 99%
[*]Two owned no land.
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Particularly striking is the large number who stated 
that they had no need, and saw no particular advantage, in 
membership. A typical reply was that given by Mrs Lamaan 
Japathasen who said that she could get everything she 
needed just as easily and cheaply elsewhere? while Mrs 
Munamaa Bunalaa was a little more strident and said that 
she didn't have the time to sit and listen to people 
talking at unnecessary meetings (it was almost as though 
she held a grudge against the coop) [1]. The previous 
section clearly demonstrated that as far as fertilisers, 
pesticides and marketing are concerned this is true, and 
might also be true for a large section of the population 
with regard to the access to credit. Similar to this 
group of 17 farmers are the seven who were ignorant of the 
cooperative, its functions and services, and how to join. 
They all gave the impression of being ignorant for the 
simple fact that there was no pressure on them to become 
informed. Even so it is still rather surprising that 
farmers in small communities such as those of Noon Tae and 
Tha Song Korn can be so ill-informed about a major vehicle 
of government aid, and arguably the sahakon should 
advertise itself more intensively.
Linked to the problem of ignorance is that of 
mis-information and the important issue of eligibility. 
Four households appeared to say that they had been unable 
to join for reasons which the cooperative office claimed
[1] Two other farmers also said that being a member was a 
"waste of time".
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were irrelevant: one family who owned 8 rai of land (6 of
riceland/ 2 of upland), stated that they had insufficent 
land to be eligible for membership. A second woman, aged 
66, said that she was barred from membership because she 
was too old. A third because one of the conditions was 
that a farmer must own pigs, of which he had none: and the 
last because each applicant had to pass a "test" which, 
among other things, insisted that a farmer earn over 
10,000 baht per year. Each of these responses were 
isolated cases and seemed to be the result of a certain 
murkiness about how one actually goes about becoming a 
member. Once again this indicates that the sahakon should 
do something about making the details of the organisation 
wider and better known. Undoubtably, part of the problem 
is the confusion that many farmers have over which 
government department does what: the man who said that he
had to pass a "test" appeared to be muddling the 
cooperative with the Farmers Association, while the 
individual who said that he had to rear pigs was probably 
thinking of the Pig Cooperative - a quite separate entity.
Conclusion
From this account of "cooperatives" in Noon Tae and 
Tha Song Korn it should be clear that the word is 
something of a misnomer, and in effect the sahakon only 
operates as a source of inputs and services rather that as 
a true cooperative enterprise. This fact has been noted 
on many previous occasions (Kirsch, 1981, pp 103-114;
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Demaine,1976,p 8; Kiyoshi Kamegai,Jan 1982,p 155). The 
families of the two villages saw nothing particularly 
beneficial in membership, and it certainly appeared that 
even those services that were provided could be obtained 
easily enough elsewhere. But even so, there is still a 
paradox for which there is no clear solution: why is
there a relationship between membership and agricultural 
income, credit, fertilisers bought and size of land 
holding? (Table 7.3). This problem has been discussed and 
talked around in the last few pages but nothing concrete 
has arisen. In the absence of any obvious explanation it 
is only possible to take two hazardous stabs at an answer:
Firstly, it maybe that the distribution is derived 
from a former period when eligibility was stricter and 
when farmers did not have access to so many alternative 
sources of inputs, credit and marketing facilities. This 
would have led to a particular type of farmer joining-up, 
and would explain the present situation where the 
wealthier and larger land owners have membership but in 
many cases do not bother to utilise the facilities to 
which they are afforded access [1].
And secondly, there seems to be some evidence to 
suggest that the main benefit of cooperative membership, 
credit extension, is the cause (or one of the causes) of 
the relationship. For, it is only the larger landowners
[1] This being because the cooperative no longer has a 
monopoly on the supply of any service.
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who are able to reap the full rewards of the system by 
which loan-limits are calculated on the basis of the 
quantity of land owned. This would naturally mean that 
those households with more than the average amount of land 
would be encouraged to join.
Farmers Associations
sahakon was not the only governmental cooperative 
institution operating in the two study villages; there was 
also the Farmers Association or klum kasetakorn. This 
group, as will become clear/ played only a minor role in 
the lives of the population but even so is worth briefly 
describing/ as in the past it has been an important part 
of the government's extension programme. Its failure to 
make any sort of impact in the research communities does 
help to demonstrate why it is now being phased-out.
Farmers Associations were first established in 1973
[1] with the principal purpose of providing agricultural
credit facilities at low cost by using group guarantees
{Chinnawoot Soonthornsima/Jan 1979,p 36). They have,
however, been singularly unsuccessful in meeting their
aims (Direk Patmasiriwat,Oct 1981,p 52-3), and ' the 1979 ✓
five-year plan for the development of agricultural 
cooperatives recommended that they be phased out and their 
members incorporated into the cooperative structure
[1] Although Rice Farmer Associations, an earlier 
grouping, were established in Feb 1955 under the 
supervision of the Department of Agricultural Extension 
(Direk Patmasiriwat,Oct 1981,p 52).
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(NESDB,Feb 1979). This is slowly occurring and indicative 
is that in the 1982 fiscal year the BAAC supplied only 57 
million baht to Farmers Associations for onlending, 0.5% 
of its total disbursements in that year (BAAC/1983,table 
4,p 77).
To members living in the villages of Amphoe Muang 
Mahasarakham the organisation supplied the chemical 
fertiliser 16-20-0 at the rate of 235 baht per 50 kilogram 
sack, sold machinery (though demand was minimal) and 
extended short and medium-term loans at an interest rate 
of 14% per annum. It did not though, despite what some 
government reports state, market produce or provide seeds 
or pesticides [1].
In Noon Tae and Tha Song Korn only ten farmers in the 
sample (13% of agricultural households) said that they 
belonged to the grouping, of whom three stated that they 
used the organisation to purchase fertilisers and one as a 
source of credit. It can been seen therefore that not 
only was membership limited but also that among the 
members the services that the klum kasetakorn provided 
were grossly under-used. On the whole, the inhabitants of 
the two communities had only a limited appreciation of its 
functions and, in the majority of cases, appeared to be 
virtually oblivious to its existence. This level of 
ignorance seemed to be a product of the institutions' 
unimportance to the villagers. It was almost as if, with 
the improving living standards of the farmers, it had 
outgrown its usefulness.
[1] This is probably because of the winding-down process 
now in progress.
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Credit
Although both the cooperative and klum kasetakorn 
were able to provide loans to their members, neither of 
them approached the importance of the Bank for Agriculture 
and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC) as a source of 
agricultural credit in Noon Tae and Tha Song Korn. For 
this reason it is necessary to look in detail at the BAAC 
as well as at the alternative sources of credit to which 
farmers have access and sometimes resort; and to examine 
the role which each source, as far as the farmers were 
concerned, filled or failed to fill within the two 
villages.
The importance of farmers having access to credit at
fairly low rates of interest has long been assumed to be
an important ingredient in the intensification and
modernisation of agricultural production (Lightfoot and
Fox,1983,p 2). In Thailand the government became involved
in the extension of agricultural credit, albeit on a small
scale, as early as the reign of King Rama V, about a
century ago (BAAC,Dec 1982,p 8). However, despite this
early beginning a document produced by the UN agency,
ESCAP, in 1979 found itself concluding:-
"It is obvious that rural poverty and heavy debt 
burden are widespread in rural areas of 
Thailand. Moreover, the flow of savings and 
credit tends to favour urban people rather than 
rural people. It is crucial that, in order to 
solve the problem of mass poverty in rural 
areas, a new strategy for package operations and 
reorientation of various financial and rural 
institutions is applied in the field of rural 
savings and credit" (Chinnawoot Soonthornsima,
Jan 1979,p 41).
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Gloomy accounts, such as this (which may well be 
accurate),of the credit situation in rural Thailand 
commonly give little detail to the charges that they make, 
or to the figures that they give. This means that they 
can go only part of the way to providing a comprehensive 
critique, for raw data, in itself, is of little use as it 
fails to provide any background information regarding the 
conditions in which specific groups of farmers are 
operating. Equally important are the details of each 
credit source and the restraints, both real and imaginary, 
which prevent or cause farmers to borrow money. It is only 
in the light of such information that the data can become 
meaningful
The farmers of Baan Noon Tae and Baan Tha Song Korn 
borrowed money from a number of sources. Principal among 
these was, not suiprisingly, the BAAC, although the 
cooperative, friends, relatives, middlemen and other 
government offices also played a part. The distribution 
of loans, by source, is shown in table 7.6 and it reveals 
that 79% of the money came from official governmental 
outlets. This is a little more than the figure arrived at 
by a survey carried out by the Department of Agricultural 
Economics which found that 64% of the farmers' debt was 
borrowed from institutional creditors, and the rest from 
private or non-institutional creditors (BAAC,Dec 1982,p 
9). A visual representation of the flows of credit to the 
farmers of the two villages is shown in figure 7.2.
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Fig. 7.2. Flows of Agricultural Credit 
Source: adapted from :BAAC ,Dec.1982,p10 (percentage flows from questionnaire)
Table 7.6
Credit Use in Noon Tae and Tha Song Korn/ by source
households % Baht per % total 
Household loans
BAAC 24 60.0% 8,125 60%
Cooperative 8 20.0% 7,125 17%
Farmers Assoc'n 1 2.5% 7,000 2%
Relative 3 7.5% 2,066 2%
Friend 2 5.0% 6,000 4%
Middleman 1 2.5% 30,000 9%
Other Gov't Office 1 2.5% 20,000 6%
(No Loan: 37 households)
The Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural 
Cooperatives is just that: it extends loans to
agricultural concerns/ both on its own accord and through 
the Agricultural Cooperative and Farmers Association.
The loans issued through the cooperative and klum 
kasetakorn are relatively simple in the form that they can 
take. They are either short (1 year) or medium-term (3 
years) and are issued at an interest rate of 14% per annum 
[1], However/ there is one significant difference between 
these two credit giving bodies: the sahakon gives loans to 
its members individually using land as collateral to 
guarantee the transaction (the district office said it 
would allow farmers to borrow money on their land upto a
[1] This is the interest rate that the cooperative and 
farmers association charged to its members. The bank 
lends to the institutions themselves at a rate that is 
generally lower and depends on the use to which the money 
is to be put. For onlending to members the figure is 11% 
per year (BAAC/1983,p 61).
limit of 2,000 baht per rai). The klum kasetakorn though 
operates on the basis of shared liability in which groups 
of farmers guarantee each other. They must satisfy their 
fellow members and the BAAC of their credit worthiness, 
and to take out a loan must have an account with the bank. 
Because of this intimate link with the BAAC and because of 
their generally hazy notion of the group, farmers in Noon 
Tae and Tha Song Korn were often confused as to the exact 
nature of the Farmers Association and commonly identified 
it as a direct part of the bank itself [1]. In 1982 
cooperatives accounted for 21.5% of the BAAC's 
disbursements in the Northeastern Region (BAAC,1983,table 
4,p 77) and, in 1980, for 15% of those in the province of 
Mahasarakham (Lightfoot and Fox,1983,table 5,p 18). The 
respective figures for Farmers Associations were a minimal 
0.5% and 1.0%, reflecting its declining importance within 
the country [2].
[1] A survey conducted in 1981 reported that "the 
membership in each village is sometimes identical with the 
membership of the farmers groups" (JICA,1981,p 108).
[2] The BAAC now imposes stricter controls on loans to 
Farmers Associations in an effort to stamp out fraudalent 
activities and the misappropriation of funds. This, 
combined with the government's policy of slowly 
dismantling the groups, has meant that disbursements have 
declined from 295 million bant in 1977 (BAAC,Dec 1982,p 
16) to 57 million baht in 1982 (BAAC,1983,table 4,p 77).
More complicated are the loans which the bank issues 
to its client farmers, and which it supervises itself. 
They are probably best explained in tabulated form and 
table 7.7 gives each type that is available and the 
interest rate charged. Loans such as these account for 
the majority of the bank's disbursements, and in 1982 
amounted to 2,665 million baht in the Northeastern Region, 
or 78% of the total. Those extended in Mahasarakham in 
1980 represented 85% of the total for that province 
(Lightfoot and Fox,1983,table 5,p 18).
Table 7.7
The BAAC's Loan Structure for Loans to Client Farmers
Type of Loan Interest
Short Term:l ye a r
1/ for main crop production 14%
2/ for other agricultural practices 14% [1]
3/ for postponement of sale 14%
Medium Term:3 years [2]
1/ for investment in agric'l assets 14%
Long term:5+ years
1/ for refinancing old debts 13%
2/ for investment in agriculture 14% [3]
[1] 15% for loans exceeding 300,000 baht
[2] This is sometimes extended to 5 years
[3] 15% for loans over 300,000 baht but 
under 1 million baht; 16% for loans 
over 1 million baht.
Adapted from: BAAC 1982 Annual Report.
Farmers can secure loans from the bank in one of two 
ways: either through becoming part of an informal joint
liability group of at least five members (operating in 
approximately the same manner as the Farmers Association 
groups), or by furnishing the bank with assets as loan 
collateral (BAAC,1983,p 15). The great majority of 
farmers in Thailand are too poor to guarantee loans as 
individuals and so adopt the former approach. As members 
of joint liability groups they can obtain short or 
medium-term loans at an interest rate of 14% per annum. 
Long-term loans, which were only introduced in 1975, 
usually involve large sums of money and are only available 
to farmers who can provide a mortgage (Chirinawoot 
Soonthornsima,Jan 1979,p 14).
The BAAC's statistics showed that in Baan Noon Tae 
and Tha Song Korn by far the most popular method of 
borrowing money was through joint liability loans (table 
7.8). At the end of the 1982 financial year 134 
households had loans of this type outstanding, amounting 
to 901,100 baht or 6,700 baht per loan. In contrast, 
loans issued to individual client farmers on the basis of 
land mortgage ran to only a single man who borrowed 7,400 
baht. These figures, both in terms of the number and the 
size of the loans are similar to those recorded in the 
questionnaire which revealed that of the 78 agricultural 
households interviewed 24, or 31%, had loans issued 
through the BAAC, the average loan coming to 8,125 baht 
(table 7.8).
Table 7.8
Credit Extended to BAAC Client Farmers in Noon Tae
& Tha Song Korn
BAAC Data Questionnaire data
Number Value/loan Number Value/loan
Joint Liability 134 6,700 )
Loans ) 24 8,125
)
Individual Client 1 7,400 )
Farmer Loans
Total Loans 135 (37% of agric'l 24 (31% of agric'l
households) households)
Table 7.6 showed that just over a half of the 
agricultural households interviewed had some variety of 
loan outstanding. The majority of these, 82.5% by number 
and 79% by value, were granted either directly through the 
BAAC, or through the cooperative or Farmers Association. 
The characteristics of the 24 farmers who were BAAC clent 
farmers, making up 60% of all loans both by number and 
value are revealed in table 7.9.
Table 7.9
Socio-economic Characteristics of BAAC Client Farmers and
Cooperative Members with Loans [*]
Client Farmers Coop Members Mean
Total Land(rai) 19.2 27.6 19.7
Riceland(rai) 14.9 24.1 16.1
Total Income(baht) 25,000 16,000 23,900
Agric'l Income(baht) 11,500 6,900 7,200
[*] The characteristics of those borrowing through the 
Farmers Association have not been included in this table 
because only a single farmer did so.
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They are shown to be very average in terms of the 
sample, owning slightly less land and earning a slightly 
greater income. The cooperative members who took out 
loans, by contrast, owned significantly more land but had 
a smaller income (table 7.9). The characteristics of the 
cooperative members have already been discussed, without 
really arriving at any firm conclusions about their 
significance. The fact that the client farmers appear to 
deviate very little from the mean is interesting, as 
judging from past reports one would expect them to be the 
wealthier farmers (eg: Direk Patmasiriwat,1981,pp 40-42;
Tongroj Onchan & Meyer,April 1980,p 19). It maybe that 
because Noon Tae and Tha Song Korn are relatively 
prosperous villages the problems of gaining access to 
credit for the poorer households are not immediately 
apparent.
Table 7.10 shows how the families who earned less 
than or equal to 10,000 baht per year (the average for the 
sample was 23,900 baht) acted in terms of borrowing money. 
As a group there were slightly fewer borrowers and they 
borrowed less: 45% took out loans, as against 51% for the
sample as a whole and, much more dramatically, the size of 
the average loan at 2,361 baht was just over half the size 
of that for the sample mean at 4,194 baht. If total 
income and agricultural income are then correlated with 
credit a very strong relationship is revealed, significant 
to 99.8% in the first instance and 99.9% in the second. 
Table 7.10 also shows the breakdown, by source, of the 
loans issued to farmers earning less than 10,000
baht/year. It demonstrates that not only did they borrow 
less than the average/ but also that over twice as many of 
their loans came from informal sources. This indicates 
that whereas table 7.9 appears to show that farmers 
gaining access to institutional creditors do not represent 
a clearly defined group in the two communities there is, 
in fact/ a strong correlation between income and credit/ 
and also a link between income and the source of that 
credit.
Table 7.10
Credit Use among Farmers Earning less than 10/000
j^a ]1-{: ^ y e a r
Households with Sample 
income <10,000 baht Average
Average Loan(Baht) 2,361 4,194
Sample Size(Households) 31 78
Households in Debt 14 40
% of Sample in Debt 45% 51%
Source of Credit (Households):
BAAC 6 ) 24 )
Cooperative 3 ) 64% [1] 8 ) 82%
Farmers Assoc'n - ) 1 )
Other Gov't Office - 1
Relative 3 ) 3 )
Friend 2 ) 36% [2] 2 ) 15%
Middleman - ) 1 )
No Loan 17 38
[1] Percentage loans from institutional sources
[2] Percentage loans from non-institutional sources
That a farmer obtains credit does not mean that he is 
satisfied with the quantity he has managed to procure, and 
of the 39 households who gave an answer 22 or 56% said 
that they would have liked to have borrowed more. Of 
these, eight were intending to take out another loan,
eleven said they had insufficient collateral and three 
that they were afraid of being any further in debt. 
Unfortunately the question, "would you like to borrow 
more; why don't you", was in many ways unsatisfactory. 
Farmers often replied "yes" (because of course they 
wished to have more money), without really contemplating 
the agricultural necessity for the additional capital. 
Much more fruitful is an examination of those households, 
38 in all (almost half of the sample) who, for one reason 
or another, had decided not to borrow any money.
Table 7.11a shows the basic characterisitcs of this 
group and, once again, there is no hint that they are 
special in any way, as both their average income and the 
size of their landholding conform closely to the mean. 
However, what the table masks is an interesting difference 
between these farmers and those of the rest of the sample 
(table 7.11b). This difference becomes even more 
pronounced when the families who were forced to go to 
informal creditors because they could not meet the 
requirements of the institutional outlets are removed from 
the calculation (table 7.11a & b). It demonstrates that 
whereas nearly two-thirds of the households who went to 
formal creditors had an income of between 10,000 and
40,000 baht, only a third of those without loans fell into 
this income bracket. It seems that the poorer households 
were unable or unwilling to be in debt, while many of the 
richer ones had no need to be in debt producing (in 
comparison to those with formal credit) a bimodal 
distribution of income within the group (graph 7.1).
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Table 7.11a
Comparison between those Households who have obtained 
Credit Facilities and those who have not
Households Households Households with 
without Credit with Credit Formal Credit
Total Land(rai) 
Riceland(rai) 
Total Income[*] 
Agric'l Income
21.1
17.2
24,300
5,000
20.3
16.4
25,000
9,300
21.5
17.3
27,400
10,000
Table 7.11b
Income Distribution among Households with, and 
without, Credit Facilities
Number of Households with:
Yncome <10,0 00[*] 16(43%)
Income 10,000-40,000 13(35%) 
Income >40,000 8(22%)
Total Households 37
[*] All incomes are in baht.
14(35%) 
21(52%) 
5(12%) 
40
9(26%)
21(62%)
4(12%)
34
Graph 7.1
Income Distribution among Households with Formal Credit
and without Credit
households with formal credit
X
15
i
households without credit or with informal credit 
» households without credit
>40,00010-40,000<10,000
INCOME (BAHT)
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This is all very neat, but in essence it only 
involves the use of statistical data to back up hypothesis 
regarding credit use in Noon Tae and Tha Song Korn. To 
further reinforce the hypotheses it is necessary to see 
how the qualitative responses align themselves with what
the raw data appears to be saying. Table 7.12 shows the
reasons that the 37 households gave for borrowing no 
money.
The two crucial groups here are those who said that
they had "no need" to borrow money and those who said that
they were unable to. The 20 who had no need earned an 
average cash income of 29,000 baht per year, somewhat over 
the average; while the nine who either felt they could not 
afford to borrow money or were unable to gain access to 
sources of credit earned only 15,400 baht per year, almost 
90% less (table 7.12). This supports the contention 
presented earlier that there are two sections to the group 
of farmers who did not borrow money; one who were unable 
or unwilling to, and one who had no need to.
Table 7.12
Reasons given why Farmers Borrowed no Money
Number of
Households %
No Need
Afraid of being in debt 
Insufficient collateral 
Doesn't know how to
No answer
Will borrow in the future 2
20
7
2
2
4
54%
19%
5%
5%
5%
11%
Total 37
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That twenty households should have no desire to 
borrow money, even though they can be shown to have a 
superior income, is surprising as it is often assumed that 
the rural areas of Thailand suffer from capital shortages 
(Direk Patmasiriwat,Oct 1981,p 2). It is also worth 
noting that these twenty households, as well as earning 
20% more than the average income also owned 25% more land. 
It might be expected therefore that they would require 
proportionately more money to purchase agricultural 
inputs. However, in chapter five it was demonstrated that 
the limits of investment did not relate so much to the 
amount per rai (ie; the intensity of investment) but to 
the absolute quantity of investment. This was partly 
because of the risks associated with the greater outlays, 
and also because many of the larger landowners were able 
to meet their subsistence requirements without having to 
intensify their production. This meant that they could 
escape from the dilemma of needing to increase their 
yields in a marginal environment where the risks are great 
and the opportunities of investment within agriculture, 
few.
Another seven households, 19% of those who borrowed 
no money, said that they did not wish to because they were 
afraid of being in debt. These farmers, as well as many 
of the others, gave the impression of being conservative 
financially; they realised that repayment might be 
difficult and were not willing to enter into an agreement 
which they felt they might not be able to fulfil . In 
fact, throughout the two villages the debt burden appeared
to be fairly well balanced. Farmers did not borrow beyond
their means and although there were some very poor
families there were none who could be regarded as
insolvent or bankrupt. This probably relates to both the 
careful control of credit by the BAAC [1] and also to the 
nature of the Northeasterner who is careful and
conservative, never wishing to over-extend himself past 
the limits of his resources (this mirrors, and is possibly 
a result of, the farming of the region which, due to the 
environment, must minimise the risks of crop failure
through flexibility).
When the farmers of Noon Tae and Tha Song Korn 
borrowed money they used it for a variety of purposes 
(table 7.13). The majority, 23 households or 57.5%, used 
it to either purchase inputs, land, livestock - in other 
words they invested it productively within agriculture. 
But, there were also 14 families who used their loans 
unproductively - for consumptive purposes; and a small 
number who used them productively but outside the strict 
confines of agriculture.
[1] The BAAC has a good reputation of credit supervision 
and, "as a registered bank controlled by an Act of 
Parliament, it is required to operate commercially and 
cover its running costs from interest payments" (BAAC,Dec 
1982,p 12).
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Table 7.13
The Uses to which Credit was put
Number of 
Households %
Non-Productive
To buy Inputs
To buy Land
To buy Livestock
To set-up a Trade
To buy unharvetsed cassava
To finance Migrant Labouring
14
16
3
4 
1 
1 
1
35.0%
40.0%
7.5%
10.0%
2.5%
2.5%
2.5%
Total 40
In theory, all the loans issued by the BAAC, the 
cooperative or the Farmers Association must be used for 
purposes relating directly to agriculture. However, in 
response to the questionnaire 13 of the 33 farmers who 
obtained institutional credit said that they used it in 
other ways. Eleven of these said that they spent the
money non-productively, to buy clothes, food and other
essentials; one to set up a trade selling clothes within 
the village; and another farmer to buy "green" cassava to 
harvest and sell [1]. That such a large proportion of 
those with loans from formal sources should claim to use 
them non-productively is worrying, as it indicates that 
much of the money extended by the BAAC, obtensibly to be 
invested within agriculture, is being diverted to other 
uses where it does nothing to stimulate greater production 
or to intensify cultivation. This is peculiar as the BAAC 
(9 of the 13 were BAAC client farmers) closely supervises
its loans. It maybe that Noon Tae and Tha Song Korn are
[1] The last two farmers could conceivably have obtained 
their loans for the purposes for which they used them.
exceptions where the banks control is weak; or it is 
possible that the responses from the farmers are
misleading. Whatever the situation this is certainly an 
area where deeper study would be useful.
Strangely, if all the 14 farmers who used their
credit for consumptive purposes are compared with those 
who used it productively there is little to separate them. 
Their household sizes, total land and riceland holdings
and income are all comparable, and because of this it is 
hard to make any statement about why 18% of the
agricultural households interviewed should need to borrow 
money and then use it non-productively. It may be that 
looking at credit use in this way is not wholly 
satisfactory. For usually farms are not run as businesses 
but as part of a system covering every aspect of 
production and consumption, and because of this, 
"household and farm expenditure [is] an inextricable 
knot..." (FAO,1965; quoted in Direk Patmasiriwat,Oct 1981, 
p 4). If that is so then the money borrowed may be used 
productively, but in an indirect manner. In other words, 
the loan could replace money (and be used for consumption) 
which has already been diverted to production expenditure. 
The only way to discover if cash is flowing in this manner 
is to compare the productive outlays each family made with 
the size of the loans they secured.
The eleven households who obtained credit from 
institutional sources but claimed to use it 
non-productively, borrowed an average of 7,545 baht. 
Their outlays on fertilisers and the hire of labour in
1982/83 (the two inputs which account for the great 
majority of farm investment) amounted to 3,213 baht, or 
43% of the worth of the loan (table 7.14). However, there 
is a complication, for the loans were spread over an 
average 2.2 year period so that the value of the loans 
'per year' (assuming an equal division of expenditure) was 
3,429 baht (table 7.14). This means that the farmers were 
investing approximately the same amount of money in their 
farms each year as they were borrowing from the bank or 
cooperative. Further, if the agricultural investments 
made by all the other farmers who obtained loans from 
institutional creditors, but said that they used them 
productively, are calculated the picture changes little; 
for their average agricultural investment of 4,234 baht is 
closely matched by the size 'per year' of their loans at 
4,095 baht. All this gives credence to the assertion that
Table 7.14
Comparison of Agricultural Investment and
Institutional Credit [*]
Annual Agric'l Loan % Length Loan/ 
Investment Size of Loan 'year'
Farmers who claimed
to use their loans 4,235 8,190 52% 2.0 yrs 4,095
productively
Farmers who said thay
used their loans 3,213 7,545 43% 2.2 yrs 3,429
unproductively
[*]: Average, per household.
All income in baht.
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farmers in Noon Tae and Tha Song Korn treat both 
productive and non-productive expenditure as part of a 
unit, and that any money borrowed merely enters the system 
to be used, for whatever purpose, as it is required. It 
also means that looking at the direct uses to which credit 
is put is unsatisfactory when farming "is not a business 
but a way of life" (FAO,1965; quoted in Direk 
Patmasiriwat,Oct 1981,p 4).
Finally, there is the question of informal loan 
sources. These are important to investigate as they 
represent the alternative to government initiated lending 
and show that there does exist a section of the population 
who, either because they are unwilling or unable to go to 
institutional sources, visit informal outlets.
The proportion of institutional to non-institutional 
lending has been a source of considerable discussion. In 
1981 Direk Patmasiriwat reviewed a number of past reports 
and found that they indicated that formal credit as a 
percentage of total agricultural credit had increased from 
5% in 1962/3 to 57% in 1975/6 (Direk Patmasiriwat,Oct 
1981, p 13). A survey conducted in the provinces of Khon 
Kaen and Roiet (both in the Northeastern Region) in 1980 
found this trend continuing with 68% of loans, by value, 
coming from formal sources (Yongyuth Chalamwo.ng & 
Meyer,Nov 1980,table 7,p 18).
In Noon Tae and Tha Song Korn among the agricultural 
families questioned six borrowed money informally; five of 
these went to friends or relations, and one to a middleman
(table 7.15). The value of the loans amounted to 48,200 
baht, 15% of the total, and the average interest rate was 
52% per year (table 8.14). This average hides a great 
deal of variation however: two of the loans (given by
relatives) had zero interest and appeared to be 
charitable, being based on no notion of financial gain on 
the part of the creditor. While in contrast, the other
four, one from a relative, two from "friends" and one from
a middleman, had rates of interest averaging 78% per year;
rates that could be viewed as usurious.
Table 7.15
Loans from Informal Creditors (Baht)
Source Amount In terest[ *] Use Income
1/Relative 2,000 0% Non-productive 10,000
2/Relative 200 0% Non-productive 6,000
3/Relative 4,000 60% Non-productive 6,000
4/Friend 2,000 120% Productive 3,000
5/Friend 10,000 60% Non-productive 10,000
6/Middleman 30,000 72% To finance mig­
rant labouring
93,000
Total 48,200
[*] Interest is percent per year.
The first point that needs to be looked into 
regarding informal credit is, why didn't these farmers go 
to the BAAC? As far as the farmers being charged zero 
interest are concerned the question does not apply as it 
was obviously worth their while borrowing money 
informally. For the remaining four it was a different 
story. All of them would have gone to the BAAC if they 
had been able to but, for various reasons, they felt they 
could not meet the bank's lending requirements:
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Mrs Keng Nuangwongchaa (case number 3 in table 7.15) 
borrowed 4/000 baht at an interest rate of 60% per year to 
pay for her son's schooling. She didn't go to the BAAC, 
even though she had had a savings account there for eleven 
years/ because at the time she did not realise she was 
eligible for a loan. By the time of the interview she had 
realised her mistake and was intending to obtain credit 
from the bank and pay off the debt to her relative 
(presumably she would have to claim the money was for 
agricultural purposes).
Mrs Ow Matannaa (case number 6 in table 7.15) 
borrowed 30/000 baht from a middleman who lived in Baan 
Noon Tae. The interest rate on the loan was 6% per month 
to be paid monthly (72%/year)/ and the money was used to 
finance her husband's trip to Saudi Arabia as a migrant 
labourer [1]. This household owned no land whatsoever 
(the Mae Baan was lent 5 rai of riceland by her father) 
and was therefore unable to gain access to any 
institutional loans.
The remaining two farmers/ Mr Naa Narinyaa and Mr Gaw 
Jammaamurii (cases 4 and 5 in table 7.15) also had 
insufficient collateral to get a loan from the BAAC. 
They, like five of the six families in the table (the 
exception being Mrs Ow Matannaa), were relatively poor 
with an income of 10,000 baht per year or less. It is 
this income which is the limiting factor. For, the BAAC's
[1] Agencies in Bangkok and elsewhere in Thailand organise 
employment in various middle-eastern countries. They 
charter flights, do all the preparatory work and in 
exchange are paid a fee.
regulations insist that unless a farmer can guarantee a 
loan individually he must join an "infamal joint liability 
group". This might appear to mean that loans are thereby 
made accessible to all farmers. However, in practice the 
members of joint liability groups, understandably, only 
accept fairly credit-worthy people as fellow-members. 
This means that a man with a limited income would find it 
hard to join.
Closely linked to this must be the level of interest 
rates charged by the informal creditors. They may appear 
to be excessively high and certainly the government of
Thailand regularly decries such "exploitation". However, 
it should be remembered that the middleman, relative or
"friend" is taking on a credit risk which no financial 
institution is willing to take (this applies to cases 4,5, 
and 6), and it is not therefore particularly surprising 
that the potential profits, as well as the risks of
default, are great.
Conclusion
Credit use was widespread among the households of
Noon Tae and Tha Song Korn. The majority was negotiated 
through formal sources (primarily as BAAC client farmers) 
and on the whole the input on the part of the government 
was satisfactory. Indeed, only 19% of the agricultural 
households had any clear reason to be dissatisfied with 
their position vis a vis the provision of credit. 
However, there are two points worth re-stating:
B r*
Firstly, there were a surprising number of farmers who
used the money they borrowed unproductively. This seemed
to relate to two factors. One was the increasing pressure
on farmers to make cash outlays on non-agricultural goods
and services such as consumer durables, soap, cigarettes,
books, schooling, and med.icines. And the other was the
problem inherent in attempting to invest in agriculture
when the environment makes that investment risky.
Secondly, it has been shown that income was an
important determinant in preventing farmers from taking
out loans and also in deciding the size of those loans and
from which source they came. The households who were
forced to go to non-institutiona1 creditors to meet their
needs, as well as the nine families who were unable or
unwilling to borrow money, demonstrate that despite the
laudable efforts of the BAAC to meet rural credit
requirements there is still a section of farmers at the
bottom end of the income scale who remain unfulfilled.
This portion of the population would probably benefit from
being treated as a special group (possibly loss-making)
for which the BAAC could relax its strictly commercial
profit orientated methods. As the FAO noted in a document
issued in 1965:
"In the initial stages of agricultural 
development, credit to farmers must have a 
predominantly consumptive character....It is 
only at the later stages of agricultural 
development that the productive element in
agricultural credit gradually increase. As long 
as agriculture is not a business but a way of
life, cost-price is a sheer fiction, and
household and farm expenditure an inextricable 
knot..." (FAO,1965; quoted in Direk
Patmasiriwat,Oct 1981,p 4).
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SECTION II 
Alternative Strategies
The previous three chapters have shown that in Noon 
Tae and Tha Song Korn farmers have, for a number of 
reasons, been reluctant to invest much money in 
intensifying agricultural production and have failed to 
adopt many of the recommendations presented by the 
government. At the same time, the inhabitants of the 
villages clearly exhibited a desire to have a greater 
dispos able income while also needing to feed a growing 
population from an area of farmland that could expand no 
further. Given that the cultivation of crops is unlikely 
to meet these objectives, what alternative strategies, if 
any, exist?
Many of the households of the two villages earned a 
significant proportion of their income from sources 
outside cropping. These can be divided into four 
categories: secondary agricultural income; on-farm
non-agricultural income; off-farm income 1
(intra-changwat); and off-farm income 2 {extra-changwat). 
Employment opportunities of these types are clearly one 
way in which farmers can off-set the shortfall between 
their needs and desires and the production potential of 
their land [1]. Indeed, such off-farm income has been an 
important aspect of the Northeastern region's economy for 
many years.
[1] The 'production potential' of the land is not a fixed 
and static quantity, but reflects the manner in which it 
is cultivated.
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Another element of such alternative strategies, but 
which is very much the government's concern, is the 
provision of development policies and programmes that aim 
to encourage aspects of the farm economy outside cropping. 
The Community Based Integrated Rural Development Project 
(C BIRD) initiated in Baan Noon Tae is just such a 
programme.
The following two chapters will investigate these two 
avenues as their importance follows-on from the 
conclusions of the first section of the thesis: that the
opportunities for increasing agricultural production are 
few. The first looks at the alternative sources of income 
which farmers are exploiting, and the second at CBIRD.
Chapter Eight 
Alternative Sources of Income
Introduction
The market economy of Thailand, for so long 
concentrated in Bangkok and the Central Plain, probably 
began to extensively influence Amphoe Muang Mahasarakham 
in the 1950's when cash crops were first cultivated and 
sold [1]. Today Baan Noon Tae and Baan Tha Song Korn are 
fully integrated into the system and most of the 
traditional forms of exchange (barter, long khaek etc) are 
mere outliers within the society. The implications of 
this on farming communities which have been based on the 
priorities of subsistence are manifold. The inhabitants 
of the villages are forced to make outlays on services and 
inputs such as electricity, schooling, medicines and 
fertilisers which previously never existed, and they are 
faced with a wealth of consumer products which can only be 
acquired with cash. In the light of this it is not 
surprising that when asked if they would like to rent any 
additional land, of those who gave an affirmative reply, 
78% said, "yes - upland"; so that they could augment their 
income (Appendix 8.1); and undoubtedly, rising 
expectations and ubiquitous advertising are placing great 
pressure on farmers to have the means to be able to afford
[1] There was a railhead at Baan Phai, some 70 kilomteres 
from Mahasarakham town, from the 1930's and this must have 
had some influence on the area. For instance, it is 
likely that some farmers would have been encouraged to 
rear livestock and to cultivate extra land for the Bangkok 
market. Even so, it is still pertinent to see the zone as 
largely untouched by wider economic forces, at least until 
after the Second World War.
these goods and sevices. Chapters 5 & 6 showed that there 
are few opportunities for extensive increases in 
agricultural production and that the nature of the 
environment inhibits any high input/output forms of 
cultivation. Farmers are therefore forced to meet their 
needs for cash in some other way.
Of the villages' average household income of 21,000 
baht [1], some 7,400 baht or 35% of the total was 
non-agricultural. This may seem to be an indication that 
agriculture was less important in the lives of the 
villagers that the previous chapters have implied. This 
was most certainly not the case. The population viewed 
themselves as farmers, and every other activity was 
treated as subsidiary to farming. Rice cultivation met 
the full subsistence requirements [2] of 60% of the 
agricultural households, and when other nutritional 
requirements are added onto this (fish, chickens, pigs, 
ducks, vegetables etc) it becomes clear that the invisible 
value of farm products makes agriculture the core of each 
family's livelihood. This is evident just from the value
[1] Two estimates of income were obtained; one based on 
the farmers' own approximation (income 1) and the other 
built-up through the questionnaire (income 2). They were 
comparable, varying overall by only 8.8%. The second 
figure will be used in this chapter (unless specified) as 
it can be broken down into its constituent parts. In 
chapters 5 & 6 income 2 was quoted as-being 22,200 baht. 
In this chapter, one of the households interviewed has 
been omitted from all the calculations giving a sample of 
77, and an average annual income of 20,990 baht.
[2] This was based on the average per capita paddy 
consumption in Thailand between the years 1967 and 1977, 
as calculated by the World Bank (IBRD,Sept 1978,table 73,p 
197).
of the rice that was grown: the average agricultural
household grew 2,840 kilograms of paddy and had a 
subsistence requirement of 1,491 kilograms [1]. If this 
rice (1,491 kg) had to be bought at market it would mean 
an outlay of something approaching 8,800 baht, or 42% of 
the average income [2]. This said, it was also clear that 
the actual cash income of the villages had diversified 
into a number of non-agricultural areas. These have to be 
analysed if the village, as an economic system, is to be 
understood. For the farmers rarely divided their lives 
into neat packages as academics (and others) are wont to 
do, and for this reason the village unit, as a totality, 
must be examined.
The income of the population of Noon Tae and Tha Song 
Korn can be broken down into five groups, depending on its 
source:
1/ Primary Agricultural Income (rice and upland crops).
2/ Secondary Agricultural Income (livestock & 
vege tables).
3/ On-Farm Non-Agricultural Income.
4/ Off-Farm Income: Intra-Changwat.
5/ Off-Farm Income: Extra-Changwat.
[1] Although, in total, ample rice was grown to feed the 
households who were interviewed, if the excess that 
families produced is assumed to have been sold then the 
average crop would have amounted to 1,115 kilograms, or 
nearly 75% of subsistence requirements. The value of 
this, if it were to be bought at market, would be about 
6,600 baht.
[2] The average wholesale price in 1982 for 100% 
non-glutinous rice was 5.938 baht per kilogram (Bangkok 
Bank Monthly Review,July 1983,p 331). Glutinous rice has 
a slightly lower market value but this is off-set by the 
inability of individual farmers to obtain wholesale 
prices.
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Table 8.1 shows the breakdown of income among the 77 
agricultural households covered by the sample survey. It 
demonstrates that income derived from agriculture accounts 
for 35% of the total and that of this only 25% came from 
the sale of crops. The cultivation and marketing of rice 
and upland crops has already been dealt with in some 
detail in chapters 5 and 6. However, the role of 
livestock in income generation has not been discussed.
Table 8.1
Annual Income of Agricultural Households in Noon Tae 
and Tha Song Korn; by source (baht)
Amount
(baht) %
Famil
Invol
Total Income 20,990 77
Agricult'l Income 7,395 35%
Rice Income 1,150 5% 13
Upland Crop Income 4,120 20% 41
Secondary Agric'l Income 2 ,125 10% 21
On-farm Non-Agric11 Income 3,450 16% 53
Off-farm Income:Intra-Changwat 4,590 22% 18
Off-farm Income;Extra-Changwat 5,550 26% 15
Secondary Agricultural Income
Income lying outside that derived from rice and 
upland crops averaged 2,100 baht per household or 10% of 
total income (table 8.1). The money came from the raising 
and marketing of livestock which included, in order of 
importance; pigs, buffalo & cattle and chickens & ducks; 
and, to a small degree, from the sale of vegetables (table 
8.2). However of these only one, pigs, can be viewed as
an important element of income generation among a broad 
section of the population. For cattle and buffalo were 
only sold by eight farmers/ of whom two can be discounted 
as they needed to buy replacement animals prior to the 
onset of the next season (see chapter 5); and although ten 
farmers marketed chickens or ducks it was on a limited 
scale with an average return of only 600 baht per 
household. In contrast, 13 farmers sold pigs in 1982/83 
(18 were raising them for sale in the future), giving an 
average return of 7,500 baht.
Table 8.2
Secondary Agricultural Income; Livestock
Households Households Re turn:1 Re turi
raising marke ting (baht) (bah
Buffalo/cattle 70 8 6,560 680
Pigs 18 13 7,510 1,300
Horses 3 - - -
Fowl 55 10 600 80
Geese 4 - - -
Vege tables 77 3 1,650 65
Total — _ _ 2,125
Returnrl - Only accounting for those households who 
marketed the particular livestock.
Return:2 - Taking into account all 77 agricultural 
households.
Of these 13 farmers, three were members of the CBIRD 
"Pig Group" and the remainder independant of any grouping. 
However, although none of the farmers belonged to it, 
there was also a government organised pig cooperative or 
sahakon muu, to which farmers could become affiliated.
This was administered at the district level (its office 
was in Mahasarakham) and at the end of 1982 had a total 
membership of 1,040 organised into 10 klum, representing 
5% of the agricultural households of the Amphoe. In Noon 
Tae and Tha Song Korn membership was even more limited 
with only two members in each village, accounting for 
little more than 1% of the farming households. Up to 1982 
the cooperative provided two services to its members; it 
sold pig feed and purchased the animals. However, in that 
year the first of these services was discontinued so that 
in the season under study, 1982/83, farmers could only use 
the sahakon muu as a marketing organisation [1].
Except for those who belonged to the CBIRD group, 
farmers raised pigs in a rudimentary and unsystematic 
fashion: pens were of various shapes and sizes;
commercial pig feed did not appear to be used; and 
inoculation against disease was rare. The marketing of 
the animals in these ten cases was through middlemen who 
came to the village, weighed and checked them for 
malformations [2], and paid for them with cash. Why 
farmers should sell their animals through private 
middlemen rather than the pig cooperative related, once 
again, to the perceived shortcomings of the government 
body. Farmers complained that they could not sell their
[1] In the 1981/2 crop year the Amphoe office of the 
sahakon muu had bought 4,588 pigs or 4.4 per member. The 
price paid ranged between 18 and 21 baht per kilogram live 
weight, and the pigs weighed an average of 140 kilograms. 
Therefore the price paid for the "average" animal 
fluctuated through the year between 2,520 and 2,940 baht.
[2] Middlemen take off some of a pig's value if they find, 
for example, it has broken and thus deformed a leg.
pigs when they liked/ and had to wait until it was "their 
turn". For this reason they turned to the middlemen who, 
despite the fact they paid a lower rate per kilogram live 
weight/ gave the farmers greater autonomy over when they 
sold their animals.
Finally/ there is the CBIRD pig group. Three of its 
members sold pigs to the group in 1982/83/ and a further 
four were expecting to in the following year. The 
grouping will be discussed in detail and in association 
with all the other aspects of the project in the next 
chapter. Suffice it to say that the three farmers were 
more than satisfied with their dealings with the body.
Given that the income derived from the sale of pigs 
constituted 7/510 baht per household or almost 30% of the 
total income of the 13 households involved (25/820 baht)
Table 8.3
Characteristics of those Households who Raised Pigs
Those who Sample
raised pigs Average
Household Size 6.1 members 6.2
Productive Household Size [*] 3.7 members 3.3
Total Land 22.5 rai 20.8
Riceland 17.7 rai 16.8
Total Income 23,410 baht 20,990
Sample Size 18 77
[*] All through the thesis/ and this chapter in 
particular/ 'productive’ members of a household are 
defined as those men or women who are no longer in school 
and who are fully active within agriculture. In other 
words/ they cannot have alternative work to farming and 
cannot be physically debilitated or excessively old; they 
are thus agriculturally fully productive.
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it is useful to see if those farmers who raised (or were 
raising) pigs have any distinguishing characteristics 
which mark them out from the rest of the sample. Table 
8.3 shows that as a group they correspond closely to the 
sample mean in terms of size of household and landholding/ 
and in terms of income. In other words they do not form/ 
as far as one can see, a distinctive body within the 
villages.
On-Farm Non-Agricultural Income
Table 8.4 shows the various sources of what might be 
rather loos&y termed "on-farm non-agricultural income". 
Included in this grouping is income derived from such 
agriculturally associated activities as fishing, 
agricultural labouring, the marketing of (bought) cassava 
and the renting out of land. It is clear that although 
there is a wide variety of sources only one - crafts - is 
significant among a large section of the population. 
However, in spite of this it is worth mentioning the 
others before turning to crafts as they hint at the 
potential for further broadening the economic base of the 
two villages.
Four households in the sample bought, harvested and 
marketed cassava giving them an average return of 14,750 
baht (table 8.4). In chapter 6 it was explained that they 
conducted their marketing enterprises on a small scale and 
regarded the activity as subsidiary to that of farming. 
The families all had an effectively high man/land ratio in
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the 1982/3 season (double the sample average) [1] giving 
them the excess manpower to meet the labour demands of 
harvesting; and in fact selling man sampalang green was 
really a means by which households in labour surplus or 
labour deficit could interact to create a more equitable 
distribution of labour supply and demand.
Table 8.4
On-Farm Non-Agricultural Income
Households Re turn:1 Re turn:2
Involved (baht) (baht)
Grafts 49 3,250 2,070
Agric’l labouring 3 3,200 125
Marketing cassava 4 14,750 770
Marketing other goods 2 6,500 170
Renting-out land 4 ? ?
Hiring-out transport 1 10,000 130
Running shop/business 2 4,850 125
Fishing 2 2,300 60
Returnrl - Only accounting for those households who were 
involved in the activity.
Return:2 - Taking into account all 77 agricultural 
households.
Only three farmers claimed to have earned money from 
agricultural labouring (table 8.4). This is strange as 
almost one half of the agricultural households interviewed 
said that they had hired labour. How can this anomaly be
[1] The "effectively high man/land ratio" takes into 
account the land that was uncultivated in 1982/3.
explained? It is possible that farmers continued to view 
labouring and the hire of labour as a form of exchange in 
which cash outflows and inflows balanced out. In other 
words, the process was still seen as being in the mould of 
long khaek in which, overall, there is no return; even
though there is an exchange of cash after each days work. 
The three households who did say that they were involved 
in agricultural labouring had a total average income of 
5,330 baht (25% of the sample mean). They owned, on 
average, only 12.3 rai of land (59% of the sample mean)
and had a productive household of five members (51%
greater than the sample mean); ie - they were in labour 
surplus (relatively). In view of this, agricultural
labouring was clearly one of the few ways in which the
families could boost their incomes.
Four farmers rented out land to other villagers (all 
four were relatives). In three of the cases the return is 
rather difficult to calculate as two demanded a proportion 
of the production as rent - share cropping - (one,
one-half and the second, two-thirds), and the third lent 
ten rai of thii dorn as the interest payment on a loan. 
The fourth farmer charged 200 baht per rai for each of 
five rai of upland.
Fishing was an activity followed by many of the
farmers and fish represented an extremely important 
protein supplement to the diet of the villagers. Only 
two, though, actually caught and sold fish. Both of them
used traps and it gave them an average return of 2,300 
baht. The population viewed fishing as "sanuk" -
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something that was done after the real agricultural work 
had been completed. Indeed/ often farmers would return 
from an afternoons enjoyment with very little to show for 
their endeavours/ and the fact that this was so appeared 
to matter not a bit.
One of the agricultural families owned a truck which 
was hired out to other villagers for the transportation of 
produce to Mahasarakham and Kosum Phisai. From this they 
estimated their annual return was 10,000 baht. 
In addition to these associated agricultural activities 
one farmer ran a general store in Baan Noon Tae selling 
such things as washing powder, cigarettes, soft drinks and 
kanom from which he earned 2,500 baht per year. A second 
lady had set up a tailoring shop making clothes to be sold 
locally from which she made 7,200 baht. And a third 
farmer "had a trade" selling articles like blankets and 
linoleum sheets giving him a return of about 10,000 baht.
However, all these sources of income are greatly 
exceeded in importance by that from the production of reed 
mats and, to a lesser degree, from the weaving of silk and 
cotton cloth. Forty-nine farmers, or 64% of agricultural 
households, had an income from these crafts of whom 45 
made and sold mats; one, cloth; and three, both. The 
average return amounted to 3,250 baht per household. It 
is important to realise that although only four families 
sold cloth, production for home use was widespread and 
most houses had both a loom and a mat-making frame located 
underneath them where the inhabitants could work while 
keeping out of the sun. Women and adolescents made the
mats and cloth, working primarily during the dry season 
when agricultural labour demands were minimal. The mats 
were generally produced from locally available reeds which 
were dried, dyed and then woven into a warp of twine [1]. 
The finished product was sold to middlemen who visited the 
villages several times each year and who, according to an 
officer at the Communtiy Development Department, exploited 
the farmers by taking an excessively large profit margin.
Thread for weaving cotton and synthetic cloth was 
not, apparently, produced within the villages. Farmers
would go to Mahasarakham and buy ready-dyed thread
(usually made in Japan) which they would then weave and 
sell, like the mats, to middlemen. Silk however, was
still made in Noon Tae and Tha Song Korn, albeit on a
minor scale: a number of families kept silk worms from
which they would spin thread and consequently make cloth. 
The worms were kept in a rudimentary fashion (they 
appeared to be multivoltine [2]) and production was always 
low - hardly constituting a business. A small group of
[1] Mats were made from two types of reed - "flat" and 
"round". The former, from which most were produced, was 
available locally. The second was much scarcer but made a 
better quality and more expensive product. Occasionally 
villagers would go out of their way to obtain this 
superior reed: for example; one day in February a group 
from Noon Tae got together, hired a lorry and travelled to 
the neighbouring amphoe of Borabu to collect them.
[2] The Thai sericultue industry is based on the poly- or 
multi-voltine silk worm. This indigenous breed is 
resistant to disease and is easy to rear. Attempts to 
introduce the higher-yielding bi-voltine worm have been 
unsuccessful in the rural areas of Thailand because it is 
highly su^eptible to disease (especially pebrine) and 
small-scale producers such as those of Noon Tae and Tha 
Song Korn cannot reproduce the conditions necessary for 
its upkeep (Business Review,Feb 1973,pp 25-29).
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women in Baan Noon Tae had formed an informal silk 
cooperative. They pooled the money they obtained from 
selling the cloth/ using it as an "emergency fund" to 
resort to when income from other sources failed to meet 
their requirements. A far more sophisticated and better 
organised group had been established by CBIRD in 1981 and 
which had a membership of 10 by March 1982. Like the pig 
group, it will be discussed in detail in chapter nine.
A question that should be investigated, as it was 
regarding the raising of pigs, is whether there are any 
characteristics of the households who obtained income from 
crafts which identify them as a distinctive group within 
the sample. Table 8.5 shows that they owned less land 
(both riceland and upland) and had a smaller income. Why 
should this be so? It could be that given that their 
household size was comparable to the sample average while 
their land holdings were smaller, they were in labour 
surplus. This would have allowed them the time to 
increase their production of mats and cloth, boosting an 
income which without that derived from crafts averaged 
only 13,380 baht, 46% of the income earned by the other 
agricultural families interviewed. This can only be a 
tentative stab at a reason, for when craft income is 
correlated with the size of landholdings and with income 
the relationship is shown, at best, to be weak.
Table 8.5
Characteristics of those Households with an Income from
Craft Production
Those with Those without Sample
Craft Income Craft Income Average
Size of Household
Size of Productive
Household
Total Land
Riceland
Total Income
Agricultural Income
16,630
4,900
3.5
18.1
14.9
6.3
31,210
10,600
2.9
25.3
20.1
6.0
20,990
7,400
3.3
20.8
16.8
6.2
Sample Size 49 28 77
Off-Farm Income: Intra-Changwat
The average on-farm income of the 77 agricultural 
households interviewed amounted to 10,750 baht. This is 
only 51% of their total income of 20,990 baht and it shows 
how crucial off-farm sources are to the inhabitants of 
Noon Tae and Tha Song Korn. The souces can be divided 
into two groups; intra-changwat and extra-changwat. The 
usefulness of this division is that it distinguishes 
between those inhabitants who return home to their 
villages each day ("intra-changwat"), and those who, at 
best, only return during the peak periods of rice 
cultivation ("extra-changwat").
Table 8.6 gives the details of the 18 agricultural 
households who had off-farm intra-changwat income. 
Although the table is to an extent self explanatory, it is 
still worth expanding a little on the various sources:
Four "farmers" [1] had labouring jobs at the upland 
crop station. This was located approximately one
kilometre west of Noon Tae and Tha Song Korn just off the 
Khon Kaen to Mahasarakham road. All four were the heads 
of their households and of them, three worked there 
throughout the year, while the fourth only laboured during 
the dry season. Their mean income was 19,750 baht. 
Another man, Mr Phonmaa Narinyaa, worked at a government 
funded pump irrigation centre located near Baan Doon Dor, 
two kilometres to the east of the two study villages. He 
was an unskilled labourer and worked throughout the year 
for an income of 21,600 baht. Five "farmers" had
full-time employent in Mahasarakham. Three worked at the 
government road building and repair centre; a fourth was a 
labourer (unspecified); while the fifth was a cleaner in a 
government office. Their average income was 22,080 baht. 
In addition to these men, another five had off-season work 
in Mahasarakham or in its vacinity. Mr Phiithik, Mr
Samay, Mr Suwan and Mr Yut all worked as carpenters on
house construction projects earning 6,000, 10,000, 5,000
and 3,000 baht per year respectively; while Mr Kaw 
Jammaamurii was employed in a cement factory for which he 
received approximately 9,000 baht. Once again, all three 
returned to their homes each evening. Finally, there were
[1] All these households owned land in addition to earning 
an income outside agriculture. The extent to which 
farming dominated their lives and the proportion of their 
income which originated off-farm varied considerably 
(table 8.6). However, they still regarded themselves as 
farmers, and it is still pertinent to talk of the families 
as being farming families.
Table 8.6
Off-Farm Income: Intra-Changwat
ousehold
number
Individual
working
Type of 
work
Income
(baht)C*]
Duration
1/CM] head carpenter 10,000
(33%)
of f-season
2/ son running a rice 
mill
30,000
(38%)
all year
3/ head labourer:pump 
irrigat!n stn
21,600
(98%)
all year
4/ head labourer:upland 
crop station
27,600
(77%)
all year
5/[M] son-in-law labourer:gov't 
road centre
18,000
(42%)
all year
6/[M] head carpenter 6,000
(36%)
off-season
7/ head Teacher 74,100 
(100%)
all-year
8/[M] head labourer:gov11 
road centre
36,000
(7$%)
all-year
9/ head labourer:upland 
crop station
20,400 
(100% )
all-year
10/CM] daughter nanny:Mahasara'm 4,800
(87%)
all-year
11/ head labourer:upland 
crop station
13,600
(69%)
off-season
12/ head labourer:upland 
crop station
17,400
(85%)
all-year
13/CM] head labourer:cement 
factory
9,600
(83%)
of f-season
14/Cm ] head labourer 14,400 
(100%)
all-year
15/Cm ] son-in-law labourer:gov11 
road centre
18,000
(64%)
all-year
16/Cm ] head cleaner:gov11 
office
24,000 
(100% )
all year
17/ head carpenter:house 
construction
5,000
(55%)
off-season
18/Cm ] head carpenter 3,000
(60%)
off-season
AVERAGE 19,640 
(69% )
[*] In brackets: off-farm intra-changwat income as a
percentage of total income.
(Ml Employment directly connected to the town of 
Manasarakham.
three households with sources of off-farm income as 
follows; one owned a small rice mill in another village, 
Baan Thin Laat, which the eldest son operated and from 
which the family obtained an annual income of about 30,000 
baht. Another had a daughter of fifteen years old who was 
working as a nanny in Mahasarakham. She returned to Baan 
Tha Song Korn each month (nb; she was the only person in 
table 9.5 not to return home every day) bringing with her 
approximately 4,800 baht per year. While the head of the 
third household, Mr Thong Phuun, was a teacher at the 
primary school located at the entrance to Baan Noon Tae. 
His income amounted to 74,100 baht per year.
The average return of the 18 households with an 
off-farm (intra-changwat) income amonted to 19,640 baht or 
nearly 70% of their total income. They therefore relied, 
to a considerable extent, on non-agricultural sources of 
cash which came from outside the immediate confines of the 
village. As a group however it is necessary to make some 
distinctions between its members: firstly between those
who only worked during the agricultural off-season and 
those who worked throughout the year; and secondly, 
between those whose income was directly related to the 
influence of the town of Mahasarakham and those whose work 
was independent of its presence (these two distinctions 
are labelled in table 8.6).
The first distinction is important because 
individuals (especially if they are household heads) with 
full-time empoyment off-farm are, to a great degree, 
agriculturally unproductive. The second is also crucial,
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because it is important to recognise that Mahasarakham has 
an influence on the lives of the inhabitants of Noon Tae 
and Tha Song Korn and that this could make the two 
villages atypical.
In all, ten farmers had jobs which were in some way 
connected to the town of Mahasarakham. To remove these 
families from any assessment would, it is believed, be 
misguided as the village is naturally enough a product of 
its location and to select those agricultural households 
who fit a particular perception of what such a farming 
community should be like, would be false. It is also 
important to realise that in the Northeastern Region, with 
the development of communications, the expansion of the 
market economy and the creation of a pervasive government 
administration, off-farm jobs are no longer a rarity and 
it wojld not be unusual to find some farmers in most 
villages having such employment as road repairing and 
house building. Even so, it is not denied that the two 
study villages must have been (and are being) influenced 
by the fact that they are positioned 10 kilometres from a 
provincial capital just to the north and to the south of a 
main road.
Table 8.7 shows that the 18 farmers with an off-farm 
income owned 32% less land than the sample average. When 
those households whose head was in full-time off-farm 
employment are analysed the average landholding drops to 
nearly one half of the mean. This relationship between 
land holdings and off-farm income is very tentatively 
supported when the two are correlated to reveal a negative
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coefficient significant to 86% in the first instance and 
84% in the second (it should be remembered that the small
number of cases with intra-changwat income - 18 & 8 -
means that a high degree of significance would be
unlikely). As it is improbable that the families would
have sold land just because the household head had managed 
to procure a job outside agriculture [1]/ one must
presume that they had obtained off-farm employment because 
their small landholdings and neglible agricultural income
Table 8.7
Characteristics of those Households with an 
Off-Farm Intra-Changwat Income
Households with Households with Sample 
Off-Farm Income Off-Farm Income Mean
Cl] [2]
Size of Household 6.0 6.0 6.2
Size of Productive
Household [3] 2.5 2.4 3.3
Total Land 14.1 10.5 20.8
Riceland 12.0 8.9 16.8
Total Income 28,270 32,370 20,990
Agricultural Income 4,260 1,190 7,400
Subsistence Produced 1,003 kg 771 1,504
Subsistence Required 1,478 kg 1,478 1,130
% Subsistence Deficit 32% 48% 25%
Sample Size 18 8 77
[1] Includes all those families with an off-farm
intra-changwat income.
[2] Only Includes those families whose household head is 
in full-time employment off-farm.
[3] As noted earlier, this implies agriculturally
productive household members, and does not include those 
with full-time employment off-farm.
[1] Land was only sold on very rare occasions when 
families were forced,often for economic reasons, to do so.
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(table 8.7) had dictated that they do so. Interestingly, 
when off-farm income is correlated with the area of upland 
(for the 18 households) the strength of the negative 
relationship is greater than that with total land 
holdings, and is significant to 91% (which is still weak). 
This can be understood when one remembers that it is the 
upland on which farmers grow their cash crops. Because of 
this, the quantity of agricultural income which a family 
has the potential to earn is more dependent on the area of 
thii rai than on the area of thii naa; and it is those
farmers with less upland who are more likely to have to 
find off-farm enployment to boost their income. It is 
worth noting that their paddy production met 68% of their 
subsistence requirements, as against an average for the 77 
agricultural households of 75%. They would, therefore, 
have had to buy rice to meet the shortfall [1] and, not 
suprisingly, when off-farm income (intra-changwat) is 
correlated with total income a positive coefficient 
significant to 98% is revealed.
The closure of the frontier in farmland expansion has 
meant that many farms are now too small to ensure a 
minimum subsistence production. This, coupled with the 
increasing need and desire for a cash income, has forced 
many farmers to look beyond the limits of rice and upland
[1] The average shortfall between the quantity of rice 
produced and the subsistence requirement of the 18 
households with an off-farm income (intra-changwat) 
amounted to 475 kg. per family. This, if it had to be 
bought at market would have cost (1982 wholesale price: 
100% unbroken non-glutinous rice) approximately 2,820 
baht.
crop cultivation. Some, as has been shown, have turned to 
raising livestock and the production of crafts; others to 
various forms of local off-farm employment; and more still 
to off-farm opportunities outside the boundaries of the 
province. They (or members of their households) have, in 
other words, become migrant labourers.
Off-Farm Income: Extra-Changwat
15 households received money from (ex-) members of 
their families who had left the changwat to gain 
employment in other parts of the country, or in other 
countries of the world. In addition, there were a far 
greater number who had left the village and entirely 
broken-off contact with their families. The money 
remitted by these individuals amounted to 26% of the total 
income of those 77 farmers who were interviewed, and in 
these terms represented the single largest source within 
Baan Noon Tae and Tha Song Korn (as categorised in table 
8.1). Migrant labouring has been an important element of 
the economy of the Northeastern Region for many years. As 
Klausner notes: "Migration from the northeast has been
going on for quite a few decades...going back even before 
the Bangkok-northeast railway was built [1930], 
northeasterners came to the Central Plain area principally 
for cash work...The Northeastern villager did not intend 
to leave his village for good. He was not a pioneer" 
(Klausner,1972,pp 97-98). The migrant flows to the 
Central Plain have, if anything, grown in recent years 
(Klausner,1972,p 105) and although the level of permanent
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Table 8.8
Off-Farm Income: Extra Changwat
[ousehold Individual Type of 
number working work
Income 
(Baht)[
„ contact with 
*] village
1/ son electrician 7,200
(34%)
returns for 
agric'l season
2/ head labourer:
Iraq
96,000
(93%)
one year 
contract
3/ son lumberjack: 
N . Thailand
40,000 
(80% )
returns for 
holidays
4/ husband ? 
(separated)
6,000
(56%)
does not 
return
5/ head carpenter: 
Saudi Arabia
90,000
(97%)
two year 
contract
6/ head carpenter: 120,000 
Iraq (99%)
one year 
contract
7/ son petrol pump att­
endant : Pat taya
18,000 
(62% )
holidays
8/ son petrol pump att­
endant: Par taya
12,000 
(24% )
holidays
9/ daughter labourer: 
Central Plain
3,600
(24%)
returns for 
agric'l season
10/ cousin housekeeper:
Bangkok
2 ,000 
(20%)
does not 
return
11/ son border police 2,000
(7%)
occasionally
returns
12/ 3 children ? 5,000
(55%)
do not 
return
13/ son fisherman:Songkhla
daughter shop assistant: 
southern region
13.000
10.000 
(35%)
returns 
for harvest 
does not 
re turn
14/ son
son
tailor:
Kanchanaburi
guard:
Northeast
500
400
(15%)
returns for 
agric'l season 
returns for 
festivals
15/ daughter labourer:textiles 
Bangkok
2,000
(20%)
returns for 
festivals
Average 28,510 baht.
£*] In brackets: remitted income as a percentage of total
income.
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rather than circular migration has increased as a 
proportion of the total, the underlying stimulus remains 
the search for additional cash income (see: Lightfoot and 
Puller,1982).
The details of the work which the migrant labourers 
from the 15 households were involved in are shown in table 
8.8. If the table is compared with that for off-farm 
intra-changwat income (table 8.7) one difference is 
immediately obvious: that is that whereas 14 of the 18 (8
all-year) households with employment within the province 
were household heads, only three of the 15 migrant 
labourers were. This means that except in those three 
cases [1] the families were still the traditional farming 
units containing a male household head as the decision 
maker. This is important: the sons, daughters and
cousins who remitted money were not crucial to the 
operation of the farm and their loss was a natural process 
which did not appear to be a response to the limited 
opportunities on their farms [2] (as it seemed to be with 
respect to employment within the province). This view 
is reinforced when a table of their characteristics is 
compiled (table 8.9).
[1] And also in one case where a woman who was estranged 
from her husband was acting as the household head.
[2] Although it did not seem to be a response to limited 
opportunities on individual farms, it may well be a 
product of limited opportunities in the villages and 
indeed, in the area as a whole.
408
Table 8.9
Characteristics of those Households with an
Off-Farm Extra-Changwat Income
Households with 
Extra-Changwat Income
Sample
Mean
Size of Household 
Size of Productive 
Household 
Total Land 
Riceland 
Total Income 
Agricultural Income 
Subsistence Produced 
Subsistence Required 
% Subsistence Deficit
39,600 
6,600 
1,249 kg 
1,5 93 kg 
22%
3.2
20.1
17.1
6.5
20,990 
7,400 
1,139 kg 
1,504 kg 
25%
3.3
20.8
16.8
6.2
Sample Size 15 77
It shows that except in terms of income the 
households conform closely to the sample mean, and do not 
seem to form a distinctive group. Even their total income 
which is 89% greater than the average is deceptive, as 
when the three families with their phor baan working in 
the Middle East are removed from the calculation it drops 
to 23,075 baht, only a little above the mean.
Once again, certain distinctions can be made between 
the 15 cases in the table. Firstly there are those 
households whose family head had left the village; 
secondly, those labourers who had left permanently (or 
rarely return); and lastly, those who return to their 
village to work during the peak agricultural periods 
(either transplanting, harvesting or both). The three 
family-heads who travelled to the Middle East were all 
inhabitants of Baan Noon Tae and went, in two cases, to
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Iraq and in the third, to Saudi Arabia. The length of 
their contract varied between one and two years, and
although there must, inevitably, be a degree of hardship
caused by separation many of the farmers of Noon Tae and 
Tha Song Korn expressed a desire to go abroad (or have a 
member of their family go). This was clearly for 
financial reasons: two years of labouring in the Middle
East would yield a cash return of approximately 204,000 
baht. Assuming costs of 30,000 baht [1] this leaves a 
clear "profit" of over 170,000 baht or the equivalent of 8 
years income for the average agricultural family.
Of the remaining 12 households [2] who had a 
proportion of their income remitted, four returned to 
engage in agricultural work during the peak periods of 
rice cultivation. This leaves the majority, ten, who sent 
money but to all intents and purposes were independent of 
their respective "households" (at least for the 
foreseeable future). Eight of them were sons or 
daughters, one was a cousin, and the tenth a husband who
was separated from his wife and sent money to support his
son.
It is atg uable that there is a play-off, when it 
comes to off-farm empJ^ment, between the additional income 
earned and the loss of an agriculturally productive member
[1] One farmer estimated that agency fees and travel costs 
were about 30,000 baht.
[2] Note: two of the households in table 9.8 had cash 
remitted by two relations.
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of the workforce - resulting/ perhaps, in the need to hire 
additional labour to meet any deficit at peak agricultural 
periods. How pertinent such a play-off is in Noon Tae and 
Tha Song Korn can be seen if the characteristics of the 
eleven households whose family heads had obtained 
full-time off-farm employment (intra- and extra-changwat) 
are analysed [1]- Table 8.10 shows that these eleven 
families had a man/land ratio the same as that for the 
entire sample [2]: 0.16; and hired a similar quantity of 
labour. It appears therefore, that their smaller land 
holding not only meant that they were encouraged to look
Table 8.10
Characteristics of those Households who had Lost an 
Integral Family Member to Off-farm Employment
Households with Sample 
Off-farm Income [*] Mean
Household Size 6.1 members 6.2
Productive Household Size 2.3 members 3.3
Total Land 13.9 rai 20.8
Riceland 11.0 rai 16.8
Man/land Ratio 0.16 0.16
Labour Hired/rai [+] 8.6 man days 8.7
Sample Size 11 77
[*] Includes families who had lost an integral family 
member to off-farm employment.
[+] As was the case earlier in the thesis, the respondant 
who claimed to hire what seemed to be an inordinately 
large quantity of labour has been omitted from the 
calculation.
[1] It was thought that only those family members integral 
to the farming unit should be examined. Thus, households 
with sons and daughters away from 'home' are not included 
in table 8.10.
[2] The family member employed off-farm is seen as 
agriculturally unproductive. He is therefore excluded 
from the calculation of the man/land ratio.
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for additional income outside agriculture but also that 
they had the surplus labour to be able to afford to lose a 
family member from the processes of production without 
upsetting the balance of labour supply and demand.
Conclusion
The previous discussion has shown that although it is 
still correct to talk of Baan Noon Tae and Baan Tha Song 
Korn as being farming communities# the majority of their 
cash income came from a variety of sources outside 
agriculture (table 8.1). The data reveals that when the 
two sources of off-farm income (extra- & 
intra- -changwat) are individually correlated with the 
size of landholdings there is a weak inverse relationship. 
The relationship becomes stronger if the two sources are 
combined and then correlated with land holdings# and is 
significant to 93% with respect to riceland holdings and 
98% for upland holdings. This can be seen to be a result 
of the pressures on farmers to augment their income while 
at the same time being faced with a situation in which the 
growth of population coupled with the closure of the 
frontier in farmland expansion is leading to the 
fragmentation of landholdings; and in which the 
environment precludes# to any degree# the intensification 
of cultivation. In the face of these contraints in which 
it is hard to either intensify or extensify cultivation# 
farmers - especially those with small areas of riceland or 
upland - have turned to other income earning opportunities 
both on and off-farm.
As the agricultural situation is unlikely to change 
very dramatically in the future (with relation to 
cropping), there are some good reasons why the Thai 
government should place greater emphasis on aiding and 
encouraging the development and expansion of other income 
earning opportunities in the region [1]. One project 
which attempts/ on-farm, to do just this is the Community 
Based Integrated Rural Development programme, for which 
Baan Noon Tae has been chosen as a pilot village.
[1] It is significant that the only aspect of on-farm 
income outside cropping in which the government did have a 
role - the pig cooperative - had been rejected by the 
villagers as a marketing organisation.
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Chapter Nine 
An Alternative Development Project: 1CBIRD1
Background
The Community Based Integrated Rural Development 
Project (CBIRD - "Sea bird") was initiated in July 1981 in 
60 villages covering three districts (or sub-districts) of 
the Northeastern Region of Thailand. They are: Amphoe
Muang Mahasarakham; the Kae Dam sub-district, also in 
Mahasarakham province; and Amphoe Ban Phai, Khon Kaen. 
The project was designed to run for an initial period of 
two years to June 1983, and has a total target population 
of 19,250 villagers. The operation has been financed by 
two organisations: Agro Action [1], which has provided
77% of the total budget of 2,360,239 Deutsch Marks (DM); 
and by the Population and Community Development 
Association [2] which has met the remaining 23%. The
[1] Agro Action is apparently a Canadian aid organisation 
(although it is not at all clear why the budgetting should 
be in Deutsch Marks rather than Canadian Dollars).
[2] The Population and Community Development Association 
(PDA) is a Thai Government agency which was set up in mid 
1970's. However, in terms of the structure of the Thai 
bureaucracy it is something of a misfit as it is largely 
independent of any ministry. Initially under the 
leadership of the charismatic figure of Mechai Viravaidya, 
it has concerned itself primarily with the extension of 
family planning to the rural areas of the country and in 
these efforts the Association has been remarkably 
successful. Contraceptive use has spread so that in 1980 
there were over 1.1 million new acceptors 
(NS0[2],n.d.,table 2.7,p 13), and in the province of 
Mahasarakham, whereas the average population growth rate 
between 1976 and 1980 averaged 1.6%, by 1981 it had fallen 
to only 0.8% (PDA document, 1983). The PDA has also 
concerned itself to a limited degree with some of the 
broader aspects of social and economic development and 
part of this effort is the CBIRD project.
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objectives of CBIRD are "to improve the livelihood, 
employment opportunities, living standards and quality of 
life" (from PDA document) of the 60 target villages 
through the introduction of new income generating 
activities and through improving their health and
nutritional status. The communities were not all given
the same emphasis however: 10 were designated as Model A
where the development input was to be intensive; 20 Model 
B, with a moderate input; and 30 Model C, where the input
was light. The relative differences between intensive,
moderate and light can be gauged by the initial capital 
provided per village, which amounted to 50,015 DM in the 
first case (100%), 19,946 DM in the second (40%) and 5,000 
DM in the third (10%) (Table 9.1). This money was designed 
to be distributed among all of the households in Model A 
communities, 50% of Model B and 25% of Model C. This means 
that in terms of investment per target household the three 
models, A, B & C received 500, 400 and 200 DM respectively 
(table 9.1).
Table 9.1
CBIRD; Budget Breakdown
Model A Model B Model C
Fund 500,150 398,925 150,000
Villages 10 20 30
Total HouseholdsC*] 1,000 2,000 3,000
Target Households 1,000 1,000 7 50
Investment/village 50,150 19.946 5,000
Investment/household 500 400 200
Investment/person 71 57 29
[*] The document assumes that the average number of 
households per village is 100, and that the average family 
size is seven.
All currency is Deutsch Marks.
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The range of programmes which the project was 
extending to its target villages are listed in table 9.2.
Table 9.2
CBIRD - List of Activities
A Animal Raising 
1/ Pig *
2/ Commercial Chicken * 
3/ Village Chicken *
4/ Fish *
5/ Duck *
6/ Geese *
7/ Rabbit *
B Agriculture
8/ Marketing Funds 
9/ Fertiliser 
10/ Home Gardening 
11/ Seedlings and Trees 
12/ Insecticide 
13/ Crop Storage
C Home Industry
14/ Silk Weaving *
15/ Cloth Weaving *
16/ Clothes Making *
home industry con’t
17/ Water Jar
18/ Ecoomic Stove
19/ Food Preservation
20/ Bamboo/ Wood Products
21/ Bamboo/ Wood Tools
22/ Pottery
23/ Brick Making
D Environment
24/ Improve Village Ponds 
25/ Construct New Ponds 
26/ Improve Existing 
Wells
27/ Construct New Wells 
28/ Latrines 
29/ Biogas
* = Income generating
Aims and Approach [1]
The CBIRD project was formulated in the belief that 
in Thailand, as in many other countries, development 
programmes designed to solve rural problems have failed 
because:
- they are uncoordinated and unrelated to each other
[1] All the quotes in this section are taken from assorted 
CBIRD and PDA documents.
- there is a lack of social preparation and 
communication with the residents of the communities within 
which they are to be implemented
- there is a lack of community participation
As the project summary states:
"Projects are likely to succeed when designed in 
partnership with villagers, focusing on 
community problems and desired practices. 
Villagers should be given an active role in 
implementation of activities in their own 
communities."
This is the basic development ethos which CBIRD attempts 
to reflect and to adhere to; and it is within this 
framework that the aim of improving the livelihood, 
employment oppotunities, living standards and quality of 
life is set. It is to be achieved through:
1/ "The introduction of income generating activities 
aimed at increasing skills and productive capacity in 
agriculture and livestock."
2/ "Improved health and nutritional status by the 
provision of better environmental standards and greater 
availability of nutritious foods."
There are two further points that need to be stressed
with regard to CBIRD's approach. Firstly, the project
attempts to provide farmers with income earning
opportunities while at the same time removing any of the
risks involved in undertaking such endevours [1]. For
example: all the costs of raising pigs (feed, drugs, sty
construction) are met by CBIRD and then subtracted from
[1] Whether this would always be so was not clear. The 
objective of any project, as CBIRD itself observed with 
reference to the self-help element of its activities, is 
that it should become self-perpetuating. In other words, 
that it should continue to function even when the 
initiating body's role has ended. If this is to happen 
with respect to CBIRD then the villagers must take over 
the risks which are, at the present time, not passed onto 
them.
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the gross return at the time of sale. If, by chance, 
there should be a net loss this is not passed onto the 
members but is borne by the project. Secondly, CBIRD 
carefully breaks activities down into those aspects which 
can be successfully undertaken by the inhabitants 
themselves and those which cannot. Those that the project 
management undertake are usually either of a technical 
nature, or relate to supply or marketing. For example, 
again with respect to the pig group: CBIRD vaccinates the
animals against cholera and gets its own technicians to 
construct the gently sloping concrete floor of the sty, as 
it feels both of these actions are too sophisticated to be 
successfully completed by the farmers. Likewise, the 
project supplies the pig feed and the piglets, and 
organises the marketing of the animals as it believes that 
economies of scale apply (as well as better access to 
information) allowing the organisation to obtain better 
prices. The members are left to do such things as 
construct the fence and roof of the sty and the concrete
feeding trough (a mould is provided) as these jobs are
seen as appropriate to the villagers* level of expertise, 
to the bargaining power which they can exert, and to the 
materials to which they have access.
Selection of Participants
After a community has been selected as a target
village a meeting of all its inhabitants and the personnel
of CBIRD is held. During this meeting an outline of the 
objectives and the general philosophy of the programme is
given and each project manager describes the structure and 
purpose of the activity with which he is associated. The 
villagers are then asked to sign up if they wish to be 
considered for participation in a particular 
activity(ies).
Because of the link between CBIRD and the PDA , and 
also because the project was designed with the notion that 
over-population and under-development are two closely 
related problems/ for a household to be considered for 
participation one of its members must be a family planning 
user (or if elderly: an ex-user). Those who have signed
up are then vetted by CBIRD which asks the phuu yay baan 
if each villager is a suitable candidate. If potential 
participants are wealthy/ or if the headman says that they 
are untrustworthy they may be refused membership. 
Generally however/ those who sign up are accepted.
It is worth noting the amount of responsibility given 
to the headman. It is he who is sought to provide 
information on the character of each villager and it is he 
who plays a large role in the decision as to who to accept 
and who to discard. Such responsibility must be open to 
abuse. A poor headman may bias his information/ 
recommending that those he holds a grudge against be 
rejected/ and those that he supports/ although they may be 
unsuitable/ be accepted. The formation of power cliques 
and interest groups around particular influential 
individuals (monks/ teachers/ headmen and the wealthy) is 
common in the rural areas of Thailand (see for example: 
Hanks, 1972; HankS/1975; Potter/1976/ chapter 8 / pp
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147-223), and although Mr Prichaa Phonlaa, the headman of 
Baan Noon Tae appeared to be a fair, skilled and 
industrious man there were sections of the village who 
disliked him (and whom he disliked?) for one reason or 
another.
CBIRD and Baan Noon Tae
Baan Noon Tae was selected as a Model A target 
village and given the maximum investment. The programmes 
implemented in the community and the number of households 
involved in each is shown in table 9.3. A description of 
each activity is necessary to complement the review of the 
project's overall aims and its operational approach as 
presented in the previous pages. However, as the thesis 
is primarily concerned with the problems of intensifying 
agricltural production and increasing the income of the 
households in the two villages, it will be those 
programmes associated with agriculture, with income 
generation, or with the more efficient use of resources 
that will be concentrated upon (table 9.3). In addition, 
to avoid a catalogic and repetitive description of the 
activities, which in many respects embody similar methods 
and objectives only the pig/ commercial chicken, silk, 
home gardening, fish and biogas groups will be analysed in 
detail; the remainder will be mentioned only in passing 
with further information regarding their operation being 
placed in appendices.
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a ) The Pig Group
The Baan Noon Tae pig group has a total of 29 
members. Before the first pigs were provided by CBIRD 
each member had to build a sty to a specific design 
(appendix 9.6). The total cost of each pen amounted to 
approximately 300 baht and the construction materials/ bar 
those available locally/ were provided by the project. 
This 300 baht was then deducted from the profits from the 
first sale. After construction each member was provided 
with four piglets (drawn by lots) aged between five and 
seven weeks old (therefore weaned) which were delivered to
Table 9.3
CBIRD; Activities & Membership in Baan Noon Tae
Membership
* Pig 29
* Commercial Chicken 10
+ Village chicken 15
* Duck 5
+ Geese 10
* Rabbit 10
* Fish v
+ Fertiliser 72 (?)
+ Home Gardening 47
* Silk Weaving 10
X Economic Stoves 20-30
+ Improving Village Ponds 1 pond
+ New Village Ponds 1 pond
New village Wells 1 well
Latrines 43
X Biogas 4-5
+ - Agricultural/ but principally non 
income generating 
* = Income Generating 
x = Efficient use of resources
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the farmers. When the animals were nine weeks old they 
were de-wormed (an operation performed by the villagers 
who were given a powder to administer by incorporating it 
into the feed) and at ten weeks vaccinated against cholera 
(this was performed by a CBIRD official). Following the 
delivery of the pigs each participant received four bags 
of "grower feed" which, when exhausted, was replaced by a 
regular supply of a protein supplement consisting of fish 
meal, rice bran & broken rice and added vitamins & 
minerals. To augment this feed members were expected to 
feed their animals with vegetables, grass and food waste
[1]. As already mentioned, all the initial costs of the 
feed, drugs and the actual piglets was met by CBIRD which 
subtracted them from the return that each farmer made.
The pigs were marketed when they had attained a 
weight of approximately 110 kilograms [2]. Although the 
marketing was organised by CBIRD the actual sale was 
conducted through a middleman who came to the village. He
[1] CBIRD was hoping that farmers could be encouraged to 
turn a small area of unused land (250 square metres) over 
to the cultivation of fodder crops such as hamata, lab lab 
bean, spirato, paragrass and lucaena. The plot would be 
low-input both in terms of labour and in terms of 
fertilisers and pesticides, and the production was to be 
used as additional feed for pigs, ducks, geese, chickens 
and rabbits. However, CBIRD had been unsuccessul, at 
least in the initial stages of extension, in promoting 
these fodder plots principally, it appeared, because of 
the belief among the farmers that they were time consuming 
and that the labour input would not be matched by the 
benefits that would accrue.
[2] The pigs raised are of European descent and their 
optimal marketing weight is 100 kilograms (in terms of 
their feed conversion rate). However, Thai middlemen 
prefer to buy pigs at the slightly higher weight of 110 
kilograms.
paid 23.50 baht per kilogram liveweight for the pigs if 
they weighed between 97 and 130 kilograms [1]. This is 
because the meat of pigs over 130 kilograms has a high fat 
content and is therefore inferior; while the transport 
costs of those below 97 kilograms becomes excessively high 
per unit weight of pig as all pigs, no matter what size, 
occupy a basket of similar dimensions in which they are 
transported to the wholesale market in Bangkok. After the 
animals had been sold each farmer had to disinfect and 
thoroughly clean his pen which was then checked by a CBIRD 
officer prior to the delivery of the next batch of 
piglets. If any of the pens did not pass this cleanliness 
test then none of the members would receive their 
replacement animals. This was designed to ensure that 
rules of hygiene were strictly adhered to by giving 
farmers a sense of group responsibility.
Costs and Returns
The first sale of pigs by the pig group of Baan Noon
Tae occurred on January 20 and 21 1983. The second batch
of piglets were delivered on February 1 1983. All the
costs and returns relate to this first sale.
The average weight of the animals sold by each 
farmer was 112.7 kilograms, with a high of 124.6 kilograms 
and a low of 101.25 kilograms. The middleman paid an
[1] If the animals were outside this range the middleman
deducted 1 baht for each kilogram over or under the limit. 
He also deducted money for deformities in the animals, eg; 
5 kilograms off the weight of an animal with an injured 
leg which had subsequently healed.
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average of 23.3 baht per kilogram live weight (the price 
was not consistent: it varied over the two days; one
farmer had money deducted because one of his pigs had an 
injured leg; five because an animal was underweight; and 
two because they were overweight). The cost per kilogram 
of raising the animals averaged out at 20.09 baht giving 
a net profit of 3.21 baht per kilogram live weight/ or a 
total net profit for four pigs of 1,447 baht [1]. The 
members did not, however, always get the return they were 
due. The CBIRD official in charge tended to give slightly 
more (per kilogram) to those with the lightest animals and 
slightly less to those with the heaviest [2] thereby 
narrowing the disparities between the two extremes [3].
The pigs are raised over a four month period which means 
that in a year, with the delay between the sale of one 
batch and the delivery of another, farmers can raise 
approximately two and one half sets of four pigs (ten 
animals). Assuming that the first net profit was not 
abnormal then the average income per member through the 
year would be 3,617 baht, boosting the average income of 
the farmers who were interviewed by 17%. On the face of
[1] The cost of pen construction at 300 baht per member is 
not included.
[2] Especially those he thought had been "unlucky" - eg; a 
pig belonging to one farmer had died because it had been 
fed large amounts of the high protein grass leucaena, 
which had expanded in the animal's stomach and killed it.
[3] The difference between what should have been the 
highest and lowest return was 2,300 baht (251 baht as 
against 2,551 baht).
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it, this represents a substantial and important addition 
to the average household's cash income.
Observations on the CBIRD Pig Group
The membership of the CBIRD pig group were, without 
exception, satisfied with its performance and the eight 
who were interviewed did not profer any criticisms, even 
on prompting. The reason for this state of affairs is 
simple: upto mid 1983 the project had been well organised
and run; and, more importantly, that section of the 
membership who had sold their animals had received a 
sizeable profit. However, there are several areas where 
problems could arise.
Firstly there is the problem of inconsistencies in 
upkeep: commercial large-scale concerns have far greater
control over conditions of growth than small farmers such 
as those of Baan Noon Tae. In the first sale nearly 20% 
of the animals lost some of their value because they were 
either over or under-weight. When competing against large 
pig farmers who are operating on small and highly tuned 
margins of costs and returns such inconsistencies can be 
the difference between profit and loss. Part of the 
problem of trying to monitor upkeep more closely must lie 
with the farmers, who are unfamiliar with such a "strict" 
regimen to the raising of livestock. For example; before 
the first piglets were delivered, the CBIRD official in 
charge of the pig group gave each member a record card so 
that both CBIRD, and the farmers themselves, could keep 
track of feed inputs, drugs used and calculate (in the
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end) the feed conversion rate. But not one of the members 
bothered to fill in his record card. There are, however, 
some advantages which the pig group has over larger 
enterprises and with which the project hopes to off-set 
the losses incurred through the lack of control in upkeep:
(1) The farmers labour is free causing labour costs to 
be nil.
(2) A fair proportion of the feed (grass, food scraps, 
waste vegetables etc) is likewise without cost.
The second and more serious problem is that of
profitability and the necessity of ensuring a continuous 
return that is large enough to make the activity 
worthwhile in the face of fluctuating market prices and 
stiff competition from other producers.
The middleman paid 23.50 baht per kilogram live 
weight. The total costs amounted to 20.09 baht per
kilogram live weight giving a healthy profit margin of 
14.5%. However, at the time of the sale (20/21 January 
1983) the price of pork in Bangkok was estimated by the 
CBIRD official to be some 3 baht per kilogram higher that 
the average price through the year. This was for two
reasons: one, because of the cyclical nature of pork
prices which means that January is a seasonal high; and
two, because of the impact of the fish epidemic which had
struck many provinces in the Central and Southern Regions 
and had caused an increase in the demand for pork and
hence to a rise in its price. If the average annual price 
is really somewhere around 20.50 baht at the farm gate
then the profit margin is a slim 2% giving a return of 
only 185 baht. Unless upkeep is made more efficient and
costs are cut it could be that although the farmers will 
never actually make a loss, the profits will be too small 
to maintain their interest in the programme.
b ) The Commercial Chicken Group
This group in Noon Tae had a membership of ten. The 
chicken pens, like the pig stys, were built to CBIRD 
specifications and they were designed to contain 200 adult 
birds. The project provided the chicken wire, roof 
covering, water drinkers and lighting but expected the 
group members to complete all the construction processes, 
with a CBIRD technician checking the work when it was 
finished. After completion the pens were sprayed to help 
protect against disease. The total cost of construction 
and out-fitting varied between 1,600 and 1,900 baht, and 
because this was so much greater than that of the pig stys 
the costs were gradually deducted from the profits, rather 
than from the profits of the first sale.
Each member was given 200 day-old chicks which were 
raised, to begin with, in circular woven pens and kept 
warm with lights until they were old enough to be 
transferred to the larger run. CBIRD provided ready-mixed 
commercial chicken feed which was graded according to the 
age of the birds. Again, the feed costs were met by the 
project and then subtracted from the profits. The 
chickens were marketed after approximately 45-60 days when 
they had reached a weight of between 1.6 and 1.8 
kilograms. They were collected from the farmers and sold 
by CBIRD in one of two ways:
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(1) either directly to a middleman.
(2) or CBIRD itself killed and plucked them, selling 
them in the town of Mahasarakham (it was the older birds 
which tended to get marketed in this manner).
Costs and Returns
Unfortunately, detailed costs and returns were not 
available for the commercial chicken group (this fact will 
be returned to later). All that could be determined was 
that profits were being made and these were being 
distributed back to the members, less the costs incurred 
by CBIRD.
Observations on the CBIRD Commercial Chicken Group
The members of the group, like those of the pig 
group, appeared to be satisfied with its progress. 
However, any detailed criticisms would have been unlikely 
as the project was still in its infancy. Even so, two 
problems had already emerged:
Firstly, that of marketing. The local demand for 
chicken was both limited and it fluctuated through the 
year. This made it hard to ensure a stable outlet for the 
groups production, and meant that CBIRD often had to sell 
to middlemen, something which the project had hoped to 
avoid, believing that middlemen are one of the major 
reasons why profits are small. They were attempting to 
avoid this problem by arranging to market a proportion of 
the production through a PDA division called "Fair Price" 
which supplied the refugee camps along the Kampuchean 
border with food. But, demand from the division was
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becoming less as the camps shrunk in size and it looked as 
though this outlet would only account for a small number 
of birds. So the problem remains, and will become more 
serious as the project becomes fully operational and fowl 
begin to be produced continually and in large numbers.
The second problem was one of disease. Chickens are
s
extremely supeptible to infectious diseases, especially 
when large numbers are raised in small pens [1]. This is 
accentuated because of the difficulty of controlling 
disease in a village environment where farmers are 
unfamiliar with large-scale production techniques and 
where other, village chickens, roam free. Although there 
had been no serious outbreaks in Baan Noon Tae upto mid 
1983 the officer running the commercial chicken group 
feared that it was only a matter of time before one of the 
more common diseases hit the community [2],
The Village Chicken, the Goose and the Home 
Gardening Groups
These three groups were all low input/output 
projects. The village chicken group had fifteen members 
in Baan Noon Tae, the goose group, ten, and the home
[1] In addition, the chickens provided were of foreign 
stock less resistant to disease than the native types.
[2] It has been estimated that 50-70% of village chickens 
are lost each year due to infectious diseases. The most 
common are Newcastle's disease, infectious brochitis, fowl 
cholera and fowl pox (Charan Chantalakhana,0ct 1981,p 26).
gardening group, forty-seven. CBIRD provided no feed for 
the two livestock groups and did not supervise the 
construction of pens or give a great deal of technical 
advice and assistance, leaving farmers very much to 
themselves. In this rd^pect they differed from the pig and 
commercial chicken groups where the project played a major 
and continuing role (details in appendices 9.1 & 9.2).
c ) The Home Gardening Group
The home gardening group was the simplest of all the 
CBIRD activities that will be described in this chapter.
It was an effort to give each of the 47 members access to 
a variety of seeds, fertilisers and pesticides at a rate 
lower than that available from the merchants in 
Mahasarakham [1]. They were to be used, with a modicum of 
advice, to form productive and diversified home garden 
plots. Because of the small quantity of each input 
purchased the cash outlay was correspondingly small and 
therefore the project did not defer payment but demanded
cash on delivery [2], As the name of the group suggests
it was designed to provide vegetables for home consumption
[1] An example of the sort of package CBIRD provided and 
the costs involved is as follows:
2 kilograms of the fertliser 16-16-8: 12 baht
100 grammes of “yard long bean" seeds: 12 baht
100 cm3 of the pesticide "lenate": 18 baht
Total Cost: 42 baht
The above package was estimated to be sufficient to 
cultivate one ngaan (0.25 of a rai).
[2] There was a degree of dispute over this: one of the
officers thought that it was possible for members to pay 
for their pufchases after harvest, although it seemed that 
due to the small amounts involved farmers preferred to pay 
on the spot.
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rather than for sale, and although the members could 
market the produce if they wished CBIRD was not involved 
in the process.
The number of households in the village who were 
involved with this group - 47 - indicates that it appealed 
to the farmers and met some sort of a demand. It seemed 
from their responses that what attracted them the most was 
their ability to buy small quantities of a wide variety of 
vegetable seeds at competitive prices. It is striking 
that so simple a project could elicit such a wide and 
enthusiastic response and shows that often small farmers 
can be motivated to adopt a development initiative which, 
on the face of it, appears to offer very little.
The Duck and The Rabbit Groups
These two groups represent, in terms of CBIRD 
supervision and involvement, a point somewhere between the 
pig & commercial chicken groups and the goose & village 
chicken groups (details in appendices 9.3 & 9.4). In Baan 
Noon Tae the Duck group had five members and the rabbit 
group, ten.
d ) The Fish Group
It would be more accurate to call this the "Fish Pond 
Project" as rather than being a group of villagers who 
were involved in an activity for their own benefit it was 
intended as a community project that would benefit all the 
inhabitants of Baan Noon Tae.
In the compound of the wat of Baan Noon Tae there was
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a pond of about 1,000 square metres in area. CBIRD asked 
the abbot if it could be used to establish a fish pond and 
he gave his consent. The pond was ideally suited to such 
a community activity because: firstly, it was already
perceived by the villagers to be communally owned [1]; and 
secondly it was felt that they would be unlikely to 
"poach" fish as it was located within the wat precincts.
After getting permission to use the pond it was 
pumped dry (petrol costs: 100 baht) and all the fish
removed to ensure that there were no predator fish. After
six weeks it had filled again (31 July - 17 September) and 
was ready to be stocked. CBIRD stocked it with 500 common 
carp, 500 talapia, 700 tawes, 300 rohu and 20 grass carp. 
All these fish were supplied free as fingerlings by the 
local government fishery station. The common carp,
talapia and tawes represent the standard poly-culture. 
They feed at different depths and therefore do not 
compete. The rohu and grass carp were added because of 
the high price they fetch at market (grass carp were 
selling for 40-50 baht per kilogram). From this account 
it can be seen that the cost of establishing the pond was 
minimal.
CBIRD then organised a group of villagers to manage 
the pond. They were expected to feed the fish with grass 
cuttings, buffalo dung and a feed which was provided (and
[1] This is important. In Baan Tha Song Korn a dispute 
over the ownership of a fish pond was creating friction 
within the village and had, to some extent, polarised the 
community into two sets of supporters. There was no 
possibility of such an occurrance with this pond CBIRD had 
chosen.
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consisted of broken rice and rice bran) every day, either 
early in the morning or at night. When the fish had grown 
to a marketable size it was intended that "fish catching 
days" would be announced. The villagers who had been 
placed in charge of the pond would catch a number and they 
would then be sold within the community at rates 
considerably below market price. The profits from the 
sale would be divided as follows: 10% to the maintenence
group as a fee for their work; 60% to a village fund; and 
30% to CBIRD to recoup some of their costs. After the 
pond had attained an equilibrium it was hoped it would 
yield 200 kilograms of fish a year and that this would 
fetch about 3,000 baht.
As with most plans, the results did not quite match 
up to their expectations. The two major problems concerned 
the nature of the pond itself (its physical properties) 
and the difficulty of stimulating "community spirit".
The pond was only 1,000 metre square in size and 
although long-established [1] lost water at a fairly high 
rate through leakage. This meant that it had reached a 
critical level by the beginning of December so that fish 
could only be raised over a six-month period, from July to 
December. As a result, the highest weight of any fish 
caught during the final catching session was a talapia of 
200 grammes, and in total only 25 kilograms of fish were 
sold at 15 baht per kilogram (the market rate was 24 baht) 
yielding a return of 375 baht. In fact, 600 of the
[1] Normally, "old" ponds have built up an impermeable 
layer of silt on their bottoms preventing leakage.
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smallest fish were so small that they were taken by CBIRD 
and introduced into one of the projects own ponds to 
mature.
The disappointing yield from the pond not only 
related to its size however; there was every indication 
that it was also maintained poorly. The officer in charge 
of the Baan Noon Tae pond noted that a great many 
community fish pond projects in the Northeast had failed, 
or had been less successful than hoped, because of a lack 
of cooperation. In this case it was also true. The group 
of villagers assigned to look after it had acted in an 
undisciplined and unsystematic manner: they had failed to
clear the pond of debris regularly and had fed the fish 
inconsistently. Indicative of this lackadaisical approach 
is that on the day of the visit by CBIRD for the final 
catching session only two of the members turned up, and 
the CBIRD manager as well as a fortuitous visiting 
research student had to be called upon to help. Why it 
should be so hard to stimulate cooperation when a project 
is designed to be materially beneficial to those involved 
(the management group receive 10% of the profits from the 
sale) is difficult to say although the following two 
factors probably played a part: firstly; farming in the
Northeastern region is very much an individual household 
enterprise and commentators have commonly noted the 
independent nature of the Isan farmer when compared with 
those of the North and the Central Plain and the 
difficulty of eliciting any sort of community response. 
Secondly, the phuu yay baan of Baan Noon Tae had failed to
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give his support to the project (for some unidentifiable 
reason)/ and CBIRD believed that because of the headman's
I
influence within the commnuity this was hampering the full 
involvement of the villagers.
In an attempt to overcome the problem of pond 
management it was proposed that the respo^ibiltiy of 
feeding the fish and clearing out the pond be assigned to 
the monks. They could either do it themselves or organise 
a roster of children to carry out the work. The advantage 
of turning to the abbot for help is that he is possibly 
the most influential man in the village and by gaining his 
support the problem of the headman's cool reception to the 
project could be overcome. In addition/ the abbot was 
very development conscious and there was every likelihood 
that not only would he be willing to run the village pond 
project/ but would also be very good at it.
As well as this pond in the wat compound/ there was 
another in the grounds of the primary school located at 
the entrance to Baan Noon Tae (this is the "new pond" in 
table 9.3). The pond had been excavated in mid 1982 by a 
government programme known as kor sor chor[l]. However/ 
it was too shallow and needed to be re-dug before it could 
be stocked with fish. This was going to be done later in 
1983 by kor sor chor whereupon CBIRD were to take it over 
and enlist the help of the pupils and teachers of the 
school to maintain it.
[1] "Programme to develop off-season jobs in the 
countryside" under the control of the Ministry of the 
Interior.
e ) The Silk Group
The silk group of Baan Noon Tae had a membership of 
ten women. Silk weaving is a traditional activity of the 
Northeast and all the members already possessed the looms, 
and the skills to produce cloth [1]. CBIRD therefore saw 
its principal role as one of supply and of marketing in 
which the project would supply the silk thread (cost: 280 
baht per piece of cloth) and then sell the production.
The women were given two types of silk thread: Thai
multivoltine for the weft and Japanese bivoltine for the 
warp [2]. The women were then expected to complete all 
the subsequent operations providing CBIRD with the 
finished product to market [3].
[1] In fact, CBIRD did have a supply of second hand looms. 
They were taken from the refugee camps near the Kampuchean 
border which were gradually contracting in size through 
1982 and 1983. Unfortunately the project did not realise/ 
until they were delivered to their headquarters near 
Mahasarakham/ that the looms were of a different designffom 
those used by the communities within which they were 
working.
[2] The thread from multivoltine silk worms is more 
irregular and comes in shorter lengths than that from 
bivoltine worms. As the latter are much more difficult to
e
raise/ being less hardy and more supeptible to disease/ 
Thai farmers tend to keep the multivoltine variety despite 
the fact that the yield is considerably less? although the 
government is trying to change this state of affairs by 
promoting bivoltine worms (Business Review/Feb 1973,p 25). 
However, for the warp it is obviously useful to have long 
lengths of thread and for this reason Japanese bivoltine 
silk is imported and used (Pradit Charsombut,Aug 1980,p 
5 ).
It is worth noting that the characteristic rough 
texture of Thai silk, which many people prefer to the 
smooth silks of China and Japan, is a product of using 
multivoltine thread and makes Thai silk distinctive.
[3] CBIRD decides which patterns/designs the members are 
to provide.
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When the villagers had completed a piece of cloth 
CBIRD paid them between 80 and 100 baht. This is really a 
fee for their labour rather than a "profit" as the project 
had not yet begun to sell the cloth and it did not depend 
on the market price (as it did with the livestock groups). 
The variation in price was an attempt to bring some sort 
of quality control to the enterprise for at the present 
time little emphasis is placed on good workmanship as the 
production of flawless cloth is not perceived by the 
villagers to be very important.
The members of the group work as a unit/ not as 
individuals. They produce approximately 27 pieces of 
cloth per month giving them a monthly return of between 
2/160 and 2,700 baht. In terms of the annual income per 
member this represents a return of between 2,590 and 3,240 
baht. At the time of the research CBIRD had not actually 
begun to market the cloth although they were ende^ouring 
to find a European outlet. Two problems which they were 
facing with regard to finding a stable market demand 
related to the quality and to the pattern of the cloth. 
As mentioned, the villagers were not imbued with a sense 
of quality control and the production was therefore 
heterogeneous. If the cloth is to be sold to a 
sophisticated market such as Europe or the US this is 
unacceptable and it is essential that CBIRD emphasise to 
the membership (as they are trying to do) the importance 
of maintaining standards. Similarly, if cloth is to be 
sold to the West the patterns must be adapted to suit the 
demands of the market. The contact through whom CBIRD was
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trying to secure an outlet stressed that the market for 
"traditional" or "ethnic" patterned cloth was virtually 
saturated and that the designs should be altered to aim 
for the fashion fabrics market. Once again, this will 
necessitate a greater degree of supervision by CBIRD and
discipline on the part of the members.
f ) The Fertiliser Group
The fertiliser group, which contained 72 members, 
provided the chemical fertiliser 16-16-8. As explained in 
the rice chapter, for amounts upto 150 kilograms payment 
was deferred until after the harvest and for quantities 
over this weight half of the cost had to be paid
immediately and the remainder after the harvest. The only
factor that separated the CBIRD group from the host of 
other fertiliser programmes, and it was an important one 
as far as the farmers were concerned, was that CBIRD 
delivered the input to the village.
The Economic Stove and the Biogas Groups
Finally, there are two groups which although not 
income generating or agricultural, were intended to use 
resources more efficiently thereby saving farmers' money. 
The economic stove group is described in appendix 9.5, 
while the biogas group was organised as follows.
g ) The Biogas Group
By April 1983, CBIRD had built four to five Chinese 
"fixed-dome" digesters for the production of biogas in
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Baan Noon Tae [1]. Although termed the "biogas group" the 
four (or five) households involved did not form any sort 
of union and the term is inappropriate. The digesters 
were built individually and there was no cooperation 
between each of the members. The digesters provide two 
benefits to those who use them; firstly/ they produce a 
"clean, smokeless and instant source of heat" (from a 
CBIRD document) and secondly, the effluent can be used as 
an organic fertiliser.
Before CBIRD arrived the villagers who had decided to 
have a biogas digester built had to dig a hole on a 
suitable site (ie; close to the cooking area) and build up 
the surrounding land so that the construction could be 
sunk into the ground. From this point on the members did 
very little as the construction process was too 
technically rigorous to be made into a community self-help 
activity (hence the inability to form a group - as with 
the making of the economic stoves and toilets). The cost 
of each digester varied between 3,600 and 3,800 baht. 
This money is lent to the villagers in the form of an 
interest-free loan to be repaid monthly at the rate of 
between 100 and 150 baht per month. As biogas was 
perceived to be a luxury (and as a status symbol) it was 
only the richer families who felt that they could afford 
to divert so much income to a non-essential enterprise
[1] The Chinese fixed dome digester was favoured to the 
Indian type because, "it gives a higher gas pressure which 
is suited to cooking sticky rice" (CBIRD document). In 
addition, the project felt that the experience from all 
over Thailand was that the Chinese type was being 
increasingly used in preference to the Indian.
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(3,600 baht is 17% of the average total income of the 
agricultural households interviewed). It is very much an 
amenity for the wealthy (or was seen to be).
The question that should be asked though, is whether 
the benefits from biogas really do match the outlays. 
CBIRD calculated that the value in NPK terms of the 
effluent produced by the digester in one year is 740 baht.
However, it is hard to illustrate this value to farmers
who already often have supplies of free organic fertiliser 
(dung) but do not use it because of what they see to be 
overly large transport and labour costs. The point here 
is that farmers cannot envisage the bedsits derived from 
organic fertilisation balancing with the costs and the 
trouble involved in applying it, and although they may be 
wrong in this respect it is still necessary to clearly and 
forcibly demonstrate it to them.
The value of the gas is harder to calculate. CBIRD 
thought that "under practical village conditions" gas 
production should be 2.0 cubic metres per day. The daily 
per capita gas requirement is approximately 0.25 cubic 
metres. On this basis the process should produce enough 
energy to supply a household of eight members (average 
household size: 6.2 members). Evaluation of the value of 
this output is difficult because farmers often collect 
wood rather than buy it and the cost is therefore an 
invisible labour cost. As children (and women) are those 
who usually perform the chore it is arguable that farmers
perceive the cost as a minimal one - or not as a cost at
all but as part of the normal running of their lives.
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For these very understandable reasons the biogas 
project had not "taken-off1 in Noon Tae and the majority 
of householders had not been convinced of its value. 
There is one further point. The biogas project/ to a 
limited degree, is a visual display of wealth indicating 
that the family has almost 4,000 baht to spend on a 
non-essential luxury. It could be said that government 
agencies should not be involved in enhancing disparities 
in communities where income differentials are increasing, 
and that the project should be made a financially
attractive proposition to the middle income earners too.
What the prece ding description of CBIRD and some of
its activities has not done is to investigate if the
participants in the various projects are distinctive in 
any way, and if they attract farmers in a particular 
position or predicament. This gap will be filled by using 
the material gathered from the households who were 
questioned in Baan Noon Tae.
Table 9.4 shows the number of households interviewed 
in Noon Tae who were members of the various CBIRD groups. 
As the sample for the entire village was small (37 
questionnaires) the number of families who were involved 
in each of the projects was even smaller. For this 
reason, except for the pig and the fertiliser groups which 
had memberships of 8 and 9 respectively, it is only really 
by combining member families that any statistically 
significant analyses can be carried out.
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Table 9.4
CBIRD Membership in the Questionnaire Sample
Member 
Households [*]
Pig Group
Goose Group
Rabbit Group
Commercial Chicken Group
Village Chicken Group
Fish Pond Group
Fertiliser Group
Silk Group
Duck Group
Vegetable Group
Biogas Group
8
4
2
3
3
1
9
1
1
6
2
[*] These 40 member households represented 23 families. 
In other words, the average household involved with a 
CBIRD activity belonged to 1.7 groups. The implications 
of this will be returned to later.
The households that belonged to the pig group had one 
distinguishing characteristic: their annual income of
14,520 baht was just over one half (53%) of the sample 
average (table 9.5). This is understandable - those 
families with a smaller income would have had a greater 
incentive to become involved in such income earning 
oppotunities as CBIRD was extending. However, the members 
of the fertiliser group show the reverse characteristic - 
their annual income is larger than the sample mean by 50%. 
How can this be explained? It could be argued that 
because the fertiliser group requires a cash outlay on the 
part of the farmer it is only the richer ones who are 
attracted to it. This is not particularly convincing 
though (look to chapter 5) and the bottom line must be 
that such hypotheses have little basis due to the small
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Table 9.5
Characteristics of CBIRD Member Households
Groups* Household Total Riceland Total
Size Land(rai ) (rai) Income
Pig 6.1 22.0 16.6 14,520
Fertiliser 7.2 25.0 19.2 40,000
Pig + C.Chicken 6.4 19.5 14.7 21,640
All Livestock Groups 6.6 22.1 17.4 22,060
Livestock Groups 2 7.6 27.4 22.8 23,100
Non Income Generating 5.8 21.0 16.5 38,380
All Income Generating 6.5 20.7 15.8 21,440
Village Sample Average 6.3 21.3 15.6 27,260
* "All Livestock Groups" includes: the pig/ commercial 
chicken/ village chicken/ goose/ rabbit/ and duck groups.
* "Livestock Groups 2" includes: the goose/ village 
chicken/ duck and rabbit groups.
* "Non Income Generating" groups includes: the village 
chicken/ goose, biogas and home gardening groups.
* "All Income Generating" groups includes: the pig/ duck, 
rabbit, commercial chicken, and silk groups.
numbers involved. For, table 9.5 shows that whatever 
meaningful combinations of groups one analyses [1] nothing 
particularly unusual about the membership, in comparison 
to the average for the village, is apparent. In the light 
of this one must presume that it is likely that CBIRD had 
been successful in attracting a broad section of the 
population into its various activities, even though a more 
detailed survey might well reveal that particular groups 
had conditions of membership which attracted particular 
villagers.
[1] The combination of groups in table 9.5 is designed to 
place similar activities together so that the sample size 
can be increased. For example:- all livestock groups; all 
the groups concerned with' income generation; all those 
groups whose primary objective is something other than the 
generation of income.
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Integrated Development and the CBIRD Project
At the present time/ although the term "integrated 
development" is widely used/ there is no consensus of 
opinion as to its exact meaning. This is because the term 
has been used to mean very many different things (Chang/ 
June 1977/pp 4-13;Whang, Oct 1977/pp 2-10;Charan
Chantalakhana/1980/pp 184-195;The Nation/Jan 24 1983/p 5):
- It can imply the integration of government agencies 
with the rural populace resulting in better communications 
between the government and the governed.
- Or it can mean the integration of government agencies 
at different levels in the hierarchy; tambon/ amphoe, 
province/ region/ nation (this is often thought of as 
"vertical integration").
- Or it can be the integration of various government 
policies at a particular site so that possible conflicts 
between the sectoral policies can be eradicated (this is 
often termed "horizontal integration").
- Or it can be the integration of technical and 
socio-economic disciplines so that a complete system of 
rural development is achieved [1].
- Or/ finally/ it can mean the integration of crops and 
livestock into an "integrated farming system".
CBIRD, to varying degrees/ embraced all five of these 
meanings. It was a single agency/ virtually independent 
of any government ministry/ which provided every element 
of the development programmes which it was initiating. It
[1] It is possible to identify an almost infinite number 
of systems within the farm and, ultimately the world, 
system. These are nested within each other, but even so 
they can be selected according to the problem that is 
being investigated (this is not to say that each is 
discrete; there is always a certain amount of linkage 
between one and others, and in this sense one is being 
necessarily devisive - something that systems analysis, at 
least in theory, tries to avoid). A "complete system of 
rural development" is seen to involve the combination of 
social, economic and agronomic development policies into a 
full and integrated programme.
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attempted to cooperate closely with the target households 
identifying the areas in which it could be of most 
benefit. And/ it was trying to diversify the economic 
base of the communities and provide farmers with 
alternative sources of income which were compatible (ie - 
integrated) with the demands imposed on them by their 
principal activities of rice and upland crop cultivation.
The previous account has shown that even though the 
project had barely begun to produce any concrete results 
there were numerous problems associated with its 
activities which cannot be viewed as mere "teething
troubles". However/ the overall success of the project
(as far as this can be ascertained) has not been discussed 
and nor has the nature of "integration" within CBIRD.
CBIRD is publicly presented as a "self-financing" 
endeavour/ the idea being that 10% of all the profits made 
by the various groups are deducted and then used to 
maintain the project. In private though/ many of the 
officials concede that it will be virtually impossible to 
ever run it unsubsidised as the profits will never be 
sufficient to cover the costs involved. This is all the 
more pertinent when one remembers that a major hurdle
which seemed to be appearing with respect to the income 
generating activities was the problem of finding stable 
markets and ensuring a consistent and well-disciplined 
supply of production (ie; keeping quality up and price 
down). Without these elements profits will continue to be 
small and variable (this applies to the commercial
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chicken/ pig/ rabbit and the silk groups). The problem 
can be "blamed" to a large degree on the competitiveness 
of the bigger producers and the middlemen who have cut 
their margins to a minimum. There was also a considerable 
element of poor management on the part of the farmers 
(look back)/ often due to a lack of discipline; and/ in 
addition there was some evidence that the actual man^ement 
was sometimes at fault:
With respect to the duck/ village chicken/ goose and 
rabbit projects documentation of profit/ costs and returns 
was very poor. If CBIRD really is endeyouring to become 
self-financing (and profit margins are small) then it is 
obviously very important to keep accurate records. This 
was supposed to be one of the functions of the group 
managers and is an indication that, at least in this 
respect/ they were either ill-trained, incompetent or 
negligent.
In spite of this criticism and the more specific 
problems associated with the individual projects, CBIRD 
was becoming 'successful' and was doing so in a number of 
different ways. Firstly, the inhabitants of Baan Noon 
Tae, without exception, felt that CBIRD was providing a 
useful contribution to their lives and they were more than 
satisfied with its efforts. As any project is designed to 
aid a target population, if that population views the 
project in a good light then clearly it has fulfilled a 
major objective. This CBIRD had done.
Secondly, the project had convinced the farmers that 
it s activities were worthwhile and consequently had
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enticed the majority of the village into participation 
[1]. A crucial element in this attraction was the no-risk 
clause which caused many of those who were unwilling to 
over-extend financially when it came to rice and upland 
crop cultivation/ to sign up for the income earning 
activities. The question, however, is whether the groups 
can continue to have the support of the farmers. This is 
clearly something that concerns the levels of return which 
the farmers can obtain from the activities, for if profits 
drop too low the participants may loose interest feeling 
that the income derived from participation does not 
balance with the labour-time involved.
CBIRD has also been successful with its social 
projects which have not been discussed in any detail. By 
the middle of 1983 CBIRD had built (or initiated the 
construction of) 20-30 economic stoves, 43 latrines, 4-5 
biogas generators, 48 water tanks (in cooperation with the 
PDA) and had dug one well and improved two ponds. These 
amenities, although they provide no income, raise the 
conditions in which the households live: they were often
labour-saving; they reduced the possibility of disease! 
and they narrowed the gap in living standards between the 
rural households of the Northeast and the rest of the 
country. A gap which, in the 1960's and 70's was blamed, 
in part, for the growth of CPT membership in the region.
[1] Many Thai government development initiatives have 
received a poor response from farmers who often view the 
efforts as inappropriate to their situation or not as 
particularly advatageous. This can be seen in Baan Noon 
Tae and Tha Song Korn in the farmers response to the 
cooperative, the klum kasetakorn and the pig cooperative.
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As CBIRD is o stensibly a "community based integrated 
rural development project"/ how has it fulfilled this 
categorisation - ie: in what sense is it integrated? 
Referring back to the five definitions noted earlier/ it 
was stated that CBIRD embodied varying elements of all 
five.
It is structured so that there are no conflicts 
between government departments or between departments at 
different levels in the Thai administrative hierarchy 
(horizonatal and vertical integration). The project has 
been modestly successful in achieving these two modes of 
integration/ and has done so by attempting to fulfill 
every element of it s programme without ever having to 
turn to other agencies for help. This is extremely 
important as one of the greatest criticisms of development 
efforts in Thailand has been the problem of designing and 
running successful projects within a bureaucracy which 
often has duplication of roles/ conflicts of interest/ a 
hierarchical and inefficient top-down command structure 
and an excessively centralised decision-making process 
(see/ for analysis of the Thai bureaucracy: Riggs/1966:
Mosel/1957; IBRD/ Sept 1978/pp 123-130; Rubin/ 1974) [1].
[1] NERAD (Northeast Rainfed Agricultural Development 
Project)/ a project based at Tha Phra was/ like CBIRD, 
attempting to present farmers with an integrated 
development package. The project head complained that one 
of the main obstacles to implementing any such package lay 
with the nature of the Thai bureaucracy which in its 
segmented form and top-heavy command structure made it 
almost impossible to link the various aspects of a 
programme together. CBIRD had been fortunate in being 
able to bypass this problem due to its special position as 
a department of the PDA.
448
However, there is one serious criticism of the manner in 
which CBIRD has attained this unusual independence from 
the main body of the administration, and that is that it 
has not been achieved through integration but through 
detachment, and as a result there is still a duplication 
of roles and the ensueing waste of financial and human 
resources. For example; the supply of fertilisers and 
pesticides is now pursued by the Office of Agricultural 
Extension, the klum kasetakorn, the cooperative as well as 
CBIRD. This cannot be a sensible state of affairs and 
should somehow be rationalised. In addition, as a result 
of the divorce of CBIRD from any other department and the 
absence of communication between agencies [1] there is an 
accidental duplication of roles resulting from the fact 
that no one knows what the other is doing. This was
evident in the Baan Noon Tae fish pond project. It was an 
entire year into the programme before the CBIRD management 
realised that kor sor chor had already excavated a village 
fish pond in Baan Noon Tae and that their aims and methods 
over-lapped. On realising this they decided that they
[1] Thai government ministries have often been thought of 
as independent "kingdoms" (see: Riggs,1966,pp 329-335) run 
by a minister who feels he is in competition with the 
other ministries as he tries to gain as large a proportion 
of the total budget as posssible. This means that there 
is little rationalisation of resources as the needs of the 
other sections of government are rarely taken into account 
when a request for funding is entered by a ministry. The 
1978 World Bank report notes: "Annual resource
allocations, both among government agencies and 
regionally, tend to be more heavily influenced by historic 
patterns of expenditure and by institutional or informal 
pressures than by national development priorities as 
articulated in the development plan [the national 5-year 
plan] or by an objective assessment of relative needs" 
(IBRD,Sept 1978,pp 29-30).
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should cooperate with each other; but, even so it 
demonstrates a certain amount of poor planning which was 
the result of the tendency for projects to be run (CBIRD 
included) in isolation from each other.
CBIRD is also trying to design projects, "in 
partnership with villagers, focusing on community problems 
and desired practices" (CBIRD document). This can be seen 
as the integration of the administrative machinery with 
the rural populace. The emphasis on no-risk income 
generating activities, which the farmers found 
particularly attractive, and the identification of those 
parts of programmes which members could, and could not, 
undertake themselves are two ways in which CBIRD had tried 
to communicate with the villagers and involve them in the 
design and implementation of their development 
initiatives. However, there still remained the impression 
that the membership of the various groups were reacting to 
CBIRD1s suggestions rather than vice versa and there was 
certainly a great deal of room for further communication. 
It would have been appropriate at the time the groups were 
gradually becoming operative for a detailed survey to have 
been done to record the members* criticisms, and to have 
then reassessed the design of some of the activities [1].
[1] CBIRD had carried out a detailed survey ("social 
preperation") prior to the establishment of the groups. 
However, there was no sign that a follow-up survey was 
being planned before the final assessment of the project's 
success. As farmers find it difficult to offer 
suggestions and constructive criticisms of activities 
which have not been implemented, the original survey can 
do no more than provide a preliminary framework on which 
to base the project design.
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Whether CBIRD had achieved the integration of 
technical and socio-economic disciplines to create a 
complete system of rural development depends on the level 
at which one views the evidence. As a project at the 
village level it had succeeded in realising this form of 
integration. But at the household level it had not. Each 
group was very much a separate entity with few links to 
the other groups and little cross-fertilisation. Farmers 
would join the pig or the biogas group and it was left at 
that. This is clear from the pattern of membership: if
the members of the fertiliser group are removed from the 
analysis [1] it leaves only seven of the eighteen 
households interviewed who belonged to a CBIRD group 
actually being involved in more that one activity. This 
is a very low level of 'integration' (39%) if that is what 
the project was attempting to achieve.
To some extent this criticism is unfair as the
creation of a "complete system of rural development" is
something that is more attractive and more useful on paper 
than in practice. For farmers in the Northeast have
already evolved a complete system of existence and
development projects should aim to fill the gaps rather 
than create another, superfluous, cycle. This is where 
the identification of useful projects through cooperation 
and communication becomes so important. Thus the pig
[1] The fertiliser group is not integrative in nature. It 
is merely another means, together with the cooperative, 
the BAAC and the kaset amphoe, by which farmers could 
purchase chemical fertilisers without actually having to 
go to commercial middlemen in Mahasarakham.
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group and the vegetable group were both extremely 
appropriate/ as individual projects/ to the conditions in 
which the inhabitants of Baan Noon Tae lived, and there 
was no particular need for their integration with other 
projects (although the two groups could have benefitted 
from some coordination - vegetable residue could be fed to 
the pigs and the pig manure returned to the vegetable 
plot).
In a similar way to the above the creation of an 
"integrated farming sys tern" through integrated 
development is largely unneccessary for one already 
exists. The need is to identify, which CBIRD had tried to 
do, the areas in which the system could be improved or 
added on to.
The final two questions that should be posed 
regarding CBIRD are: firstly; did it provide a
significant contribution to the welfare of those farmers 
who were involved with it? And secondly; is it feasible 
for the project to be expanded to become a regional or 
national initiative?
The first question can only be tentatively answered 
because "results", as such, had only just begun to appear. 
But, the project had certainly had a beneficial effect 
with respect to many of the non-income generating 
activities (latrines, water tanks, economic stoves); had 
contributed substantially through some of the agricultural 
(non-income generating) groups (vegetable, fertiliser); 
had increased the income of those members of the pig 
group; and, hopefully, was going to increase the income of
the membership of, particularly, the commercial chicken 
group.
Whether the project could be extended in its present 
form is unlikely. Certainly the most successful aspects 
could be implemented over a larger area although, 
arguably, it would then stop being an integrated 
development project. It is hard to see it being 
implemented in its entirety how ever - the amount of 
investment both in financial terms and in terms of skilled 
man-power is such that Thailand would not have the
resources available to devote to such an intensive 
programme. It is possible that it could be simplified and 
cut back so that the Department of Agricultural Extension 
and/or the Community Development Department would be able 
to take it over, but in so doing it would probably become 
too structured and inflexible and the programme would be 
little different from all the other government development 
projects which are imposed on the farmers from above and 
in which his advice is seldom sought. It is also,
incidentally, extremely unlikely that the various 
departments associated with each type of project [1] would 
actually cooperate together.
But then it should be accepted that nothing can 
actually be organised in the best possible way and it is
necessary to structure a programme so that it not only
[1] Water tanks, toilets: Community Development
Department.
Fertilisers, pesticides and seeds: Department of
Agricultural Extension.
Fishponds: kor sor chor and Department of Fisheries.
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fits into the farm system, but also comes within the 
limits which the nature of the Thai bureacracy imposes 
(either this or change the nature of the bureaucracy). In 
the light of this constraint, which exists in all 
countries, the best course of action would probably be to 
take the most encouraging parts of the CBIRD project and 
to adapt and then incorporate them into the exis ting 
extension system.
How does CBIRD compare with the government programmes 
described in chapters five, six and seven? Undoubtably, 
the input per villager, both in terms of cash and man 
hours, is far greater that the Royal Thai Government could 
achieve nationally. Largely as a result of this, the 
design of each activity and the manner in which it is 
implemented is far more specific, taking into account 
differences between villages and even between households 
in individual villages. In addition, many of the methods 
(or the stated methods) are laudable [1]; for example, the 
emphasis on community problems and desired practices; on 
self-help; on integrated development; and on community 
participation [2],
[1] It has been shown that the stated objectives have not 
always been fulfilled when it has come to actual 
implementation.
[2] In general, CBIRD was far more sensitive to farmers1 
opinions, needs and desires. They had, in this sense, 
gone some way to breaking down the hierarchical framework 
in which many of Thailand's development projects have to 
ope rate.
However, far more important is the central aim of the 
project, for it seems to fill a gap which the national 
development efforts have failed to identify (or, perhaps, 
have failed to take action on): namely, that there is a
need to provide both additions and alternatives to the 
cultivation of rice and upland crops.

456
Chapter Ten 
Synthesis
This study aimed to investigate three inter-related 
questions with reference to two villages in the province 
of Mahasarakham, Northeastern Thailand; firstly/ the 
nature of agricultural production in a marginal rain-fed 
environment; secondly/ the relevance of government 
policies and pr^rammes in the light of the constraints 
which faced the farmers/ taking special note of the 
influence of the environment; and lastly, to look at the 
alternative strategies (if any) to which farmers resorted 
in their efforts to raise their standards of living. 
Having covered these three questions in some detail in the 
body of the thesis, it is now necessary to try and draw 
the disparate threads together to form a coherent and 
condensed summary of the argument.
In the past it has been usual for studies of the 
'Green Revolution' to emphasise the socio-economic 
restrictions limiting uptake. As Parmer noted with 
reference to South Asian rice production, these are not 
the only factors involved, and "some of [the] problems are 
fundamentally related to insufficiently resolved 
difficulties in adapting the new technology to certain 
important local and seasonal environments" (Farmer,1979,p 
304). This comment would most certainly not be lost on 
the farmers of Baan Noon Tae and Baan Tha Song Korn.
The inhabitants of the two villages were operating in
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an environment where the absence of irrigation
facilities, the variability of rainfall - both seasonally 
and from year to year, the nature of the topography and 
the character of the soils all combined to create a 
situation in which the farmers could never guarantee the 
water conditions that would exist in their padis. Given 
that "the variability in the amount and distribution of 
rainfall is the most important factor limiting yields of 
rainfed rice..." (De Datta,1981,p 18) it is not surprising 
that this fact should have been the central reason why the 
technology of the Green Revolution had failed to make an 
impact in the communities. However, to understand this 
more fully it is necessary to examine in greater detail 
the strategy of rice cultivation in Noon Tae and Tha Song 
Korn.
The fields of the villages were far from homogenous 
in terms of the conditions of water supply that they could 
expect to receive. Mirroring this, the farmers had 
identified and named a variety of padiland types which, 
although they referred to their topographical position 
{'upper1, 'middle1 and 'lower' padis), in effect also 
referred to their supeptibility to flood and to drought. 
Ethno-ecologically therefore, it can be seen that the 
farmers perceived their riceland in a far from standard 
manner, and indeed, beneath these three major divisions 
was a wealth of further subdivision and classification 
relating to such factors as salinity and permeability. In 
the light of this complexity it is not surprising that the 
strategy of rice cultivation had evolved in a similarly
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intricate way (indeed the strategy reflects the 
terminology and vice versa).
The rice varieties that the farmers chose to grow 
exhibited two contrasting/ although not contradictory, 
features: firstly, a great specificity of response to
varying edaphic and topographic conditions; and secondly, 
an emphasis on flexibility of response to the variable 
climate. The fact that the *RD' rice types were neither 
specific enough to fulfil the first role or generalised 
enough to fill the second meant that, on their rainfed 
riceland, only one farmer planted an RD rice amounting to 
0.5% of the total riceland. The willingness however, of 
farmers to turn to the HYV’s when presented with the 
appropriate environmental conditions was illustrated by 
those farmers who had access to irrigated riceland and the 
associated close control of water - for they all planted 
these new varieties.
Fertiliser use  ^although widespread, was of low 
intensity and this can also be seen to be a reaction, in 
part, to the environmental difficulties of cultivation. 
For, when only 63% of the planted riceland is actually 
harvested and when 45% of plots yield less that 120 
kilograms of paddy per rai (national average in 1980/81 = 
271 kg/rai) the economics of high input cultivation 
becomes dubious. Indeed, the possibility of a high 
input/high output strategy becomes impossible and the 
farmers would instead be operating a system where high 
input/variable output production dominated. This is 
coupled with the fact that because rice in Thailand is
459
taxed through the rice premium and this ’cost' is 
inevitably passed down to the farmer, the input/output 
price ratios become even less attractive to those who are 
intending to use chemical fertilisers.
Combined with the risks of investing in the face of 
uncertainty, the inhabitants also had a limited 
dispos able income with which to buy agricultural inputs. 
This imposed severe constraints on the larger farmers who 
would have to make that much larger an outlay to meet a 
particular fertiliser doseage (given that income varied 
little with farm size). But even so, it appeared that 
when farmers had the available income to apply large 
quantities of chemical fertilisers they were discouraged 
from doing so by the prevelance of low and variable 
yields. In this sense, the limitations set upon the 
inhabitants by income were often disguised.
- If the recommendations of the District Agricultural 
Extension Office with respect to rice cultivation are 
placed against the farmers’ actions there is a clear 
disparity between the two, and it is arguable that the 
policies are out of touch with the position in which the 
farmer finds himself. This is because the extension 
service has ignored the special problems of growing 
wet-rice in a marginal rain-fed environment where 
recommendations suitable for irrigated riceland do not 
apply and consequently, are irrelevant. What is strange 
is that the Training and Visit System of Extension which 
Thailand has adopted recognises the need to both remain in
touch with farmersJneeds and abilities; and also with the
problems that they face. Taking fertiliser use as an
appropriate example Benor & Harrison note that;
"All too often extension agents recommend set 
quantities of N, P and K per hectare as 
'optimal’. Apart from the fact that the doses 
are often not optimal (they are generally high) 
and are seldom adjusted to the specific 
fertility level of an individual farmer’s field 
or the input-output price ratios prevailing at 
the time, few farmers can actually afford such 
an amount of fertiliser, at least intially" 
(Benor & Harrison,May 1977,p 16).
They then go on to say that a research programme should
be:
"...well-tuned to the needs of the farmers. 
Without a network of field trials upon which new 
recommendationsfcan be based and without 
continuous feedback to research from the fields, 
the extension service will soon have nothing to 
offer the farmers, and the research institutions 
will lose touch with the real problems farmers 
face" (Benor & Harrison,May 1977,p 16).
Clearly, somewhere in the progression from project
design to implementation the bases on which the extension
process is supposed to have been built have been
distorted. A possible reason (or part of a reason) is the
continuing dislocation of research and extension in
Thailand. They occupy different departments in the
Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives and there is
little cross fertilisation. Indeed, the US Presidential
Mission to Thailand (US Presidential Mission, April 1982)
considered one of the measures needed to improve
agricultural production to be the "better coordination [of
extension] with various research sources" (p 21). It also
emphasised that it was necessary to organise research
programmes so that they correspond with the "existing
461
important principal problems of each area, aiming first at 
production increases in areas outside the irrigation 
limits..." (p 20). Without such coordination between 
research and extension it is impossible to create the
'unified extension service' that Benor and Harrison
envisage (Benor and Harrison,May 1977,p 10) or to 
formulate relevant policies and to design relevent
programmes. It is arguable that in this sense there has 
been only a modicum of progress since 1969 when the World 
Bank observed that the "...Northeast is merely the most 
striking example of the widespread predisposition to 
disregard the potential for rainfed agriculture - at least 
at the official level" (quoted in Donner,1979,p 629).
The strategy that farmers followed in their choice of 
which upland crop to grow and the manner in which to grow
it was distinctly different from that for rice. This
befits the difference between what is ostensibly a 
subsistence crop - rice, and what is a cash crop.
Farmers invariably chose to grow cassava and over 90% 
of the cultivated upland was planted to it. The
over-riding reason why this was so was because man 
sampalang yielded a higher net return than any other crop
of which they had knowledge. In the light of this fact,
the attempts by the Thai government to encourage farmers 
to diversify into other crops is particularly unrealistic 
and, once again, goes against the advice contained in the
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Training and Visit System of Extension/ for it states:
"Nothing should be recommended that does not 
increase farmers' incomes" (Benor & Harrison/May 
1977/p 14).
Although profitability/ at present/ is the most 
easily identifiable reason why farmers chose to grow 
cassava there were numerous underlying factors which/ it 
could be argued/ would prevent a switch to an alternative 
even if it were demonstrated to be more profitable. For/ 
unlike rice which must be cultivated within severe 
constraints imposed by the environment/ upland cash crops 
must be grown within constraints imposed by various 
socio-economic factors and by the demands of rice (the 
former often being linked to the latter). It was the 
ability of cassava to be moulded around these limitations/ 
without seriously affecting its yield, which enamoured it 
to the farmers of the two communities.
Cassava can be planted and harvested at any time of 
the year and can be cultivated for between 8 and 14 
months, or even longer [1] (Somsak Chaewsamoot,1974,pp 5 & 
8), the yield increasing with maturity. The timing of 
cultivation is therefore remarkably flexible and the way 
in which a farmer choses to grow it can be determined by 
the labour demands of rice or, increasingly, of 
non-agricultural income-earning opportunities.
In addition, the successful cultivation of the crop 
does not depend on a rigorous system of cultivation
[1] Although as the tuber gets older it becomes more 
fibrous and lignified so that the starch content, and thus 
the quality, is reduced (Onwueme,1978,pp 132-133).
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practices as it does with rice and kenaf & jute. Weeding 
and labour intensive forms of land preparation (eg: raised 
beds) need not be indulged in; man sampalang will respond 
to such inputs but their absence will not negatively 
affect yields. Similarly, it can be grown on extremely 
impoverished soils and still give an acceptable yield, but 
will respond positively to the increased use of chemical 
and organic fertilisers. In other words, there are no 
necessities for the farmer, only possibilities.
This was supported by the data from the questionnaire 
which showed that for those cultivating cassava there was 
no relationship between the quantity of labour hired 
(either in total or per rai) and the size of the 
productive household, while there was a positive 
co rrelation between labour hired (both in total and per 
rai) and income. In contrast, among those farmers who 
planted kenaf or jute, just the reverse was true: there
was a negative correlation between productive household 
size and labour use, and no relationship between income 
and labour use. Thus, it could be said, for the farmers 
growing bor it was necessary for them to use a certain 
minimum labour input whatever their income; while for 
cassava it was merely a possibility, and only those 
farmers with the available cash chose to make the outlay.
The reluctance of farmers to intensify upland 
cropping through, for example, the application of 
fertilisers, was a response, primarily, to two factors: 
first, the limited available income of most of the 
farmers; and second, the risks associated with making cash
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outlays on crops whose price/ and therefore return/ 
fluctuates through the year (note the difference to rice 
cultivation). It is also important to see upland cropping 
as inextricably tied into rice cultivation: farmers often
felt that they could not afford to intensify paddy 
cultivation/ and this was their subsistence crop. The 
fact that they were even less willing to intensify the 
cultivation of man and bor - cash crops - is not/ when 
viewed in this context/ at all surprising.
The households of Baan Noon Tae and Baan Tha Song 
Korn were therefore faced with a dilemma: population
growth had meant that there was no free land onto which 
cultivation could be extended and indeed/ holdings were 
becoming smaller as the pressures of population exerted 
themselves on a finite resource. But/ the alternative to 
extensification namely/ intensification/ had only limited 
possibilities/ for the marginal rainfed environment meant 
that the risks of intensifying rice cultivation were 
great. Similarly/ on their upland - although for 
different reasons - the farmers were reluctant to invest 
even moderate sums of money in raising yields. In 
response to this dilemma/ the households of the two 
communities were increasingly looking beyond the 
cultivation of crops to secondary agricultural endevours 
and to non-agricultural income-earning opportunities/ both 
on- and off-farm.
In many respects one can see this development as 
being linked to/ and also as a continuation of, the ideas
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put forward by Boserup and Brookfield (Boserup/1965; 
Brookfield/May 1972). Boserup envisaged agricultural 
innovation (intensification) occurring with pressure of 
population on the land; Brookfield extended this beyond 
the limits of subsistence requirements to incorporate the 
needs and wants of people being drawn into the money 
economy (he also goes into considerable detail regarding 
the importance of culturally determined needs [1]) by 
highlighting the 'innovation' of cash cropping. In Noon 
Tae and Tha Song Korn the farmers/ under similar pressures 
to those described by both authors had/ due to the 
problems of intensifying agricultural production [2] (the 
avenue of escape for Boserup) in a marginal environment/ 
turned to the innovation of alternative/ non-agricultural/ 
means of income generation. They had/ in these terms/ 
resorted to an exogenous response.
Among the agricultural households of Noon Tae and Tha 
Song Korn who were interviewed/ 64% of their total cash 
income was derived from non-agricultural sources. These 
included both on-farm (principally crafts) and off-farm 
(migrant labouring/seasonal work, remittances) activities
[1] "It proves useful to consider the level of subsistence 
as a 'surface' which has close orthomorphism with the 
surface of population density. Above this lies a 
superimposed surface of social needs, expressed in terms 
of the land requirement of social production. The 
combined surface represents the total pressure of needs on 
resources, and it may deviate very substantially from the 
population map" (Brookfield,May 1972,p 39).
[2] Brookfield does note that the environment exerts a 
limiting effect on the possibilities of intensification 
(unlike Boserup).
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with family members travelling to work within the 
province, to other parts of Thailand and even to other 
countries of the world. In addition, a further 10% came 
from what has been termed 'secondary agricultural sources' 
- primarily, the raising and sale of livestock. It is the 
former group of activities - those which are 
non-agricultural, which are of most interest as they are 
evidence of a diversification of economic activity into 
areas outside those traditionally associated with farming 
communities.
In chapter eight it was indicated that those families 
with non-agricultural sources of income owned smaller land 
holdings than the average and were often unable to produce 
enough paddy to meet their subsistence requirements. In 
the face of this predicament they had been stimulated to 
search for opportunities to raise cash outside farming so 
that they could meet the deficit by purchasing additional 
rice with the income that they earned. Interestingly,
when upland and riceland holdings were taken separately 
there was a stronger negative relationship between thii 
rai and off-farm income than there was with respect to
thii naa. It is possible to hypothesise that (it is far
from conclusive) this is further evidence of the pressures 
on farmers to have a greater cash income. It is no longer 
enough just to be able to guarantee a certain subsistence 
level of agricultural production; households need money to 
buy goods and to pay for services which they are being
goaded into wanting and, into expecting. So, it is those 
farmers who do not have the resources to earn cash within
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the agricultural system (ie; through the cultivation of 
upland cash crops) who are under the greatest incentive to 
look beyond the limits of farming, and beyond the 
boundaries of their villages.
Therefore, although Noon Tae and Tha Song Korn can be 
seen as communities whose populations have a livelihood 
still firmly entrenched within rice cultivation and, to a 
lesser extent,. upland cropping (and importantly, they 
continued to perceive themselves to be farmers), there had 
been enough of a diversification of economic activity for 
a caveat to be inserted into this categorisation: namely
that they had integrated a further system of production 
into their lives and thus had evolved somewhat. In many 
ways off-farm income earning activities are more closely 
related, in terms of the pressures that induced farmers to 
indulge in them, to upland cropping than upland cropping 
is to rice, for they are both products of the accelerating 
need & desire among the inhabitants for cash.
Where does the future lie then; and how should 
policies be formulated so that they are of most benefit to 
the villages [1] ? Clearly, the kaset amphoe should adapt 
its recommendations so that they take account of the 
environmental constraints of the area. In addition, it is 
crucial that a viable and equally profitable and flexible
[1] It is accepted that the policies which are most suited 
to the position in which the inhabitants of the two study 
communities find themselves may not be those policies 
which are best for the region as a whole, or indeed for 
the province.
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alternative to cassava is found. Farmers will simply 
ignore any advice that takes no account of the advantages 
that man sampalang presently holds over any other known 
upland crop. Further, there is a need to accept the 
limitations of agricultural production in the area, and to 
devise policies that will give farmers and their children 
opportunities to earn a living outside agriculture. And 
if the Thai government is really concerned with stemming 
the migration of rural peoples to the Bangkok metropolis 
then these new industries must be located in the 
Northeastern region.
However, whether or not the Khorat plateau could 
really become, even with considerable public investment, a 
vibrant area of industrial enterprise is difficult to 
ascertain. Some analysts maintain that "the Northeast is 
at last on the threshold of rapid change" (McCulloch,July 
1982,p 46) and Khon Kaen, only 70 kilometres from 
Mahasarakham, has been designated a growth pole. But even 
so, the Northeastern region, with a third of the nation's 
population currently (1981) produces only 4.8% of it's 
manufacturing output (NSO[6],n.d.) having declined from a 
figure of 8.3% in 1969. With Bangkok being one of the 
most vivid examples of primacy anywhere in the world (it 
is 45x larger than the next biggest city in Thailand, 
Chiang Mai) and with 'decentralisation' arguably being no 
more than a paper policy as far as the Northeast is 
concerned [1], it is difficult not to be pessimistic
[1] The Fifth Five Year Plan (1982-86) does have an 
'Industrial Restructuring and Decentralisation Programme'
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about the long-term prospects for the region's 
development.
This belief is/ to some extent, reinforced when the 
developments that are occurring, or that have occurred, 
are looked at in greater detail.
The few agro-industries to locate in the Northeast 
have encountered numerous problems. For example; the 
sugar industry has suffered from a combination of 
excessive production and declining world prices and the 
five mills located in the region have all had to struggle 
to maintain profitability. Inevitably, some of the 
consequences of this have filtered down to those farmers 
cultivating cane and in November 1982 the buying price of 
the crop was reduced from US$23.00 per ton to US$16.08 per 
ton (Business in Thailand,Nov 1982,p 56). The need to 
reduce production so that the ISO (International Sugar 
Organisation) export quota of 1.173 million tons for 1983 
(reduced from 1.38 million tons in 1982; reflecting the
global over-capacity of the industry) could be met caused 
the government to exert considerable pressure on farmers 
to diversify into other cash crops, and also to require 
that mills did not expand (there is a fine set by the 
government on over-production which, in 1982, stood at 
US$150 per ton). Indeed, it is more likely that mills 
will close (see: Business in Thailand, Nov 1982,pp 56-61). 
In contrast, the reverse problem has afflicted the 
pineapple canning factory which was recently constructed 
in Khon Kaen: it has been unable to meet its production
targets due to a shortage of fruit.
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Another/ and perhaps the most significant/
agro-industry to locate in the area is the Phoenix Pulp 
and Paper plant/ also in Khon Kaen/ which was set-up with 
considerable encouragement from the Royal Thai government. 
It was intended not only as a 'pioneer' industry through 
which others might be enticed into the region but also as 
a means to boost the upland cropping prospects of the area 
by creating a demand for kenaf which the plant uses to
produce pulp. But/ just as the plant came on stream a 
slump in world pulp prices meant that it was unable to 
compete on an international basis. Even after a 20%
tar i\ff was imposed on imported pulp in November 1982/ 
paper producers in Bangkok could still buy pulp on the 
international market at a price which/ together with the 
20% surcharge/ was still some 16% less than the cheapest
rate at which Phoenix could produce the commodity [1]
(Business in Thailand/ Jan 1983/p 15). The failure of 
pioneer industries to be enticed to locate in the region 
means that it is difficult to envisage Khon Kaen, or any 
other town of the plateau, actually becoming a 
manufacturing centre, surely the essence of economic 
vitality. Thus, at the present time the provincial centres 
of the region are only service centres for government and
commerce alike to which goods are sent to be distributed
to the population of the area. There is very little 
production generated in the towns themselves.
[1] With the surcharge, in January 1983 imported pulp
cost 7,540 baht per ton. The cheapest rate at which 
Phoenix Pulp and Paper could produce was at 9,000 baht per 
ton (Business in Thailand, Jan 1983, p 15).
However, perhaps the area of greatest optimism 
involves the development of primary industries: the
Northeast has considerable potash and rock salt resources 
of which the potash is especially viable. Preliminary 
exploration has indicated that there may be six trillion 
tons of potash in the region much of it of 'carnallite1 
grade (82% purity), and much of this located in the 
central portion of the plateau around Khon Kaen and 
Mahasarakham. It is hoped that eventually these reserves 
might be exploited leading to a 20,000 million baht 
investment in their development (The Nation, 7 Feb, 
1983,pp 9-10). Even more dramatically, in November 1981, 
Esso Petroleum and Production Khorat Inc. (having been 
awarded the concession in March 1979) found natural gas in 
Khon Kaen province (McCullogh, July 1982,p 51). Further 
discoveries have been made since that date with, in 
February 1982, Esso Standard announcing that the Nam Phong 
I field in Khon Kaen had reserves to produce gas on a 
commercial scale at 30 million cubic feet per day for ten 
years (Economic Times,Vol l,No. 30,23 Feb 1983). But 
despite the excitement that has resulted from these 
discoveries, it is difficult to envisage the benefits from 
the development of such primary resources either adding 
considerably to employment in the region or leading to 
much additional investment. The plans at present are to 
build a gas separation plant not in the Northeast but on 
the Eastern Seaboard. Similarly, the potash will be taken 
to an integrated fertiliser complex located at Rayong, 
also on the Eastern Seaboard, while the rock salt will
probably be used to feed a soda ash plant (part of a 
series of projects planned to be built in, and organised 
by, the ASEAN group of countries) again located on the 
Eastern Seaboard. Further, not only will the Northeast 
receive little benefit from the development of these 
natural resources but, in addition, it is likely that much 
of their 'value' will be reinvested in Bangkok, causing a 
net loss of worth from the Isan region.
The only area of significant economic growth in the 
foreseeable future is likely to be within the service 
sector, and even this would not spread to affect the lives 
of a significant proportion of the rural population. As 
the Governor of Khon Kaen, Chamnarn Pochana, observed in 
mid 1982: "Industry will help Khon Kaen's economy, but
this may only increase the per capita income by 20% or 
30%. Most of the money will be made in the service 
industries like hotels, restaurants and entertainment 
centres. The farmers will remain unaffected" (McCullogh, 
July 1982,p 52). If this is the outlook for the changwat 
of Khon Kaen, the industrially most vibrant province of 
the plateau, then the prospects for Mahasarakham and other 
changwats are indeed bleak.
Undoubtedly this is rather too negative an appraisal 
of the plateau's prospects but, to the villagers of Noon 
Tae and Tha Song Korn, it would probably seem to be an 
accurate assessment. For farmers, with limited education 
and access to information, can only perceive what is 
around them. And, in these terms, they are faced with a 
decreasing man/land ratio, severe environmental
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constraints restricting intensification and only a few 
opportunities to earn income outside agriculture within 
the immediate vicinity of their villages. In these 
circumstances/ the younger inhabitants are increasingly 
inclined to leave for the Central Plains and Bangkok 
where/ rumour has it, there are opportunities to be had.
However/ these opportunities are not open to all the 
inhabitants of the Northeast and there is a need to 
develop the region for both social and poltical reasons. 
For/ as the younger/ more skilled/ educated and motivated 
men and women leave/ so the area will lose valuable human 
resources (together with the physical resources noted 
earlier) and become even less able to ’develop'. In 
circumstances such as this/ the latent dissatisfaction of 
the populace with central government together with their 
feeling of seperateness and Isan identity might be 
reignited/ causing problems similar to those of the 1970's 
when the Communist Party of Thailand controlled 
significant areas of the region. The so-called 'domino 
effect1 in which Thailand is clearly seen as the next 
domino to fall is not entirely lost upon the
administration. In addition/ the development of the 
Northeast should not be viewed in isolation but as part of
the national plan. It is the government's stated desire
to stem the flows of migrants into the Bangkok metropolis 
(which are largely due to the combination of perceived 
opportunities in the capital and the absence of
opportunities in the regions) and to decentralise economic 
activity. This obviously entails that the Khorat plateau
474
should be developed.
These factors/ and others/ necessitate that money be 
invested in the region. Undoubtably/ the core of the 
Plateau's economy will remain the agricultural sector and 
the search for further production increases and 
alternative crops must remain the first priority. But, it 
is also clear/ at least from the evidence from Baan Noon 
Tae and Baan Tha Song Korn, that alternative income 
earning opportunities should also be developed in an 
attempt to broaden the economy and provide sources of 
income outside agriculture.
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Appendix 1.1
Translation of Questionnaire
Page 1
Village:
Da te:
House number:
Name of household head:
Marital status:
Age:
Place of birth:
Have you moved to the village:
- where from:
When did you arrive:
Occupation:
Education level:
Can you read and write:
Have you participated in any 
training courses. If so, what:
Page 2
Details of Household members
Relationship to head of household:
Sex:
Age:
Marital status:
Education level:
Occupation:
Do they participate in agricultural production:
Do the members have any other work (eg:labouring) ouside 
agriculture. If yes: is it within the village or outside
it (another changwat). Income/year:
Details of those members of the household who leave the 
village to work in the agricultural off-season
Relationship to head of household:
Occupation they go to:
Where do they work:
Do they remit money, how much per year:
What do they return to the village to do (eg: 
transplanting, harvesting etc):
Page 3
In your household is there anyone who belongs to a 
cooperative group
Name of group:
Name of person who is the member:
477
(Appendix 1.1: questionnaire/ con't)
When did they become a member:
When was the group established:
Which government department runs this group:
What are the internal problems of the Agricultural 
Coope rative:
Why aren't you a member of the Agricultural Cooperative:
Page 4a
Land Identification: by plot (thii lum/ thii raap, thii
dorn/ thii rai)
Area (rai/ ngaan):
Tenurial Status:
How did you acquire the land:
If rented/ what is the rate (cash or in kind):
Rented from whom:
Last year did you plant a crop (variety):
If unplanted/ why:
Is the land harvested:
Was any of the crop damaged/ how/why:
On this piece of land have you ever planted any other crop 
or variety of crop:
Page 4b
How long ago did you change:
Is the change permanent or temporary:
For what reason did you change:
Has production declined or not:
If it has declined did you apply fertilisers:
Have you used any other cropping techniques:
Why did production decline:
After you did the above did production stay the same/ go 
up or decline:
If production is declining and you have take no action; 
why not:
Page 5
Do you rent any land out
Area:
Ra te:
To whom:
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Type of land: 
For what crop:
Do you lend any land out
Area:
To whom:
Type of land:
For what crop:
Would you like to rent more land
For what crop:
At what rate:
Do you think that land is fragmenting:
Do you thing that tenancy is increasing:
Page 6
Last Years Production
Type of crop (variety):
Planted area:
Harvested area:
Produc tion:
Amount sold:
In what form:
When:
To whom:
Where:
For how much:
Will you sell any more:
Are you waiting for higher prices or is there another 
reason:
Do you think middlemen are exploitative:
Why haven*t you sold to the government:
This year will you have to buy rice:
Do you have enough storage space for rice:
Or do you have to sell immediately after harvesting 
because you have nowhere to store it:
Do you have storage facilities for other crops:
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Page 7 
Fertiliser Use 
Crop variety:
Type of fertilisers (chemical/organic): 
Amount used:
Cost:
Bought from whom:
When is it applied:
When did you start using it:
Who introduced you to its use:
Would you like to use more- why don't you: 
If you don't use fertilisers/ why not:
Pesticide & Herbicide Use 
Crop variety:
Type of pesticide/herbicide:
Amount used:
Cost:
Bought from whom:
When is it applied:
When did you start using it:
Who introduced you to its use:
Would you like to use more- why don't you:
If you don't use pesticides or herbicides- why not:
Page 8
Details of Seeds Used (by crop)
Type:
Cost:
Bought from whom:
When did you start using them: 
Who introduced you:
Would you like to use more:
If yes, why don't you:
Page 9
Labour Use (hired and long khaek)
What crop:
Cost:
When is it hired and for what:
For how long:
Relationship of labourers to household:
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Is it hard to find labour to hire:
If you could hire more labour would you:
Page 10 
Do you Own
Tractor:
Rotavator:
Cassava chipper:
Lorry:
Pickup:
Rice mill:
Other machinery:
Do you rent any of the above out:
If yes, specify- for what and how long, rate and to whom:
Do you Own
Water tank (size): 
Biogas generator: 
Latrine:
T.V.:
Radio:
Motorcycle:
Do you hire or borrow any of the following
Tractor/cultivator:
Cassava chipper:
Rice mill:
Lorry:
Other machinery:
If yes, specify- when and for what, for how long, at what 
rate, from whom.
Is it hard to hire:
If you were able to, would you hire more:
481
(Appendix 1.1: questionnaire con't) 
Page 11
Do You Own Any of the Following
Buffalo ) number, do you sell them,
Cows ) return
Pigs )
Ducks )
Fish ) number, do you sell them, return,
Rabbits ) is a government dept involved
Chickens )
Other animal )
Page 12 
Credit Use
From whom (money lenders/ cooperative, BAAC, other 
government organisation, commercial bank, neighbour, 
relative, other)
Amount:
I n te re s t:
For how long:
For what purpose:
Would you like to borrow more money:
For what purpose:
Why can't you get it:
If you have never used credit, why not:
Page 13
Non Agricultural Sources of Income
Silk:
Mats: amount/year, when sold,
Market gardening: government involvement,
Fishing: when did you begin
Other:
Other sources of Income- off farm:
Estimation of annual income:
What large outlays do you make during the year (eg: 
medical costs, schooling):
How much do you contribute to the temple fund each year:
Do you use family planning:
Appendices (con't)
Appendix 2.1
Cash Income per Family per Year, by Region (1931)
Region Income (baht)
Central 
North 
Sou th 
Northeast
279*
176
125
83
* Because the depression affected the Central Plain 
earlier and more vigorously than the rest of the country, 
the author believed that the normal cash income of the 
region would have been even higher at approximately 330 
baht per year.
Appendix 2.2
The Agricultural Land Reform Office
The Agricultural Land Reform Office was created after 
the promulgation of the Agricultural Land Reform Act to 
supervise the efforts at land consolidation (Amara 
Pongsapich,June 1982,p 48; Ramsay,Nov 1982,p 1075).
The programme had the following objectives:
1/ To survey the present land holding status.
2/ To buy land from those farmers who own more than that 
stipulated by law (it varies, but in the Northeast it is 
approximately 25 rai per family) or do not make use of it.
3/ To distribute this and other public land to landless 
farmers and to those with very small plots.
4/ To provide additional marketing and production 
services.
(adapted from: Amara Pongsapich,June 1982,p 51; US
Presidential Mission,April 1982,p 46)
Source: Zimmerman,1931,p 48.
Appendix 5.1
The Training and Visit System of Extension
Benor and Harrison (Benor & Harrison,May 1977,pp 
10-18) outline the major elements of the system as 
follows:
1/ Unified Extension Service. The most essential 
management principle is to establish a single line of 
communications from the governmental agency responsible 
for agriculture to the field-level extension worker. 
Unless the agency has the full administrative control of 
the extension service it is not possible to carry out 
extension systematically and effectively.
2/ Extension Exclusively. Extension personnel should 
devo.te all their working time to agricultural extension 
and not to administrative duties. Supply of inputs, 
recording of statistics etc; should not be their problem.
3/ Systematic Training and Visits. Work, duties and 
responsibilities should be closely supervised. A specific 
schedule of visits to farmers fields must be rigidly 
followed. Frequent training sessions for extension 
officers are integral to the system.
4/ Concentration of Efforts. Concentration of efforts 
should be practised to obtain clear, visible impact and 
continued progress. Agents should only be involved in 
agricultural extension, most effort should be put into a 
few major crops and for those crops only the few practices 
which will bring the best economic results should be 
concentrated upon. In addition, the officers should 
concentrate on selected contact farmers, so as to make an 
impact.
5/ Immediate Success. In the initial stages of 
extension it is very important to achieve an immediate 
impact so as to give farmers confidence in the service. 
From here the process should be self-reinforcing.
6/ Imitable Contact Farmers. It is impossible for 
extension workers to maintain regular contact with all 
farmers, so 'contact farmers' are focused upon who will 
assist in speading the new practices. Contact farmers 
must be willing to adopt practices and to allow fellow 
farmers to visit their fields. They should be 'average' 
farmers so that the community as a whole feels it can 
follow them.
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7/ Best Use of Available Resources. Farmers should be 
taught to imaTte the best use o? available resources. 
Nothing should be recommended .which will not increase 
income. Intially better cultivation practices should be 
concentrated upon (land preperation/ weeding etc;) rather 
than on increased use of purchased inputs.
8/ Recommendations According to Ability. Extension 
agents should advise farmers to apply new practices on 
only small portions of their land. This reduces risk and 
means adoption is more likely. When success is evident 
then farmers will spead use by themselves. The officer 
should concentrate on advice relevent to the majority/ but 
should be prepared to adapt for special cases.
When farmers have improved their practices then 
attention should be turnedto inputs; not greater use but 
better use. 'Optimum' levels of application should be 
avoided; it is better to recommend a minimum level.
9/ Research. Extension should be linked to a vigorous 
research programme/ well-tuned to the needs of the farmers. 
Continued feedback from the farmers is essential.
10/ Supply of Inputs and Credit. The links between 
extension and supply of inputs and credit need to be 
carefully defined and developed. There should be close 
links between the extension office and the credit 
organisation and sources of inputs.
11/ Continuous Improvement. The system requires a 
built-in process for continuous adaptation to changing 
condi tions.
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Appendix 5.2
Explanation of Figures 5.3a - 5.3e and 6.1a - 6,1c
These figures are an attempt to show the 
inter-relationships, as they appeared in Baan Noon Tae and 
Baan Tha Song Korn, between the various factors impinging 
on the farmers in their decision making with respect to 
rice and upland crop cultivation. They specifically refer 
to four aspects of cultivation, namely; labour use, choice 
of rice variety or upland crop type, fertiliser 
application and pesticide use; and each has been isolated 
to make the relationships visually clearer. They can, 
however, be built up to reveal the entire system to which 
they refer. The arrows are weighted (a thicker arrow 
denoting a stronger influence) and they point towards the 
element that is being affected.
Appendix 8.1
Replies to the question; 'Would you like to rent any 
(more) land; if so, for what crop*
Crops Households
Cassava 39 )
Cassava or kenaf/jute 4 ) thii rai
Kenaf/jute 2 )
Rice 9
Rice/upland crops 2
Vegetables 2
No desire to rent land 20
Not applicable 3
Total 81
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Appendix 9.1
The Village Chicken Group
The members of the village chicken group were given 
five semi-mature birds; a cock and four hens. The project 
was designed to improve the quality of village chickens 
and to provide farmers with eggs and meat. The birds 
could be marketed either by the members themselves/ or 
they could be given to CBIRD who sold them in the same 
manner as they did the production from the commercial 
chicken group. In exchange for the fowl each member was 
expected to supply CBIRD with chicks so that they could be 
raised in a controlled environment until they were mature 
enough to be distributed to other members. Profits; as 
such, are hard to gauge as its main aim was not to be 
income generating but to provide the villagers with better 
quality village chickens, thereby raising protein intake 
and improving the diet of the inhabitants.
One of the problems which the project had already 
encountered was to find enough good quality village 
chickens to form a breeding base. The use of imported 
breeds (as in the commercial chicken group) was not seen 
as a possibility because of the environment in which 
village chickens must survive; foreign stock are more 
suceptible to predators and diseases; they require higher 
levels of nutrition and management,. and are poor 
scavengers (Charan Chantalakhana,Oct 1981,p 5). For these 
reasons CBIRD decided to try and breed a superior village 
chicken by selecting the best examples from the 60 
communities involved in the project. Unfortunately, in
Q
this effort CBIRD had been unsuccessful as they were unable 
to find enough chickens of the quality they desired to 
form a breeding group.
Appendix 9.2
The Goose Group 
The ten members of the goose group were given five 
geese; a male and four females. Like the village chickens 
they were provided in a semi-mature state so that they had 
passed the most vulnerable phase of their life cycle. In 
return the members were expected to give CBIRD fourteen 
goslings so that they could/ in turn/ be distributed to 
other members. At maturity the geese were killed and 
either eaten by the householders themselves or sold either 
through CBIRD or privately by the members. The project 
was not specifically designed to be income generating but 
was intended/ once again/ to improve the nutritional 
standards of the community while at the same time 
providing a possible means by which farmers could 
diversify their incomes. At the time of the research this 
particular project was only in its first cycle and no 
problems were apparent or criticisms made.
Appendix 9.3
The Duck Group 
Each member of the duck group was provided with 20 
adolescent ducks. Although no rigid specifications were 
given regarding the construction of their pens/ CBIRD did 
provide rough guidelines and some supervision (But the
villagers were expected to procure all the building 
materials themselves). Feed consisting of broken rice and 
bran was supplied by the project, the costs being deducted 
from any profits.
The fowl were raised for both eggs and meat, the idea 
being that they would only be sold after they had passed 
their most productive egg-laying phase. The members could 
market the eggs and the birds either privately or through 
CBIRD. As it turned out most of the members chose to use 
CBIRD as their marketing outlet. In contrast to the 
commercial chicken group where there were problems of 
finding a stable demand for its production, the project 
had no trouble disposing of the ducks. This was due to 
the far smaller numbers involved - 20 per member versus 
200 per member - which meant that the market had not 
become saturated.
Appendix 9.4
The Rabbit Group 
The ten members of this group were provided with two 
rabbits; a buck and a doe. The cages were built of 
chicken wire to a CBIRD design, the wire being supplied by 
the project and deducted from any profits. It was felt to 
be very important that the cages were constructed to the 
specifications as rabbits are suf:eptible to disease and 
the design was an attempt to minimise the chances of 
disease breaking out. .
The offspring of the breeding pair were weaned at 
eight weeks, and marketed by CBIRD at the age of two
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months. The members were given approximately 40 baht per 
animal (less costs) and it was anticipated that each pair 
would produce 35-40 young per year. This would give each 
member household an average income of between 1,400 and 
1,600 baht per year (feed costs were minimal). However, 
there are two observations that should be made:
Firstly, the breeding rate of the rabbits owned by 
the ten members in Baan Noon Tae had been below that 
estimated by the project. Upto March 1983 (ie- after over 
six months of the project being in progress), only 17 
two-month old rabbits had been sold giving an average 
annual production of only 3.4 rabbits per member and 
providing an income of 136 baht. This is clearly far 
below expectations, even allowing for the fact that the 
project had only recently got under way.
The second observation regards cage construction. The 
cages were designed with a mesh floor so that droppings 
could fall through and the chance of disease minimised. 
But, the project had failed to guide the farmers and to 
check the cages closely enough resulting in many being 
built with solid floors. Although this fact had not 
caused any problems after six months of operation it is an 
indictment of the management of the project.
Appendix 9.5
The Economic Stove Group 
These are stoves designed to burn wood and rice husks 
more efficiently than an open fire. This is an important 
consideration for in the Northeastern Region there is a
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severe shortage of fire wood and the few areas of forest 
that remain intact are (or are meant to be) protected.
The households who had signed up for involvement in 
the project numbered between twenty and thirty. As all 
the stoves were made at the same time the members were 
asked to decide among themselves which day they wished 
CBIRD to come to the village to organise the construction 
programme. On that day all the members gathered together 
to build the stoves under the guidance of a technician. 
It is important to stress that this was a cooperative
process and the households were not constructing their 
"own" stoves. It was only afterwards that each member was 
allotted one - by lottery. The stoves are made fron brick 
and the costs involved are minimal - 25-30 baht - which is 
paid immediately by the villagers. In fact, this minimal
sum is an over-costing designed to impress upon the
farmers that CBIRD is not a charity.
One problem with the stoves is that they have a
tendency to crack. To solve this they are now being built 
of rice husks and clay, rather than brick, as the former 
is more fire resistant. Another problem, this time of a 
cultural nature, is that there is a belief in the area 
that pregnant women will abort if they inhale the smoke 
from burning rice husks. Although this was only accepted 
by the more elderly portion of the population it still 
remains a constraint limiting the spread of the use of the 
stoves.
At the time the fieldwork was coming to an end CBIRD 
had begun to switch to a new design of stove - the Khmer
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economic stove. This only burns rice husks and is even 
more efficient than the original design.
Appendix 9.6
Sty Design
The stys had dimensions of 3.2 x 2.1 metres/ giving 
each pig almost 1.7 square metres of space. The floor was 
gently sloping so that waste could be washed away and was 
constructed of concrete. In addition/ the stys had wooden 
fences/ concrete food and water troughs and a rush roof.
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